undistinguishably. Under insolvent proceedings, a receiver was appointed. Held, (1) that such an institution is a mere trustee for the benefit of the depositors. (2) That a depositor who borrowed money from the bank, secured by his note or mortgage, cannot offset his debt against the amount of his deposit at the time when the decree of insolvency was made. (3) That the so-called "special" depositors are not entitled to priority in payment over the other class of depositors. (4) That debts and expenses contracted by the bank in carrying on its ordinary business, are to be preferred. (5) That a claim, under a covenant in the lease, for rent accruing after the surrender of the premises to the lessor by the receiver, cannot be maintained. (6) That money paid to the bank in exchange for its check, given for the accommodation of the payee, which was dishonored, presumably went into the funds, and the debt should be preferred. (7) That checks given to depositors, on account of deposits, are not to be preferred. Newark Sav. Inst. v. Case, 1 Stew. 552; Grant on

Banking, 614; Huntington v. Sav. B'k, 6 Otto, 388; Corte v. Soc. for Sav., 32 Conn. 173; Bunnell v. Collinsville Sav. Soc., 38 id. 203; Osborn v. Byrne, 43 id. 155; Pratt v. Levan, 1 Miles, 358. New Jersey Court of Chancery, Feb. Term, 1880. Stockton, Atty. -Gen., v. Mechanics & Laborers' Savings Bank. Opinion by Runyon, Chancellor.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

COVENANT -BY TENANT TO PAY TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. The plaintiff, as owner of certain premises in the borough of Brighton, was summoned by the urban sanitary authority of the borough for not complying with a notice to abate a nuisance thereon occasioned by defective sewage, and for that purpose to make drainage communication with the common sewer. On the hearing of this summons, an order was made directing the plaintiff to execute the works in question, under section 96 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vict., ch. 55), which he accordingly did. The defendant was tenant of the premises under a lease by which he covenanted (inter alia) to "pay and discharge * all taxes, rates, duties, and assessments whatsoever

* *

* *

therefore was not liable. Ct. Appeal, March 16, 1880. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. London & Provincial Supply Association Limited. Opinions by Bramwell, Baggallay and Thesiger, L. JJ., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 569. (Subsequently affirmed in House of Lords.)

PARTNERSHIP — AUTHORITY OF PARTNER-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. One of two partners must be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have authority to make a payment on account of a debt due by the firm, so as to take the debt out of the statute of limitations as against the other. A, one of the partners in a firm, gave instructions to their solicitor to put in force and realize a bill of sale held by the firm, and to place the proceeds when received "to the account of the firm," who were then indebted to the solicitor for his bill of costs. The solicitor having sued the two partners for the balance of his bill of costs, B pleaded the statute of limitations. Held ion), that there was sufficient evidence for the jury of (affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Divisa part payment so as to take the case out of the statute of limitations as against B. Ct. of Appeal, March 12, 1880.

568.

Goodwin v. Parton & Page, 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)

WILL TAKES EFFECT AS TO TESTATOR'S ESTATE AT DEATH CONSTRUCTION. A testator devised and bequeathed all his property to trustees for his wife and children and a few months afterward executed a separation deed, reserving to himself a power of appointment by will over one-third of his property, and declaring trusts of the remainder for his wife and children. Held, that the will, speaking as to the estate comprised in it as from the testator's death, was a good execution of the power; and that the separation deed and the circumstances could not be looked at to collect from them an expression of a contrary intention. Re Ruding's Settlement (L. Rep. 14, Eq. 266) questioned. Decision of Malins, V. C., reversed. Thomas v. Jones, 2 J. & H. 475. Ct. of Appeal, March 12, 1880. Boyes v. Cook. Opinions by James, Brett and Cotton, L. JJ., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 556.

DENED COURTS.

