for his own amusement to etch, draw, or make a water-color, he would still be within the very strict meaning of the language, because he would have made a copy or copies of the print which is protected." "Now I think in the case of Gambart v. Ball, 8 L. T. (N. S.) 426, the object of those acts was very well pointed out as being of a two-fold character, first, the protection of the reputation of the engraver, and secondly, his protection against any invasion of his commercial property in the print. It seems to me idle to suggest that in this case the reputation of the engraver from whose hands that beautiful engraving proceeded, will suffer from the publication of a print intended for the purpose of ladies or others working in Berlin wool from it. It would be idle to suggest that his reputation could suffer, and as far as regards his commercial property, it appears to me to be almost as absurd to imagine that the commercial position of the owner of a print should suffer by the sale or the publication of this article. Now I would not desire to say that a representation of this print in chromo-lithography, executed with that high skill and art with which works of art are now executed in chromo-litho this thing and the print before me. But then is that a copy of the engraver's work? It appears to me, without going into any etymological definition of the word 'copy,' but using the word copy in the ordinary sense of mankind as applied to the subject-❘ matter before us, and as used in the act of Parliament, the question is, Is it a piratical imitation of the engraver's meritorious work in the print? Now I am of opinion, as a matter of fact, that the thing is not a copy, nor a piratical imitation, nor a colorable imitation, nor a piratical reproduction of Brooks' engraving. The work itself was intended to be and appears at sight to be something intended for a totally different purpose, and not to be intended as a print in the ordinary sense of the word. It was intended to be printed, and was printed as a pattern for Berlin woolwork, not put forward in any way fraudulently, or as a sham, but really in truth intended to be, and it looks upon the face of it to be that which it is said to be, a pattern for working in Berlin wool. Now I am of opinion that whatever may be the similarities between the one and the other, the attempt to produce, not the print but something which has some distant resemblance to the print, not by any thing in the nature of engrav-graphy, of a character fitted to be framed and hung ing work, or the introduction of the engraving lines, but by what I might call a mosaic of colored parallelograms, is not in any sense of the word a piratical imitation of the print. Nobody would ever take it to be the print; nobody would ever buy it instead of the print; nobody would ever suppose that it was, to use the language of the first act, a base copy of the print in any sense of the word. It is a work of a different class of art intended for a different purpose, and in my opinion, no more calculated to injure, in the sense in which protection is given by these acts of Parliament, the print quá print, or the reputation of the engraver, or the commercial value of the property in the hands of the proprietor, than if the same group exactly were reproduced from the same engraving by waxwork at Madame Tussaud's, or in a plaster of Paris cast, or if taking or using this print as the design or model something were devised from it as like it as could be for the purpose of being printed upon a surface of porcelain or upon any other material of that kind. I cannot conceive myself that such a reproduction of the subject 'as that, whether it is worked in tapestry or Berlin wool, printed upon china, or reproduced in earthenware, or any other material of that kind, is within the meaning of the act of Parliament. What the act of Parliament intended to prevent was the piratical appropriation of the work of the engraver for the profit of some person minded to steal that work." Baggallay, L. J., said: "I also am of opinion that this Berlin wool pattern is not a copy of a print protected by the statutes." "Now it is perfectly clear that those words must receive some limitation, because if a lady was to paint upon a china plate and procure it to be baked, a copy of that print, or a copy reduced in size, or even of a portion of that or any other print, the acts could not be said to extend to such a case as that. So, in like manner, if a person were simply up in a person's room or used as an ornament in that way, could not be treated as a copy of the print prohibited by the statute. I do not say that it would be so, but that it might be a matter of contest. Looking at the deviations even in the subjectmatter here you have no doubt a young man and a young woman standing up in the centre of the picture, but beyond that almost every detail is altered from beginning to end. Again, you have no work of art in this woolwork pattern. The woolwork eventually to be made might probably be a work of art, but you cannot call this a work of art. You might almost as well call a representation of the king and queen on a gingerbread stall at a fair a work of art. I cannot, therefore, at all understand in what way this thing can be looked upon as a copy within the intent and meaning of these acts of Parliament, and at present it is not necessary to go into any other part of the case." Bramwell, L. J., said: "What these statutes intended was to protect the artist in engraving, and that what the Legislature contemplated was that his work, as an engraver, should not be pirated by any