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action out of which the controversy arises. It is on the time which has elapsed between them, though not enough that they refer to or narrate the transac- it must always be an important element in the contion after it is past; they must be so connected in sideration of the question; a considerable time may time and circumstances with the principal fact as to elapse and yet the declaration be a part of the res be a part of it. When declarations of an agent or geste. It may be made immediately upon the fact, of a party himself are so closely connected with the and the circumstances be such as to exclude it. principal fact as to be a part of the res gestæ, is often Each case must depend on its own peculiar circuma very nice question to determine. There are on the stances, and be determined by the exercise of sound point many decisions which appear difficult to recon- judicial discretion.” cile with each other." This ruling is supported by the following cases: Where the action was for in- An interesting question of description of a legajury from a train of cars running over plaintiff's tee came up in Patching v. Barnett, Eng. Ch. Div., wagon and horses, driven by his servant, it was held Sept. 11, 1880, 43 L. T. (N. S.) 50. A testator bethe defendant might prove a conversation with the queathed a bust, after his wife's death, to “J., now servant at the time of the accident and relative to Duke of B.," on condition that he caused it to be it. — T. & W. Ry. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185. In placed and remain in W. Abbey, and at the time of an action against a railroad company for damages, the delivery of it to him settle it so as to be held as caused by delay in the carriage of cattle, the state- an heirloom by the persons who under the limitaments relating to the delay of the conductor, made tions to which the abbey should then be subject while he had control of the train in which the cat- should then be entitled to the possession thereof, tle were, were held part of the res gesta.
with a gift over in case J. should neglect so to do C. & T. R. Co., 14 Mich. 489. In an action against for twelve months after request by the trustees. J., a railroad company for wrongful expulsion from one Duke of B., had died in 1839. F. was Duke of B. of its trains, a conversation had immediately after at the time of testator's will and death, and was the expulsion, and serving to illustrate its character, owner in fee of W. Abbey. F. died during the between plaintiff and the offending brakeman, was life-time of the tenant for life, and consequently held part of the res gesta. Bass v. C. & N. W. Ry. never received the bust. The present Duke of B. Co., 42 Wis. 654; S. C., 24 Am. Rep. 427., The ac- was willing to allow F.'s executors to place the cident being the running of a railroad train against bust in the abbey. Held, that the bust belonged to a peddler's wagon, and the destruction of his goods, F.'s executors. Malins, V. C., said: “This testathe trial court admitted evidence of what was said tor had many articles of taste and vertu. Amongst at the time of the accident, by the engineer in charge other things he had an original bust of Oliver Cromof the train, as to negligence in running it. This well, which was of very great value; at all events, was held no error by the Supreme Court, which said: he evidently attached very great value to it. Now "We cannot say that the declaration of the engineer he makes this bust a particular object of his will. was no part of the res geste. It was made at the time First of all he gives it to his wife for her life, and of the accident, in view of the goods strewn along then he says, “and from and immediately after the the road by the breaking up of the boxes, and seems decease or second marriage of my said wife, which to have grown directly out of and immediately after shall first happen, I bequeath my said marble bust the happening of the fact. The negligence com- of Oliver Cromwell to the most noble John now plained of being that of the engineer himself, we Duke of Bedford, upon condition that he cause it cannot say that his declarations made upon the spot to be placed and to remain in the library or some at the time, and in view of the effects of his con- conspicuous place in Woburn Abbey,' and so forth. duct, are not evidence against the company as a Now the first argument is, that this bequest fails alpart of the very transaction itself.” H. R. Co. v. together because John Duke of Bedford had died Coyle, 55 Penn. St. 396. In Luby v. H. R. R. Co., seventeen years before the will was made. It is 17 N. Y. 131, the plaintiff was run against and in- gravely argued that the testator must have intended jured by a car drawn by horses. The car was John Duke of Bedford who had for many years been stopped, and the driver arrested by a policeman. dead, and who therefore could not take the bust or In the trial the policeman was allowed to testify perform any of the conditions imposed by the testhat upon arresting the driver as he was getting off tator with regard to it. It is said that I am to be the car and out of the crowd surrounding it, he guilty of the absurdity of thinking