be said in Mr. Hunt's praise that he made a report. He was the only committee-man who succeeded even so far. Mr. Butler was prevented by the absence of his colleagues and his inability to confer with them, although his report was otherwise ready. None of the other committees had heard from their chairmen. Mr. Evarts, strange to relate, not only made no report, but was not even present, and sent no excuse. Of the papers of Messrs. Bispham and Hyde, we can only say that while Mr. Hyde's subject was well chosen, it seems to us that Mr. Bispham's subject was neither of importance nor of interest sufficient for the occasion.

a

It is evident that the association is not great success, and is not likely to be. Why is it not? Is it because lawyers are not naturally gregarious, or have no interest in these matters, or are intent on their own enrichment and aggrandizement; or is it because of some fault of management? Every other class of men can hold successful conventions clergymen, physicians, dentists, manufacturers, publishers, strong-minded women, Concord philosophers, and fanatics of every description. The "masonic order" will travel a thousand miles for the privilege of pranking about the streets of Chicago and tumbling down in a sunstroke. But it seems impossible to persuade a hundred lawyers to meet in council. We are no better off so far as our own State Bar Association is concerned. We do not believe that lawyers are averse to the counsel and companionship of their professional brethren. We know that they are the most harmonious and sociable of all classes of men. We do not think them particularly selfish. Therefore we are fain to suspect that the cause of this state of things is in the management, but wherein we do not feel called upon just now to offer a conjecture. It would seem obvious, however, that it is better to select for chairmen of committees men who are able and willing to do something, like Messrs. Hunt and Butler, than to put great names on the programme and get no response.

Our correspondents ask us a good many questions which we cannot answer. Now we propose for once to give them some questions. If Dr. Buchanan has committed suicide, can his bail be held? Ordinarily, death of the principal releases the bail, but how is it when the principal has brought about his own default by a voluntary death? Again: if a rescue is attempted, and the sheriff's posse is overpowered, has the sheriff a right to kill the prisoner, is reported to have been done recently in Georgia?

as

what is a table of the like kind with those specified in the statute, according to its true intent and meaning, there are two decisions of this court which seem to settle the matter beyond all controversy. They are, Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694, decided in 1828; and Huff's case, 14 Gratt. 648, decided in 1858. In Wyatt's case it was unanimously held by the late general court, in an opinion delivered by Daniels, J., that 'the distinctive feature in the character of the games called A B C and E O and faro bank, is that the chances of the game are unequal, all other things being equal, and those unequal chances are in favor of the exhibitor of the games or tables. If other games resemble those standard games in that distinctive feature, they come within the terms of the 17th section of the Gaming Act (corresponding with the 1st section of the present Gaming Act), being 'gaming tables of the same or like kind,' and are liable to the penalties denounced against those standard games, whatever may be the denomination of those other games, and whether played with cards, dice, or in any other manner.' In Huff's case it was unanimously held by this court, in an opinion delivered by Allen, P., that ‘an indictment for gaming under the 1st section of chapter 198 of the Code (corresponding with the 1st section of the Gaming Act in the present Code), must charge the playing of one of the games specified; or it must show by averment that the gaming charged is of the like kind as those specified — that is, that the chances of the game are unequal, all other things being equal.' These two cases clearly show that the game proved to have been played in this case was not a game of the like kind with any of those specified in the statute, as it was clearly not one of the games so specified." In Stith v. State, 13 Ark. 680, it was held by the Supreme Court of that State that the owner or occupant of a house, etc., cannot be indicted under the 4th section of the Gaming Act for permitting poker or any of the small games of cards mentioned in the 8th section of the Act to be played in his house, etc., but only for suffering some of the games, tables, cards, etc., embraced in the previous sections to be played, etc., therein. The court said: "An attentive perusal of the statute makes the conclusion almost irresistible that the first seven sections are intended to relate exclusively to the banking games, whether called by the names specified or by any new name or device. They are usually exhibited by persons whose occupation it is to prey upon the community, and who are therefore peculiarly obnoxious to the laws, which design also to punish with equal severity those who allow them to be exhibited in their houses." In Kennon v. King, 2 Mont. 437, the court held that poker was a game of chance, and they would take judicial notice of it.