-

the cost of executing the above works. Rawlins v. Briggs, L. R., 3 C. P. D, 368; Thompson v. Lapworth, 17 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 507; Cross v. Raw, L. R., 9 Ex. 209; Hartly v. Hudson, L. R., 4 C. P. D. 367; Case & Tidswell v. Whitworth, 15 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 574, distinguished. C. P. Div., Dec. 20, 1879. Budd v. Marshall. Opinion by Grove, J., 42 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 149. DEFINITIONS PERSON - CORPORATION NOT. By the Pharmacy Act, 1868 (31 and 32 Vict., ch. 121), section 1, it is unlawful for "any person," without being qualified under the act, "to sell or keep open shop for retailing, dispensing, or compounding poisons," and by section 15 "any person doing so is liable to a penalty. Defendants were a company registered under the Companies Act, 1862 and 1867. Their business included a department for the sale of drugs, and for retailing and compounding poisons. The manager of this department, who was paid by salary, but was also a shareholder in the company, was qualified under the Pharmacy Act, being a registered chemist, and his assistants were duly qualified. The managing director was not qualified, Plaintiffs sued defendants to recover a penalty under section 15 for selling poisons. Held (reversing the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division), that the defendant company was not a "person" within sections 1 and 15, and

Saratoga, Aug. 13th, the committee appointed submitted the following suggestions and conclusions, which were adopted:

Any amendment of the organic law of the State, and especially of the article which establishes the judiciary, is work requiring careful thought, deliberate consideration, and the substantial co-operation of the courts, with the legalization of the people, in all parts of the State. In any attempted change in that article of the Constitution, it is essential to have due regard to both economy and efficiency. It seems to be conceded that some amendment of the Constitution is necessary and demanded by the increasing business of the State, and for the due and speedy administration of law. The chief cause of complaint may be found, in part, from an inadequate judicial force, and to some extent in an imperfect organization of the courts, by reason of which the practical usefulness of the present force is inadequate or rendered unavailable. The existing force is substantially that created a third of a century ago, and then deemed adequate. During the interval which has elapsed the State has doubled in population, its business has quadrupled, and the value of its taxable property has increased quite five-fold. The numerical strength of the court of last resort has not been increased. The Constitution of 1870 relieved four justices from duty in the Court of Appeals, and an

We

amendment in 1879 added a single justice in the Second District. Aside from these additions and such relief as has been secured by an increase of local courts in cities, the present force is the same as that created by the Constitution of 1846. Without considering the complaints of the law's delays which come from different portions of the State, it must be apparent to the intelligent, that the present force, as now organized, is wholly inadequate to the business of the State. are satisfied that the accumulated and accumulating business in the Court of Appeals renders that court, with its present force, unequal to its dispatch. Notwithstanding the well-directed industry and laborious devotion of the members of that tribunal, it already occasions a delay of more than one year, and before any relief can be given by an amendment to the Constitution, two or more years will be required to reach an unpreferred cause in that court, and time will increase the growing embarrassment. Remedy must be found in the increase of the working force of the court, or in some limitation upon appeals to that court. We are not prepared now to recommend which should be applied.

In the Supreme Court of the State the evil is still greater. In many of the larger counties, in the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Districts, fully two years are required to reach an unpreferred cause at the Circuit Court. In the General Term of the Fourth Department there is a substantial blockade. Six hundred causes are now undisposed of on the calendar of that court, and the embarrassment is increasing yearly, notwithstanding the faithful labors of an able court. The same evils exist, to a greater or less extent, in other departments. We can discover no remedy except in an increase of the judicial force, or in the transfer of the powers and judicial force of superior city courts to the Supreme Court, when a wider field of usefulness can be opened to that force, or in both. The consolidation of some of these courts with the Supreme Court in some form is worthy of consideration, but we believe that further consultation and mature thought and deliberation should be given the subject before any definite plan of amendment to the Contitution be proposed. We therefore recommend that a committee of the Bar of the State, representing the several judicial districts, be appointed by this meeting and charged with the duty of conferring with the State Bar Association and the Bar Association of the city of New York, to the end that an amended article be perfected and submitted to the Legislature at its next session and its approval by that body and the people may be secured.

The following committee was appointed: First District, Stephen P. Nash and John E. Burrell; Second District, Homer O. Nelson and Winchester Britton; Third District, Henry Smith and F. L. Westbrook; Fourth District, William H. Sawyer and A. A. Yates; Fifth District, C. D. Adams and John C. Churchill; Sixth District, George M. Diven and Orlow W. Chapman; Seventh District, J. C. Cochrane and James Wood, Jr.; Eighth District, A. G. Rice and M. H. Peck.