that the testaasked him why he did not stop the car, to which tor meant a dead man instead of a living man, when the driver replied the brake was out of order. This he said, 'I bequeath my said marble bust of Oliver was held error. The court said: “The declaration Cromwell to the most noble John now Duke of Bedwas no part of the driver's act for which the de- ford.' The testator mistook the name; he thought fendants were sued. It was not made at the time that the then Duke of Bedford was John, whereas, of the act, so as to give it quality and character. | in point of fact, he was Francis. There is no magic The alleged wrong was complete, and the driver, in a name; the testator did not know whether the when he made the statement, was only endeavoring duke's name was Thomas, John, William, or Francis; to account for what he had done." The court in the what he did mean was that the now Duke of Bedprincipal case also observe: "It is evident that ford,' that is, the living Duke of Bedford, should whether the declaration is directly connected with, have this bust. There could have been only one and growing out of, the main fact does not depend Duke of Bedford at the time; it is a case in which
the Christian name has been mistaken, which is a defendant's knowledge. Held, that the defendant very common occurrence. When there is nothing was liable, and it was immaterial that he did not but the Christian name to go by, I entirely adhere know that the purchaser was in the habit of becomto the rule laid down by Fry, J., in the case of Gar-ing intoxicated. Dudley v. Sautbine, 49 Iowa, 650, land v. Beverley, L. R., 9 Ch. Div. 213. In that p. 165. case there was a devise of certain lands to “William · ARREST AND BAIL. - An undertaking of bail for the eldest son’ of the testator's nephew; but it murder, entered into on Sunday during vacation, is turned out that John was the eldest son.
a case of necessity and valid. Hammons v. State, held that the devise was to William, therefore the 59 Ala. 164, p. 13. name prevailed. The name will prevail if there is ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. - An nothing to contradict it or to lead the court to a assignment for the benefit of creditors authorizing contrary conclusion. Here it is a gift to the 'now the assignee to “sell and dispose of the property Duke of Bedford;' it is a gift to “John now Duke and generally convert the same into money, upon of Bedford.' The duke's name happened to be such terms and conditions as in his judgment may Francis, but the testator thought it was John.” appear just and for the interest of all parties inter
ested,” is not void upon its face. Brahmstadt v. Mc
Whirter, 9 Neb. 6, p. 396. THIRTY-FIRST AMERICAN REPORTS.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. An agreement between
attorney and client, for the attorney's compensation NHIS volume contains the leading cases reported for services rendered and to be rendered, will be
in 59, 60 Alabama, 53 California, 89 Illinois, jealously scrutinized, and will not be supported 64 Indiana, 49 Iowa, 22 Kansas, 30 Louisiana Annual, without clear proof on the part of the attorney that 69 Maine, 38 Michigan, 24 Minnesota, 56 Mississippi, it is fair and reasonable. Dickinson v. Bradford, 59 9 Nebraska, 75 New York, 81 North Carolina, 33 Ala. 581, p. 23. Ohio State, 2, 3 Lea, 51 Vermont, 31 Grattan, 13 The contract of an attorney for services as such West Virginia. The notes are as follows: Assign- before a department of government or a legislative ment for benefit of creditor, authority to sell on body is valid, but for lobby services is void, and credit; Carrier, perishable property, unreasonable where it is for both, the entire contract is vitiated. limitation of liability; Constitutional law, waiver of McBratney v. Chandler, 22 Kans. 692, p. 213. exemption from execution; of jury trial; Contract, CARRIER. The last of several common carriers, place of, indorsement in another State; for service, forming a connecting line, cannot be held for the what authorizes rescission by employer; Corporation, negligent loss of goods by a prior carrier of the liability of stockholder, how enforced; Criminal law, same line. Lowenbury v. Jones, 56 Miss. 688, p. 379. abortion, intent; burden of proof of sanity; homi- A stipulation in a bill of lading given by a comcide by negligence; Former judgment, splitting mon carrier, that in case any claim for damage claim; Gift, savings bank deposit; Interest on dam- | should arise for the loss of articles mentioned in the ages; Married woman's assumption of mortgage; receipt while in transit or before delivery, the extent Negligence, carrier, responsibility for manufactur- of such damage or loss shall be adjusted before reer's negligent construction of vehicle; contributory, moval from the station, and claim therefor made in infant trespasser; Negotiable instruments, ratifica- thirty days to a “trace agent” of the carrier, is an tion of forgery; "Public place” and “public unreasonable provision which the courts will not house;" Sale, piano on rent; Vendor's lien, statute uphold. Capehart v. Seaboard and Roanoke Railof limitations; Witness, rights of accomplice testi-road Co., 81 N. C. 438, p. 505. fying for State.
