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according to Thorley's invention. The invention is said to be by somebody else, whose recipe is said to have been purchased by the original Thorley, and "Thorley's Food for Cattle" here, according to my view, does not mean food consisting of particular ingredients or made up according to a particular recipe, because no purchaser would care about that; but "Thorley's Food for Cattle" meant that food which for many years was manufactured at works belonging to Joseph Thorley, and afterward was manufactured by his executors carrying on his business at the same works. The words "Thorley's Food for Cattle" would indicate, according to my view of the case, to a purchaser, this: You have always had a very good article called "Thorley's Food for Cattle;" any article bearing that name is to you a guarantee that it comes from the same place from which that has come with which you have hitherto been well satisfied and content. That in truth is the meaning and object and result of a trade-mark. That is what a trade-mark is; it does not signify what it is-whether it is a name, or a symbol, or a fancy name, or any thing else. It indicates this, a warranty that the article to which it is attached has come from the particular manufacturer of the goods with which buyers have been hitherto pleased. "Thorley's Food for Cattle" never became an article of commerce as distinguished from the particular manufactory from which it had proceeded. I referred in the course of the argument to a case as an illustration which was the converse of this, the case of Liebig's Extract of Meat Company, where the company wanted to prevent some defendants from selling Liebig's extract of meat, or selling any thing of that name, the company having got Liebig to assist them and lend them his name. The answer to that was: Liebig's extract of meat has ceased to be a thing made by Liebig, because Liebig has published to the world the mode by which it is made, and it has been made and manufactured generally, and has got into the Pharmacopoeia, into books of cookery, into a dozen places, where a dozen people can make it, and has now become as much known as if it were called "Extract of Meat" alone, or any thing else, and Liebig's extract has ceased to have any connection with Liebig as the maker of it for the purpose of the manufacturer, and was merely the description of it as the article known to the medical world and other persons who had occasion to use it. That was the converse of this case. There is nothing like that in this case of "Thorley's Food for Cattle." Then we have to consider what was the animus. It appears to me that that would be almost sufficient to dispose of it; but there is one thing that struck me in this all through. We have had nothing like a satisfactory explanation of how J. W. Thorley's company came into existence; how they came to form themselves into a company, unless it was that they thought that Thorley was making a very good thing; that they thought that Thorley's food was a very profitable thing; that it had got a very great reputation, and that some of them would like to steal the reputation which Thorley's article had acquired. In order to do that, they seem to have somehow or other got into communication with a gentleman who was a relation of the late Joseph Thorley, and a connection of his executors, and who for some years had been in the service of Joseph Thorley, and during those years, according to his own account, which I take to be true, had acquired a knowledge of the recipe, and had acquired the exact knowledge of the manufacture, but who for several years previous to the existence of this company had never had any thing to do with the manufacture of food for cattle, but was probably gaining his livelihood in some other way; but having the same name of Thorley, which was the distinguishing mark of food for cattle, he either tendered himself for sale, or was found for purchase by some person, in order that his name might