thing which copied what he had done, and the author of which availed himself of what the engraver had done for the purpose of making a copy which would be a substitute for what he had done. What really was in the contemplation of the Legislature at that time was that there should not be another plate made another engraving-the engraver of which would have the benefit of what had been done by his predecessors." "There is a picture of which Mr. Brooks is not the owner, I mean the picture by Mr. Millais. It is conceded, as I understand, that anybody might have gone to that picture and made a fresh engraving of it upon a fresh plate, unless there had been some bargain which possibly might have precluded his having a right to do it if it was known to him, as to which I say nothing, because I know nothing. It is conceded a multo fortiori that the person who prepared this might have gone to the picture and taken from it the materials for producing that which is produced here before us." "But if that is so, if this Berlin wool pattern might with these trifling variations have been taken from the original picture without infringing the engraving, how can it be possible to say that the case is within the acts because the man who did it, instead of going to the picture (if he could have got access to it), thought it more convenient to take this engraving, or possibly a smaller one, or possibly the etching for any one of them would have served his purpose, because all he wanted was the outline and the scale in order to produce it with trifling variations, which do not identify it with this engraving, and are no piracy of the engraver's skill or art? How can it possibly be said that that is within the act? really cannot think it is." maker, if when the note is negotiated the maker's name stands first on the back. Woodward v. Towne, p. 41.- An attorney in fact does not act in a "fiduciary character" within the meaning of the Federal bankrupt act. Connecticut River Railroad Co. v. County Commissioners, p. 50.—A statute authorizing the taking of lands for the use of a railroad owned by the State, and of other railroads, without providing for compensation to the owners except from the earnings of the State railroad, is unconstitutional. Freeman's National Bank v. Savery, p. 78.-L., a member of the firms of S. & Sons and P. & Co., made his own notes, payable to the order of P. & Co., and without authority indorsed them in the name of S. & Co. D., another member of the firm of P. & Co., then indorsed the name of that firm as first indorsers. They were presented to plaintiff for discount, before maturity, one by a broker and the other by D., who was known to it to be a member of the firm of P. & Co., and discounted by the plaintiff. S. & Sons had no benefit from the notes. Held, in an action against S. & Sons, that the facts showed no conclusive notice of the invalidity of the indorsements. Mullen v. Old Colony Railroad Co., p. 86.- If one fraudulently obtains from another his signature to a discharge of a cause of action, the latter may maintain the action without returning the money. Bradlee v. Warren Five Cents Savings Bank, p. 107. The treasurer of a savings bank cannot bind it by his indorsement in its name, although it had directed the sale of its notes, and authorized him to "draw all necessary papers and discharge all obligations." The Vienna Juristische Blaetter contains a decision by the Austrian courts on the formalities necessary to the execution of a will. The evidence showed that John P. intended to make a written testimony according to law. He procured a notary, N., to draw the same for him. The law requires that the testator shall subscribe the instrument; that he shall affirm the instrument to be his will before three competent witnesses, and that the witnesses shall sign the paper as witnesses. It appeared that the notary had written the will at his office; that then he had called in three clients of his to act as witnesses; that the will was read in their presence and in that of the testator, and then subscribed by them; that they did not speak with John P., and he was silent during the transaction. The notary, the testator and the witnesses were the only persons present in the room. The will contained the following conclusion: "I have declared, before the testamentary witnesses called in, these provisions to be my last will, and subscribe the same before them." Churchill v. Holt, p. 165.-An occupant of a buildThe Supreme Appellate Court decided that the willing, who has been compelled to pay damages for was not legally executed. They say: "The law does not indeed require that the affirmation shall be express and oral, in a certain formula, but it must be declared in a manner excluding any doubt of the witnesses, that the instrument contains the last will of the testator. The mere and silent presence of the latter at the reading of the instrument cannot be taken for such affirmation, the less so, as the witnesses do not state that they observed an utterance of the testator which would show in an unmistakable manner that he had heard what was read, had understood it, and would have it in force as his last will." ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH THIS Towne v. Fiske, p. 125.