Where goods, specially accepted by a We note the following cases of peculiar interest: carrier for transportation, are lost or injured, the
ABATEMENT. — An action by a husband against a burden of proof is for the carrier to show that the carrier of passengers for loss of services of his wife loss or injury was within the terms of the excepand expenses in consequence of injuries to her per- tion, and that he was not negligent. Shriver v. son, resulting from the defendant's negligence, is Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad Co., 24 Minn. 506, grounded in tort, but survives as an action for a wrong to the “property, rights or interests of an- If a carrier of passengers purchases his vehicles other,” within the statute. Cregin v. Brooklyn Cross- from reputable manufacturers, giving them such extown Railroad Co., 75 N. Y. 192, p. 459.
amination as is practicable and usual among prudent An action of damages for fraud of the defendant carriers using similar vehicles, he is not responsible in inducing the plaintiff to marry and cohabit with for defects not discoverable on such examination, him, by means of false and fraudulent representa- although they might have been discovered in the tions that his first wife was dead, is for injury to the manufacturing. Grand Rapids & Indiana Railroad person, and does not survive. Price v. Price, 75 N. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537, p. 321. Y. 244, p. 463.
CIVIL DAMAGE Act. – In an action under the AGENCY. — A statute prescribed a penalty for sell-Civil Damage Act for injury to means of support in ing intoxicating liquors to any person in the habit consequence of intoxication, a recovery may be had of becoming intoxicated. The defendant instructed where the intoxication caused the death of the inhis servant not to sell liquors to any such person, toxicated person; and in estimating the damages the but the servant disobeyed the direction, without the condition of the family and the estate may be con
sidered, but exemplary damages are not proper. action of its business," may purchase its own stock. Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, p. 409.
Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49 Iowa, 25, p. 140. CONSPIRACY. The eighteen defendants, journey- CRIMINAL LAW.— It is unlawful for the occuman tailors, working for the plaintiff by the piece, pant of lands to set spring-guns or other mischievby conspiracy stopped work simultaneously, and re- ous weapons on his premises, and if the same cause turned their work to the plaintiff unfinished, and death to any trespasser it is a criminal homicide. worthless in that condition. The plaintiff was una- But to authorize a conviction of assault with intent ble to get any hands to finish the work. Held, that to commit a murder, a specific felonious intent must he might maintain an action of damages. Map- be proved; and so, where one plants such weapons strick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390, p. 415.
with the general intent to kill trespassers, and CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. — An act of the Legisla-wounds a particular person, he cannot be convicted ture authorizing the opening of an existing judg- of assault with intent to commit murder. The inment is unconstitutional. Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 tent to kill that particular person alone must be Gratt. 105, p. 716.
shown, and cannot be implied from the general conA statute providing that no person shall recover duct. Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, p. 1. damages from a municipality for an injury from a A receipt for money as part of the purchase-price defect in a highway, unless he resides in a country of a farm is an “acquittance" within the statute of where similar injuries constitute a like cause of ac- forgery, and an indictment for forgery thereof is tion, is unconstitutional. Pearson v. City of Port- good without charging any extrinsic dealings beland, 69 Me. 278, p. 276.
tween the parties. State v. Shelters, 51 Vt. 102, p. A farm overseer is not a “laborer” within the 679. constitutional provision giving to mechanics and A county treasurer, without authority, issued and laborers a lien on the subject of their labor for their negotiated instruments for the payment of money, compensation. Whitaker v. Smith, 81 N. C. 340, p. purporting in the body to be the obligations of the 503.
county, but signed only by him in his own name, The right to exemption from execution is a per- with the addition, “treasurer.” Held, not to be sonal privilege which the debtor may waive, and forgery, the same not “ being or purporting to be such a waiver in a promissory note is binding upon the act of another” within the statute. People v. him. Brown v. Leitch, 60 Ala. 313, p. 42.