In Smith v. Schooner "J. C. King," U. S. District Court, 10 Pitts. Leg. Jour. 274, it was held that a seaman upon a schooner in the harbor of Frankfort, Michigan, where she was towed to receive a cargo of lumber, cannot refuse to work on Sunday in

loading the schooner where the towing vessel is not able to enter the harbor by reason of an insufficiency of water, but is lying outside in the lake awaiting the schooner and is in a place of danger. Where the master of the schooner was of opinion that it was necessary for the safety of the towing vessel that the loading of the schooner (begun on Friday) should be completed on Sunday, and ordered the work to be done, it was the duty of the crew to obey, and a seaman refusing to work on Sunday was rightfully expelled from the schooner and forfeited his wages for his disobedience. The court said: "I am satisfied from all the evidence, that with reference to the situation of the Davidson, there was reasonable necessity for the Sunday labor which the libellant was called upon to perform. It was, however, for the master of the King, under the then existing circumstances, to determine whether the work of loading the schooners was necessary for the safety of the Davidson, and obedience to his orders was the plain duty of the libellant. It was not for him to set up his judgment against that of the master. That it was Sunday was no excuse for his refusal to perform the duty required of him (The Richard Matt, 1 Biss. 440), and I am of opinion that the master of the King had a clear right to discharge the libellant for his disobedience. Had these four rebellious seamen been permitted to remain on board, their spirit of insubordination might have infected the rest of the crews." To the same effect, Leslie v. Mackie, 21 Alb. L. J. 425.

American Insurance Co. v. Foster, 92 Ill. 334, is a curious case of vacancy within the meaning of an insurance policy. The insurance was on premises described as a school-house. There was the usual condition against vacancy. The school was discontinued, and the building was subsequently occupied as a dwelling, until April, and was then vacant until the 14th of October, when it was burned, while unoccupied. It was held that the insurance was forfeited. The court said: "It is, however, contended that as the building was insured as a schoolhouse, and the company knew it was to be so used, it may be inferred that it was intended to be vacant and unoccupied as common public school-houses usually are in vacation; that all know that the common public school-houses of the country are not continuously occupied, and it must be inferred that occupancy of that character was intended. If such had been the intention of the parties, they would no doubt have so written the condition. And the bare reading of the language repels such an inference. The language requires a continuous and uninterrupted occupancy, at least of the character usual to houses occupied for schools. It may be and probably is true, that there being no person in the building of nights and Saturdays and Sundays would not amount to a breach of the condition and avoid the policy, as such is the usual manner of occupying school-houses. But the most strained construction cannot go beyond that, so as to hold that it need not be occupied as a school or as a residence for

several months." In the absence of any condition against change of occupation, we should say this limitation of the vacancy to nights, Saturdays, and Sundays, is wrong, for the insurers must have contemplated the usual vacancy for several months during vacation. But the length of the vacancy here probably takes the case out of that rule, for the building was unoccupied even within its customary use as a school-house. In Whitney v. Black River Ins. Co., 72 N. Y. 117; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 116, it was held that the temporary discontinuance of a saw-mill, on account of low water, diminished custom, or derangement of machinery, did not amount to a breach of the condition against vacancy. "It is to be construed in view of the character and situation of the property insured, and the contingencies affecting its use, to which this and other property of like character, similarly situated, is subject.” "Take the case of the insurance of a church building, school-house, or cider-mill. Would the fact that the church was closed for six days consecutively each week be a violation of the condition in question, or would the school-house in vacation time, or the cider-mill when no apples were to be had, be without the protection of the policy?"

W

ESCAPE.

E have long thought that to punish a prisoner for escape is a refinement of cruelty. To escape from restraint is an instinctive impulse. We see it in the smallest children. Man but obeys his natural promptings in breaking jail. Why should society punish him for it? Why should an officer of justice be justified in pounding to a jelly or in shooting to death an escaping prisoner, charged with felony, if he cannot otherwise prevail on him to stay? Why may not society just as logically punish him for not having voluntarily given himself up to justice, as for trying to get away when justice has overtaken him? If a man cruelly whips a runaway horse, or tortures a squirrel recaptured after escape from his revolving cage, or a runaway dog which sees preparations for putting him to churn, Mr. Bergh will be on his track very quickly. Why punish a man for himself obeying the same instincts? It may be said, because he knows better than to escape. We should rather say, he knows better than to stay to be caught or punished.

