known by an alphabetical name: APPRENTICES, ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; INDIANS, etc. So we have a broad title CRIMES for whatever applies to crimes in common and a specific title for each nominate crime: ARSON, BURGLARY, LARCENY.

As practical convenience overrides theory, in classification, there are many variations from the theorem. Some arise from the unwillingness of the compiler to depart too much from the usual methods of classifying. Some are attributable to want of apt, correct names capable of alphabetic arrangement. In many instances (in the Digest), a specific title formed under one class, if it pertains wholly to a specific title drawn from another class, is made a subdivision under it, thus: LEASE, which is assorted as a species of CONTRACT, but pertains wholly to the relation of LANDLORD AND TENANT, is a subdivision under it; and COLLISION, which is a species of WRONGS, but affects only vessels, is placed under SHIPPING. Again, instead of the large titles " Conveyances," "Remedies" and "Goverument," " Deeds," " Practice," and "United States" and "States" are employed in the printed book.

One who should endeavor to assort a pile of paragraphs for an index, by aid of any such theorem might naturally first assort them into eleven piles; one for each category or class, and one for matters which will not well go in either. These last are best dealt with by duplicating them in the two or three classes most germane; in that way they are most easily found. Let practical convenience always override theory. Having now ten classes, the indexer will find some of them none too large. If it is an equity book, CRIMES, if it is a criminal book, CORPORATIONS will be small enough. Those which are too large may well be reduced by considering which species under them occupy much space, and taking what relates to these out for a separate title. It remains to write cross references to the classes and species under the various heterogeneous words and phrases under which a reader, looking in haste and by haphazard, might try to find what he wished.

Different volumes indexed on this plan would not exhibit the same titles; but there might be uniformity enough in method to aid a reader very much in using them all.

A

BENJ. VAUGHAN ABBOTT.

NEW YORK, Aug. 18, 1880.

NOTES.

CORRESPONDENT sends us the following from the Davenport Democrat newspaper: "In May, 1879, the largest meteoric stone ever beheld in America fell on a farm in Emmet county. The farm belonged to Mrs. Colonel C. H. Perry, of Keokuk. The stone lay imbedded fifteen feet deep in the ground for ten or twelve days, visited by hundreds of people, each one carrying off a piece of it. A friend of Mrs. Perry, residing in this city, wrote her asking her if she would not like to have the meteorite stored in the Davenport Academy of Sciences. She replied that it would cost $150 or $160 to get it out and place it upon the railroad train for something would have to be paid the tenant of the farm, who claimed a sort of partnership in the ownership-and if the academy would raise the amount it might have the stone and welcome. Alas! there wasn't a dollar in the academy treasury, and the effort to raise the amount failed. Then a Mr. Berge gave Mrs. Perry $160 for the stone, she supposing that he intended it for an institution in this State-and Mr. Berge gave the farm tenant $50 or $60 for the right of way across the fields. And so Mr. Berge got possession of that stone, and not long since he sold it to the British Museum for $6,500; and there it is to be placed in a glass case and preserved as a celestial won

An American contemporary has been sorely exercised with the question whether nothing can be done to put a stop to Dr. Tanner's exhibition; and after consideration has arrived at the conclusion that "there seems to be no law against a man's making an ass of himself." There is no doubt an insuperable obstacle to proceedings against the doctor on the ground of attempted suicide. He does not want or intend to die, but to live, and as Wightman, J., told the jury in R. v. Doody, 6 Cox, 463, the question to be considered in such cases is whether the prisoner did in fact intend to take away his life. But we may suggest one way in which Dr. Tanner might possibly be visited for his iniquities. The life and limbs of every citizen are under the safeguard and protection of the State, because they may be called on for the service of the State. See Co. Litt. 127b. "Hence," says Coke, “in my circuit, in anno 1 Jac. regis, in.the county of Leicester, one Wright, a young, strong, and lustie rogue, to make himselfe impotent, thereby to have the more colour to begge or be relieved without putting himself to any labour, caused his companion to strike off his left hand; and both were indicted, fined, and ransomed therefor, and that by the opinion of the rest of the justices, for the cause aforesaid." Dr. Tanner has imperilled the life which belongs to the State; could not both he and his abettors be indicted for that offense?- Solicitors' Journal.