-A portable hot-air furnace and gas-fixtures in a house, although connected with the house in the usual manner, are not part of the realty. injuries sustained by another by falling into a hatchway on the premises negligently left open and unguarded by a third person, may maintain an action against such third person for indemnity. Donlan v. Provident Institution for Savings, p. 183. The by-laws of a savings bank provided that depositors should sign and conform to the by-laws; in case of loss or theft of the deposit-book, should give immediate notice to the bank; and that the bank would not be responsible for payment to a wrong person in absence of such notice. A. subscribed the by-laws by his mark, and was unable to read. Having died, his book was presented to the bank by one fraudulently personating him, and his deposit was paid by the bank. His executors had previously published the usual citation for proof of his will. The bank did not know of his inability to HIS volume contains the following cases of gen- read, and had received no actual notice of the theft eral interest: Dubois v. Mason, p. 37. - Where one indorses a note, payable to the order of the maker, before negotiation and before indorsement by the maker, his liability is that of indorser, and not of joint of the book nor of his death. Held, that the bank was not liable in an action by the executor for the deposit. Blagge v. Ilsley, p. 191.- An action for seduction of a daughter may be maintained upon proof that in consequence she became nervous and excitable, and did not appear to be herself, without proof of pregnancy or sexual disease. Costello v. Crowell, p. 293.- A promissory note bearing in the margin the words, “given as collateral security with agreement," is not negotiable. National Mahaiwe Bank v. Peck, p. 298.- A bank discounted for B. two notes, one executed by him in his official capacity as town treasurer, and indorsed by P., and the other his individual note. B. at the time kept a deposit account with the bank, but the proceeds of the official note were not put to that account. The official note was not paid at maturity. The individual note matured the next day after the official note, and exceeded the balance then on deposit to B.'s credit. The bank thereupon applied such balance on the individual note. Three days later P. tendered to the bank B.'s individual check, payable to and indorsed by himself in his official character, for such balance, and money suffi- | cient therewith to pay the official note, and demanded the note. The bank refused to give it up, and brought suit on it against P. Held, maintainable. Huck v. Globe Insurance Co., p. 306.—A fire policy was conditioned to cease if the insured building should fall except as the result of fire. The building was equally and completely divided by a brick partition wall, with communicating doors in each story. A girder in one half fell, bringing down substantially the whole of that part and the goods stored therein, but leaving the other part standing uninjured. A fire afterward broke out in the fallen part, destroying every thing in it save the outer walls, the partition wall, and an elevator, but not communicating to the other part. Held, that no action on the policy could be maintained. Blumantle v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., p. 322.— A railway passenger had merchandise checked without disclosing its character. There was no evidence of any agreement to carry it as freight, nor that the baggage-master had any authority to receive it as freight or as personal baggage. Held, that the company were not responsible for its loss, although the baggage-master knew the character of the baggage, and received similar packages from other passengers. Cromarty v. City of Boston, p. 329.- Where a foot-passenger, using due care, is injured by falling on a portion of a city sidewalk made of glass and iron, and worn smooth and slippery, solely in consequence of its slipperiness, he cannot maintain an action against the city therefor. | | ruins of the building and its contents were immediately set on fire by coals from a stove therein. Held, that the company was liable on all the policies. Dempsey v. Gardner, p. 381.—The mere delivery, for value, of a bill of sale of a chattel to the purchaser does not vest title in him as against a subsequent attaching creditor of the vendor. Commonwealth v. Holmes, p. 424.- Although a jury may convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, yet, if evidence, introduced under objection for the purpose of corroboration, does not tend to connect the defendant with the crime, but it is left to the jury to say whether the principal evidence is corroborated, and they are instructed that if they are satisfied of the defendant's guilt upon the whole testimony, they should convict, this is error. Commonwealth v. Munson, p. 459. - The statutes of Massachusetts provide, except in the case of Friends or Quakers, that magistrates or ministers may celebrate marriages, and also provide that marriages thus celebrated shall be valid although the magistrate or minister shall have exceeded his authority or jurisdiction; and do not enact that marriages not thus celebrated shall not be valid. Held, that a ceremony of marriage, performed in good faith by a man and a woman, at a public religious meeting, no third person participating, and no magistrate nor clergyman nor any person supposed to be such being present, and neither party being a Friend or Quaker, is not a valid marriage under the law of Massachusetts. Hunter v. Farren, p. 481.- Where stones were thrown against plaintiff's shop by a blast, carelessly set off by a contractor employed on a neighboring public work, and his workmen left his shop in fear, and his business was consequently suspended, held, that he might recover for the interruption of his business, and the measure of damages was the value of the work thus prevented from being done. Searle v. Sawyer, p. 491.