THIS

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

XVIII AMERICAN DECISIONS.

HIS volume contains cases from 1 Stewart, 7 Connecticut, 2 Blackford, 7 T. B. Monroe, 7 Martin N. S., 1, 2, Harris & Gill, 1 Bland Chancery, 5 Halsted, 8, 9 Cowen, 2 Devereux Law, 1 Devereux Equity, 1 Rawle, 1 Harper Law, 1 Vermont, 1 Randolph, with important notes on trover by finder of lost articles; corporate acts at meeting irregularly called; forcible entry; States not subject to garnishment; mandamus as to legislative acts; partner's separate property, when

in civil actions where the relief demanded is the recovery of a sum of money not exceeding $3,000." Should not some one "rise to explain?" The Constitution, art. 6, § 15, declares that "They (county courts) shall have original jurisdiction in all cases where the defendants reside in the county and in which the damages claimed shall not exceed $1,000." To the minds of most people this is an absolute limitation which the Legislature cannot enlarge. Possibly the law-makers had in mind the succeeding section of the Constitution which declares that "They (county courts) shall also have such other original jurisdiction as shall from time to time be conferred upon them." But how this sentence can be deemed to enlarge the powers before limited, is not easily seen. The word "other," in its ordinary sense, means such new powers (or such jurisdiction over some new subject) as had not before been given, subject, however, to the $1,000 limitation. How does this strike the profession?

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In reading our new Code that is to be, I notice that section 1761, treating of marriage after divorce for adultery, forbids the marriage of a guilty defendant until the death of the plaintiff. Remembering the successful efforts of such an one with the Legislature of 1879, I turn to chapter 321 of the Session Laws of that year, where there is a different provision. This act is not expressly repealed by chapter 245 of 1880. What is the effect of section 3355 on it? Which will be law after September 1? I ask for the sake of those fallen ones" whose conduct has been uniformly good for five years, and would venture again on the matrimonial sea. C. G. I.

UTICA, N. Y., Aug. 7, 1880.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In view of the approaching first of September when the nine chapters of the new Code go into effect, will you kindly furnish us some light on the following subject: In Laws of 1879 (chapter 321), it was enacted that a defendant in a divorce suit, convicted of adultery, could, by permission of the court, after five years from the date of the decree, and on the marriage of the plaintiff and proving good conduct during such time, remarry.

This is a good season of the year to have your readers as well as yourself answer the following legal problem, taken from actual experience: A, B and C each hold a mortgage of $5,000 on a certain parcel of land. The order of time of delivery is A, B, C; the order of date of record is C, B, A.

When B took his mortgage he knew of A's unrecorded prior lien, and when C took his he had like knowledge of B's but not of A's.

The property, at a public sale, brought $10,000. Which two mortgagees are entitled to be satisfied out of that? Awaiting your own solution, I am,

NEW YORK, Aug. 7, 1880.

THE

Yours truly,

NOTES.

"MIDSUMMER.

Southern Law Review for August-September contains the following leading articles: Negligence of telegraph companies, by Edwin G. Merriam; Formation of the Federal Constitution, by W. T. Brantly; Insurance Agents, by James O. Pierce; Liability of Directors of Corporations, by Seymour D. Thompson; and a number of most excellent book reviews, in which department the Review is easily at the head of all legal periodicals. The third volume of the North-western reporter, published at St. Paul, by West Publishing Company, has 1016 pages, and all the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska and Dakota, from Nov. 22, 1879, to Jan. 10, 1880. The first volume of the Federal Reporter, issued by the same publishers, contains 976 pages and all the decisions of the Federal Circuit and District Courts from March to May, 1880. The books are handsomely printed on good paper. Statistics show that the volumes of Alabama Reports, from the 52d to the 61st, inclusive, contain 278 reversals and 276 affirmances.

A Kansas judge in a murder case, addressing the audience in the court room: "Gentlemen, the court wishes you would let somebody die a natural death here, if only to show strangers what an excellent climate we have. - George Jacob Holyoake, in "Nineteenth Century." Mr. Holyoake has wrongfully located this story. Kansas is a very orderly State. It is probably not predicable of any State. The recent statement in the newspapers that the only way for a man to be hanged in Texas is to steal a four-dollar mule, is also libellous. They do a great amount of hanging in Texas, and it must be borne in mind that very many of the homicides there are committed in mutual affrays. We should have felt a little more sure of Texas justice, however, if that murderer Currie had not been acquitted.