The foregoing may sound like a mid-summer jest to old lawyers, but we are deadly serious. We have good backing, too. Dr. Wharton says, 2 Crim. Law, § 1678, note: "Whether, in a humane jurisprudence, the unresisted escape of prisoners from custody is a punishable offense, may well be doubted. The later Roman common law holds that it is not. The law of freedom, so argue eminent jurists, is natural; the instinct for freedom is irrepressible; if the law determines to restrain this freedom, it must do so by adequate means; and it cannot be considered an offense to break through restraint when no restraint is imposed. Undoubtedly it is a high phase of Socratic heroism for a man condemned to

death or imprisonment, to walk back, when let loose, to be executed or imprisoned. But the law does not undertake to establish Socratic heroism by indictment. It would not be good for society that the natural instinct for self-preservation should be made to give way to so romantic a sentiment as is here invoked; and it is a logical contradiction to say that the scaffold and the cell are to be used to prove that the scaffold and the cell are of no use. If men voluntarily submit to punishment, then compulsory punishment is a wrong. Besides this, a jailer may argue that if we hold that a prisoner is under bonds as much when he is let loose as when he is locked up, there is no reason for over-carefulhess in locking up. Following these views, the conclusion has been reached that an unresisted escape is not per se an indictable offense, and this view has been adopted by all modern German codes. The English decisions on this point may be too firmly settled to be now shaken; but considerations such as those which have been mentioned may not be without their use in adjusting the punishment on convictions for unresisted escapes."

It seems to us more reasonable to reward a prisoner for staying quietly and obediently in jail, as some States now do, than to punish him for running away. If it is cruel to punish a man for breaking jail, what shall we say of punishing his wife for aiding him?

The law is guilty of cruelty quite worthy of the inquisition in this regard. For example, an imprisoned convict went by permission of his keeper about the land connected with the jail, went to market and brought back provisions for the inmates of the jail, cooked food for them in the kitchen of the dwelling-house attached to it, went to the adjacent barn and there fed and milked the cow, and from the barn departed and left the State. Held, a criminal escape. Riley v. State, 16 Conn. 47. What a cat-and-mouse-play doctrine is this! Even if the jail is so unhealthful and filthy as to endanger his life, he is punishable for breaking out. State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439. "The necessity, to excuse,' say the court, "must be real and urgent, and not created by the fault or carelessness of him who pleads it." He should have “exhausted the lawful | means of relief in his power before attempting the course pursued. It was not shown or claimed that he had ever complained to the sheriff or the board of county commissioners, or that he had ever endeavored to obtain relief by any lawful means. Well, suppose he had complained, and his complaints had not been heeded, he could not help himself. So held in Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 83 Ill. 341; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 397; People v. Same, 84 Ill. 303; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 461. In these cases there was a disclosure of frightful filth and unhealthfulness, but the Court of Chancery in the first case said the prisoner had a remedy at law, and they would not enjoin the use of the jail; and in the latter the court of law said that they could not compel the supervisors to provide a suitable jail, so long as they provided any. So the prisoner had to stay until the bugs should carry him out. It is a

comfort, however, to know that if the jail takes fire he is not bound to stay and be burned to death; 2 Whart. Crim. Law, § 1676; and that he may go to a necessary, in the yard, at night to attend call of nature, if there are no accommodations in the jail. Pattridge v. Emmerson, 9 Mass. 122. But he cannot go for this purpose to the yard unless there is a necessary in it. McLellan v. Dalton, 10 id. 191. The two last were cases of imprisonment on civil process.

But he is bound to stay in jail even if he is innocent. So held in State v. Lewis, 19 Kans. 260; S. C., 27 Am. Rep. 113. The prisoner, awaiting trial on a criminal charge, escaped, and being rearrested, was tried and acquitted of that charge. Then they tried him for escape, and held that he could not plead his acquittal of the main charge as a defense. "He escaped before conviction,'" say the court. "When a party is in legal custody, and commits an escape, we do not think that it depends upon some future contingency whether such an escape is an offense or not." Perhaps so, if you try him for the escape first, but if it is first demonstrated that he is innocent of the main charge, and consequently had a legal right to go free, why punish him for going free without awaiting the legal demonstration? In People v. Washburn, 10 Johns. 160, the prisoner was held not indictable for aiding the escape of one indicted on suspicion of having been accessary to the breaking" of a certain house, "with intent to commit a felony," because no distinct felony was thus charged. But according to the Kansas court the escaping prisoner must have waited to have the indictment quashed.