be got into a joint-stock company limited, for the sake of selling these goods. Why was that name got in there except for the purpose of inducing the world to believe that it was the same concern, or that it was the Thorley, that it was the same Thorley whose name was the principal characteristic of the name of the article? The name of the company, I cannot help observing, was J. W. Thorley & Co., Limited,and that J. W. Thorley & Co., Limited, is, to my mind, to begin with, a fiction, an intentional fiction. The meaning of J. W. Thorley & Co., Limited, that which it would convey to any person's mind, is that there was a partnership of J. W. Thorley & Co., a real partnership, which had been carrying on business in the manufacture of this food for cattle, and that for some reason or other, such as we have seen constantly in our experience in this court, the partnership had been minded to convert itself into a limited company for the more convenient transaction of its business. But here the J. W. Thorley was not a partner. J. W. Thorley was employed as an agent, as the manager; and J. W. Thorley's only connection with the company, qua company, is that he had a one-shilling share in it, the company itself having a capital of 2001., or something of that kind. To my mind that really would be exactly the same thing as if somebody were to establish a brewery at Burton, finding some one of the name of Bass, or somebody who would take the name of Bass-because there is no law to prevent a man assuming any name he likes - and then calling themselves J. Bass & Co., Limited, or W. Bass & Co., Limited, and advertising Bass & Co.'s pale ale. I really can see no distinction between Bass & Co.'s pale ale, as advertised by such a company got up in that way, and "Thorley's Food for Cattle," advertised by the company which has procured a person of the name of Thorley to be connected with their company. That of itself, to my mind, is a very strong thing to begin with. And then next we have to look at the advertisements and circulars, and the almanac. First of all, as to the packages, could any thing be more calculated to deceive? Those are the things by which the company really influenced customers. It is said by the defendants that they are very careful, and they have always been very careful, to avoid any thing which could be considered as indications of any intention on their part to pass their goods off as the others'. If they had been so very much minded in that way, why did they not make their packages different the same shape and the same size it might be, because it might be convenient; but why did they not put them in a scarlet, blue, or orange and blue wrapper, or something that would have immediately shown not only to a person minutely comparing the things together, but to any person who was in the habit of having the things in an orange packet, that it was a blue packet? Why did they not do that, if they were minded, as they say they were, not only to take care that their things should not be mistaken, but that the world should know that they were rival manufacturers? Then there is the almanac which they have circulated, and in which they put things which were paid for by Thorley-Dr. Hassall's description and report, and things of that kind, and other passages for the purpose of implying that they were the persons for whom Dr. Hassall's report had been obtained, and that Dr. Hassall's report was a report on their manufacture. Then there is this again. they put, "It is the best cattle food in the world. Upward of 95,000l. has been awarded to horses and cattle fed on Thorley's food for cattle. It has gained the diplomas from the Pennsylvania State Agricultural Society and of the Royal Agricultural Society," and so on, all of which was true of the article which was manufactured by Joseph Thorley, but was not true of the article which was manufactured by them; that is to say, their article had not received any of these things. They may say

their article is the same or as good, but in my opinion the representation is not, "We are making an article as good or the same as Thorley's, which gained the prize," but "This is the thing, we are the persons who are selling the thing, the produce of the manufactory, which has obtained those prizes." There are other things which I need not stop to dilate upon. On the parol evidence I am satisfied, and I agree very much with what Mr. Townsend said with regard to the witness Stillwell, who was a traveller for the company, and who went to people and said, "I come from Thorley's; Joseph Thorley is dead; the persons I represent are carrying on the business." I have not the slightest doubt that, being well warned that he was not to say any thing which could be construed into a positive assertion that the company were carrying on the same business, at the same premises, or were the successors in business, he took care to say that they were carrying on the business of manufacturing food for cattle. It might be said, it was true that they were carrying on the food for cattle business; but the intention and the effect of that, in my mind, was to cause a belief to be entertained by the persons to whom it was addressed, who all say they did form that belief from it, that it was the same concern; that the company were carrying on the same manufactory from which the things used to be distributed to the world. I am therefore of opinion that, in this case, what the defendant company have done has been calculated to deceive, and I am bound to say in my judgment I have no doubt was from the first intended to deceive, the persons purchasing their article, into the belief that they were purchasing the article which Joseph Thorley had formerly manufactured at the works which had obtained the great reputation which Thorley's manufacture appears to have obtained from the purchasers of those condiments. I am of opinion that the order should have been granted very much in the general words in which it was asked.

