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neither found nor shown that the officer did, or omit- ble by a fine of not more than $100,” is applicable ted to do, any thing by reason of such act of omis- to a person stopping a train carrying the United sion of the respondent, or that the plaintiff in the States mail, although he has obtained a judgment execution was in any way prejudiced thereby." In and writ of possession from a State court against Vanderhorst v. Bacon, 38 Mich. 669; S. C., 31 Am. the railroad company in respect to the lands about Rep. 328, it was held that the right to exemption to be crossed by such train. Patterson, commiswas not waived by the debtor's failing to claim it sioner, said: “Nor could the fact of want of reand receipting for the goods.
muneration by the relators to such owner, if proven
in the case, enter as an element for consideration In the late English case of Hatcher v. Ball, the
here. The United States were no party to any question of restraining the use of a person's name,
laches by the relators in that respect, nor are they and the publication of a false advertisement, was de- alleged to have been or to be cognizant of or privy cided. The plaintiff was the owner of an hotel at
to that failure by this company, or any preceding Dawlish called Hatcher's Royal Albert Hotel, and organization. In the absence of notice, or of the the defendant owned an adjoining hotel called the fact being brought to their knowledge, they would Royal Hotel. The defendant had married a daugh-be justified in regarding the title of the relators to ter of Hatcher the father, and had since December,
the land on which their tracks were laid to be as 1877, placed over his door “Hatcher's ” Royal Ho- good as that of any other road over which their tel. The defendant had also recently advertised his mails were carried. They found a road constructed hotel as the only hotel at Dawlish having an unin
and in running order, and recognized and used it terrupted sea view. The plaintiff complained of for postal service, just as they do an ordinary highthis advertisement, as his hotel also had a sea view. way. To apply the principle of caveat emptor to The plaintiff had advertised his hotel as having a
them in such cases, and say they were bound to splendid sea view. Pollock, B., said: “Both on
look up the title of every railroad and spur and principle and on the authority of decided cases,
branch, and ascertain if it was clear of claim and there was no sufficient case here calling for the in- cloud, would seem to impair, to a serious extent, terference of the court. As to the first part of the
the efficiency and benefit of the service.” “My motion in reference to the use of the word 'Hatcher,' opinion is that no ultra or decisive steps should have it was clear that word had been used by the defend been taken by the owner at so early a date. On beant without question since the year 1877, and there-ing advised of the facts the authorities of the fore there was no case either for an interim order, or
United States, in equity, would have been comin fact for an injunction at all. As to the adver-pelled to make compensation, or fall back on the tisement, he was also of opinion no case had been bonds of the company. They would have no fair made out for interference. It was no doubt true claim to use the road, upon notice of the facts that the defendant's advertisement would deceive,
shown here, unless by agreement with the owner. and in fact it could scarcely be said that any hotel
But until such notice their right to carry the mail could have an uninterrupted sea view from all its
remained the same as before.” windows. People should no doubt not exaggerate in their advertisements, but it was a question of de
Campbell v. James, U. S. Circuit Court, Southern gree how far any advertisement constituted an ac
District of New York, 3 Fed. Rep. 513, is a decistionable injury. Looking at the question in a rea
ion important to postmasters. The plaintiff had sonable light, would it be said that such an adver
recovered a judgment of more than $60,000 damtisement would constitute an injury, for instance, at
ages against Postmaster James, of New York city, Brighton or any of those towns where nearly all the
for unlicensed use of his patented stamp for cancelhotels would have a sea view? The only question ling postal stamps. The defendant moved for a cerwas, would such an advertisement make any differ
tificate under section 989 of the Revised Statutes of ence where there was perhaps only one other hotel
the United States. That section is as follows: with a sea view? There was here no affirmative
“When a recovery is had in any suit or proceeding statement that the plaintiff's hotel had no sea view, against a collector or other officer of the revenue for and therefore the case did not come within the
any act done by him, or for the recovery of any class of cases of Thomas v. Williams and Thorley's, money exacted by or paid to him, and by him paid etc., Company v. Massam. It was also clear that de
into the treasury, in the performance of his official fendant did not claim any distinctive name so as to duty, and the court certifies that there was probable come within another class of cases, and therefore
cause for the act done by the collector or other offion the whole the motion failed.”