Mann, 75 N. Y. 484, p. 482. CONTRACT - A note written and dated in Maine, Where the prisoner, in sport and without criminal but signed in Massachusetts by the wife of a citizen design, aimed a pistol at another, both supposing it of that State, as surety for her husband, and re- to be unloaded, and the prisoner pulled the trigger, turned by mail to the payee in Maine, is a Maine whereby the pistol was discharged and the other contract, and is enforceable in Maine although void was killed, held, no crime. Robertson v. State, 2 Lea, by the laws of Massachusetts. Bell v. Packard, 69 239, p. 602. Me. 105, p. 251
Where an officer had in custody a prisoner charged Where a bank discounted a note, its officers know- with a misdemeanor, and the prisoner trying to esing that the proceeds were to be used for an unlaw- cape, the officer shot and killed him, without intendful purpose, but not intending to aid such purpose, ing his death, he was guilty of manslaughter. Rethe note is not invalid. Henderson v. Waggoner, 2 neau v. State, 2 Lea, 720, p. 626. · Lea, 133, p. 591.
One who finds lost goods which have no marks or The plaintiff agreed, in writing, to serve the de- indications of ownership, and who does not know fendant for three years, as superintendent and man- the owner, is not bound to exercise diligence to asager of his manufactory of clothing, and to devote certain the owner, and is not guilty of larceny in his whole time, attention and skill thereto; and the retaining the goods. State v. Dean, 49 Iowa, 73, p. defendant agreed to pay him therefor $3,000 a year, 143. in equal monthly payments. The plaintiff, with- A corporation is indictable for libel, and the joinout fault on his part, was arrested and kept in jail der of an individual in a separate count is not error. for about a fortnight, during the busiest season, and State v. Atchison, 3 Lea, 729, p. 663. the defendant hired another person in his place. Every man is primarily presumed sane, but when On being released the plaintiff tendered his services, facts are proved tending to engender a doubt of the which the defendant refused. He had been paid in sanity of a person accused of crime, it devolves on full for the time he actually worked. Held, that the State to remove that doubt and establish the the plaintiff could not maintain an action of dam- sanity of the prisoner to the satisfaction of the jury, ages for breach of the agreement. Leopold v. Sal- beyond all reasonable doubt. Cunningham v. State, key, 89 Ill. 412, p. 93.
56 Miss. 269, p. 360. A stipulation by the vendee of a newspaper to The complainant was fraudulently induced by two pay “all of the outstanding liabilities” of the pa- confederates to expose some money in his hand; one per, will not make the vendee liable for the dam- of them then snatched it from him and ran away, ages for libel subsequently recovered against the while the other held him so that he should not purvendor, in a suit pending when the sale of the paper sue, and a struggle between them ensued. Held, was made. Perret v. King, 30 La. Ann. 1368, p. 240. that this did not constitute robbery. Shinn v. State,
CORPORATION. -A corporation, with power to 64 Ind. 13, p. 110. purchase “property deemed desirable in the trans- A statute provided for the punishing of the se
duction of any unmarried woman “of previously chaste character." Held, that “ character” referred to moral qualities and not to reputation, and evidence of reputation was not admissible upon the issue of character, but only to impeach or corroborate testimony regarding particular acts of unchastity. State v. Prizer, 49 a, 53
DAMAGES. — An abutting owner, who does not own the soil of the street, cannot recover for any injury to his freehold resulting from the presence of a steam railway in the street, but only for damages resulting from such misconduct in its management as amounts to a nuisance, as leaving cars standing an unreasonable time, unnecessary noises and dangerous speed. Grand Rapids & Indiana R. R. Co. v. Meisel, 38 Mich. 62, p. 306.
DEED. A purchaser of land is not affected with constructive notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance by the mere fact that he was one of the subscribing witnesses thereto. Vest v. Michie, 31 Gratt. 149, p. 722.
EVIDENCE. - In an action on a policy of insurance on the life of one for the benefit of another, the declarations of the insured, before or after the insurance, are not competent evidence, unless part of the res gesto. Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Morris, 3 Lea, 101, p. 631.
An instrument in this form : " Received of A. $500 due on demand,” is open to parol explanation of its consideration, to show that it was intended as a mere receipt. De Lavallette v. Wendt, 75 N. Y. 579, p. 494.
In the case of a mother, aged sixty-nine years, her son-in-law, aged forty-five, and his two children, aged respectively ten and seven years, who all perish in the same shipwreck, there is no presumption of survivorship. Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78, p. 424.
EXEMPTION. — A partnership is not within the language or intendment of the exemption law, and hence none of the property of a partnership is exempt from seizure on execution. White v. Heffner, 30 La. Ann. 1280, p. 238.