BAGGALLAY, L. J. The first of the two appeals which was opened to us was against the judgment in the action in which Thorley's Cattle Food Company were the plaintiffs. The vice-chancellor declared that the defendants were not entitled to advertise or represent that they or the proprietors of the establishment carrying on business as Joseph Thorley were alone possessed of the secret for compounding the condiment known as "Thorley's Food for Cattle," and proceeded to grant an injunction restraining the defendants from advertising or representing, or inserting or suggesting in their advertisements or circulars, that they were alone possessed of the secret, and from representing or suggesting, or doing any thing calculated to represent or suggest, that the cattle food manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs was spurious, or not genuine, or not compounded in accordance with the true recipe. I need not read the remainder of it. I agree with the lord justice in thinking that that appeal should be dismissed. The company having been founded in March, 1877, these advertisements were inserted in the newspapers, and the circulars issued in the latter part of the month of June in the same year. The advertisement was in fact in the form of a caution: "The public, and in particular all farmers, graziers, dealers and others, purchasing this world-famed food, are warned that any food for cattle purporting to be Thorley's Food for Cattle, and not signed with the name of Joseph Thorley,' is not the manufacture of the establishment carrying on the business as Joseph Thorley." Thus far no objection could be raised to it; but it goes on, "The proprietors of which are alone possessed of the secret of compounding that famous condiment, and carry on business at Pembroke wharf, Caledonian road. "In the circular which was the second subject of complaint, they said that they had sent

round circulars of warning to the effect that the company were seeking to foist upon the public an article which they pretended was the same as that manufactured by the late Joseph Thorley. I do not think that the defendants in that action were justified in issuing either the one or the other. In my opinion they had no right to state that they were alone possessed of the secret, nor had a right to say that the plaintiffs in that action were seeking to foist upon the public an article which they pretended was the same as that manufactured by the late Joseph Thorley. It is unnecessary to go through the evidence in the case, but I feel bound to say that, in my opinion, the burden was on the defendants in such a case to show that there was some difference, and I think something more than a mere nominal difference, some substantial difference between the article made by the plaintiffs and the article made by the defendants. In my opinion, having very carefully gone through the several analyses in each case, there does not appear to be any substantial difference. There may be a little more of the spice in the one than in the other, and so far as there might be a little excess of spice the article may be perhaps a little more useful, but there is no substantial difference between the constitution of the contents of the two packets. But passing from the appeal in that case to the appeal in the action in which the executors of Joseph Thorley are the plaintiffs, I am of opinion that the question for determination by us is this: Have the company, in offering for sale the article manufactured by them, made representations which were calculated to induce a reasonable belief on the part of those to whom the offers were made that the article was manufactured by the successors of Joseph Thorley? In my opinion that question must be answered in the affirmative, and, being so answered, it appears to me that an injunction ought to issue substantially in the form in which it is mentioned in the writ. Now, the circumstances under which this manufacture was commenced by the company in the year 1877 cannot be disregarded. Down to that period the manufacture of the article known as "Thorley's Food for Cattle" had been carried on for twenty years, first of all by Joseph Thorley, and after his death by his executors. He had acquired the recipe for the manufacture of this article from a person, I think, of the name of Fawcett twenty years before the time when the company was formed. No doubt, after a time, when Fawcett had fully instructed him in the manufacture of the article, his brother, J. W. Thorley, was taken by him as clerk or as some other servant, into his employment, and whilst in that employment he acquired a knowledge of the way of compounding this condiment. But he had left his service for ten years before Joseph died in 1876, and then, his business having been confined to Joseph Thorley and his executors, within nine or ten months after Joseph Thorley's death we have this company formed under circumstances which are very suggestive of an endeavor to get the benefit of the sale, or the good repute which the manufacture and sale of this article had produced to Joseph Thorley. We have a company formed and called "J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Company, Limited." The only excuse for having the name "J. W. Thorley" introduced into the description of the company is this, that he took a share to the extent of one shilling, the shares of this company being one shilling only. He took one share of one shilling in the company, and was then employed by the company as the manager of their business. I say this company was started under circumstances of a very suspicious character. We have had a good deal of argument as to the right to use the name "Thorley's Food for Cattle," and whether any person at the present time could use that name except the executors of Joseph Thorley. I think the passage which James, L. J., has referred to

