« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
question presented on the bill of exceptions, If, on the breach of the condition not to sell, whether Mr. Greenfield took an absolute es- the testatrix had given the property in the netate, by the terms of the will, in the property groes to a third person, the limitation over bequeathed to him. A devise of personal es- would have been declared void; because such tate in general terms, without words of limita- a restriction would be on a condition repugnant tion, vests in the legatee the absolute property and void. in the thing bequeathed. If a testator says, But here is a bequest of freedom, on the same “I give all my personal estate to A B,” with repugnant conclusion. How is it to take effect, out other words, A B will take the absolute without denying to the master that control over estate in all the personal property of which the the negroes which he is by law entitled to exertestator may die possessed.
cise over them, and which he might exercise over The language of the will, in the case before any other *property in like circumstances, (*5 the court, is as general, comprehensive, and without subjecting himself to a forfeiture? effective, for the purpose of passing the whole There is a class of cases in which it has been estate, as language can be; and gives to the leg- held that a testator may restrain the alienation atee the whole estate, subject only to the re- of the interest given by the will, and limit the striction of the right of alienation.
estate over in the case of alienation, whether There is here no limitation of the estate-no voluntary or involuntary. This class of cases intention expressed to confine the legatee to an originated in the case of Dommett v. Bedford (3 estate for life in the slaves, or to give him a Vesey, 149). The principle of this case has mere personal benefit by the bequest.
become a general rule of law, in the folowing Admitting the validity of the restriction, if cases: 13 Vesey, 404, 429; 3 Swanston, 505; 5 he should neither remove the negroes or sell Mod., 515; 6 Maddox, 482. them, at his death they will go to his repre- In this class of cases, the estate is vested in sentatives, to be distributed among his next of trustees; and it is provided that the interest or kin, if he should die inestate; and to his lega- income shall be received by the trustees, and a tee, if he should make a testamentary bequest. certain portion thereof be paid at certain peri
It has been suggested that this very restric-ods to the legatees, unless they become banktion will operate to limit the legatee to an es- rupts, or make voluntary assignments of the tate for life; that it shows that it was not in amounts respectively settled in said cases; tended he should have the absolute power and whereupon, in each case, the annuity is to cease, control over the negroes. But a restriction on and the estate is devised over. Such bequests 4*] the right to sell never has been *construed are held to be short of a .ife estate, and to be into a limitation of the estate of the devisee, intended for the mere personal benefit of the when the language of the will passed the fee. legatee.
The proviso is a restriction on the right of The cases belonging to this class differ maalienation. The property is given to the legaterially from that under consideration. In them tee absolutely, with a condition annexed, that the title to the estate is in trustees; in the legahe shall not sell; a condition which is repug- tee of the annuity, there is nothing but a right nant to the nature of the estate, and therefore to receive payment of a sum of money, until void. (Co. Lit., 206 b, 223 a.)
the happening of a given event-his becoming If there be a limitation over, on the breach bankrupt, or voluntarily parting with the right of such condition, it does not alter the case. to receive it. The annuitant takes only a life The condition itself being void, the estate lim- estate—the gift was merely for his personal ited upon it must be void also.
benefit, What is a conditional limitation, but an es. By the will in this case the legatee took to tate which is to vest on a certain condition, or himself the absolute property in the negroes bethe happening of a certain event, by which a queathed. The enjoyment of them is not limpreceding estate is to be devested? If, then, ited to a mere personal benefit. The property the condition on which the preceding estate is does not cease at his death, but will pass to his to be devested, be unlawful and repugnant, representatives, to be disposed of, or distributed and therefore void, the preceding estate can according to law. not be devested; can a man be deprived of his Mr Bradley, for the defendant: estate by refusing to do an unlawful thing, or This is a will. The intention of the testatrix by doing that which the law authorizes him to to be gathered from all the parts of the will is do with his own? (Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves to be effected, if it can be, without contraveney, 324; 2 Caines' Reports, 348.)
ing some settled principle of law. (Smith v. Bell, It will be contended, on the part of the de-6 Peters, 75, and the cases cited.) fendant in error, that there is something in the What estate did Gerard take? What effect nature of the property which is the subject of had the exportation and sale?' this devise, that requires the application of a There are two bequests, one of property in rule of law different from that which would be the slaves, to Gerard, *supposed to be abso-(*6 applied to a case arising on the title or owner. lute; another of freedom to the slaves, upon the ship to any other kind of property.
