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MUNICIPAL BONDS

BOARD OF EDUCATION—ACTS

IN ISSUING BONDS IN EXCESS OF POWER DO NOT REN

DER BONDS VOID - INNOCENT HOLDER. - (1) Where a
power to contract is conferred by statute and has been
fully executed, and something additional not author-
ized by the statute is stipulated to be done, which is
clearly distinguishable from the rightful execution,
the execution of the power, so far as authorized, is
good, and void as to the excess. (2) A board of educa-
tion, under the provisions of the act of March 13, 1868
(S. & S. 710), authorizes it to borrow money to pay
existing indebtedness by the issue and sale of bonds
bearing interest at a rate not exceeding eight per cent
per annum, payable semi-annually, agreed to borrow a
sum of money at an aggregate rate of interest of fif-
teen per cent, in manner following: For the amount
so to be borrowed bonds were to be issued bearing the
authorized rate of interest, and for the excess of inter-
est orders on the treasury were to be issued payable at
the same time as the legal interest. The bonds were
regularly issued, bearing eight per cent interest, and
sold at par, and the money was received and used as
authorized. For the excess of interest, orders on the
treasury were at the same time issued and delivered to
the purchaser, as agreed to by the parties, but were
never presented for payment, and after their maturity
he offered to return them for cancellation. Held, that
this agreement to pay excess of interest is void, and
having never been executed in whole or in part, will
not avoid a recovery on the bonds. The fact that such
agreement for unlawful interest was made does not
make the purchaser chargeable with notice of the prior
fraudulent practice of members of the board in incur-
ring the debt, for the payment of which the money
was borrowed, which had no connection with the sale
of the bonds, and of which the purchaser had no
knowledge. State of Ohio ex rel. Laskey v. Board of
Education of Perrysburg. Opinion by Johnson, J.
Oakey, J., dissented, being of opinion that the real
transaction was a sale of bonds at less than par, in
violation of the statute.
[Decided March 16, 1880.]

INSURANCE LAW.

And while the modern authorities hold that a covenant in a deed against incumbrances would embrace the inchoate right of dower, none can be found which hold that in a policy of insurance the word incumbrance would embraco such a claim or interest as a contingent right of a woman whose husband is still living. Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, March Term, 1879. Southern Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kloeber. Opinion by Christion, J. (Appearing in 31 Grattan's Reports.) The same doctrine is held in Virginia Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Kloeber, decided by the same court at the same time. Opinion by Anderson, J. Citing Wooddy v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 31 Gratt. 362, and Hough v. City Fire Ins. Co., 29 Coun. 10.

FIRE INSURANCE - OVER VALUATION WITHOUT WRONGFUL INTENT, IN PROOF OF LOSS, DOES NOT AVOID

POLICY.— In the preliminary proofs of loss of property insured against fire, the plaintiff, who was insured, stated the value at $5,000. In an action on the policy the referee found the value to be $2,000. The referee likewise found that the plaintiff, in making proofs of loss for the purpose of establishing his claim under the policy, did not knowingly, willfully and for the purpose of defrauding the defendant, swear to a false statement of the value of the property, but that he grossly exaggerated its value and quantity, in consequence of his imperfect knowledge of the English language, while acting under the direction of the person who aided him in making the proofs. But according to the finding of the referee, the actual value of the property destroyed exceeded the amount of insurance upon it. Under these circumstances, if the plaintiff did honestly, or without any fraudulent intent, place an extravagant valuation upon the property, it would not prevent a recovery upon the policy. Parker v. Amazon Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 364; Ins. Co. v. Weides, 14 Wall. 375; Williams v. Phoenix F. Ins. Co., 61 Me. 67; Moore v. Protection Ins. Co., 29 id. 97; Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 43 Peun. St. 350; Marion v. Great Republic Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 35 Mo. 148; Wolf v. Goodhue F. Ins. Co., 43 Barb. 400. Wisconsin Supreme Court, May 27, 1880. Dogge v. North-western National Insurance Co. Opinion by Cole, J.