Lord Eldon, who has just finished a church at a cost of near $200,000, and lost valuables worth another $100,000 by the hands of Bill Sykes & Company, represents the largest fortune which ever came directly from the law. His great-grandfather, the pet Chancellor of George III and IV-it was not often that they approved of the same man-started with little more than a pretty and shrewd wife, for his marriage compelled him to give up his Fellowship at Oxford, and his father, an old coal-shipper at Newcastle, albeit well-to-do, was not disposed to lavish money on Jack, more especially after he had dared to elope at twentyone with Bessie Surtees. The habits of cheese-paring and flint-skinning which the pair acquired at their start were never lost in after years; and it is well known that when Lord Eldon went back to town, on one occasion Lady Eldon had the shoes taken off his pony, and locked them securely in her desk, to prevent wear and tear meantime. Not only did he save the bulk of great earnings at the Bar, but those also he had as Chancellor, and for some twenty years he had from 20,000l. to 30,000l. a year, for in those days the chancellor was largely paid by fees, which were enormous. Besides all this, the bulk of the fortune of his brother. Lord Stowell, the pillar of international law, ultimately came to swell the Eldons' wealth. Lord Stowell, as judge of the Court of Admiralty during the long war period, positively coined money, aud he too was exceedingly careful of what he got. No member of the family has since been conspicuous for ability. The present Earl, who is grandson of the chancellor, is, like his father before him, a quiet country gentleman, whose voice is never heard in the councils of the nation.-New York Times. — The Pittsburg Legal Journal has changed its form from quarto to Svo., a decided improvement.

The Albany Law Journal.

MR.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1880.

CURRENT TOPICS.

[R. COMPTROLLER LAWRENCE, of the Treasury Department, has made an interesting decision. A joint resolution of Congress provides that employees in the government printing office are to be paid wages for legal holidays on which the office is closed, in cases where other employees of the government are so paid. This, he holds, applies to the case of the 4th of July falling on Sunday, and celebrated and observed on the 5th. He defends this on principles of statutory construction, and by the usage of the government. He observes: "There had been a usage in the government printing office for many years, by which holidays were observed and the employees paid as if they had rendered service. And if a holiday fell on Sunday, the next day was observed and employees paid therefor. Thus, the 4th of July was on Sunday in 1869 and 1875, and the 1st of January was on Sunday in 1865, 1871, and 1876, but in each case the next day was observed and paid for. This usage was subsequently discontinued. The other departments of the government for many years observed and continue to observe the usage which had prevailed in the government printing office. The discontinuance of the usage in the government printing office left the employees therein less favored than those of other departments. The object of the statute was to place all on the same footing, and give like advantages to all rendering service in like manner. The evident design was that no distinction should be made on account of the place of service. Without this construction, the equity of the resolution in some measure fails."

The London Law Times says: "The greatest respect is paid in this country to decisions of American courts and the opinions of the legal press. We are surprised to observe that the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL concludes a comment upon the decision on the writ of error in the Tichborne case with the remark, 'We receive every thing from an English court concerning the claimant with a grain of suspicion.' Our contemporary appears irritated because the Tweed case was not accepted as a settlement of the question in the claimant's favor. We would remind him that respect for American judges does not mean subservience to their opinions." The statement in the first sentence quoted we believe to be generally correct; but the decision complained of exhibited an ignorance of the constitution of our courts and the grounds of the adjudication in the Tweed case that half amused and half annoyed the legal profession of this State, and a flippancy and an impatience that extorted a rebuke even from English law journals. The claimant is generally considered in this country as great a rascal as Tweed, VOL. 22.-No. 10.

A very warm controversy is going on in the Chicago Legal News respecting the use of the word 'garnishee" as a verb. Some lawyer has actually been bold enough to defend this vulgar corruption. We think he must have been retained to do it. It seems to us that there can be no question about the matter. The verb is garnish; the noun is garnishee. Neither Webster nor Worcester gives any countenance to garnishee as a verb. The best reporters, such as Mr. Chaney, use garnish as the verb. In some of the older reports the practice was otherwise. On principle, one might as well say that land is mortgageed, or a note indorseed, as to say that a debt is garnisheed. Our profession make a similar mistake in using guarantee as a noun describing an agreement. The noun is guaranty; the verb is guarantee. We know Webster gives both words as nouns and as verbs, but it is not elegant, for it makes no distinction between the agreeing, the agreement, and the person benefitted by the agreement. The Southern Law Review, in a notice of a recent volume of Wisconsin Reports, speaks of "injunctive" and "evincive" as coinages. The writer justly criticizes the title-pages of reports announcing "cases argued and determined," as tautological, but congratulates this reporter on having ceased to announce that the cases are argued and determined by himself. A little less fear of literature would not harm some of our profession.

The Master of the Rolls is unquestionably a very learned and acute judge, but it seems to us that he is unlike George Washington, who, according to Artemas Ward, "never slopped over." In the recent case of Ginesi v. Cooper, 42 L. T. (N. S.) 751, he held that the vendor of a business and a good will might be restrained from soliciting or in any way endeavoring to obtain the patronage of his former customers. This is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition. In this case, however, the purchaser was, by the terms of the sale, at liberty to use the vendor's name in the business for two years, and the court held that on the vendor's reassuming business at the end of that period, he might be restrained as above. We are not prepared to say that this is wrong, although in the absence of any agreement not to reassume business, we should feel inclined to hesitate about approving it. when the learned judge continues, "but I go further, and say that he must not deal with the old customers," he certainly "slops over." A sale of good will can only bind the will of the vendor; it cannot bind the will of the customers; and if they choose, uninfluenced by the vendor, to deal with him rather than with the purchaser, they cannot be prevented, nor can he be debarred from assenting to their pre

But

ference. Fortunately, the learned judge admits that his remark is obiter. Since writing the above we have discovered that our impression has been verified. The Court of Appeal have maintained the injunction as to solicitation, but have held that as the defendant had not entered into any express agreement not to deal with customers of the old firm who might come to him voluntarily, the injunction must be confined to preventing the solicitation of the old customers. The Master of the Rolls should ponder the scripture, "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," and content himself with just law enough for the case in hand.