cer, or that he acted under the direction of the sec
retary of the treasury or other proper officer of the In United States v. De Mott, commissioner's court, government, no execution shall issue against such district of New Jersey, 3 Fed. Rep. 478, it was held collector or other officer, but the amount so recovthat section 3995 of the Revised Statutes, providered shall, upon final judgment, be provided for ing that " any person who shall knowingly and and paid out of the proper appropriation from the willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, treasury.” The motion was denied, on the ground or any carriage, horse, driver, or carrier carrying that a postmaster is not an “officer of the revenue.” the same, shall, for every such offense, be punisha- | The court said: “It is clear that the word “reve
nue,' in all these forms of expression, means only furnished that sum to the grantee to support a colthe revenue from customs. The act does not relate orable payment. It also appeared that the patient to revenue from any other source. So far as it re- had been under insane delusions. On these grounds lates to revenue from any source it relates only to the decision is distinguished in the principal case. revenue from customs. The words ' officers of the This is the only hostile decision there referred to. revenue,' in section 12, mean officers of the revenue In Dent v. Bennett, 4 My. & Cr. 269, Lord Chancelfrom customs. The words • officers of the revenue' lor Cottenham said: “A medical attendant obtains in section 989 of the Revised Statutes, which is a from his patient, eighty-five years of age, an agreemere revision or reprint of section 12 of the act of ment to pay him £25,000 for services completed two 1863, can have no different meaning from what it years before, the regular charge for which had been would have had if there had been no revision or re- previously paid; and this privately, without the inprint. Under said section 12 the words other offi- tervention of any third person, and carefully concers of the revenue' would never have been con- cealed until after the death of the patient." "It strued to mean a postmaster. Therefore, they can- was argued, upon the authority of the civil law, and not be so construed in section 989 of the Revised some reported cases, that medical attendants were, Statutes. The revision cannot change the meaning upon questions of this kind, within that class of perof the same words by displacing the enactment sons whose acts, when dealing with their patients, from the connection in which Congress originally ought
ought to be watched with great jealousy. Unplaced it. This is the view held by the post-office doubtedly they are; but I will not narrow the rule, department itself; for in the report of the post- or run the risk of in any degree fettering the exermaster-general to the president, of November 8, cise of the beneficial jurisdiction of this court by 1879, reference is made to this suit, and to the de- any enumeration of the description of persons cision on it, by the interlocutory decree, adverse to against whom it ought to be most freely exercised. the defendant James, and it is stated that “there is the relief,' as Sir S. Romilly says in his celebrated no provision of Federal law to secure 'certificates reply in Huguenin v. Baseley — (from hearing wilich of probable cause to United States officials, other I received so‘much pleasure tha: the recollection of than treasury officials, in cases of adverse judg- it has not been diminished by the lapse of more ments for acts done in their official capacity. This than thirty years) — 'the relief stands upon a genis unquestionably a correct view. For what acts eral principle, applying to all the variety of reladone in their official capacity 'treasury officials' may tions in which dominion may be exercised by one have certificates granted to them, under the statute, person over another;' and when I find an agreement, and whether such acts can ever include the act of
so extravagant in its provisions, secretly obtained infringing a patent, are questions not involved in by a medical attendant from his patient of a very this case.'
advanced age, and carefully concealed from his pro
fessional advisers and all other persons, and have it CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD - PHYSICIAN proved that the habits, views, and intentions of the AND PATIENT.
testator were wholly inconsistent with those pro
visions, I cannot but come to the conclusion that the IN Audenreid's Appeal, 89 Penn. St. 114, A. was medical attendant did obtain it by some dominion
exercised over his patient.” The court also held to the house, but of sound mind and judgment. F. that the agreement was void at law, the money bewas his physician and confidential friend. A. exe- ing payable at death, as it was an inducement to cuted a contract with F., by which, in considera- hasten the patient's death. tion of one dollar and F.'s services in securing cer- Doggett v. Lane, 12 Mo. 215, was a case of a sale tain stock for A., A. agreed to transfer a certain by patient to physician, and there was no proof of interest in the stock to F. F. received thereby inadequacy of price. The transaction was susabout $50,000. A. having died, his executors sued tained. to set aside the transaction. Held, that F. was at Billaye v. Southee, 9 Hare, 534, was the case of a liberty to show that the transaction was a gift; that poor patient, becoming rich, and executing to his a physician is not prohibited from receiving a gift physician a note for £325, an amount greatly in exfroń his patient by reason of the mere relation; and cess of his services, and without the rendition of that the burden of proof of fairness is not on the any account. The court restrained the enforcement defendant.