happening of either of two events, defeating Negroes, by the laws of Maryland, are prop- the first devise, and therefore limiting it. If erty precisely as money in the funds, or house these events are repugnant to the devise to hold effects. The jus disponendi in the mas- Gerard, does that prevent their happening? If ter is as absolute in the one case as in the other. they happened, must they not give rise to the How shall the court decide in favor of the free- devise over? dom of the slave, without at the same time, The intent of the testatrix is clear. She and in the same judgment, deciding the right meant to give Gerard a qualified, not an absoof property as claimed? (Mima Queen v. Hep- lute estate, and to limit it to the happening of burn, 7 Cranch, 295.)
the event she has prescribed.
The bequest of freedom is not a condition tent, we must look to the relation of the parties. annexed to the estate of Gerard; it is a con. The first taker is her nephew. She meant to ditional limitation of that estate, contingent aid him, but it must be in her own manner, by until the event occurs, but becoming absolute his taking a qualified estate to be held in Maryso soon as that has happened. (Preston on land. The others are her slaves, grown up Est., 40; Fearn. on Remain., 11, 14, 16.) around her, to whom she is attached-for
It might be void as a bare condition, as to whom she intends, as far as possible, to provide Gerard; yet good as a limitation, as to the protection. She knows the laws, climate, cusslaves.
toms under which they have been protecteil, She meant to give to the slaves a higher and and grown-she does not know whither they Dobler bequest. What is it? Property? The may be carried. She leaves them to the charge same interest she had given to Gerard? The of this nephew, sub modo, qualifying and resaine estate or power? If so, how is it to be straining his power over them. There is a great estimated? By what law to be controlled ? primary intent pervading the whole will, an
Freedom is not to be valued. (Lee v. Lee, 8 intent controlling the rights conferred on GePeters, 48.) A question of freedom is superior rard, and that is the protection and preservato any question of property. (Allen v. Wal- tion of these objects of her bounty, in what she lingsford, 10 Peters
, 583.) İt is a question de thinks the best condition for them. Is this inserving the favor of courts. (Fenwick v. Chap tent opposed by any settled principle of law? man, 9 Peters, 476; Isaac: v. Randolph's Ex- *It is said the law in regard to slaves, (*8 ecutors, 6 Rand., 652.)
and the rules of evidence in cases of freedom In construing the will we must look to the are the same as in all cases of personal property, subject matter of both devises. The first re. and the case of Mima Queen (7 Cranch, 290) is lates to property, the second to freedom, and relied on as sustaining this position. We deny yet both relate to the same subject. And what it. The whole point of that case is as to the is it? Is it merely property? They are slaves; admissibility of hearsay evidence to prove a but they are human beings. They may acquire specific fact. We agree that the rules of evifreedom by implication. (Mullen v. Hall, 5 dence are and must be the same, and we invoke Harris & Johns., 190; Legrand v. Darnell, 2 the aid of that principle. We apply it to asPeters, 664.) They are recognized as persons certain the intent of the testatrix. in the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, But are the laws of personal property applisec. 9. par. 1; sec. 2, part 3; art. 4, sec. 2, par. cable? Upon what principle? Upon what adjudi. 3. They are so recognized by courts of justice. cated case? What laws ? Shall we go to England? The law of common carriers does not apply to To her system of villanage, as it once existed, in them. (Bryce v. Anderson, 2 Peters, 155.) Hu- the only part of her political or judicial frame manity forbids the separation of mothers from which was ever supposed to bear the least aninfant children, and the court will not sanction alogy to this? Trace out the analogies and see it (Fitzhugh et ur. v. Foote et al., 3 Call., how few they are? In what do they resemble 13.)
each other? Even under that condition, such If, then, the character of the bequest over be a case as this could never have arisen. We can different from that given to Gerard-superior get no aid from her jurisprudence. 7*] to property-not to be valued—*deserving Shall we go to the laws of the several States? the favor of the courts, of a wholly different Our search would be equally vain here. The sature; and the intent of the testatrix in regard right which is held in a slave is so modified by to this bequest over be clear, shall that intent statutory provisions, by local causes, by custom, be defeated by rules adopted solely for the reg. by the common law, by the social condition, alation of property? Is there any precedent and by the local and political position of each controlling this court.