in the judgment of Turner, L. J., in the case of Burgess v. Burgess, indicates very clearly what the rights are under similar circumstances. I do not profess to say now whether J. W. Thorley, if honestly carrying on a business on his own account in the manufacture and sale of this article, might not call it by the name of "Thorley's Food for Cattle," provided he took proper precautions to prevent it being supposed that the article he was so manufacturing was manufactured by the representatives of Joseph Thorley, but I feel satisfied that the company has no right whatever to use that name. I strongly lean to the opinion which was given by Lord Westbury in the Glenfield Starch case in describing the expression "Glenfield" as having a secondary signification indicating the trade denomination of the article manufactured by the particular person, but as I have said, I do not think it necessary to express a decided opinion on that point. I should be prepared to assume in this case that the defendant company had not only the right to manufacture this article, but to call it "Thorley's Food for Cattle," and even on that assumption I have come to the conclusion on the evidence in this case, that they did adopt such a mode of endeavoring to push that article in the market as to induce the reasonable belief which was entertained by many persons, that the article they were so putting upon the market had been manufactured by the representatives of Joseph Thorley. Now, in that sense, even the adoption of the name is not to be left out of consideration, because no doubt, in a doubtful case, the article being sold under the same name as that by which it was sold by another person helps the deception, if any is practiced. I pass from that to the form in which this article was sold. Mr. Higgins said that nothing was made in the evidence with reference to these packets, but it came out in this way: He was putting forward a strong case on behalf of the defendants that they had done every thing that they possibly could to prevent any mistake. He talked loudly about the different sized boxes, and the carriers observed that the shape of one box was different from the shape of the other. But when we come to look at the packets with which these said boxes were filled - and that is the article which finds its way into the hands of the customers - I cannot fail to be struck with the remarkable resemblance between the one and the other. You have a packet not only of the same size and the same shape, but you have them of the same color, and you have indorsed upon them corresponding terms as regards the amount to be given to each description of cattle, whether horse, cow, sheep, or pig, to which it is to be given, every thing exactly following not in every case according to the same words, but the same character of direction being given in almost every case. It is all very well to say that we sitting here, having heard this discussion, and looking at the two together, at once see there is a difference between the two; but how would it affect the customer who went into a druggist's shop, or some other shop, in a country town, and asked for a packet of this condiment to be given to him, and had it given to him in a packet similar in color, similar in shape, similar in size, and exactly at the same price as that which he had been in the habit of having given him before? The form of these packets is enough to indicate an intention to deceive. As has been very often said in these cases, why did they choose to adopt every thing which could make what they are selling as like as possible to what was being sold by somebody else? Why adopt the same color, the same size, why sell it exactly in the same form? The only reply which, looking at it with common sense, we can give to such a question as that is, that it was done with a view to induce the public to believe they were the same. I think that if those are the suggestions which come to our minds in the first place, looking at the packages, and

looking at the form of the attractive words on the counter bills, or whatever they are called, at the contents of the almanacs, the sending round of these almanacs purporting to be the Illustrated Farmers' Almanac, or words very similar, implying the same thing all these things bear out the same view. But when we come to consider what took place between the travellers and the different persons whom they visited, unless we are to disbelieve some eight or ten witnesses, all of whom speak most positively on the subject, there were representations made to them, representations, I fully admit, in particular instances, as far as regards the words used, not in themselves false, but calculated and proved to convey a very contrary impression of what the real fact was to those who listened to them. It has been said that Mr. Stillwell must have been almost an idiot to think that these representations would be successful. Very possibly it occurred to him that in the great majority of instances it would be unsuccessful, that it would be found out; but still would it always be found out? Was there not that prospect of success in making these representations to the different persons to whom he was going that some at least would be induced to purchase? The evidence shows that they did purchase. It is unnecessary to go further into the facts of this case. I am satisfied on the whole transaction from beginning to end that the object was to obtain as far as possible a slice of the large business previously carried on by Joseph Thorley and by his executors, and to obtain that by making representations which the practice of this court will not allow to be made.