Partnership property is not exempt from execution, before division and settlement of the partnership affairs. Spiro v. Paxton, 3 Lea, 75, p. 630.
GIFT. – S. deposited in a savings bank moneys belonging to her in trust for M. and K., who were her distant relatives. She retained the pass-books until her death, drawing out only one year's interest, and M. and K. were ignorant of the deposit. Held, that the transaction constituted an effectual trust for their benefit on the death of S. Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, p. 446.
INFANCY. — Plaintiff, falsely representing himself to be of full age, bought a wagon, paying part, and giving his note secured by a lien on the wagon for the remainder. After using the wagon until the use was worth more than what he had paid, and until it had depreciated by more than a like sum, he made default in payment, whereupon defendant took the wagon under his lien, and sold it at action. Plaintiff brought assumpsit for the money he had paid.
Held, that he was entitled to recover. Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79, p. 678.
INSURANCE. - Where, in a contract of insurance which covers a storehouse and the goods therein, it is stipulated that should the assured subsequently take out a policy in any other company the assurers should receive notice of it on pain of forfeiting their policy, a subsequent assurance of the house or the goods in another company, without notice to the assurers, will work the forfeiture of the contract with them, whether the subsequent contract was legally enforceable or not. Allen v. Merchants' Mutual Ins. Co., 30 La. Ann. 1386, p. 243.
A policy of fire insurance conditioned to be void for over-valuation is avoided by any substantial overvaluation, whether fraudulent or innocent. Boutelle v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 51 Vt. 4, p. 666. INSANITY. — A widow, in
of her lunacy, neglected to dissent from the provisions of her husband's will within the statutory time. Held, that she might afterward, in equity, claim her rights in the estate as if she had duly dissented. Wright v. West, 2 Lea, 78, p. 586.
JUDGMENT. - A physician sued for services, in a justice's court; the defendant answered, but withdrew his answer, and the plaintiff got judgment without consent. Held, a bar to a subsequent action by the defendant against the physician, for malpractice in rendering those services. Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150, p. 445.
MARRIAGE. A married woman, by the terms of a deed to her, assumed and agreed to pay a mortgage existing upon the conveyed premises. Held, that this made her personally liable for the mortgage debt, and that her grantee, in like manner assuming the mortgage, was likewise liable, and a judgment against him for deficiency on foreclosure was proper. Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103, p. 437.
Equity will enforce a note executed by a husband to his wife, during coverture, in consideration of her moneys received or collected by him. Ac Campbell v. Mc Campbell, 2 Lea, 661, p. 623.
Under a statute which enables married women to acquire, hold and deal with property, and to sue and be sued in the same manner as if unmarried, and relieves all such property, except such as comes by gift from their husbands, from liability to the disposal of their husbands or for their debts, a married woman may maintain an action against her husband on a note given directly to her by him for a valuable consideration during coverture. May v. May, 9 Neb. 16, p. 399.
A divorce was granted in a suit brought in the name of an insane wife, in confinement in an asylum in another State. On a bill on her behalf to set aside the divorce, alieging that it was procured by the fraud of the husband, held, that, whether there was fraud, in fact or not, the law would presume fraud, and set aside such a divorce, no matter by whose advice it was obtained. Bradford v. Abend, 89 Ill. 78, p. 67.
MECHANICS' LIEN. — Although land donated and devoted to public uses cannot be subjected to debts of the municipality, yet a public building thereon,
upon it, which he might easily avoid, cannot be re- th
as a jail, is subject to a mechanics' lien in favor of the note, is not binding. Workman v. Wright, 33 one who built it for the municipality. McKnight v. Ohio St. 405, p. 546. Parish of Grant, 30 La. Ann. 361, p. 226.
One who transfers a negotiable promissory note MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
- A person who volun- by indorsement without recourse impliedly wartarily attempts to pass over a sidewalk of a city, rants the genuineness of the prior signatures, and which he knows to be dangerous by reason of ice that so far as he is concerned the paper expresses
the exact legal obligations of all such prior parties. garded as exercising ordinary prudence, and cannot Challiss v. McCrum, 22 Kans. 157, p. 181. maintain an action against the city to recover for OFFICE AND OFFICER. A county treasurer and injuries sustained by falling upon the ice. Schaefler his sureties are not liable for public moneys of which v. City of Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246, p. 533. the principal was violently robbed without his fault.