Stale, that we can derive noimportant aid from It is conceded she might have given to Gerard them. It is emphatically a subject of peculiar a life estate, and freedom to the slaves upon bis regulation. But wherever we do find the right death. She could then certainly have granted to manumit, we find this cardinal point, that a less estate, and have made this to depend suits for freedom are to be favored, pervading upon a certain or uncertain event. Then it is and controlling the judicial decisions. immaterial how this event is brought about, by The laws of personal property are not applithe act of Gerard, or operation of law.
cable. She might have given a life estate in the Color, in a slave-holding State is a badge of sufruct, to be terminated by his aliening dur. slavery. It is not so where slavery does not ing his life, and remainder to the slaves. (Dom- exist. Accompanied by possession in the former matt v. Bedford, 6 T. R., 684; Brandon v. Rob- State, it is evidence of title. An adverse pos. inson, 18 Vesey, 429; Yarnold v. Morehouse, session of a slave for a period corresponding 1 Russ. & Mylne, 364; Legget v. Lear, 2 Sim., wiih the statute of limitations gives title in a 479; 4 Russ. & Mylne, 690.)
slave. (Hardeson v. Hays, 4 Yerg., 507; Partee Did she intend to give Gerard during his life v. Badget, 4 Yerg., 174; Brent v. Chapman, 5 anything more than the usufruct?
Cranch, 358; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat., 361; If she had so expressed herself, that this re-Garth's Executors v. Barksdale, 5 Munf., 101; straint upon alienation amounts to a limitation Carter v. Carter, 5 Munf., 108; Neroby v. Blakey, of the previous estate, and there is a devise over, 3 Hen. & Mun., 57; Smart v. Baugh, 3 J. J. it is not necessarily so repugnant as to be void, Marsh., 363.) but may be carried into effect. (Wilkinson v. But no length of possession, however open, Wilkinson, 3 Swan., 515; Coop. C. C., 259; 2 notorious, and absolute, can prevail against a Wils. C. C., 47.)
claim of freedom, where the claimant can trace She has so expressed herself, and it was her back his descent from a free maternal ancestor elear intent. Besides, upon this question of in-|(Rawlings v. Boston, 3 Harris & McHen., 139); 9*] or if he can show *an acquired right to Again. It has been said that restraint upon freedom, perfected in himself. (Hunter v. alienation is void. Yet in an executory devise Futener, í Leigh, 172, and cases cited; Burke this restraint exists, and has never been disv. Negro Joe, 6 Gill & Johns., 136.)
puted. (Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns., 12; Cordle By statutory provisions in Maryland, they v. Cordle, 6 Munf., 455.) are regarded as responsible and intellectual But, it is said, if the devise of freedom is beings, as persons " capable of contracting. to depend upon the happening of the event In some cases they are entitled to trial by jury. mentioned in the will, the first estate must (Maryland Act, 1751, chap. 14, sec. 4.) They vest, and then the condition is void. Not so. may contract. (1715, ch. 44, sec. 11.) They It does not necessarily follow. (Stainham and may discharge the very responsible office of Bell, Lofft., 455; Avelyn v. Ward, 1 Ves.. Sen., pilots. (1788, ch. 33.)
420; in which last case the court says, if by any If, then, the laws of personal property ap- means the conditional limitation is removed, ply, to what extent do they so apply?
the devise over will take effect; see, also, SimpConsidered merely as personal property, son v. Vickers, 14 Ves., 341, and particularly they are subject to all the laws regulating that Doe, ex dem. Smith, v. Hance, 6 Halsted, 244, species of property; they may be the subject 252–254.) of contract, pass by gift or will, descend, or Suppose the estate of Gerard to have vested. be taken in execution. Their gains belong to What was its extent and limitation? It was their owner; they can make no contract with not intended to be absolute. The power to third parties, without the owner's assent, and give or prevent freedom was not devised to none with their owner, and the issue of the him. That was already exercised. He had a woman is part of the use, the property of the qualified property. Slavery is the property person to whom the mother belongs, for the which one man has in the labor of another, time being. (1 Harr. & McH., 160, 352; 1 Harr. and the right to the custody and such limited & Johns., 526; 6 Harr. & Johns., 16, 526.) use of the person of that other, as the particular
Considered as human beings capable of ac- laws allow. The power of the master is subquiring, under the laws, rights paramount to ordinate to the law of the land, and in some all individual claims, and to be controlled only cases he is allowed by that law to give freedom by the sovereign in the State, from the exercise in Maryland in presenti or in futuro. If the of which they have been rightfully debarred master once exercises this authority, *it is [*11 by law, they acquire a higher dignity.
