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and demand the legacy; but it is otherwise where the v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214. (2) Plaintiff, in his petition, condition is subsequent.” Nevins v. Gourley. Opin- asked judgment for $483, with interest at ten per cent, ion by Craig, J.
from a specified date, which principal and interest
would amount to more than $500. Held, sufficient in IOWA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.
amount to authorize a removal. Brayley v. Hedges.
Opinion by Beck, J.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - MORTGAGE, AGREEMENT CONTRACT – VOID PUBLIC POLICY - RELEASE
TO PURCHASE SUBJECT TO, NOT AGREEMENT TO ASWITHOUT CONSIDERATION TO INFLUENCE VOTERS
SUME.—Where a vendee contracted to purchase real ESTOPPEL.-- In an action against a county for services estate “subject to” a specified mortgage, held, that as deputy county treasurer, defendant set up that such he was not bound to accept a deed containing a prodeputy had executed and filed a release for such ser- vision wherein it was stated that he was “to pay as a vices, wherein it was set forth that he had been fully part of the purchase-price of said premises " the specipaid. Plaintiff replied that such releaso was filed pre-fied mortgage, and an action would not lie against him vious to the holding of an election for county treas- for damages on a refusal to accept such deed. Held, urer without consideration in order to induce electors also, that parol evidence was not admissible to show to vote for the then incumbent of the office who was a
that he agreed to assume such mortgage. There are candidate for re-election. Held, that the release could
authorities which hold that if the amount of the innot be avoided, but constituted a valid defense. The
cumbrance is deducted from the purchase-price, court remark: The release imports a consideration,
the vendee is bound to indemnify his grantor against and operates as a discharge of the defendant, unless it the incumbrance, whether he expressly promised to do can be shown that the release was given without con- so or not, for a promise will be implied. Thompson v. sideration. The plaintiff, in order to show such want Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 333; McMahan v. Stewart, 23 of consideration, alleges, and seeks to prove, in effect, Ind. 590; Ferris v. Crawford, 2 Denio, 595. The only that the release was executed for the purpose of brib- | point decided in Townsend v. Ward, 27 Conn. 610, was ing voters, and securing an election to a public office.
that the conveyance tendered was not objected to in It is well settled that the law will leave all who share time, and therefore the vendee was holden. It was in the guilt of an illegal or immoral transaction where
held in Burke v. Gummey, 49 Penn. St.518, that "a venit finds them, and will not lend its aid to enforce the dee of property takeu subject to a mortgage makes the contract while executory, nor interfere to rescind the debt his own; and if, on a sale upon the mortgage, there contract and recover the consideration when executed. is a deficiency which the vendor is obliged to pay on In Inhabitants of Wooster v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 378, the his bond he may recover in an action against the following language is employed: “It appears to be the
vendee.' As we understand, this case only holds that settled law in England, and we are satisfied that it is the property constitutes the primary fund for the payalso the law here, that where two parties agree in vio- ment of the mortgage. This, if conceded to be sound, lating the laws of the land the court will not entertain does not meet the necessities of the case at bar, bethe claim of either party against the other for the cause the mortgaged property has not been exhausted, fruits of such an unlawful bargain. If one holds the and the plaintiffs seek to make the defendant primaobligation or promise of the other to pay him money, rily liable. It has been held by this court that the or do any other valuable act on account of such “sale and conveyance of land with covenants of warillegal transaction, the party defendant may expose ranty, subject, however, to a prior mortgage, does not, the nature of the transaction to the court, and the law of itself and without a further showing, amount in will say, 'Our forms and rules are established to pro- law to a promise to pay off such incumbrance and distect the immocent and vindicate the injured, not to aid charge the mortgage debt. " Johnson v. Monell, 13 offenders in the execution of their unjust projects,' Iowa, 300; Aufricht v. Northup, 20 id. 61; Hull & Co. and if the party who has foolishly paid his money re- v. Alexander, 26 id. 569. These cases are supported pents his folly and brings his action to recover it back, by the following authorities: Binsse v. Page, 1 Keyes the same law will say to him, 'You have paid the price (N. Y.), 87; Johnson v. Zink, 61 N. Y. 333; Strong v. of your wickedness, and you must not have the aid of Converse, 8 Allen, 557; Trotter v. IIughes, 12 N. Y. 74; the law to rid you of an inconvenience which is suit-Comstock v. Hitt, 37 Ill. 542; Fowler v. Fay, 12 id. 375. able punishment for your offense.'" To the same
In Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438, the conveyance effect is White v. Hunter, 23 N. H. 128. This doc- contained covenants of warranty, but the incumbrance trine, which is applicable to cases where the parties was excepted therefrom, and it had been estimated as are pari delicto, inust, a fortiori, apply to a case like a part of the purchase-price, yet it was held the grantee the present, in which it does not appear that the de. was not personally liable for the amount unpaid after fendant was a partaker in the unlawful purposes.