FIRE INSURANCE-WAIVER OF CONDITION — WHAT IS NOT. A policy of insurance against fire contained, among other conditions, the following: "And whenever required, the insured or person claiming shall produce and exhibit the books of account, bills of purchase, or duplicates thereof, and other vouchers, to the

FIRE INSURANCE INCHOATE RIGHT OF DOWER NOT AN INCUMBRANCE AVOIDING POLICY.-The existence of an inchoate right of dower in the wife of a former owner of insured real property does not render a statement by the insured in the application that his inter-insurers or their specially authorized agent, in support est in the property is "fee simple," a misrepresentation avoiding the policy under a condition warranting the truth of the statements made in the application. An inchoate, contingent right of dower is defined by Bishop as a merc possibility; not only is it no estate, but the right itself is a mere contingent possible thing. If the wife dies before her husband, all is vanished. Judge Baldwin defines such a right in the wife as an emanation from the ownership of her husband. See Wilson v. Davidson, 2 Rob. 384, 405. Before assignment, even after the death of husband, the widow has no estate in the lands of her husband. It is a mere chose in action, and before assignment is strictly a claim. Greenl. Cruise tit. Dower, ch. 3, § 1; 4 Munf. 382; 4 Seld. 110. In a recent Missouri case, Bliss, J., observed of this sort of inchoate dower that it is not an estate, but a mere contingent claim, not capable of sale in execution, nor the subject of grant or assignment. The dowress has merely a contingent possibility of interest in the premises, but no property, no actual iuterest in it which is the subject of grant or assignment." 44 Mo. 512, 515; see, also, 2 Bish. on Mar. Wom., § 348. Formerly it was questioned even whether the existence of this inchoate dower could be alleged as a breach of warranty in a deed against incumbrances.

of the claim, and permit extracts and copies thereof to be made; and until such proofs and exhibitions are produced, and permitted by the claimant, when required as above, the loss shall not be payable." After a firo whereby a loss occurred to the insured, notise and preliminary proofs of loss, as required by another condition of the policy, were furnished. This preliminary proof, however, not being satisfactory, an agent of the company, sent to make scrutiny of the matter, demanded of the insured that he should produce his bills of purchase, and upon being informed by the insured that these had been burned, the agent demanded duplicates of such bills, which the insured failed to produce. The company refused to pay the amount claimed by the insured, and his attorney notified the company of his intention to institute suit for the recovery of the claim. To this notification the agent replied by letter as follows: In reply to your favor of 26th, giving notice of intended suit, I am instructed t say, that the Farmers' Fire Insurance Company will contest the payment of A. Mispelhorn's claim (in its present exaggerated form), under the terms and conditions of his policy, though we should have preferred an amicable compromise. The company is more impelled to this course, as we cannot learn that the City

Co., on the same risk, have, or intend paying the claim as made. When they pay, this Co. will probably not delay longer. If, however, you prefer litigation with this Co., we shall contest the claim as above." The insured afterward sued the company, and offered this letter in evidence to show waiver of further preliminary proof of loss under the afore-recited condition of the policy. Held, (1) that this letter was no waiver, but meant that the company still adhered to and would persist in its refusal to pay the claim, because it was excessive in amount, and that the terms and conditions of the policy would be relied on as a protection against what was regarded as an exaggerated demand. (2) That the object of the condition in the policy was to put means in the power of the insurer to scrutinize the claims of the insured and to protect itself against fraud. The provision was such as the parties were competent to make, and having made it a part of their contract, the courts have no dispensing power over it. The insured was not only bound to produce and exhibit to the company or its agent, upon being required so to do, the bills of purchase if within his power or control, but if they were destroyed, he was bound to produce duplicates thereof, if it were possible for him so to do. Compliance with this condition, if required by the company, was indispensable to the insured's right of action. Maryland Court of Appeals. Farmers' Fire Insurance Co. of York, Penn., v. Mispelhorn. Opinion by Alvey, J. (To appear in 50 Maryland Reports.)

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

XIV NEVADA REPORTS. Reports of Cases determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, during 1879 and 1880. Reported by Chas. F. Bickell, clerk of Supreme Court, and Hon. Thomas P. Hawley, Associate Justice. Volume XIV. San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Co., 1880. Pp. 500.

THIS THIS volume contains among others the following striking cases: Blaisdell v. Stephens, p. 17. - In an action of trespass against two or more acting independently, and producing a result injurious to the plaintiff, one cannot be held for the acts of the others. State v. Clifford, p. 72.- If one finds lost property, and knows the owner, or there are marks on the property by which he can ascertain the owner, and he converts the property to his own use, intending at the time of finding so to convert it, he is guilty of larceny, but not so if that intention is not formed until afterward. State v. Ah Chuey, p. 79. —On a question of personal identity, a witness testified that the defendant had certain tattoo marks on his person. The court compelled the defendant, against his objection, to exhibit his person to the jury. Held, no error. Gaston v. Drake, p. 175. An agreement before an election to share the salary and fees of an office, in consideration of the plaintiff's using his influence to elect the defendant to such office, is void. State v. Hallock, p. 202.- An act to establish and maintain a State asylum for the poor and maimed of the State is unconstitutional. State v. Nevada, p. 439.-It is no defense to an indictment for escape, that the jail was unhealthful and filthy.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ACTION FOR TRESPASS ON LAND IN ANOTHER STATE. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

and has been abrogated by the new Code, permit me to make the following observations:

1. It seems to me that Mr. Murray states the reason of the rule somewhat plainly himself when he says at p. 50: "If both parties should set up an apparently good title and it should become necessary to determine their validity the action should perhaps be dismissed, because it seems the courts of one State or country cannot settle the title to lands in another." But better still is the language of Hare & Wallace in their notes on Smith's Leading Cases (7th Am. ed.) p. 1063: "A court of justice should obviously be slow to entertain. a question depending upon the local law of a foreign country and which it can only resolve at second hand by the testimony of experts. A judgment in trespass may be as conclusive of the right to real estate as a judgment in a writ of entry or ejectment, and should therefore only be pronounced by a tribunal which can take judicial cognizance of the statutes, principles and usages constituting the lex loci rei site which must ultimately prevail where immovable property is concerned. If a foreign court could adjudge such questions it might mulct the defendant in damages for an act which was subsequently ascertained to be a legitimate exercise of the authority implied in ownership." The rule is as old as the law and has the sanction of the most learned jurists in this country and in England, including Chief Justice Marshall and Lord Mansfield, and has been affirmed in nearly every State in the Union, as Mr. Murray's article shows. There would seem therefore to be some reason in not allowing even a personal judgment for damages in such cases when by the law of the place the matters proved might not constitute a trespass, or the plaintiff be entitled to sue if it were, and every reason for remitting the parties to that jurisdiction where the local statutes, laws and customs can be intelligently and with certainty administered. Although in some few cases it may be a hardship, no rule of law can prevent that. The contrary rule would be productive of vastly more.

2. Respecting the claim that the rule has been abrogated by the new Code.

1. In the article alluded to, the cases of the American Union Telegraph Co. v. Middleton and De Courcy v. Stewart, are noticed. One was a decision by the New York Court of Appeals rendered March 19, 1880, in a case begun in December, 1879 (and which came thus quickly before the court on appeal from an order of arrest), and the other by the General Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, rendered April 7, 1880. As the sections 982 and 984 of the new Code quoted to sustain the above position have been in force since September 1, 1877, these decisions must be accepted as settling the law under the new Code the other way.

2. Neither of the expositors of the Code, Mr. Bliss or Mr. Throop, has taken the view that these sections of the Code extended the jurisdiction of our courts to cases of this character. Indeed, I have a letter from Mr. Throop in which he distinctly assures me that such was not the intent. Equitable actions to compel specific performance of contracts relating to land in foreign jurisdictions, to compel conveyances of lands so situated, etc., have been entertained for some time, and the last sentence of section 982, which is new and is the foundation of your correspondents claim, relates to such actions and provides for their place of trial. It is to be read as if the words, "of which the court has jurisdiction," were interpolated; as regulating the practice, not as extending the jurisdiction.

Regarding the article contributed by Mr. F. P. Murray to your last number, by which he seeks to establishing that the rule of law requiring actions for injuries to real property to be brought in the jurisdiction where the real property is situate, is not founded in reason,

3. Section 982 reads as follows: "Each of the followactions must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action or some part thereof is situated; an action of ejectment; for the partition of real property; for dower; to foreclose a mortgage upon real

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property or upon a chattel' real; to compel the determination of a claim to real property; for waste; for a nuisance" (all local actions); or to procure a judgment directing a conveyance of real property and every other action to recover, or to procure a judgment establishing, determining, defining, forfeiting, annulling, or otherwise affecting an estate, right, title, lien or other interest in real property or a chattel real (not necessarily local). "But where all the real property to which the action relates is situated without the State the action must be tried as prescribed in section nine hundred and eighty-four of this act," which provides that "an action not specified in the last two sections must be tried in the county in which one of the parties resided at the commencement thereof." (The word "must occurs three times in the two sections and should be allowed equal force in such place, viz.: must if it can, by law.) From these two sections your correspondent argues that the plaintiff can bring an action to recover damages for injury to real property or waste in the county in which he resides, notwithstanding the fact that the land lies in another State. Does not the same reasoning apply equally well to an action of ejectment, for partition, for dower to foreclose a mortgage, to compel the determination of a claim to real property, for a nuisance? It does; and if this construction of the Code is sound, our courts have jurisdiction to entertain all these classes of actions relating to real property without the State as well as those of waste and trespass.