irrevocable, the subject of it can never be reIn their former character they are to be con- duced again to the condition of a slave, unless sidered as property. But here the very ques- by legislative provision. tion is, are they property? To determine this, Now, if any right in, or power over a thing shall we assume that the laws of property ap- granted be reserved to the grantor, or devised ply, and by those laws determine their charac- to a third person, the person taking has but a ter, and a right immeasurably above them? qualified or limited estate, it is not absolute. Can property take property? Can a man be The grantor or devisor may annex to this indicted for murder of property? Can property qualified or limited estate, conditions by which be entitled to a trial by jury, or commit a crime, it may be terminated at a period short of that or acquire a right? Yet all this may be done to which it would otherwise run. The effect by a negro; and they all imply a reasoning must be to give rise, in case of a devise over to faculty, a conscience, an immortal spirit, in the new estate, if there be one devised, or the which there can be no property?
property must revert. It cannot be that the We must look to the laws of Maryland. The tenant of the particular estate shall have the statutes there give them power to take freedom power to defeat the other and usurp the whole by devise, to take effect immediately, or at a property to himself. Is not this the case here? remote period, after a term of years or a life Without the proviso, the words are as absoestate. (Act 1796 and 1809.) The decisions of lute as in the case of Smith v. Bell (6 Peters, the courts of Maryland are in favor of this 74). But the proviso must operate to restrain 10*] capacity. The statutes direct two *modes the general words in the same manner as the of emancipation, by will or deed. The courts devise over of the remainder in that case.
She have extended it to implied manumission, as in could grant a life estate, with freedom to take Dolly Mullen's case, and to adverse possession or effect at its expiration, the life estate to be forlength of time, as in Negro Joe v. Burke. feited upon the happening of an event, and the
Where, then, the intent of the testator clearly devise over to take effect. A fortiori she appears to secure to them liberty on the hap- might make this life estate to depend upon pening of an event, which has happened; or his keeping them in his own possession and in where a doubtful form of expression is used, the State of Maryland. The uncertainty of the which, in regard to mere personal property, event can make no difference. It has happened. might amount to a condition repugnant to the The happening of the event is during a single bequest, and thus be void, yet in favor of lib. life, and, therefore, not too remote. We main. erty, and having a regard to the subject of the tain, then, that this is not a naked condition bequest and the right intended to be conferred, annexed to an absolute estate and repugnant to the court will construe the will according to it, and therefore void, but is a contingent limithe intent, and take this to be a limitation of tation of a particular estate, with a devise over the estate.
of a faculty or estate of the highest dignity Again. The intent of the testatrix is to give and most absolute character, to take effect on freedom to the slaves, unless they can be held the happening of a contingent event by which in Maryland upon the terms she has herself the particular estate was to be terminated, declared. Now, if they cannot be so held in which event must occur during the lifetime of slavery, what is to be the effect? They are free. la person in being, and the event has happened.
As to the distinction between a naked condition I will and devise the said negroes to be free
Upon the death of the testatrix, Gerard T. But, is a condition in restraint of alienation Greenfield took possession of the petitioner and Decessarily void? and are there not cases where the other slaves bequeathed to him, and held it amounts to a limitation? The true distinc- them from that time until December, 1839, tion is, that where such a condition amounts when he sold the petitioner to the defendant; to a limitation of the precedent particular and the petition for freedom was filed shortly estate, with a devise over, it is good. (Doe, d. after the sale. At the time of the making of Duke Norfolk, v. Havke, 2 East, 481; and Wil- the will, and ever since, Gerard T. Greenfieid kinson v. Wilkinson, 3 Swanst, 515.)
resided in the State of Tennessee; with an in12*] *The reason of the rule is obvious, it is terval of between two and three years, during to prevent perpetuities, and therefore the jus which he sojourned in Prince George's County, disponendi in an absolute estate is not to be after the death of the testatrix, for the purpose taken away, but even this may be qualified. of settling his business. (Litt., sec. 361; Shep. Touch., 129; Gill v. Upon this evidence, the Circuit Court inPearon, 6 East, 173; S. C., 2 Smith, 295.) structed the jury, that by the fact of such sale This last case is a clear case of a fee-simple, of the petitioner, the estate or property in the with a condition terminating it. If the power petitioner so bequeathed to Greenfield, ceased of disposal is not absolutely taken away, the and determined, and he therefore became encondition restraining it may be good. Jackson titled to his freedom. 1. Shutz, 18 Johns., 175, and cases cited; Under this direction of the court, the verdict Me Williams v. Nisby, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 507.) was in favor of the petitioner. Here be might at any time have disposed of By the laws of Maryland, as they stood at the his interest to the slaves themselves, by re- date of this will, and at the time of the death leasing it.