the mortgaged premises had been exhausted. Lewis Harvey v. Tama County. Opinion by Day, J.
v. Day. Opinion by Seevers, J. REMOVAL OF CAUSE - MISTRIAL NOT TRIAL TO PREVENT REMOVAL- AMOUNT. — (1) A case was tried in a TEXAS SUPREME COURT AND COMMISSION State Circuit Court and a verdict and judgment had
OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. for plaintiff. Upon appeal this judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered. Held, that before the new CHATTEL MORTGAGE
MERCHANDISE WITH trial a petition for removal to the Federal court under PRIVILEGE TO SELL. -- In a deed of trust of a stock of U.S. R. S., 8 639. The statute declares that the peti- merchandise, given to secure the payment of promistion and affidavit for removal shall be filed at any time sory notes, the grantors were authorized to retain posbefore the trial or final hearing. The words “ final session of the stock of merchandise covered by it, and hearing" refer to actions in chancery. Vannevar v. to continue selling in their usual course of business Bryant, 21 Wall. 41. The petition must be filed at any until default in the payment of the notes for security time before “the trial;” not before a trial or any of which it was given. Held, that this alone did not trial. “The trial" of a cause cannot mean a mistrial, constitute the deed void as to creditors. The court which counts for nothing. The words refer to that remarked that while there is no doubt great conflict in trial which shall determine the issue of fact in the the decisions upon the point, we are not prepared to case, which is the object of the trial. A mistrial, say that such a stipulation in a deed of trust without therefore, was not in the contemplation of the law- reference to the facts is legal fraud. In our opinion makers. Yulee v. Vase, 99 U. S. 539; Insurance Co. I the weight of authority is against it. To hold that
authority to sell in his usual course of business invali- other than the plaintiffs, on delivery orders signed by the dates the deed would virtually deny to a trader the consignees, the plaintiffs having no knowledge of any right to give a mortgage upon his stock for ever so dealings with the cargo. Held (by Field, J.), that upon short a time, and however inconsiderable the debt resorting to their security, the plaintiffs were entitled might be in comparison with the mortgaged property, to recover from the defendants the value of the goods or however clearly the facts might demonstrate that placed with them under the bills of lading. Meyerthere was no intent or purpose to defraud. Fletcher stein v. Barber, 16 L. T. Rep. 569; Fearon v. Bowers, v. Morey, 2 Story, 555; Briggs v. Parkman, 2 Metc. 1 Sm. L. Cas. 705; Lickbarrow v. Mason, id. 601; The 258; Jones v. Huggeford, 3 id. 515; Hughes v. Corey, Tigress, 32 L. J. 97; Wilson v. Anderton, 1 B. & Ad. 20 lowa, 399. Scott v. Alfred. Opinion by Moore, C. J. 450; Batut v. Hartley, L. R., 7 Q. B. 594. Q. B. Div., (Supreme, March 12, 1880.)