of the note beyond the amount justly due for serSo far as the burden of proof is concerned, we vices, saying: “No part of the jurisdiction of the are inclined to believe this is opposed to the almost court is more useful than that which it exercises in unanimous current of authority. The following are watching and controlling transactions between perthe principal cases of gifts from patient to physi- sons standing in a relation of confidence to each cian and contracts between them:
other; and in my opinion this part of the jurisdicGibson v. Russell, 2 Y. & C. 104. Here a deed of tion of the court cannot be too freely applied, either real estate from an aged and infirm person to his in- as to the persons between whom or the circumtimate friend and medical attendant was set aside stances in which it is applied. The jurisdiction is for fraud, one of the circumstances in proof being founded on the principle of correcting abuses of that the deed stated, contrary to the proof, a pecu- confidence, and I shall have no hesitation in saying niary consideration, £1,000. In fact the grantor it ought to be applied, whatever may be the nature
of the confidence reposed, or the relation of the ing present, that he was to attend to the acceptor's parties between whom it has subsisted. I take the teeth and supply him with artificial teeth, during principle to be one of universal application, and the life. The acceptor dying before the maturity, held, cases in which the jurisdiction has been exercised that the draft must be surrendered. The court – those of trustees and cestui que trust, guardian said: “In a case of imputed fraud, the plaintiff is and ward, attorney and client, surgeon and patient entitled to ask of the court, as a judge of fact, — to be merely instances of the application of the whether an inference of fraud -- of gross fraud principle.” “It is said that he intended to be lib- arises from the case as Mr. Davis has himself stated eral," " but intention imports knowledge, and liber-it. And I think it quite impossible to ask any reaality imports the absence of influence; and I see no sonable being to draw any different inference from evidence in this case either of knowledge or of the ab- such materials.” Citing Dent v. Bennett. sence of influence; and where a gift is set up between Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483, was the case of parties standing in a confidential relation, the onus of a patient, aged, feeble, deaf, and of very weak mind, establishing it by proof rests upon the party who has bestowing all his estate on his attending physician, received the gift.”
who lived with him and had controlling influence In Pratt v. Barker, 1 Sim. 1, a case of physician over him, for an extremely trifling compensation. and patient, the evidence showed knowledge and The transaction was set aside. The court said: absence of influence, and the transaction was sus- “Owing to the relation which the parties sustained tained.
toward each other, the deed was presumptively the In Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. 8, a patient, suffer- result of undue influence, and therefore prima facie ing from apoplexy and a diseased organization of void for that reason. It has been repeatedly declared the brain, and capable of talking only in monosyl- by learned chancellors that the mere relation of palables, and that with difficulty, executed to the sur- tient and medical adviser was sufficient to avoid the geon of the ship on which he had been voyaging, contracts of the former made with the latter, during and who had attended him, an instrument, giving the continuance of such relation.” Citing Dent v. him an annuity of £100 for his life, in consideration Bennett. The court then go on to say that this prethat he would live with him and attend him profes- sumption is not repelled by the evidence, the subsionally. The Master of the Rolls remarked: “If stance of which is given above. it were admitted that Colonel Popham was of ca- In Crispell v. Dubois, 4 Barb. 393, a will had been pacity to understand, and did perfectly understand, drawn by the testatrix's physician and confidential the nature and effect of these instruments, they adviser, devising him a considerable amount. The could not be maintained by the defendant. On the court said he “stood in relation of special confi8th of July, the defendant was informed by Dr. dence to the testatrix, both as her medical attendant Nevinson that Colonel Popham could not recover, and confidential adviser,” and that the onus of proof nor survive long; and either on that or on the pre- was on him as propounder of the will. ceding day, the defendant stated to Mrs. Popham Story says (1 Eq. Jur., $ 314): “Similar considhis own opinion that Col. Popham could not survive erations” (i. e., as to the presumption of unfairness more than a month or six weeks. When, therefore, and the burden of proof)" apply to the case of a these instruments were executed on the 12th of medical adviser and his patient. For it would be a July, the defendant well knew that he was in fact meager sort of justice to say that the sort of policy giving little or no consideration for so large a gra- which has induced the court to interfere between tuity; whereas Col. Popham must have executed client and attorney, should be restricted to such them in the hope of a prolonged life. Under such cases; since as much mischief might be produced, circumstances it would have been the bounden duty and as much fraud and dishonesty be practiced, if of the defendant to have declined a compensation transactions were permitted to stand which arose of that character, even if Col. Popham had pressed between parties in equally confidential relations." it on him, and had been in truth capable of busi- In Hare and Wallace's note to Huguenin v. Baseley, ness."