We find an amusing example of mixed metaphor in a recent judicial opinion concerning clerical misconduct, where it is said: A wolf in sheep's clothing has invaded their ranks and sits at their council board."

In an election case before Judge Brady, of this State, some years ago, after considerable debate between the lawyers, the judge himself interposed with: "Well, gentlemen, let us get to the merits of the case. I suppose that all that either party desires in this case is an honest count." At which there rose before the judge on the instant a wild and strange figure, not unfamiliar to the courts, nor yet to the footlights, which with hand upon its heart bowed low and uttered in sepulchral tones: "May it please the court, Ecce homo!" It was the Count Joannes. -The following forecast of the fortunes of Ex-President Grant, which is quite as good and veracious a prediction in its way as many ancient oracles, and more modern prophesies, may be found in the index to the first volume of the Probate and Divorce Reports, published 31st Desember, 1869, p. 786: "General Grant- Limited Administration." Canada Law Journal.

The Daily News reports the following scene between judge, jury and advocate at the county court at Bridport. The judge was Mr. Lefroy, and in a case before him 101. was claimed for breach of warranty of a mare which, as his honor said, could not be got into harness without people standing in danger of having their brains knocked out. The judge held that the animal being vicious, the plaintiff was entitled to his claim, and directed the jury before whom the case was heard to find a verdict accordingly. But on the ground that no warranty was given, the jury found for the defendant, whose solicitor, Mr. Joliffe, claimed the verdict, upon which the judge began to expostulate with the jury as to disbelieving respectable witnesses, and said their verdict was directly contrary to their oath. Mr. Joliffe said this was the most extraordinary course of things he had ever heard in his life, but was told to hold his tongue or he would be removed from the court. The jury, said his honor, had no power to find such a verdict. The jury said they could not alter their verdict; but his honor said they could. Mr. Joliffe said the jury thought with him and the public that the verdict was according to law. He dared say the lord chancellor would have something to say on the subject. His Honor said he did not care for the public, and (to Mr. Joliffe): You public nuisance, be quiet; you are a public nuisance. Mr. Joliffe replied that he did not care about -. His Honor intimated he would not allow effect to be given to the verdict. Mr. Joliffe: We will compel it by mandamus. His Honor said the jury were perversely obstinate, and was proceeding, when Mr. Joliffe protested against this intimidation of the jury, adding: His Honor had not taken a single note of the case. Where were his honor's notes? The Judge: Be quiet; be quiet! Mr. Joliffe said he was adopting his present course in order that this matter might be properly ventilated; he intended to see that an improper course was not taken. His Honor: Go and finish your speech in the street; I say the jury have found a verdict contrary to law. Mr. Joliffe: They have found a verdict not contrary to law. His Honor: I say it is not according to law or the evidence. I direct the verdict to be entered the other way. Mr. Joliffe: We will see about that, sir; that only shows the necessity. That is why the defendant had the prudence to summon a jury. I have no doubt the public will be very much benefited by the jury being summoned here to-day. The foreman of the jury, on being appealed to by his Honor, said he had given a verdict according to his conscience. Mr. Joliffe again complained of his Honor's conduct. The Judge: I wish you would exercise a little common sense. Mr. Joliffe. I regret that some other persons are not gorerned by a little common sense. Thus in great disorder the proceedings terminated, the jury firmly abiding by their verdict.

The Albany Law Journal.

THE

ALBANY, AUGUST 28, 1880.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE Nation and the New York Times are having a little misunderstanding about the late Indiana decision on the constitutional amendments.