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NEW YORK, July 20, 1880.

EDW. B. COWLES.

CONTRACTS TO "SATISFACTION."

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To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Nothing, it seems to me, is more "conceivable" and less "puzzling" than the "wheeling about" capacity of "facts on new trials-your remarks under the head of "Notes" in the JOURNAL of the 17th inst. to the contrary notwithstanding. It is the law which we are taught to conceive of as unchanging. As to the case in question, non constat but that on the second trial, which was reviewed in the 45th Conn., the evidence, more ample than on the first hearing, showed the contract to have been one to meet the reasonable satisfaction of the defendant, thus introducing an adjective into the case so qualifying of the facts found on the first trial, that they, the facts, might with truth, as to their legal effect, be said to have "wheeled about," and this so conceivably, that the unchanging law, which previously denied a judgment to plaintiff, would now most obviously make such a judgment imperative. If it be inconceivable for facts to "wheel about" in this sense, then the uses for new trials in a majority of cases are equally so, it seems to me. July 19, 1880.

T. C. I.

[Let us hope the adjective above mentioned produced the righteous result of the second trial. As to the "unchanging" character of the law, we commend our correspondent's attention to the recent Pennsylvania decisions, commented on ante, p. 42. In connection with the subject of contracts "to satisfaction," we refer to the case of Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49, where the agreement was to paint a satisfactory portrait. The holding was like that in the Connecticut case. The court said: "It may be that the picture was an excellent one and that the defendant ought to have been satisfied with it and accepted it, but under the agreement the defendant was the only person who had the right to decide this question."-ED. Alb. L. J.]

THE

NOTES.

HE current volume of Texas Court of Appeals Reports contains an account of the proceedings of the bench and bar on the death of Judge Ector, late of that court. He seems to have been greatly beloved and respected. Mr. Freeman, the reporter of the Supreme Court of Illinois, is issuing advance sheets of his reports, in parts. The last part comes down to May 18, 1880. -The July number of the American Law Register contains an article on Acts of agent after death of principal, by Joseph Wilby; the case of Scott v. Kittanning Coal Co., concerning breach of contract for successive deliveries of coal, with a note by Arthur Biddle; the case of Central Railroad of New Jersey v. New Jersey West Line Railroad Co., concerning election between suits in State and in Federal courts, with a note by John H. Stewart; and the case of Scribner v. Stoddart, concerning copyright in the Encyclopædia Brittanica. The August number of the Virginia Law Journal contains a translation of "The Value of the Roman Law to the Modern World," from the German of Prof. von Ihering.

The inaugural address of Dr. R. H. Ward, of Troy, as president of the American Society of Microscopists, recently delivered at Buffalo, contains some very interesting remarks on the value of the microscope in the examination of disputed handwritings. · Rowell's American Newspaper Directory, containing lists of all the newspapers and periodicals published in the United States, Territories, and the Dominion of Canada, together with a description of the towns and cities in which they are published, forming a closely printed volume of 521 pages, besides as many more of advertisements, must be of great use to the commercial community, affording detailed information of the best mediums of advertising. It is much fuller than the edition of 1879.

We extract the following from the address of Hon. Henry Craft, of Memphis, at the memorial proceedings on the death of Judge Trigg, of the Federal District Court of Tennessee: "I would not disparage what we call learning in judges. I would not decry the books in which judicial minds have embalmed all sorts of vagaries and absurdities, as well as the most splendid reasoning and the most wonderful analysis. But I do say that tho learned judge, in the sense of a judge who is ever exploring the reports, for decisions rather than for reasons, and who relies solely upon them, is the most dangerous of all judges. He is not much more wise than a man who would attempt to make his way through a morass at night, trusting to the guidance of the fire-fly's lamp. Technical rules are, in his hands, cast iron one day, and ropes of sand the next, according to the inspiration of the particular cases that chances to be operating upon him. It is safe to say that fully half of what makes up a law library is the merest trash, and the judge who is crammed-andcrammed-into the dimensions of case learning has, to say the least, filled much space with rubbish that were better left open for the free play of his own faculties. The man who should seek to construct a philosophy of human nature by study of the resemblances and differences between the various features of the various faces that might come under his observation, would succeed as well as the man who seeks to find the philosophy of the law in study and analysis of the likeness and the unlikeness of the features of the cases in the books to each other, or to those of the case he holds in judgment."