2 White and Tudor's Lead. Cas. Eq. 1230, it is In Ashwell v. Lomi, L. R., 2 P. & D. 477, it was said: “A physician is within the circle of confiheld that although there is no rule of law which dential relations while attending on his patients, and forbids a man to bequeath his property to his medi- until the influence arising from this source has ceased cal attendant, yet it is not a favorable circumstance to operate." for one in such a confidential position, with respect This question arose in a case at nisi prius in Engto a patient laboring under a severe disease, to take land, in August, 1880, before Mr. Justice Stephen, a large benefit under such patient's will, more par- in Mitchell v. Homfray. This was an action, brought ticularly if it be executed in secresy, and the whole by the executors of the late Mrs. Geldard, to recover transaction assumes the character of a clandestine a sum of £800, alleged to have been advanced on proceeding, and in such a case the onus will lie very loan by the old lady to Dr. Homfray, but which he heavily upon the party benefited to maintain the claimed to have received as a gift. The judge, in validity of the will.
summing up, said that if one person chose voluntaIn Allen v. Davis, 4 DeG. & S. 133, an aged gen- rily to confer a benefit upon another, to give money tleman had accepted a draft for some £262 in favor (or other things) without fraud, or any undue presof a dentist, the latter averring that it was in con- sure or solicitation, or without intention to defraud sideration of an oral agreement, no third person be- creditors, and if he has a perfectly good title, the property in the money (or goods) is as absolutely The case of Greenleaf's Estate, 12 Harris, 232, transferred as that in goods sold and delivered. cited by counsel, and the only authority relied on Upon this principle a broad and important exception by the court, has no application. The court simply had been grafted by the Court of Chancery. There said: “We cannot agree with the learned judge of are certain relations of life in which one person ob- the Common Pleas, that the gift (for such undoubttains so much influence over another by reason of edly it was) to Mr. Sudards is prohibited by law, as the relationship which exists between them that the against public policy. We know of no rule of law former can hardly avoid being more or less under or morals which will prevent clergymen from retemptation. The relationship, for instance, between ceiving gifts, large or small, even from their parishpriest and penitent is of so delicate a nature, and so ioners, which it seems was not the case with Mrs. Greenliable to abuse, that any advice given by priest to field, as she did not belong to the immediate church or penitent is regarded with a jealous eye and guarded congregation of Mr. Sudards. In this country the by strict rules. The same may be said of the rela- | danger is that clergymen will receive too little rather tionship existing between client and legal adviser, than too much.” and between a patient and the medical man who In Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden, 286, a grant of an anattends him. With regard to this latter relation- nuity, obtained by a dissenting minister having a ship, which was the important one in the present spiritual ascendancy over a woman under a state of case, his lordship said he should follow the line laid religious delusion, was set aside on principles of down by Lord Justice Turner in the case of Rhodes public policy. The report does not show what the v. Bate, 35 L. J. Rep. Chanc. 267, and should tell evidence was. Lord Chancellor Henley delivered a the jury that the law was that if a gift be made by very severe and at the same time amusing opinion, in a patient to a medical man during the existence of which he makes very different presumptions as to the relationship, the gift would be set aside, unless the clergy from those in Jackson v. Ashton. at the time when the gift was made, the patient had We are quite inclined to believe, from the foregocompetent and independent advice with regard to ing array, that in the case of any artifical confidenthe giving of it.