It does not concern us, except to set ourselves right as against a misconstruction of the Times writer. The Times says: "But it is asserted that the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL has given the opinion that there is a good deal to be said on both sides of the Supreme Court decision. We are not ignorant of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL's article out here, nor are we ignorant that it was written before the dissenting opinions of Judges Niblack and Scott were filed, and before all the facts in the case were fairly stated. Judge Biddle found 45 pages of legal cap to say on his side of the question, but yet that will not make good law or good sense, even re-enforced by the dictum of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, based upon partial information, not to mention the impertinent ignorance of the Nation." It is true that we have "given the opinion that there is a good deal to be said on both sides," and we have sustained that assertion by showing that the Supreme Courts of Minnesota and Missouri, and Mr. Justice Bradley, of the Federal Supreme Court, take the same view with the Indiana court, while the Supreme Court of Wisconsin take the opposite view. we protest, first, against the statement that we wrote "before all the facts in the case were fairly stated," and second, against the inference that we approved the law of the Indiana decision. The facts on which the decision was based were fairly stated when we first wrote, and nothing new has since come out. In our first expression of opinion as to the merits of the decision we said we thought the decision wrong, and that the Wisconsin doctrine is right, and we have reiterated that expression in remarks on the opinions pro and con. On the whole we are inclined to believe that the statement of the Times writer that "we are not ignorant of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL'S article out here," is not quite accurate. With the alleged back-stairs history of the decision we have nothing to do, and we have nothing to say about it.

But

Perhaps we have said all that can be of edification on the decision of the Indiana Supreme Court on the constitutional amendments. But we would emphasize one criticism which has occurred to us on a re-perusal of the prevailing opinion. The court say: "This court holds that it requires at least a majority of all the votes cast at the same election to ratify a constitutional amendment. We also hold that as the act of March 10, 1879, is defective in not providing for the count of the aggregate number of votes cast throughout the State on the day of the election, or in not providing some VOL. 22.— No. 9.

means to find out the whole number of votes cast, by which it might be learned what proportion the number cast in favor of the ratification bore to the whole number, there is no source from which this court can ascertain whether the amendment received a majority of all the votes cast at the election or not. As the amendment was submitted upon the day of the general spring elections throughout the State, and as there were, by law, officers to elect at the same time in the various counties, it must be presumed that other votes than those for or against the amendment were cast at the same time." Now why should the court presume that more votes were cast for officers than on the constitutional amendments? We should suppose the correct presumption would be that the electors all voted on every question. The fact was in evidence that the amendments received a majority of the votes cast on that question, and that, in the absence of evidence about If the evithe vote for officers, should control. dence before the court, or that which it deemed to be before it, showed the fact assumed, there would be a basis for the conclusion that the court have

drawn, although we believe the conclusion wrong. But it appears that the conclusion of the court rests on a mere guess of a matter which certainly cannot come within the ordinary range of judicial notice. This seems to us the weakest reason imaginable for a wrong decision. To the foregoing suggestion, we only add that whatever may have been the vote for officers, the returns show that the amendments called out a vote of from 304,000 to 322,000, with majorities ranging from 17,000 to 50,000. This affords very small countenance for the impression, which the opinion seems intended to convey, that the amendments were carried on a meager vote.

It cannot be denied that the decision has created a strong suspicion of unfair conduct on the part of the majority of the court. Making due allowance for the present demand for "political capital," among all parties, there seems to have been at least an extraordinary and undue precipitancy in the pronouncing of this opinion. The cause was argued for two full days, and the opinion was pronounced in twenty-four hours thereafter. One writer says of this: "The opinion bears upon its face evidence of great research and labor in the investigation of authorities and precedents and in twisting and construing them to sustain this most extraordinary decision. It fills nearly three and a half columns of a large newspaper in solid brevier, and contains six thousand words. It must be admitted that Judge Biddle is a man of wonderful parts; a 'lightning' penman and an indefatigable worker. Never since our Supreme Court was organized has such a quantity of judicial literature been piled up on paper in so short a time, and the like will not probably happen again in a hundred years. Deducting the hours usually required for needful sleep and refreshment, the task accomplished by the herculean constitutionwrecker, Judge Biddle, must ever be regarded as one of the most remarkable mental and physical