- A mortgagee of land out of possession may maintain an action for conversion against one who buys from the mortgagor wood and timber which the latter has wrongfully cut from the premises. Potter v. Stevens Machine Co., p. 592.-A stockholder of a corporation, who is also a creditor of the corporation, cannot enforce the personal liability of the stockholders for his debt, and one to whom he has assigned his claim, for the sole purpose of enforcing such liability, stands in no better position. Dows v. Faneuil Hall Insurance Co., p. 346. Three policies of fire insurance provided substantially that the company should not be liable in case of explosion unless fire ensued, and then only for the damage by such fire, one of the policies limiting T the provision to the explosion of gunpowder or a steam-boiler; and one of them also provided that if a building should fall, except as the result of a fire, the insurance should immediately cease. By an explosion of inflammable gas in the building insured, the larger part of the walls on two sides was blown out, and the roof and partitions fell in, and the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. BY SAMUEL T. SPEAR, D. D. HE tenth volume of Otto's Reports, recently published, and giving the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, at the October term, 1879, contains an unusual number of cases which involve and determine questions of constitutional law. The purpose of this article is to submit a brief statement of several leading cases of this character. 1. The case of The People v. Weaver, 539, involved the question whether the law of 1866, enacted by the Legislature of New York for taxing the shares of banks located in that State, and construed by the New York Court of Appeals to exclude in the valuation of these shares any deduction therefrom on account of debts due by their owners, is in conflict with section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. This section permits the shares of National banks to be "included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner or holder of such shares, in assessing taxes imposed by authority of the State within which the association is located," with the qualification "that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State." The law of New York allows debt deductions in the valuation of "other moneyed capital in the hands" of its citizens; but the act of 1866, as explained by the Court of Appeals, excluded bank shares, whether State or National, from this allowance. The Supreme Court, in the opinion stated by Mr. Justice Miller, held that under the National Constitution the authority of States to tax the shares of National banks at all is derived from the enabling or permissive legislation of Congress, and that the New York law of 1866, when applied to these shares, did not conform to the conditions imposed by this legislation. It denied to bank shares in their valuation the debt deductions which are by law permitted in the valuation of "other moneyed capital;" and this discrimination, when applied to the shares of National banks, was held to be inconsistent with the law of Congress. The Legislature of New York has since this decision changed the law, and provided that the holder of bauk shares shall be allowed all the deductions and exemptions allowed by law in assessing the value of other taxable personal property owned by individual citizens of this State." Session Laws of 1880, ch. 596, § 3. This obviates the objection of the Supreme Court to the bank tax law of 1866. 2. The case of Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 491, relates to the reserved power of the States to impose taxes upon their own citizens. Mr. Kirtland, who was a citizen of Connecticut, held obligations executed in Chicago, made payable in that city, and also secured by deeds of trust upon real estate there situated. According to the law of Connecticut these evidences of debt were taxable in that State as personal property. Mr. Kirtland resisted this taxation as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and finally carried the question to the Supreme Court. The court in this case decided that "the Constitution does not prohibit a State from taxing her resident citizens for debts held by them against a nonresident, evidenced by his bonds, payment whereof is secured by his deeds of trust and mortgages upon real estate situate in another State," and that "for the purpose of taxation, a debt has its situs at the residence of the creditor, and may be there taxed." The question then whether Mr. Kirtland should in Connecticut, the place of his residence, be taxed on these obligations, belonged exclusively to the legislative discretion of that State. The National Constitution does not limit or qualify this discretion. Mr. Justice Harlan, in stating the opinion of the court, said: "So long as the State, by its laws prescribing the mode and subjects of taxation, does not entrench upon the legitimate authority of the Union, or violate any right recognized or secured by the Constitution of the United States, this court, as between the State and its citizen, can afford him no relief against State taxation, however unjust, oppressive, or onerous." The cases cited in support of this general doctrine are McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 428; The Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 563; St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423; and State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 id. 300. 