Jan. 23, 1880. Glyn Mills & Co. v. East and West India CONTRACT
Dock Co. Opinion by Field, J., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 90. -SALE OF MERCHANDISE FOR FUTURE DELIVERY - WAGERING CONTRACT, - In order to in- CORPORATION - LIABILITY OF COMPANY ISSUING A validate a contract for the sale and future delivery of CERTIFICATE OF STOCK UNDER A FORGED TRANSFER merchandise on the ground that it is a gambling con- ESTOPPEL. — The registration of a transfer of stock tract, the intent that it should be a mere betting on and the issue to the transferee of a certificate does not the market, without any expectation of actual per- give the transferee as against the company a right by formance, must be mutual and constitute an integral estoppel to the stock. B. & Co. purchased upon the part of the contract. The secret intention of one of stock exchange 5,0001. stock in the defendant company. the parties not to fulfill his contract, uncommunicated a transfer of the stock purporting to be executed by to the other, is not enough to make the transaction C., the owner of the stock, was lodged with the comillegal, nor that it was contemplated by him thereby pany by S. & Co., the nominees of B. & Co. The comto adjust the difference resulting from the fluctuations pany, after making the usual inquiry, registered 8. & in the market price in case of a rise or fall, by making Co. as holders. Afterward B. & Co., having agreed to good, in money, by way of compensation, a guaranty deposit the stock with plaintiff to secure advances, to save the other party harmless against loss, or in like caused S. & Co. to execute a transfer to plaintiffs, who manner to make good the premium on profit to accrue were accordingly registered, and received a certificate to the other in case of advance in prices. Clarke v. froin the company. Plaintiffs subsequently being reFoss, 7 Biss. 540; Lehman v. Strassberger, 2 Wood, 562; paid their advances, had no beneficial interest in the Gilbert v. Gangar, U.S. Circ., 7 Cent. L. J. 41; Wolcott stock, but held as trustees for B. & Co. The company v. Heath, 78 III. 433; Logan v. Musick, 81 id. 415; Hib- having discovered that the alleged transfer from C. to blewhite v. McMorine, 5 M. & W. 462; Porter v. Viets, S. & Co. was a forgery, replaced C.'s namo upon the 1 Biss. 177. Marx v. Ellsworth. Opinion by Walker, register, and refused to pay dividends to plaintiffs, P.J. (Com. Appeals, March 19, 1880.)
or to ackuowledge their title to the stock. In an action NUISANCE
by plaintiffs against the company, held (reversing the - WHEN PRIVATE ACTION LIES FOR OBSTRUCTING HIGHWAY. – Where defendant had ob- judgment of Lindley, J.), that inasmuch as B. & Co. structed a public street which passed along side
were the real plaintiffs, the company were not estopped plaintiff's land, by erecting a fence across the same
from denying the validity of the transfer from C. The whereby access to such land was hindered, thereby company are not bound on behalf of the transferee to depreciating the value of the same, held, that such
make inquiry of the transferor before registering the depreciation constituted a particular injury to plaint-transfer. Ct. App., Dec. 5, 1879. Sim v. Anglo-Ameriiff entitling him to redres3. Frink v. Lawrence, 20
can Telegraph Co. Opinions by Bramwell, Brett and Conn. 118; Francis v. Schoelkepp, 53 N. Y. 152; Stetson Cotton, LL. J., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 37. v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147; Blanc v. Klumpke, 29 Cal. 156; PARTNERSHIPOswald v. Grenet, 22 Tex. 94; Wood on Nuis., ch. 18.
ACT, 1854, S. 11 ARBITRATION Shepherd v. Barnett. Opinion by Gould, J. (Supreme CLAUSE — ORDER OF REFERENCE. A deed of partnerCt. Feb. 24, 1880.)