feats on record." This fact discloses insufficient reflection or a mind made up and formulated beforehand. It contrasts strangely and unpleasantly with the fact that the dissenting opinions did not appear for several weeks. We have no hesitation in saying, at least, that the court had no moral right to put forth such an opinion under such circumstances. It inevitably throws discredit on the court and weakens its conclusions. A country justice, who does not decide at once, takes four days for consideration. But the point of our animadversion is this: speaking of the weight and authority of adjudications, the result shows the impolicy of allowing an ultimate court to be constituted wholly from one political party. The dissent of two members in this case only strengthens the popular suspicion of the other three. If a single judge of the opposite political party had gone with the majority in the case, the accusation of corrupt political bias could hardly have been made. In the famous Tweed decision in this State the two Republican | judges went with the democratic majority, and this fact took the sting out of partisan complaints. A court constituted from both political parties will frequently, perhaps generally, divide into political strata, but this is not always the case, and when it is, the scandal is less than where there is no difference of politics among the judges. Meantime, a motion has been made for reargument. If the court should grant it and reverse the present decision, they would not be much more fickle than they have been on several other subjects within our knowledge, notably, as to the intercalary day in leap-year, and indictments for selling "a pint" of intoxicating liquor, meaning "less than a quart.'

We are moved to speak now of a matter which will soon be removed into the domain of politics, and thus be without our jurisdiction, namely, the nominations for chief judge of the Court of Appeals. It can hardly be doubted that we express the sentiment of the great body of our profession when we say that the new chief should be selected from among the members of the court. It would be injudicious and impolitic, as well as a marked affront to those gentlemen, to go outside for a chief. To choose one who had had no judicial experience in the Court of Appeals would hardly be defensible. To select one who had no judicial experience whatever would be a still more serious error of judgment. There are very few persons in the State, off the bench—perhaps none · - who have had any extended experience as judges of that court, and who are competent in point of age, or who would be competent for more than a very few is plenty of material, of both politics, in the present court, from which to make a good chief. Probably the judges would be satisfied with the promotion of any one of their number, so great is their harmony and so small is their partisanship. To ignore the deserts of these learned, experienced, faithful and approved judges, and to put over them a stranger to their decade of counsel and service, would be an unhandsome and ungracious act, which

years.

There

we cannot contemplate without irritation, and surprise that it should be suggested. The nomination by one party of the present chief judge, Folger, since the above was written, is perfectly unexceptionable, and settles one-half of the suggested difficulty.

ers.

The

The American Bar Association met in a large hail, but a small hall would have held them. A boy does not become a man by getting into his father's trousThe attendance was certainly no larger than last year, and it is whispered that the membership has fallen off very considerably. The old familiar faces of Bristow, Phelps, Poland, Potter, Hunt, Young, Butler, Bullard, etc., ruled the scene, and there was the same noticeable preponderance of southern and western, and absence of New York, representatives. Speaking of the portions of the exercises which we were able to attend, they were scarcely so interesting as those of last year. paper on "Sunday Laws" was an hour's dry statement of the statutory provisions of the different States for the observance of Sunday, with a few minutes of sensible suggestion for amelioration of Much of the essay was inaudithese absurd laws. ble, but it seemed to us that while the opportunity was favorable and the subject was a good one, the treatment was not exactly suited to the occasion. Mr. Parker's address on Hamilton and Patterson was a brilliantly-written and effectively-delivered production, albeit the information about Hamilton was already somewhat familiar. But why did Mr. Parker feel bound to treat of the "architects of the Constitution?" Is it made incumbent by the laws of the association? Are there not several topics of more absorbing present interest? It strikes us that way. Last year Mr. Phelps pronounced Marshall the architect of the Constitution. This year Mr. Parker pronounces Hamilton and Patterson the architects. When is this thing to end? If it goes on, we shall incline to the belief that the job was sub-divided to conciliate a number of rival bidders for the construction of that ancient edifice. Thus far only three States have been heard from, and we shudder when we think of the future constitutional possibilities. The vivacious Mr. Hunt presented his report on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, and the association, after a spirited debate, nearly all on one side, from a suspicion that the first resolution meant more than Mr. Hunt thought it meant, and opened the door to permanent prac tice for non-residents, and that the scheme of education contemplated in the other resolutions was too ponderous, laid it on the table, as they also did Mr. Broadhead's substitute of State law schools whose

diploma should entitle to admission- a proposition in favor of which a good deal can be said. So much for what we heard.

Now as to what we did not hear. President Bristow's address seems to have been well received, and to have been an intelligent and complete summary of last year's legislation, much of which was peculiar and interesting. It must