And finally, to cap the climax of absurdity, the law holds that a prisoner has escaped when he has not actually escaped, but has the means of escape, as where, on civil process, the sheriff committed a jailer to his own jail, of which he continued to hold the keys, but where he remained. Steere v. Field, 2 Mass. 486. Under this doctrine St. Peter would have been indictable for escape, although he did not offer to go, and assured the jailor, "we are all here." So in this case the law holds the prisoner to blame for not following the instincts of nature, and availing himself of the opportunity to set himself free.

LIMITED LIABILITY OF SHIP-OWNERS.

I.

THE large number of marine disasters at sea, in

waters near our coast and in our harbors, during the present year, has induced frequent reference to the United States statute limiting the liability of shipowners in such cases. Act March 3, 1851, vol. 9, p. 635, SS 1, 3, 4, 5, 7; U. S. R. S., §§ 4282-4286, 4289. A review of the decisions in this country and in England, on some of the questions that have arisen under this and similar statutes, may not be unprofitable to the profession.

By the civil law, the owner of a vessel, or exercitor, was personally bound for all the acts of the master, as well ex delicto as ex contractu, falling within the range of his authority as master. If there were several exercitors, each was bound in solide for the full amount of the obligations of the master arising ex contractu;

but for obligations ex delicto each was bound only for his part, in proportion to the interest he had in the ship. The Rebecca, Ware, 194, 195.

But Judge Ware was of opinion that so early as the compilation of the Consolato del Mare, which embodied or became the maritime law of the Mediterranean powers, the principle was established that ship-owners were not liable either for the contracts or torts of the master, beyond their interest in the vessel. Ware, 196. And by the end of the seventeenth century that principle seems to have been so generally adopted by the maritime nations of Continental Europe, as to be fairly considered a part of their general maritime law. Machlachlan on Shipping, 110; Ware, 196-198. Whether it is now modified by legislation, and if so, to what extent, we have not attempted to ascertain.

But this principle was never adopted in England until established by act of Parliament; and in the absence of any legislation on the subject, it was never doubted that the responsibility of the ship-owner was co-extensive with the loss sustained.

The first act of Parliament on the subject was passed in 1734 (7 Geo. II, ch. 15), and limited the liability of the owner to the value of the vessel and freight in case of embezzlement, etc., of the goods and merchandise on board," or for any act, matter or thing, damage or forfeiture done, occasioned or incurred" by the master or mariners, without the privity and knowledge of the owners.

Further acts were passed for the benefit of shipowners in 1786 (26 Geo. III, ch. 86), and in 1813 (53 Geo. III, ch. 159); and these three acts were in force at the time of the passage of the act of Congress in 1851.

They were subsequently repealed, after the passage of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 and 18 Vict., ch. 104), which was amended in 1862 by act 25 and 26 Vict., ch. 63, § 54.

The courts of the United States, from the earliest period down to the passage of the act of 1851, both in admiralty and common-law causes, while fully recognizing the limited liability allowed in Continental Europe, refused to admit it here, and held the shipowner personally for the full amount of the damage done, without regard to the value of his interest in the vessel. Del Col v. Arnold, 3 Dall. 333; The Amiable Nancy, 1 Paine, 111, 118; Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, 480, 492; Hale v. The Washington Ins. Co., 2 id. 176; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 435.

Therefore in all cases to which the law of this country applies, the ship-owner can only exonerate himself from liability, in the cases mentioned in the statutes, by bringing himself within its terms.

The United States statute is not expressly made applicable to foreign vessels. By the terms of the English act of 1862, "the owners of any ship, whether British or foreign,' are entitled to its benefit.

Under the earlier acts, which did not contain this provision, the question was much discussed, in what cases, if any, the owners of foreign vessels could take advantage of the law. The opinions and arguments of the judges will be best given in their own words.

The case of The Carl Johan, in 1821, before Lord Stowell, cited 1 Hagg. 113; 3 id. 186, was a case of collision off the coast of Norfolk, between a Swedish vessel, the Carl Johan, and a British ship. The Carl Johan was adjudged in fault, and the owners claimed the benefit of the act of 53 Geo. III, ch. 159.