BRAMWELL, L. J. I am of the same opinion, and I have very little to add. As to the action in which the company are plaintiffs, I am satisfied that the two documents were libels. As to that one which uses the word "foist," it is needless to say any thing at all about it, because it seems to be confessed that it is a libel. I had some misgiving about the other one, because I doubted at first whether it was any thing more than that sort of commendation of their wares which people may put in; but really, when one thinks of the old way of declaring for libel or defamation, and considers this advertisement in that way, that is to say. with the statement of the surrounding circumstances to which it is applicable, and begins to have an idea of this introduction that the plaintiffs carried on the business of preparing food which they said they prepared according to a recipe which Joseph Thorley had formerly used in his life-time - when one considers this case with such an introduction as that, it is manifest that this advertisement is a libel on the plaintiffs in their trades. It begins "Caution," and it says, "The public, and in particular farmers, are warned that any food for cattle not signed with the name of Joseph Thorley, is not the manufacture of the establishment carrying on the business of Joseph Thorley, the proprietors of which are alone possessed of the secret of compounding that famous condiment." I am satisfied that was a libel on the plaintiffs in the way of their trade, and calculated to do them injury, and consequently an action is maintainable with reference to that as well as with reference to the other. Now as to the other case, the complaint of the plaintiffs is not that the defendants made and sold the same article that the plaintiffs made, but the complaint of the plaintiffs is that it was sold in such a way as to induce purchasers to believe, or cause purchasers to believe, that it was the article manufactured by the establishment which was Joseph Thorley's, and now is his executors'. That is the complaint which is made, and it is admitted by the learned counsel for the defendants in that action that if that is so there is a cause of action against them, and they must be restrained from

doing it. The question therefore is one of fact. Was the trade so carried on by the defendants as to give rise to that belief? Now really it is almost impossible to make a doubt about it. I confess, for my own part, directly I saw the two packages I thought there was an end of the case. It is impossible to suppose that those are not calculated to deceive. It is all very well to say, if you examine them you will find a difference between them. No doubt; so you will between a Bank of England note and a Bank of Elegance note, but people have got into trouble for obtaining money under false pretenses who passed off a Bank of Elegance note, although they never could be convicted of forgery. It is impossible to suppose that there was not an intention to mislead at the bottom of that. If not, all I can say is, the defendants ought to be very much obliged to those who have pointed out to them that they are doing that which they do not intend to do, but which there is no doubt they are doing, that is to say, misleading people. I should like to say one thing about this expression, "Thorley's Food for Cattle." It has been said that the defendants have a right to say they make Thorley's food for cattle, if they do not deceive. Well, I agree, and if one could by any possibility suppose-I ought not perhaps put it so strongly, but if one could suppose that they could use that expression without the risk of deceiving, I should think they ought to have a right to do so; but it seems to mo almost impossible that they can. Now it is said that it is hard upon them, because it is said every Thorley has a right to make food, and therefore to sell it in his own name, and consequently I suppose call it "Thorley's Food." But not only has every Thorley a right to do that, but every John Doe has a right to do that, because he may give himself the name of Thorley, and carry on business uuder that name if he thinks fit. A surname is acquired by reputation, and is not any man's legal property or conferred upon him by law in any particular way; it is gained by reputation, and if he choose to adopt it and other people call him by that name, he is "Thorley" to all intents and purposes, although his name was originally John Doe. Then it is said it is hard, if a man has the name of Thorley, that he cannot make food and call it "Thorley's Food." So he may, but if unfortunately for him some preceding Thorley has carried on the business of making cattle food in such a way that by the name "Thorley's Cattle Food" is understood the manufacture of that man, then the second Thorley, or the man who assumes his name, must take care so to conduct his business that he is not mistaken for the original Thorley, and if he willfully, or even I should say without willfulness, does carry on his business so as to be mistaken, he must be restrained from doing it, and really there is no hardship upon him at all. It is not a hardship upon him that he should put into his advertisements, as these persons might do here, "The article produced is the same as Joseph Thorley produced it; it is the article which he called Thorley's Food for Cattle; it is the same article, and we make it, and you may buy it of us as well as of them." If they do that, in that sense they might use the words "Thorley's Food for Cattle," no doubt; but if they cannot use that expression without misleading people they must not use it, because it is a thing to the detriment of the plaintiff. I should like to make one remark relating to the same business which James, L. J., mentioned. I think I can see very well how this thing arose. The persons who got up this thing, who have done this, who are now sought to be restrained, on the death of the original Thorley, I suppose, there was no one who had any particular right to use Thorley's Food for Cattle" any more than anybody else had; consequently anybody with the name of Thorley, and possibly without for all I know, could manufacture this article and call it "Thorley's Food