The Albany Law
Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 14, 1880.

CURRENT TOPICS.

E were surprised to learn, on a call from an Indiana friend the other day, that no oral arguments are allowed in the Supreme Court of that

ment.

State, except as a matter of favor, on special application. This we think a very serious error in judgOur own courts are reluctant to dispense with oral arguments, although they take submissions on printed points, if desired. Generally, counsel are also reluctant to relinquish the privilege of oral argument. Oral arguments must greatly lighten the labors of the court, by emphasizing and pointing out the decisive contentions, and enabling the court to concentrate attention on these, to the exclusion of many things which counsel put in their briefs and argue elaborately, without any serious reliance. Our profession generally talk better than they write, and better love to talk than to write. But the perfection of argument is oral founded on a written brief. The adoption of this system, we believe, would give Indiana a better court and a better bar, and judicial decisions of a more authoritative reputation. In this connection we may remark upon the enormous preponderance of litigation about pleadings and of decisions upon demurrer in that State. If we could, we think we would abolish demurrers, unless the demurrant would stipulate to abide his demurrer. They are an obstruction to justice, for in nine cases out of ten, they are simply a contest about form, and the substantial fight comes off afterward. The result is delay and expense.

One of the most frequent subjects of reflection in warm weather is ventilation. This is also the most serious problem in modern architecture. Perhaps some of our readers may know of a court-room that is well ventilated and at the same time tolerable in temperature. We do not now recall one. Most of the nervousness, headache, impatience, and petulance of lawyers is attributable to illy ventilated court-rooms. They kill off our profession with sureness and rapidity. It is impossible for any man to preserve his mental equilibrium in a court-room steaming with bad breath and foul odors, and now at roasting and again at freezing temperature. The best court-rooms of the city of New York are not irreproachable in this respect, we believe, and the worst are deadly. In London, we are informed, they are even worse. The public seem to think that almost any hole or den is good enough for the temple of justice. There need not be gorgeousness nor imposing display, but there should be a little sensible attention to the preservation of health. We may also remark here, that no attention is paid to acoustics in court-rooms. One would suppose this a rather important point, but the rule generally is VOL. 22.- No. 7.

that counsel must roar at judge and jury, and that witnesses are quite inaudible.

We heartily subscribe to the following, from the New York Daily Register, on the subject of classification in digests and indexes: "Every reader of the law reports who has occasion to pursue his search for cases on a given subject through a number of volumes finds the labor of research much increased by the diversity of method employed by subjects in the index. If, for instance, the subject different reporters in respect to the classification of

in hand is the measure of damages for a recovery under the Civil Damage Act, one reporter is found to index this subject under the head of Civil Damage Act, in another State it is noted under Liquor under Excise, in others still the readers must look Selling, in another under Intoxication, in another under Damages or under Measure of Damages. A uniform method adopted by concert among all the State reporters would be of great advantage. The changes would be not very extensive in the usages of the reports in any one jurisdiction, but would in the aggregate result in a great saving of labor to the reader, and would tend to promote the circulation and use of the reports of each State in the other States. The United States Digest, in the new edition recently completed by Little & Brown, and the American Reports Digests, in the volumes of that series of selected cases, afford a convenient basis for such an assimilation, and if the State reporters, in framing their indices, would conform their classification, as far as may be, to those works, they would bring them into closer harmony with the general usages of the profession. The classification employed in those works has been the result of long and careful study and experience, and probably comes more nearly to meeting the general needs of the profession than any other." The State reporters usually err, we think, in the paucity of cross referIt seems to us, too, that it is better, under the cross references, to give the page of the case than simply a reference to another part of the index.

ences.

We have read, marked, and inwardly digested the prevailing opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court, in State of Indiana v. Swift, on the adoption of the constitutional amendments. It is not conclusive to our minds. The decision is as follows: "The opinion, therefore, of this court is that it requires a majority of the electors of the State to ratify an amendment to the Constitution; but that the whole number of votes cast at the election at which the amendment is submitted may be taken as the number of electors in the State." To which Biddle, C. J., who pronounces the opinion, adds as follows: "The writer of this opinion, speaking for himself only, holds that it requires the votes of a majority of the electors of the State to ratify a constitutional amendment." The addition shakes our faith in the judicial soundness of the rest of the opinion, for it is an expression that has met with very little acceptance among judges, and for which there is no