According to the citation in 1 Hagg. 113, where the case was cited by counsel, before Lord Stowell himself, after alluding to the ancient rule of full responsibility of the ship-owners, he said: "But the avowed purpose of the relaxation of this rule of law was to protect the interests of those engaged in the mercantile shipping of the State, and to remove the terrors which would otherwise discourage people from embarking in the

maritime commerce of a country, in consequence of the indefinite responsibility which the ancient rule attached upon them. It was a measure evidently of policy, and established by countries for the encouragement of their own maritime interests." The court held that it was a law as to British ships but not as to foreign ships, nor for foreign owners, and that therefore the owners of the Carl Johan were not entitled to its benefits.

In the reference to the case in 3 Hagg. 186, the decision is stated to have been put upon the different ground, "that with reference to foreign vessels, the act only applied in cases where the advantages and disadvantages of such a rule were common to them and British vessels; that if all States adopted the same rule there would be no difficulty, but that no such general mutuality was alleged; that if the law of Sweden adopted such a rule, it would apply to both countries, but that Sweden could not claim the protection of that statute without affording a similar protection to British subjects in similar cases."

Perhaps each of these reports is partially correct; and Lord Stowell may have put his decision on the ground first stated, with the proviso that if it had been shown that Sweden had enacted and applied a similar law in favor of British ships, he would have allowed the Carl Johan the benefit of the act.

But it will be seen hereafter that Dr. Lushington expressly repudiated this latter doctrine, in a case where the question was directly raised, and held that the court could not administer the statute on the principle of reciprocity, without an act of Parliament or a treaty.

The case of the Carl Johan has been criticised on the ground that by a general clause, the act 53 Geo. III, ch. 159, applied only to registered British ships; as to which see the remarks of Vice-Chancellor Wood, 4 Kay & Johns. 378.

Cope v. Doherty (1858), 4 Kay & Johns. 367, arose out of a collision between two American ships on the high seas. Proceedings had been commenced against the plaintiffs' vessel in admiralty, p. 381. Thereupon they filed their bill in chancery, as allowed by the British statute, admitting their liability for the collision, but claiming to have it limited to the value of their ship and its freight. Several of the defendants demurred to the bill, and some of the defendants, who demurred, were British subjects.

Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood said: “In construing any act of the Legislature, the verbal construction of the particular section in question, if it be plain and simple, must govern the court in arriving at its conclusion. If there be any degree of doubt or difficulty upon the wording of the particular section in question, the court is entitled to look, first at the eircumstances attending the passage of the act, next at the preamble, so far as it affords any indication which may serve as a key to the interpretation of the act, and then, I may add, to the whole purport and scope of the act, to be collected from its various clauses, other than the particular clause, the meaning of which is in dispute.

"Now as regards the construction of the particular section here in question, I apprehend there can be no doubt, that if we were simply dealing with an act of our own Legislature, relating to shipping, there would be a clear presumption a priori that the act referred simply to the ships of our own country, it being the plain and obvious rule, in construing the enactments of any Legislature, that the Legislature of each independent country must be supposed to deal with those subject-matters which are within its own control and jurisdiction. As Dr. Lushington expresses it, in the case of The Zollverein, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 429, ‘in looking to an act of Parliament with reference to such a question as I am now discussing, viz., as to whether it is in

tended to apply to foreigners or not, I should, in endeavoring to ascertain the construction of the act, always bear in mind the power of the British Legislature; for it is never to be presumed, unless the words are so clear that there can by no possibility be a mistake, that the British Legislature exceeded that power, which according to the law of the whole world properly belonged to it. The power of this country is to legislate for its own subjects all over the world and as to foreigners within its jurisdiction, but no further. Prima facie, therefore, it would not be the true construction of the clause presented for my consideration that it is applicable to foreign ships on the high seasmatters in themselves entirely beyond the jurisdiction and scope of the Legislature of this country.'

"However, there are other clauses of this act of Parliament by which foreign vessels may occasionally be affected, and which may make it advisable to call in aid those additional guides to which I have referred for arriving at the true construction, namely, the general circumstances under which the act was passed, and the preamble of the act."

After showing that the preamble which recited merely that "it is expedient to amend and consolidate the acts relating to merchant shipping," shed little or no light on the question, and referring to the decision of Lord Stowell in The Carl Johan, the vice-chancellor proceeds:

"The general law, however, which is there laid down by Lord Stowell, seems to me to be very material in coming to a conclusion as to the object of the present statute, framed as it is by way of consolidation of the law as it existed when the act was passed.”