Alleys are not primarily designed as streets, but Cumberland v. Pennell, 69 Me. 351, p. 284. simply as a means of local convenience to a limited PARENT AND CHILD. A father
gave his son, ten neighborhood, and a roof twelve or fifteen feet over years of age, to a man of good character and ample and above an alley is not necessarily an obstruction. means, to keep him during minority. The father Beecher v. People, 38 Mich. 289, p. 316.
dying three years afterward, the mother brought A municipal corporation granted permission, by habeas corpus for the child. Held, that she was enordinance, to a street railway company to lay a titled to his custody, although she was poor and dedouble track in its streets. The company proceeded pendent, and he preferred remaining with defendto do so, and expended large sums of money in the ant. Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408, p. 375. work. Held, that the municipal corporation could PARTITION. — The court has no jurisdiction to not thereafter restrict the permission to a single order partition of lands, between heirs of a father, track, it not appearing that the double track would where the petition alleges that one heir is alive and cause any injury or inconvenience. City of Burling- that the mother is pregnant by the father. Gillespie ton v. Burlington Street Railway Co., 49 Iowa, 144, v. Nabors, 59 Ala. 441, p. 20.
PARTY WALL. One owner of a party wall, who NATIONAL BANK, A National bank organized as adds to it for his own use, may maintain an action successor to a State bank may maintain an action to of contribution against the other owner who has foreclose a mortgage of real estate executed to the used such additions, for one-half the value of the State bank as security for a note, and assigned to it additions when made. Sanders v. Martin, 2 Lea, by the State bank on the formation of the National | 213, p. 598. bank. Schofield v. State National Bank of Lincoln, SALE. Where goods are sold for cash, and de9 Neb. 316, p. 412.
livered, the vendor taking the vendee's check for A National bank has no power to deal or specu- the price, which on presentment four days therelate in promissory notes or to acquire title thereto, after is dishonored, the vendor may rescind the conexcept by discount. First National Bank of Roches-tract and reclaim the goods. Hodgson v. Barrett, 33 ter v. Pierson, 24 Minn. 140, p. 341.
Ohio, 63, p. 527. Under the National Bank Act, in an action upon On a sale of goods by a manufacturer for a para note usuriously discounted by a National bank, the ticular purpose, there is an implied warrant of fitamount of the usury may be set off by an accommo- ness for that purpose; but the manufacturer is not dation indorser, although the note does not carry bound to furnish the best that are or can be made, interest on its face. National Bank of Auburn v. but only such as are usually made and used, and as Lewis, 75 N. Y. 516, p. 484.
are reasonably fit for the purpose. Harris v. Waite, NEGLIGENCE. One who signs and delivers a con- 51 Vt. 481, p. 694. tract, in form like a negotiable promissory note, Where goods are sold to one for the use and benbut with a condition limiting his liability, so ap- efit of another, by whom they are received and used, pended as to be capable of separation, leaving an the latter cannot be held therefor merely upon his apparently perfect note, is liable to an innocent in- acknowledgment of the correctness of the account dorser of such note who acquires the same for value and his oral promise to pay it. Hendricks v. Robinand before maturity, after such separation has been son, 56 Miss. 694, p. 382. made by the payee, without the maker's knowledge. SLANDER AND LIBEL. — To charge a physician Noll v. Smith, 64 Ind. 511, p. 131.
with “malpractice” in a particular case is not conA boy, twelve years of age, was injured while clusively libellous in itself, if untrue, but it is for playing on a railway turn-table, left unlocked and the jury to determine whether the word was used unguarded, in an open prairie, where persons fre- in a general and actionable sense. Rodgers v. Kline, quently passed. Held, that the questions of negli- 56 Miss. 808, p. 389. gence and contributory negligence were for the jury. To charge a candidate for a popular office with Kansas Central Railway Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kans. being uneducated, lazy, idle, and ignorant, is not 386, p. 203.
libellous; nor is it libellous per se to charge him with NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT. – A mere promise to being “a social leper” who should be “deodorpay a forged note, when such promise is given by ized.” But otherwise to charge him with being a
, the supposed maker of the note without any new professional gambler, bully, thief and whore-masconsideration, and after the promisee has acquired ter. Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, p. 757,