decisive precedent. The chief justice dwells on the injustice of the plurality argument as follows: "The principle of plurality, which might ratify a constitutional amendment, irrepealable by legislative actions, binding the rights of two millions of people for an indefinite period, by the vote of two electors against a vote of one when the whole number of votes cast was but three, is not only unconstitutional, but is dangerous to human rights and repugnant to the sense of mankind. As the adoption of a Constitution is the considerate act of an entire people, and as it binds all departments of the government and cannot be repealed except by the same power that made it, its adoption should not be left to the vicissitudes of a meager plurality of votes, which the accidents of a day might cast one way or another." He dwells much on the history of the arguments in the constitutional convention

a very unsafe criterion of legislative intention. He thinks there is no analogy between the election of an officer and the adoption of a constitutional provision. Courts must judge from what conventions have submitted as the result of discussion; not from the changing phases of debate. He makes no attempt to answer the reasoning of the court in Gillespy v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544, but dismisses it as follows: "This case presents a question similar to the one we are considering; and if the Constitution of the two States were the same upon this point the decision would be entitled to great respect as an authority in the present case. But as the two Constitutions are fundamentally different as to the proportion of votes necessary to ratify an amendment, the decision cannot be held as an authority in the present case." We have already shown, ante, 46, that the provision in the Wisconsin Constitution is much more stringent than that in the Indiana Constitution, the requirement being, "a majority of all the votes cast at such general election."

It should be a cause of satisfaction to the lawabiding people of this State that the Governor has had the backbone to hang the wretches Cox and Balbo. His conduct has been heartily approved by all the press, so far as we know, with one abusive but insignificant exception. The usual disgusting exhibition of sentimental sympathy in Cox's case was not accompanied by any serious doubt of the justice of the verdict. In Balbo's case some of the judges above thought they might have brought in a different verdict if they had been the jury. We are glad that they were not the jury. We think Judge Daniels who tried the man is better qualified to form an opinion, and he says the verdict was right. Better leave these matters to the jury. There is little danger of their erring in the direction of severity. It would be a great pity if the safety of human life depended on the morbid sentimentalism, pity, and timidity of that considerable class, who send bouquets to murderers, and sign petitions for commutation in every instance, without knowing or having the smallest qualification, by nature or education, for knowing a right verdict from a wrong one. The

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scenes after Balbo's execution were exceedingly disgraceful. In such cases it would be better for the public authorities to take charge of the body and bury it, than to have it the subject of riotous sympathy and exhibition for money. Worst of all is the attempt to make political capital out of the Governor's decision.

A curious mode of evading an injunction was practiced in Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde, Ch. Div., July 10, 1880, 42 L. T. (N. S.) 657. On motion for injunction to restrain defendant from publishing a certain cautionary advertisement, or any other of a like nature, as calculated to injure the plaintiff's business, the defendant undertook until the trial not to issue the advertisements. Defendant afterward published in a newspaper a notice of the hearing of the motion, and of his undertaking, which virtually repeated the caution. This was in large type, occupying half a page. The plaintiff moved to commit the defendant for contempt. The court said, "it would have been well for Mr. Wilde to have abstained from further advertisements in the newspapers.' 19 "Silence is the best obedience in such a case." But the argument of the plaintiff, that having been ordered not to do a certain thing, the defendant was guilty of contempt in telling the world he was not at liberty to do it, did not prevail, and he was discharged.

A

NOTES OF CASES.

NOVEL case of alteration of a note arose in Leonard v. Phillips, 39 Mich. 182. The note was payable in less than two years, and it was held that the addition of the word "annually" after "interest" did not avoid it. Marston, J., said: "If with this word added, we give it a literal construction, as claimed, and say that at the expiration of the first year interest thereon would be due and payable, interest for the remaining portion of the time for which the note was to run before becoming due would not be payable until the expiration of the second year, so that the second installment of interest would not become due at the time the principal did, but some months thereafter. So the note being payable on or before October 15th, had it been paid within the first year, the accrued interest could not have been collected until one year from the time the note was given. Such, we think, is not the proper construction to be given to it, and could not have been so intended by the party who added this word to the note. The proper construction to give the note as thus changed is as though it had been made to read ten per cent per annum." Graves, J., and Campbell, C. J., concurred. Cooley, J., concurring, said: "When commercial paper is payable with annual interest, the expression means with interest at the end of the year. If the paper is to mature in less than two years, the expression is a very unsuitable one to apply, and as has been shown by my brother Marston, if construed strictly, the interest for the fraction of the second year would not be

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