of the testatrix, any person might, by deed, or The case of Bradley v. Piexoto, as stated in last will and testament, declare his slave to be the report, does not warrant the exposition of free after any given period of service, or at any it in the opinion of the Master of the Rolls. particular age, or upon the performance of any We do not controvert his law, for if the gift condition, or on the event of any contingency. was absolute of both principal and dividends, This right is recognized in the Act of Assemthat case cannot illustrate this. If it was not bly of 1809, ch. 171. sbsolute, the case is wholly inconsistent with The contingency upon which the petitioner Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, Branden v. Robinson, was to become free must, by the terms of the Dommett v. Bedford, Legget v. Lear,&c., already will, have happened in the lifetime of Gerard cited, and particularly Bird v. Hudson (3 Swanst, T. Greenfield; and if he had died without sell342.)
ing him, or conveying him out of the State of We are considering a will. The intent is to Maryland, the petitioner would have continued govern. Every intent is to be effected if possible. a slave for life. The event, therefore, upon The primary intent is to prevail. The particular which he was to become free. was not too reintent was to give the nephew a qualified estate. mote. The primary intent was to afford protection It is said, however, that this was a restraint and security to the slaves. The restraint on alienation inconsistent with the right of upon the nephew does not take away all property bequeathed by the will. But is, in. power of alienation. The execution of every stead of giving freedom to the slave, he had intent does not contravene any settled prin- been bequeathed to some third person, in the ciple of law. The event to determine the event of his being sold, or *removed out (*14 estate of the first taker is not too remote. of the estate by the first taker, it is evident upon
Besides it is a case in favor of liberty, to be common law principles, that the limitation over attained by the instruments, and in the mode would have been good. (2 East, 481.) Now, a pointed out by the statutes, a case involving bequest of freedom to the slave stands upon the one interest of the highest dignity, and de- same principles with a bequest over to a third pending on the happening of an event to ter- person. It is said by the Chancellor of Maryminate another interest of less importance. land (2 Bland's Chancery Rep., 314), that the
bequest of freedom to a slave is a specific legMr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opin- acy, and undoubtedly this is its true legal charion of the court:
acter. This case is brought here by writ of error And if a bequest over to a third person would from the Circuit Court of the District of not be regarded as an unlawful restraint upon Columbia, for Washington County, and came alienation, there can be no reason for applying before that court upon a petition for freedom. a different rule where the bequest over is free
It appeared on the trial, that the petitioner dom to the slave. In the one case, the restricwas the property of Mary Ann T. Greenfield, tion on alienation ceases as soon as the devise of Prince George's County, in the State of Mary- over takes effect; and in the other, the right of land, who died in 1824, having first duly made property ceases upon the happening of the con139] her *last will and testament, whereby, tingency, and there is nothing to alien. among other things, she bequeathed the peti- We think that the bequest in the will was a tioner, with sundry other slaves, to her nephew, conditional limitation of freedom to the petiGerard T. Greenfield, with a proviso in the tioner, and that it took effect the moment he following words: "Provided he shall not was sold. carry them out of the State of Maryland, or The judgment of the Circuit Court must there
ell them to anyone; in either of which events fore be affirmed.
GEORGE W. HAMMOND, Administrator gaged to the executors three tracts of land in
Jefferson County, Virginia, amounting in the de bonis non of THOMAS HAMMOND, De whole to one thousand and seventy-six acres, to ceased, ET AL., Appellants,
secure the payment of the purchase which he
had made, as above stated. LORENZO LEWIS, Executor of LAWRENCE
On the 11th of March, 1806, the executors Lewis, Deceased, who was the acting execu- who was entitled to a full distributive share in
assigned the mortgage to Thomas Hammond, tor of GEN. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Ap. right of his wife, and attached to the assignpellee.