3. In Guy v. Baltimore, 434, the court, after citing a series of decisions in similar cases, proceeded to say: "In view of these and other decisions of this court, it must be regarded as settled that no State can, consistently with the Federal Constitution, impose upon the products of other States brought therein for sale, or upon citizens because engaged in the sale therein, or the transportation thereto of the products of other States, more onerous public burdens or taxes than it imposes upon the like products of its own territory. If this were not so, it is easy to perceive how the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States could be practically annulled, and the equality of commercial privileges secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of the several States be materially abridged and impaired." Applying this principle to the case in hand the court held that the ordinance of the city of Baltimore which under the name of wharfage charges, exacted higher fees from vessels laden with the products of other States than from vessels laden with the products of Maryland, is unconstitutional. The exaction was regarded as being in effect "taxation upon inter-State commerce," and also as inconsistent with "the power of Congress over the subject of commerce." 4. The Trade-mark cases, 82, brought before the court the question whether sections 4937-4947 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, providing for the registration of trade-marks in the Patent Office, and the act of August 14, 1876 (19 U. S. Stat. at Large, 141), providing penalties for counterfeiting or illegally using the registered trade-marks of others, are authorized by the Constitution of the United States. Two clauses of the Constitution were considered in dispos ing of this point. The first of these clauses gives to Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." The court held that a trade-mark is neither a writing nor a discovery within the meaning of the Constitution, and hence that this clause gives to Congress no authority to legislate in regard to it. The other clause authorizes Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." This provision does not, in the judgment of the Supreme Court, sustain the trade-mark legislation of Congress. Even if the regulation of trade-marks were included in the power to regulate commerce- -a point which the court did not decide-still such regulation would be limited to the commerce placed by the Constitution under the control of Congress, and could not be extended to the purely domestic commerce which is carried on within the boundaries of a State. The trade-mark legislation in question is evidently not thus limited. As remarked by Mr. Justice Miller, "its broad purpose was to establish a universal system of trade-mark registration, for the benefit of all who had already used a trademark, or who wished to adopt one in the future without regard to the character of the trade to which it was to be applied, or the residence of the owner, with the solitary exception that those who resided in foreign countries which extended no such privileges to us were excluded from them here." Such being the character of the legislation, it was regarded by the court as an attempt to exercise "a power not confided to Congress." As to the suggestion that the legislation might be held valid in application to foreign and inter-State commerce and commerce with the Indian tribes, Mr. Justice Miller replied that "it is not within the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear, in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language which brings them within the constitutional power of that body." The court could not undertake thus to revise and virtually alter the legislation of Congress. It declined to do so in The United States v. Reese, 2 Otto, 214. Mr. Justice Miller said in conclusion: "The questions in each of these cases, being an inquiry whether these statutes can be upheld in whole or in part as valid and constitutional, must be answered in the negative; and it will be so certified to the proper Circuit Courts." 5. In Ex parte Siebold, 371, certain sections of the Federal election laws, as contained in title XXVI of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and relating to the appointment, powers and duties of supervisors of election and the powers and duties of marshals, and also the penal sections 5515 and 5522 of the same Statutes, came before the court for consideration. The main question was whether this legislation lies within the constitutional power of Congress. The provision of the Constitution upon which the legislation rests for its validity is in these words: "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulatious, except as to the places of choosing senators." Art. 1, § 4. The court held that this section of the Constitution sustains the legislation, and on this ground declined to grant the application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of the petitioners who had been indicted and convicted under these statutes. The substantial essence of the opinion, as found in the elaborate deliverance of Mr. Justice Bradley, may be embraced in the following propositions: (1) That under this clause of the Constitution Congress may "make" all the regulations in respect to such elections, "except as to the places of choosing senators," or may "alter" those made by a State, either "wholly or partially." (2) That the regulations made by Congress, so far as they are inconsistent with those made by a State, supersede and repeal the latter, and so far as they are not thus inconsistent, leave State regulations undisturbed, and simply operate