ship contained a clause that "if at any time during the
said partnership the business thereof shall not be conRECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
ducted or managed, or the results thereof shall not be
to the satisfaction of the said W. A. R. (one of the BILLS OF LADING SETS OF THREE- RIGHTS OF IX- partners), it shall be lawful for the said W. A. R to DORSEE — ENTRY UNDER SECOND BILL- LIABILITY OF give a notice in writing to the other partners or partWAREHOUSEMEN. — The consignees and owners of a ner of his desire that the said partnership shall detercargo to arrive in London indorsed and delivered the mine, and in such case the partnership shall cease and first of three bills of lading to the plaintiffs as a col-determine immediately on the expiration of three callateral security for money advanced. These bills of endar months from the giving such notice.” Held, lading had been signed by the master of the ship in that the power conferred by the clause was one which the usual set, marked respectively “First,” “Second" | W. A. R. could exercise capriciously, and at his own and “Third," and they represented the goods as de- will and pleasure. Where a partnership deed contains liverable to the said consignees or their assigns, that an arbitration clause, and disputes occur between the freight was made payable in London, and that the partners, the mere fact that one partner makes a master had affirmed to three bills of lading, “the one charge of actual fraud against his copartner is not sufof which bills being accomplished the rest to stand ficient to prevent the copartner from insisting on a void.” When the ship arrived the consignees made reference to arbitration, and the court, having regard entry of this cargo, and it was placed in defendants' to the discretion given by the Common-Law Procedure warehouses. The master on the same day lodged with Act, 1854, section 11, ought in the exercise of that disthe defendants a copy of the manifest of the cargo, cretion to allow the matters which have been expressly with an authority to defendants to deliver the goods agreed to be referred to arbitration to be so referred, to the holders of the bills of lading, and on the follow- but secus, if the partner charged with fraud desires a ing day notice to detain the cargo until the freight public examination into the truth of the stigma enshould be paid. Upon receipt from the consignees of deavored to be cast upon him. Dicta of Wickens, V. the second of the bills of lading, the defendants C., in Willisford v. Watson, 28 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 428; entered the consignees in their books as enterers, im- L. Rep., 14 Eq. 572, dissented from; Wood v. Woad, porters and proprietors of the goods, and after removal 30 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 815; L. Rep., 9 Ex. 190, observed of the stop for freight delivered the goods to persons upon as containing the principles laid down in Fisher
EXPULSION OF MEMBER — COMMONPROCEDURE
r. Keane, 41 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 335; L. Rep., 11 Ch. Div. which we are justly proud and which you indirectly 333; and Labouchere v. Earl of Wharucliffe, 41 L. T. question, I take the liberty of explaining. The case Rep. (N. S.) 638. Ch. Div., Feb. 6, 1880. Russell v. in the 45th Conn. unfortunately has not reversed the Russell. Opinion by Jessel, M. R., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. principle established in the previous volume. It is still S.) 112.
the law under which we live here, that the ipse dixit,
“not satisfactory," is amply sufficient to absolve any CORRESPONDENCE.
contracting party, in that class of cases, from all pecu
niary obligation. A coat, for instance, ordered to be DEMURRERS.
made out of blue cloth, may, by the use of this magic To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal :
talisman, with impunity be thrown in the tailor's face, I do not think your correspondent, X, is quite accu
and the author of all evil be left to pay for it. The rate on the subject of demurrers. Before the old
reasons which underlie the purchaser's dissatisfaction Code, the action of a court upon a demurrer was a
and which prompt such vigorous assertion thereof may judgment. 1 Burr. Prac. 208, 249. Although it was a
never be known. Courts and juries cannot pry into judgment, still the court often allowed a party to with this secret. It may be that since being measured, the draw the demurrer and plead, etc., on payment of purchaser has undergone a mental, not to mention a costs. This judgment was interlocutory, if damages physical change, and now prefers a coat of a delicate were assessed ; final, if not. And on this judgment, a
pea-green as well as one of ampler dimensions. Perjudgment record or judgment roll was made up. Id. haps when ordering the coat in question, he was labor233.
ing under the misapprehension that a blue coat, if The old Code also spoke of a judgment as an issue artistically constructed, would have all the effect of any of law, section 278. But in sectiou 349, sub. 2, it spoke other colored coat. Perhaps, too, at the time, he had of an order, sustaining or overruling a demurrer. I extravagant notions as to the possibilities of coats in think that is the first introduction into law terms of general, and innocently supposed that that garment the word “order," as applied to the action of a court alone would suffice for a full suit-- as to-day doth the upon an issue of law.
untutored savage of the plains - and on awakening Mr. Throop's Code has restored the former phrase
from his illusion, exclaims, not less truthfully than ology by speaking of a judgment upon a demurrer. modestly, “non satis est.” Any or all of these good $ 1021. Now it is not quite accurate to speak of an
- and to him, what better? — he may keep order for a judgment. An order is the adjudication of locked forever within his unsatiated breast, and no the court upon a motion. A judgment is the adjudi- process of the common law can force him to divulge cation upon a trial, or on a failure to answer, etc. For
them. instance, if a motion to change the place of trial be
But to give the explanation. The case in the 45th made, and the court orally grants it, the entry in the
Conn. did not touch on any of these interesting points. clerk's records of that adjudication is an order. If a It did not appear by the record there whether the facts demurrer to a complaint is argued and the court on the second trial were the same as those on the first orally declares that the demurrer is not well taken,
or not. No presumption existed that they were the the entry in the clerk's records of that adjudication is
On the contrary, the court enforced the prea judgment for the plaintiff. Very often clerks make sumption that sufficient facts must have appeared in only memoranda in their minutes, waiting until the evidence to sustain the judgment below — there having successful attorney drafts the proper order or judg- been no separate finding of fact on the second trialment as it may be. But the true name of the entry is and the only point discussed and passed upon was not thereby changed.