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for Cattle," just as I suppose anybody may make Liebig's extract of meat, or any body may make Daffy's elixir, or the other things which have been mentioned. Very likely they got hold of Thorley, who had the good fortune to have that name, and to know the secret, and so they began this business. Now, let us suppose, for instance, that Bass's firm consisted of Bass, Smith, and Jones-and it seems as though it would be admitted, as long as Bass continued one of the firm, no one would have a right to brew ale and sell it under the name of " Bass's Pale Ale," unless he took care it was not confounded with that well-known beer or ale which is produced by the firm which, I suppose, to consist of Bass, Smith, and Jones. Now, suppose Mr. Bass retired, and Smith and Jones carried on the business under the same name as beforethat is to say, Bass & Co. - could it be supposed for a moment that, because Mr. Bass had left the firm, people would then have a right to say, "Oh, there is no longer a Bass who makes Bass's pale ale, therefore we will call ourselves makers of Bass's Pale Ale.'"' It seems to me manifest there would be no right to do such a thing as that. Bass's pale ale has acquired, as Thorley's cattle food has here, a sort of name, and is known as the production of a certain establishment, and that is a right-a property I suppose one can hardly call it in the proprietor of the establishment, and no one else has tho right to so act that people dealing with him may think they are dealing with the original establishment. If after Thorley's death some time had elapsed before anybody had started afresh, before his executors had started the manufacture of this food, then tho words "Thorley's Cattle Food " might have become common property just in the same way as Liebig's extract of meat. But that not being the case, it seems to me the defendants have done, and I must say I think willfully done, what is to be regretted and what they must be restrained from doing, that is to say, endeavored to injure, not for the sake of injury no doubt, but endeavored to make a profit at the expense of the plaintiffs, by producing an article and selling it in such a way as to cause tho public to believe that they are buying the article manufactured by the plaintiffs and not a different ar

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party," and added that as the judge belonged to that party it was "unanimous for once that it need take no cognizance of the imposition practiced upon it and the disgrace attaching to it." We may safely assume that it meant to charge and did charge that the judge had decided the case wrongfully from motives of political partisanship. We have no hesitation in pronouncing such a publication to be a gross libel on its face. Nothing can be more disgraceful-not even, perhaps, a charge of direct bribery—than such an imputation on the motives of a judge in the administration of justice.

The court thereupon sent for the complainants, and on their appearance and taking upon themselves the responsibility of the publication in question, entered rules upon them to show cause why they should not be disbarred and their names stricken from the list of attorneys for misbehavior in their office as attorneys. To this rule they appeared and put in answer respectively, and the rule was afterward made absolute.

Many objections have been raised to the proceeding, which we will not stop to consider. We entertain no doubt that a court has jurisdiction without any formal complaint or petition upon its own motion to strike the name of any attorney from the roll in a case, provided he has had reasonable notice and been afforded an opportunity to be heard in his own defense.