concurrently with them. (3) That when Congress legislates on the subject the State laws which it "sees no occasion to alter" and does not alter, "but which it allows to stand, are in effect adopted by Congress." (4) That Congress may, in the exercise of its supervisory power, impose new duties upon State officers of election, or addional penalties for any breach of duty or commission of fraud, and may enforce either the laws of the State or its own laws prescribing the duties of such officers, since the Government of the United States is directly involved in and concerned with such elections. (5) That Congress has power to vest in the Circuit Courts of the United States the appointment of supervisors of election, as provided for by the statutes in question. (6) That the penal sections 5515 and 5522, defining the offenses for which indictments might be framed, and, on conviction, punishment might be inflicted, are an exercise of the power belonging to Congress, and that the Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction to try and punish these offenses. The result in this case is a judicial affirmation of the constitutionality of those sections of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, and the amendatory act of February 28, 1871, which furnished the sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States that came under the consideration of the court. 16 U. S. Stat. at Large, 140 and 433. The dispute between party politicians as to the validity of this legislation is settled by the highest judicial authority in the land. 6. In Ex parte Clarke, 399, the same general questions were before the court, and the same conclusions reached as in Ex parte Siebold. The indictment in this case was under section 5515 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the court held that Congress had power to pass the law under which the conviction was had, and that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the offense. The offense consisted in a violation of the law of Ohio, by Clarke, who was a State officer at an election for a representative in Congress. He violated that law in not conveying the poll-book, after it had been sealed up and delivered to him for that purpose, to the county clerk, and in allowing it to be broken open. Section 5515 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that "every officer of an election at which any representative or delegate in Congress is voted for, whether such officer of election be appointed or created by or under any law or authority of the United States, or by or under any State, territorial, district or municipal law or authority, who neglects or refuses to perform any duty in regard to such election required of him by any law of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof, or who violates any duty so imposed," or who does any of the other things specified in the section, "shall be punished as prescribed in section 5511" of the same Statutes. The recitals of this section covered the actions set forth in the indictment against Clarke. Hence the court, for the reasons stated in the case of Siebold, dismissed the application for habeas corpus and remanded the prisoner to the custody of the United States marshal. 7. The case of Tennessee v. Davis, 257, relates to the right of removal in a criminal prosecution from a State court to the proper Federal court. Davis, who was a United States officer duly appointed as a deputy collector of internal revenue, and who had been indicted for murder in a State court of Tennessee, presented to the proper Circuit Court of the United States his application to have the case removed thereto for trial, claiming the right under section 643 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The judges of this court were divided in opinion on the question, and so certified to the Supreme Court. The section of the Revised Statutes, under which this right was claimed by Davis, provides that "when any civil or criminal prosecution is commenced in any court of a State against any officer appointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law of the United States, now or hereafter enacted, or against any person acting by or under authority of any such officer, on account of any act done under color of his office or of any such law, or on account of any right, title or authority claimed by such officer or other person under such law," the case may, by the proceeding specified in the section, be removed to the proper Federal court for trial. The Supreme Court held that the petition for a removal of the case comes within the provisions of this statute. The question whether the statute itself is "au exercise of the constitutional power vested in Congress," Mr. Justice Strong, in giving the opinion of the court, stated in the following form: "Has the Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to authorize the removal, from a State court to a Federal court, of an indictment against a revenue officer for an alleged crime against the State, and to order its removal before trial, when it appears that a Federal question or a claim to a Federal right is raised in the case, and must be decided therein?" This question was answered in the affirmative. The leading points in the deliverance of Mr. Justice Strong, sustaining this answer, are the following: 1. That if the fact were otherwise, the National Government, acting within the States only through its officers and agents, would have no power to protect these officers and agents against State action, and might by such action be paralyzed in its operations. 2. That Con |