tial relation, like that of physician and patient, the Counsel for the appellee in the principal case cited donee must satisfy the cou on a bill brought to Jackson v. Ashton, 11 Pet. 255. The court there said: set aside the gift, that the donor had competent and “We now come to consider the fourth ground taken independent advice in conferring the benefit, that by the complainants; which is, that from the relation be fully understood the nature of the transaction, which existed between the defendant and Mrs. Good and that no undue influence was practiced; and that win, she could make no valid contract with him. He this rule is independent of age, sex, mental infirmwas her pastor and agent.” “Some years before the ity, and other incapacity. mortgage deed was signed, Mrs. Goodwin did be- As to the application of the doctrine of constructlong to the church under the charge of the defend-ive fraud as between a minor and a person in loco ant; but this relation had ceased long before the parentis, see Berkmeyer v. Kellerman, 32 Ohio St. death of Goodwin; but if this relation existed in 239; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 577; husband and wife, fact, it is not charged in the bill. Does the profession | Boyd v. De La Montagnie, 73 N. Y. 498; S. C., 29 of a clergyman subject him to suspicions which do Am. Rep. 197; Darlington's Appeal, 86 Penn. St. not attach to other men? Is he presumed to be dis- 512; 8. C., 27 Am. Rep. 726; parent and child, Jahonest ? It will indeed exhibit a most singular cox v. Jacox, 40 Mich. 473; S. C., 29 Am. Rep. 547; spectacle, if this court should by its decision fix this affianced parties, Pierce v. Pierce, 71 N. Y. 154; S. stain upon the character of a class of men who are C., 27 Am. Rep. 22, and note, 26; Gilmore v. Gilgenerally respected for the purity of their lives, and more, 7 Or. 374; guardian and ward, Ferguson v. Lowtheir active agency in the cause of virtue. They ery, 54 Ala. 510; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 718, and note, are influential, it is true, but their influence depends 728; grandfather and grandson, Cowee v. Cornell, upon the faithfulness and zeal with which their 75 N. Y. 91; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 428; attorney and sacred duties are performed. Acquainted as we are client, Dickinson v. Bradford, 59 Ala. 581 ; S. C., 31 with the imperfections of our nature, we cannot ex- Am. Rep. 23. pect to find any class of men exempt from human infirmities. But why should the ministers of the
THE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE. gospel, who as a class are more exemplary in their lives than any other, be unable to make a contract
BY ISAAC VAN WINKLE. with those who know them best and love them
II. most ? Their influence, by precept and example, does more to reform the actions of men, and restrain their vicious inclinations, than all the institu
arrangements respecting property,except when there tions of society. And yet we are called upon to
are no special agreements which the parties may make
as they think proper, and not contrary to good morals. denounce this whole class, and hold them incapable They cannot by any agreement change the legal order of making a contract with those who are under their of succession. They may declare in a general manner pastoral charge, and who, like Mrs. Goodwin, are
that they intend to be married under the régime de la distinguished for their piety.” These remarks, it
communauté (possession in common, or under the
dotal system - le régime dotal). In such cases the re will be seen, are obiter, and the case was of con
spective rights of husband and wife and their heirs are tract, and not of gift.
governed by rules under the title of Community of Goods and Dotal System. In default of special stip- tion, in order to contest it. A wife who has obtained ulations which derogate from the system of commun- a separation of property must contribute in proportion ity, or which modify it, the rules hereafter laid down to her means and to those of her husband, to the exform the common law of France.
penses of the household, and to those of the education All marriage settlements must be drawn up before of their children. She must bear these expenses marriage by a notary and cannot be altered after solely if the husband has no means. A wife judicially marriage.
separated, or separated only in property, regains the The communauté, either legal or conventional, begins uncontrolled management of her property. She may from the day of the registration of marriage, and can- dispose of her personal property, but she cannot aliennot be stipulated to commence at any other time. ate her real property without the consent of her husPossession in common comprises all the personal prop- band, or on his refusal, without that of the court of first erty which the husband and wife possessed at the time instance. Upon a partition of the community each of marriage and all that accrues to them during mar- consort or heir takes from the bulk of the property riage, by succession or gift; unless the donor has ex- (1) his or her private property that did uot enter into pressed the contrary.