whether the finding of facts on the first trial was still According to your correspondent's idea, when there existing as res adjudicata, or was destroyed by the is an adjudication on a demurrer, there should be first, order for the new trial. The court took the latter the oral or written announcement of the opinion of position.
T. C. I. the court; second, an order entered in the records of the court; third, a judgment entered in tho same
NOTES. records; and, fourth, a judgment roll thereon. And some attorneys practice in this manner, so that the
E have received the first number of a new law judgment roll contains apparently two adjudications magazine, the Kentucky Law Reporter, a monthly, by the court; one denominated an order, the other a published at Frankfort, under the editorial charge of judgment.
Messrs. J. C. and Frank L. Wells. This number makes Your correspondent says that the clerk enters up a very respectable showing, containing amoug other judgment. But a judgment on a demurrer is the adju- things an article on Rights of Purchasers at Execudication of the court. The clerk's business is simply tion Sales, and the case of Vanmeter v. Estill, concernclerical; to record what the court does. And what ing fraudulent sales, with a note. We welcome the the court does is to adjudge, that on the demurrer, the new-comer, although, like the father of a large and plaintiff or the defendaut recover.
rapidly increasing family, we cannot avoid some I am pleased to hear that your correspondent cannot anxious conjectures as to the support of the last armake judges or opponents understand that his course rival. Kentucky, however, needs a representative law is the one to be pursued. My owu observation has magazine, and we trust that its bar will take care of been that too many lawyers pursue it.
A. the promising publication.
The June number of the American Law Register To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal :
contains, among other matter, an article on Riparian The statement in your JOURNAL of June 12th, in an
and other rights in non-navigable water, by Arthur
Biddle; the case of Sturges v. Bridgman, on easement, interesting article on “Contracts to Satisfaction," to the effect that a Counecticut court, in the 45th Conn: Rosenberg v. Frank, concerning the meaning of pro
with a note by Edmund H. Benuett; the case of Zaleski v. Clark, had sustained a judgment for plaint-rata” in a will
, with a note by C. H. Wood; and the iff, after having reversed a similar judgment on precisely the same testimony, is scarcely accurate.
case of Knaggs v. Green, concerning avoidance of an
And as the article referred to suggests that the counsel in
infant's contract, with a note by Marshall D. Ewell.
- The subject of the prize essay of the New York that case may “perhaps inform us" how so happy yet State Bar Association for 1880 is the following: "What inconceivable a result was effected by legal processes, National legislation, if any, should be had to regulate in the interest of that stability in our decisions of commercial intercourse between the States?"
Albany Law Journal.
several towns and wards of this State to assess the The
same as land to the value thereof, so far as any of
their lines extend through their respective assessALBANY, JULY 10, 1880.
ment districts. I have given the question which
you have presented careful consideration, for the CURRENT TOPICS.