ment the following memorandum: "The execu
tors are not to be made personally liable, in any Legatees not liable for difference between nominal respect, or on any pretense, *wherein, (*16 and actual value of mortgage assigned to him for, or by reason of the above assignment, and which was in excess of his share-due diligence. further, the within-named Burdett Ashton,
Jun., his heirs, executors and administrators, In the distribution of the estate of a deceased is to have credit for his proportion of $5,179.05, person, an assignment, to one of the distributees, of a mortgage which is for a greater sum than his being the share of each legatee of said George distributive share. does not make him responsible Washington, of certain sales of real and per. to the executors for the difference between his sbare sonal estate made by the said executors, as well and the nominal amount of the mortgage in case the mortgaged premises sell for less than the amount as for the proportion of the sister of the said of his share, where the distributee has, with proper Burdett, as her attorney in fact." diligence, and in good faith, subjected the mort
As it was thought that the distributive shares gaged property to sale, and has not bound bimself absolutely for the nominal sum secured by the of the said Ashton and Hammond, when added mortgage.
together, would not quite exhaust the debt due
from Ashton to the executors, the latter took 15*] *THIS was an appeal from the Circuit from Hammond, on the same day on which District of Columbia, bolden in and for the mortgage, in which it was stipulated that HamCounty of Alexandria.
mond should indemnify the executors, and also The facts in the case were these:
should pay to the executors whatever surplus General Washington, by his will, executed might remain, after deducting Hammond's and in 1799, devised all
the rest and residue of his Ashton's distributive shares from the amount estate, real and personal, not before disposed of of Ashton's debt to the executors. by said will, to be sold by his executors, at such
On the 2d of April, 1806, Hammond, being time, in such manner, and on such credits (if indebted to Smith, Calhoun & Co., of the city an equal, valid, and satisfactory distribution of of Baltimore, in the sum of $5,604.64, assigned The specific property could not be made with to them all his right to so much of the mortout). as in their judgment should be most con- gaged premises as would be sufficient to satisfy ducive to the interest of the parties concerned; the sum aforesaid. As speedily as possible, and the moneys arising therefrom to be divided Smith, Calhoun & Co. obtained a decree in the into twenty-three equal parts.
high Court of Chancery,in Virginia, to foreclose On the 19th of July, 1802, the executors as. Ashton's mortgage, who, at the time of such foresembled the legatees, with a view to consult closure, was insolvent, and died so. The result them upon certain questions arising under the of such sale is thus stated in the opinion of the will; and it was agreed that a certain portion of Circuit Court, delivered in a subsequent stage the personal estate should be sold, another por- of the cause: tion divided, a certain portion of the lands
The property mortgaged by Ashton, sold undivided, and the residue sold by the execu- der decree for (net proceeds) $3,908.46. tors.
The debt of Ashton was
$9,410.20 On the 6th of June, 1803, a meeting of the He had a right to retain
3,452.70 devisees was held, at which it was agreed that certain lands, lying on the eastern waters, The real amount of Ashton's debt should be sold, and, if purchased by the dev
$5,957.50 isees, such purchaser should pay at three Hammond's claim was
5,179.05 equal annual installments with six per cent. interest from the day of sale, but to be credited Amount rec'd by Hammond's mort. with his proportion of the sales which had there
$778.45 been made, and which were to be divided
At some period between 1819 and 1823, the among the said devisees.
executors addressed a circular letter to each of On the 7th of June, 1803, Burdett Ashton, the legatees, who had by this time become very who was entitled, in his own right, and that of numerous, expressing a desire to close their exhis sister, to two thirds of a distributive share, ecutorial duties, and stating that a difficulty expurchased from the executors, property belong. isted in the mode of calculating interest. They ing to the estate, for the sum of $9,410.20; pay: say, “there are but two *modes by which (*17 able one third on demand, one third on the 7th our objects can be attained - a reference of the of June, 1805, and one third on the 7th of June, accounts to arbitration, or a suit; the former we 1806.
should prefer, as most consonant with the inOn the 12th of March, 1805, Ashton mort- junction of our testator, if it were not attended
1.- In the progress of the cause, G. W. Hammond by insuperable difficulties, on account of the also died, and his administratrix became a party: dispersed situation of the legatees, who conbut the suit having been an amicable one, this did sequently could scarcely be expected to agree not delay the proceedings. It is mentioned only upon the arbitrators; we therefore propose that because sometimes the one and sometimes the other is spoken of as the person interested.
the legatees should concur in instituting an