"On the bench, lawyers are charged with a higher

grade of function, little more important than their duty at the bar. The bench necessarily depends much upon the bar. A good bar is an essential of a good court. The problems of justice can rarely be safely solved in solitary study. Forensic conflicts give security to the judgment of the law. The world sometimes scolds at the delay and uncertainty of the administration of justice. These are evils essential to our civilization, perhaps to any attainable civilization. But summary judgment is judicial despotism. Impulsive judgment is judicial injustice. The bench symbolizes on earth the throne of divine justice. The judge sitting in judgment on it is the representative of divine justice, has the most direct subrogation on earth of an attribute of God. In other places in life, the light of intelligence, purity of truth, love of right, firmness of integrity, singleness of purpose, candor of judgment, are relatively essential to high beauty of character. On the bench they are the absolute condition of duty; the condition which only can redeem judges from moral leprosy. When I was younger, I could declaim against the enormity of judicial corruption. I could not now. I have no heart for it. The mere words seem to have a deeper ignominy, than the wisest brain and the most fluent tongue could put into other language. The judge who palters with justice, who is swayed by fear, favor, affection, or the hope of reward, by personal influence or public opinion, prostitutes the attribute of God, and sells the favor of his maker as atrociously and blasphemously as Judas did. But the light of God's eternal truth and justice shines on the head of the just judge, and makes it visibly glorious."

The orator spared the "dunces," remarking that "they are altogether too respectable and influential a class to be criticised with safety," but under the head of "knaves" he dissected the pettifogger, the shyster, and the "professional adventurer who trades in judicial favor." Of the latter, he said:

"He is almost always a dunce, a fellow of low intellect and vitality; of meager life; of mean and selfish instincts and tastes, dull of head and cold of

heart; of little passion and no impulse; so cold and clammy, that he might have been a fish; a creature whose lean brain and thin blood, cautious egotism and selfish greed, would fit him, as far as they go, for store or bank or factory, conducted on purely economic principles; but could fill no honest place in a lawyer's office. A quick-tempered or warmhearted rogue could never fill the favorite's place. It requires a fellow of no pity to mitigate his thrift, and of no temper to betray his confederacy. So you find him a grave, quiet, sedate sharper; guarded, formal, presuming, dogmatic, with as little taste for fun as talent for honor. In his intercourse of business, he rarely speaks of his uncle, or father, or cousin, the judge; but he utters no words to client or adversary, in which the judicial influence is not implied, like the verb sometimes in grammar, which gives significance to the whole sentence. He is indignant at the slightest reference to the nepotism. But he is virtuous about expression only, the thing he wishes always understood. It is his stock in trade, his family estate."

This is almost worthy of Montaigne.

IN

NOTES OF CASES.

Smalley v. Smalley, 70 Me. 545, it is held that one receiving a trivial legacy under a will, by which he is deprived of a larger estate as heir, is not to be regarded as beneficially interested under the same, so that he cannot be an attesting witness thereto. The court said: "In this case Bart K. Smalley is not interested to sustain the will, but rather to defeat it." The witness beneficially interested under the will was one gaining by and under its provisions. But an attesting witness who is called to establish a will by which he is divested of his inheritance can hardly be regarded as beneficially interested by it and so interested to maintain it. One losing an estate by a will under which he is a legatee for a cent or a dollar cannot in any ordinary use of language be considered as a gainer-or beneficially interested, unless a loss is determined to be a gain. As is well remarked by Bigelow, C. J., in Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, referring to Haven v. Hilliard, 23 Pick. 10, where it was said to be held that a witness might be incompetent when his interest was adverse to the validity of the will; 'certainly so far as it seems to support the proposition that an heir-at-law, who is disinherited in part or in whole by will, is incompetent as an attesting witness, the case is contrary to well-established principles, and must be overruled.' Undoubtedly, the object in giving this trivial legacy was to guard against the witness taking a portion of the estate under the provisions of section 9 by which a child omitted in the will may have its share of the estate, unless such omission was intentional or such child had had its due proportion of the estate during the life of the testator."

In Ducker v. State, Oregon Supreme Court, A by mistake paid to B a roll of twenty-dollar gold pieces, supposing it to be a roll of half dollars. B subsequently discovered the mistake, and knew, or had the means of knowing, who was the owner,