No question can be made of the power of a court to strike a member of the bar from the roll for official misconduct in or out of court. By the 73d section of the act of April 14, 1834, P. L. 354, it is expressly enacted that "if an attorney-at-law shall misbehave himself in his office of attorney, he shall be liable to suspension, removal from office, or to such other penalties as have heretofore been allowed in such cases by the laws of this Commonwealth." We do not mean to say - for the case does not call for such an opinion - that there may not be cases of misconduct not strictly professional which would show a person not to

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public capacity where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently made shall be established to the satisfaction of the jury."

But the grievance of the offense of the complainants was that the publication was a libel on the court of which they were attorneys-and this, it is earnestly contended, was "misbehavior in their office," which gave the court power to exercise summary jurisdiction by removing them from their office.

The duty of an attorney is briefly comprehended in the terms of his oath "to behave himself in the office of attorney according to the best of his learning and ability, and with all good fidelity, as well to the court as to the client." Was the publication in question a breach of this oath? Fidelity to the court includes many particulars, but they all evidently concern his official relations. "The sum of the matter," says Chief Justice Gibson in Austin's case, 5 Rawle, 205, is that an attorney-at-law holds his office during good behavior and that he is not professionally amenable for assaulting the official conduct of the judge which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Some of the remarks in the opinion in that case have been much relied upon by the learned counsel in support of the action of the court below. But there are two considerations bearing upon the question, which now exist, but did not at the time that decision was ordered. The first is the new provision on the subject of the liberty of the press, which has been introduced into the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1873, and the second is that at that time the judiciary was not elective. Judges in 1835 were appointed by the governor, and their term of office was during good behavior. There might then be some reason for holding that an appeal to the tribunal of popular opinion was in all cases of judicial misconduct a mistaken course and unjustifiable in an attorney. The proceedings by impeachment or address were then the ones, and the only ones, which could be resorted to to effect

islature was then the proper step. To appeal to the people was to diminish confidence in the courts and bring them into contempt without any good results. We would not say that the case is altered and that it is not the right and the duty of a lawyer to bring to the notice of the people who elect the judges every instance of what he believes to be corruption or partisanship. No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinion as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges, than the members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those, who are called on to vote, never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system.

be fit to be an attorney, nor fit to associate with hon-ively remedy the supposed evil. To petition the Legest men. Thus if he was proved to be a thief, a forger, a perjurer or guilty of other offenses of the crimen falsi. But no one, we suppose, will contend that for such an offense he can be summarily convicted and disbarred by the court without formal indictment, a trial and conviction by a jury, or upon confession in open court. Whether a libel is an offense of such a character may be a question, but certain it is that if the libel in this case had been upon a private individual, upon a public officer, such as the districtattorney, the court could not have summarily convicted the defendants and disbarred them from practice. The office of an attorney is his property, and he cannot be deprived of it unless by the judgment of his peers, the law of the land - the last phrase meaning as we have been taught by Lord Coke, "due process of law." By the seventh section, the first article of the Constitution of 1874-the Bill of Rights-it is declared "that no conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of papers relating to the official conduct of affairs of men in public capacity, or to any other matter proposed for public investigation or information when the fact that such publication was not maliciously made shall be established to the satisfaction of a jury." This is a new and very important provision introduced into the Bill of Rights by the Constitution of 1873. It would be a clear infraction of the spirit, if not the letter, to hold that an attorney can be summarily disbarred for the publication of a libel on a man in a public capacity, or when the matter was proper for public investigation or information, for as he certainly does not forfeit his constitutional rights as a free man by becoming an attorney, it guarantees to him immunity from all liability to punishment in the case of "the publication of papers relative to the official conduct of affairs of men in

In admitting, as he seems to do, that a libel on the court may be a breach of professional duty in an attorney, Chief Justice Gibson adds a most material qualification. "The motive should be clearly shown to have been the acquirement of an influence over the judge in the exercise of his judicial functions by the instrumentality of popular prejudice." No such motion has been or can be imputed to the complainants. The learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court below imputes no such motive to them. He says: "Their motive, though not openly or at all avowed in the publication, is too obvious to admit of doubt. The least reprehensible motive by which their professional misconduct can be supposed to have been

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