the community, if it exists in kind, or the property 2. All the fruits, rents and interest of whatever acquired by reinvestment. (2) The price of the reakind, due or received during the marriage, and all property alienated during the community and not rethat arises from property which belonged to the hus- invested. (3) Indemnities due to him or her by the band and wife at the time of the marriage, or which community. The claims of the wife take precedence have accrued to them since from whatever source. over those of the husbaud for property which no longer 3. All the real property acquired during marriage. exists in kind. A wife who renounces the community
Real property (immeubles) is considered as having and its effects forfeits her right to the property of the been acquired in commov, if it is not proved that one community, and even to the personal property which of the consorts was the owner or in legal possession of she herself brought to it. She has a right to retain it before marriage, or that it has accrued to him or wearing apparel, etc., for her own use. A wife who her by beirship or gift. The liabilities of the commu- renounces has a right to recover: (1) Real property nauté consist of: All personal debts due by the con- belonging to her, when not alienated, or the real propsorts on the day when the marriage was solemnized or erty which has been bought as reinvestment. (2) The the successions which fall to them during its continu- price of her real property which has been alienated ance, saving compensation for liabilities relative to the and reinvested without her consent. (3) All the inreal property that belongs separately to one or other demnities that may be due to her by the community. of the consorts. 2. Debts, whether of principal sums, By her renunciation she is discharged from all the arrears or interest, contracted by the husband during debts of the community, both as regards her husband the community, or by the wife with the consent of and as regards creditors. her husband, saving compensation in cases when it is Married persons may modify the legal community of due. 3. Arrears and interest only of such rents and property by any kind of agreement not contrary to debts as are personal to either of the consorts. 4. Re- law. The principal modifications are: (1) That the compairs chargeable to the usufructuary of immovabies munity shall only comprise property acquired in comthat do not fall in common. 5. The maintenance of mon. (2) That the present or future personal property the consorts, education and maintenance of their shall not be in common, or only partly so. (3) That it children, and all other charges incidental to marriage. shall comprise the whole or part of the real property, A husband solely administers the property of the com- present or future, by changing it into personalty. (4) munity, and may sell, alienate or mortgage it without That the consorts shall pay separately debts conthe concurrence of his wife. He cannot bequeath more tracted before marriage. (5) That in case of rethan his share of the community. Penalties incurred nunciation the wife may take back free and clear by the husband for misdemeanors may be recovered from all burdens whatever she brought into out of the property of the community, compensation the community. (6) That the survivor shall have being made to the wife; those incurred by the wife stipulated benefit (précipul). (7) That tho consorts can only be recovered out of the non-propriété (prop- shall have unequal shares. (8) That a community of erty of which the usufruct belongs to another) or her all their property in general shall exist between them. real property so long as the community lasts. The Consorts may exclude from the community all their criminal condemnation of one of the consorts affects personal property which they at present or may in fuonly the delinquent's share in the community, and his ture possess. If they put part of it to the amount of a or her private property. Deeds executed by the wife certain sum or value into the community, they are without the consent of the husband, and even when deemed to have reserved for themselves the remainshe is judicially authorized, do not affect the property der. Upon the dissolution of the community each of the community unless she contracts as a public consort has a right to take back the value of the pertrustee and for the purpose of her business.
sonal property that he or she brought into it at the A husband has the management of all the property time of the marriage; also that which has accrued to of his wife, and may sue solely in all actions that relate him or her since. to her. He cannot alienate her real property without The stipulation by which the consorts, or either of her consent, and in default of due care he is respons- them, bring into the community the whole or a porible for deterioration of the property of his wife. The tion of their real property, whether present or future, community is dissolved: by death; by judicial sepa is called ameublissement (ameublir un immeuble – to ration; by separation of property. All voluntary sepa- change real property to personalty -- an immeuble to a ration of property after marriage is void. A judg-meuble). It is either definite or indefinite. It is definite ment declaring the separation of property takes effect when the consorts declare their intention to change from the day that the demand was made. Private to personalty and bring into the community a particcreditors of the wife cannot, without her consent, ular realty for the whole, or to the amount of a given demand the separation of property. But in cases of value. It is indefinite when it simply declares that bankruptcy or insolvency of the husband, creditors they will bring into the community real property to a may exercise her rights to the amount of their claims. certain amount. The effect of this definite ameublisseCreditors of the husband may obtain redress against a ment is to convert the real property affected by it into separation of property adjudged, and even executed, the goods of the community as personal property. in fraud of their rights; they may even make them- | When the whole of the real property of the wife is so selves parties to the suit, on the petition for separa-converted, the husband may dispose of it as of the other