reason, that as far as I have been able to discover,
no decision upon the precise question before us has N connection with our recent article on Contracts been made by any of the courts of this State, and
the question therefore is a new one. I am greatly trary right to be dissatisfied, the case of Lesser v. aided, however, in reaching this conclusion by the Sherwood, lately tried at the New York Circuit of opinion of the Court of Appeals in People ex rel., the Supreme Court, has some significance. Lesser, etc., v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 46, which holds in this lana dentist, sued Sherwood for the price agreed upon
guage: “The term “lands' as used in the statute in for a set of teeth he had manufactured for him. relation to assessment and taxation (1 R. S. 360, $$ Upon the trial he proved the manufacture, almost 1, 2), includes such an interest in real estate as will complete, of the teeth, according to his contract. protect the erection, or affixing, and possession of All that was necessary to finish the job was the buildings and fixtures thereon, though unaccompresence of the defendant in the plaintiff's office for panied by the fee, and such interest with the buildthe purpose of fitting the teeth properly in the ings and fixtures may be assessed to the owner mouth. Defendant repeatedly promised to call, but thereof.' See, also, 74 N. Y. 365, and 52 Barb. 105. invariably failed to do so. The court dismissed the It is also held in People ex rel. New York Elevated complaint. The General Term reversed the judg- Railway Company v. Commissioners of Taxes, dement upon appeal. Judge Barrett, in his opinion, cided by General Term, First Department, and reconcurred in by Davis, P. J., says plaintiff "did aliported in 19 Hun, 460, that'foundations for piers tbat he was bound to do or could do, and the de- or columns placed in a public street by an elevated fendant was liable for such proper damages as re
railroad by legislative authority, whether standing sulted from the breach.” If, however, the contract alone or with columus and the superstructure thereon had been that Lesser should take his chances of are properly taxable as real estate.' If the piers Sherwood's attending to have the teeth fitted, we and columns of an elevated railway, as in the last suppose the holding would have been the reverse. case cited, and the stringers, ties and rails of a horse A somewhat analogous case is Moore v. Robinson, 92 railroad, as decided in the case of People v. Cassity, Ill. 491. A person having been indicted for an al-supra, are 'land' and taxable as such, though in leged offense, his brother paid to an attorney-at-law neither case did the company own the fee of the a sum of money, and also gave him his promissory land upon which these structures stood, it would note for a further sum, upon the agreement that the seem that telegraph posts, piers and abutments and attorney should defend the person so indicted, and
lines are also land and taxable as such. It would procure his acquittal and discharge at a certain speci- seem also from the case of People v. Cassity, supra, fied term of the court in which the indictment was and People v. Barker, 48 N. Y. 70, and indeed from pending, and if the accused should not be released the statute itself, that in all cases the premises are at the time mentioned, the attorney was to return
to be assessed in the name of, and to the company the money
and the note. The accused failed to ap-owning the line and not in any case as 'non-resipear at the term specified to answer to the indictment, so the attorney, without any fault on his part,
The recent decision of the Indiana Supreme was unable to proceed with the trial or to procure Court, holding that the constitutional amendments the discharge of the accused. Held, that the con
voted upon at the election last April in that State tingency upon which the attorney was to be entitled
were not adopted by a legal majority, involves a to retain the money and to collect the note, not
very interesting question, namely, what constitutes having occurred, he was liable to an action for the
"a majority of the said electors of the State.” The money, and could not recover upon the note; but
amendments in question were voted upon at town was entitled to compensation quantum meruit for his services, and could retain such amount out of the elections, and although they received a majority of
the votes cast upon the particular questions, they money he had received.
did not receive a majority of all the votes cast at
the same time for town officers. The majority of The opinion of Attorney-General Ward upon the the court held that they must at least receive a manovel question whether telegraph poles are to be jority of all the votes cast at the same election. assessed as real estate will probably find general | This view is supported by decisions of the Missouri acceptance. The learned attorney-general says: and Minnesota Supreme Courts, but is opposed by a "It is entirely clear to my mind that these telegraph decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. We structures are 'articles erected upon and affixed to shall soon take occasion to review these decisions the land,' so as to create an interest therein, and are, with the care which the question deserves. to the extent of the value thereof, land of the telegraph company erecting them, and as such liable to In view of this conflict of judicial opinion, the taxation. And it is the duty of the assessors of the l ambiguity of the language in question, the charac
VOL. 22.-- No. 2.