He then argues that the general law, or law of nations, with regard to injuries of this description, has provided for full compensation to the injured party; and that a construction of the statute which would restrict the rights of foreign owners under this general law, whenever run down by a British ship upon the high seas, would be the last construction he ought to adopt.

As regards this part of the opinion, it is to be remarked that unless it has reference to the "general law" as administered in British courts, and the rights of foreigners therein, it seems to be founded on a misapprehension, the general maritime law on the continent being different, as we have seen.

After showing how unjustly such a construction of the act might operate against nations with a small marine and employing a small class of vessels, the vicechancellor proceeds to consider the application of various other provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act to foreign vessels. He then says:

"In the case before me it is damage done by one American ship to another American ship on the high seas. Now hitherto I have considered only the question as between a ship of this country and a ship of a foreign country. Even in such a case, it appeared to me, as I have said, that it would be beyond the province of the Legislature of this country, and unreasonable and inequitable to legislate; but to suppose that the Legislature of this country had it in contemplation to restrict the natural rights I have referred to as between two ships, both belonging to foreign countries, on the high seas, would be still more startling than to presume that it intended to deal with foreigners in a case where those who are affected by the act of such foreigners are British subjects, and amenable therefore to the acts of the Legislature." P. 383.

"It was contended upon this part of the case that the lex fori should prevail upon those general grounds upon which the lex fori has been held to operate. But it is clearly laid down by Dr. Lushington in the case of The Zollverein, citing with approbation Mr. Justice Story's work on the subject (Coufl. of Laws, 558), that although the lex fori has application to every thing

concerning the form of the procedure with regard to the substance of the proceeding, it has no application whatever. And clearly an act which limits the damages to which the ship-owner is to be liable, under circumstances like the present, deals with the substance and not the form of the procedure."

The opinion concludes: "I have not commented upon what was alleged in the argument in support of the bill, that the American law is identical with our own upon the point in question, because that is not averred upon the bill, and not being averred, I cannot take cognizance of it. If that were averred and proved, a case of a different description might arise between the plaintiffs and such if any of the defendants as may be Americans. I should be competent to administer American law between Americans coming here for relief.

"As regards such of the defendants who have demurred, as are English, it will be useless to amend; for as against them no amendment will better the plaintiff's case. ** ** As regards such of them as are English I entertain no doubt."

The demurrer being allowed, the plaintiffs appealed, and after argument the appeal was dismissed by the lords justices. 2 De Gex & Jones, 614.

Knight Bruce, L. J., said he was of opinion, considering the state of the law of England immediately before the passing of the act, and considering the context, that the court ought not to construe the "limited liability sections as applying to the case. He expressly declined to say whether the plaintiffs would have been right or wrong if one of the two ships had been British, or if the collision had happened in a British river or port."

*

Turner, L. J., said: "The words of these sections are no doubt wide and extensive. * * But it is not because general words are used in an act of Parliament, every case which falls within the words is to be governed by the act. It is the duty of courts of justice so to construe the words as to carry into effect the meaning and intention of the Legislature."

"This is a British act of Parliament and it is not, I think, to be presumed that the British Parliament could intend to legislate as to the rights and liabilities of foreigners. In order to warrant such a conclusion, I think that either the words of the act ought to be express, or the context of it ought to be very clear."

"Another consideration, which, as it seems to me, bears strongly upon the general words of these sections of the act, is, I think, furnished by considering the source from which these sections are derived. They are plainly taken from 53 Geo. 3, ch. 159, and the prior acts on which that statute was founded, and those acts had, before the passing of this act, been decided not to apply to foreign rights. The Legislature cannot be supposed to have been ignorant of that decision at the time this act was passed, and it cannot, I think, be imputed to it, that with that knowledge it intended to alter the law on this important question without some more definite expression of that intention.

"But what seems to me to be more decisive upon the subject is the context of the act. If the 504th section (corresponding to § 4283, U. S. Rev. Stats.), reaches the case of a collision between foreign vessels owned by foreigners, the 503d section (see § 4281, U. S. Rev. Stats.) must also reach that case, and then we must suppose that the British Parliament meant by this act to legislate upon the questions what should be inserted in the bills of lading of foreign shippers and what should be declared by them to the masters of the vessels on board which their goods were shipped." "An attempt was made on the part of the appellants to bring this case within Don v. Lipman, and cases of that class (on the lex fori); but I think those cases have no bearing upon the point. This is a question of liability, and not of procedure."