ter of the amendments themselves, and the legisla- as venial in Texas. But if this wretch were really tive action in respect to them, we cannot see any insane, then society ought to shut him up, just as warrant for the acc
ccusation, now current in some they would shut up, if they would not kill, a dog newspapers, that this is a “political decision.” The which had once run mad. At least he should be Boston Journal says: “ The amendments affected shut up until it should be satisfactorily established by the decision of the court are seven in number: that his madness had permanently passed away. the first is designed to guard against repeaters and Texas owes some such measure of precaution to political colonizers by requiring a local residence of travellers if not to its own citizens. We have desixty and thirty days before voting; the second rived a high opinion of the criminal jurisprudence strikes out the old provision against negro suffrage; of Texas from our perusal of its criminal reports, the third changes the date of all general elections and we hope that the profession will interest themfrom October to the first Tuesday after the first selves in procuring the passage and enforcement of Monday in November; the fourth strikes out the laws similar to our own, for the restraint of insane word 'white' as a qualifying term applied to citi
criminals. zens; the fifth authorizes the Legislature to grade the salaries of public officers in proportion to the
NOTES OF CASES. population which each is required to serve; the sixth authorizes the establishing by law of courts below the grade of the present superior court; and
N Robertson v. Berry, 50 Md. 591, it is held that the seventh forbids any municipal corporation to
a publisher or author has either in the title of incur an indebtedness greater than two per cent of
his work, or in the application of his name to the its assessed valuation. This provision applies also work, or in the particular marks which designate to towns, counties and the State itself. These it, a species of property similar to that which a amendments were not the occasion of a strict party
trader has in his trade-mark, and may, like a trader, division. Democratic as well as Republican execu
claim the protection of a court of equity against tives had recommended them, and in the Legisla
such a use or imitation of the name, marks or desig. ture they were supported by the entire Republican nation, as is likely, in the opinion of the court, to be membership, and by some of the abler and more
a cause of damage to him in respect of that propcandid Democrats. They were first passed by a Re-erty. This doctrine, in cases where the facts are publican Legislature in 1877, and again by a Demo
sufficient to sustain it, has been held applicable to cratic Legislature in 1879, and were then submitted
such periodical publications as newspapers, magato the people last April and adopted by the follow-zines and almanacs. To entitle a complainant to ing votes:
relief he must clearly show a property right in himFor.
self, and a fraudulent or colorable imitation by the 169,479 | No. 1..
152,363 defendant. A property right may be acquired in No. 2. 177,542 No. 2.
139,002 | the devices, emblems and title-pages of an almanac No. 3. 174,400 | No. 3.
144,812 by adoption and user. The injunction restrained No. 4.. 176,320 | No. 4.
136,279 the publication of “T. G. Robertson’s Hagerstown No. 5. 181,887 | No. 5.
136,177 No. 6.
Almanack,” in imitation of “ J. Gruber's Hagers175,612 No. 6.
141,296 No. 7.. 176,931 | No. 7.
town Town and County Almanack." We are in
debted to the Solicitors' Journal for the following The majorities in favor of these amendments exhaustive summary of the cases on this point: In ranged from 17, 116 for the provision against repeat- Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, the proprietor of “ The ing and colonization, to 49,982 for the provision re
Wonderful Magazine” succeeded in stopping the stricting indebtedness. The vote was duly an
publication of “The Wonderful Magazine, New nounced by Gov. Williams, and the adoption of the Series, Improved.” In Edmonds v. Benbow, Seton, amendments was proclaimed by him in due form."
3d ed., 905, the proprietor of “The Real John Nor do we see any evidence of corruption in the
Bull” was held to be entitled to an injunction to fact that the court delivered their long opinion the
restrain the publication of another paper as “The next day after the submission.
Old Real John Bull." In In re Edinburgh Corre
spondent Newspaper, Ct. of Sess. Cas., 1 ser., I, new In connection with the recent acquittal of Currie, ed., 407 n., the same name was prevented from bethe Texan murderer, we commend to our Texas pro- ing used. In Constable & Co. v. Brewster, Ct. of fessional friends the perusal of Mr. Hopkins' arti- Sess. Cas., 1 ser., III, 215, new ed. 152, it was decles, ante, p. 6, on the Treatment of Insane Crim-cided that “The Edinburgh Philosophical Journal” inals. We cannot understand Currie's acquittal. was interfered with by the publication of a "New From the report of the evidence which we saw, Series of the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal." there could be no serious pretense of his insanity. So in Chappell v. Sheard, 3 W. R. 646; 2 K. & J. His act was that of a reckless, drunken, God-defy- | 117; and Chappell v. Davidson, 2 K. & J. 123, where ing desperado, but he was no more insane than Bu- the plaintiff's song was entitled “Minnie," and those ford, who killed Judge Elliott, nor indeed half as of the respective defendants “Minnie Dale” and much so.
Texas juries of late have seemed dis- “Minnie, Dear Minnie." So, again, where the purposed to do justice and to take care of the com- chaser of “The Britannia” newspaper incorporated munity. Perhaps the killing of an actor is regarded l it with the “John Bull," under the name of “The