upon the premises, whereon to levy the same, it should be lawful for Prout, his heirs or assigns, to re-enter and take possession of the leased premises. The special covenant was to this effect, that if at any time or times thereafter, and before the expiration of the lease, Parsons, or his heirs, executors, &c., should pay to the said Prout, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, the sum of $196.874 over and above all rents for said piece of ground that might then be in arrear, that then the said Prout, his heirs, &c., should make and execute a good and sufficient deed of release in fee-simple to the said Parsons, his heirs, &c., for the said piece or portion of ground. In 1813 Parsons died, having occupied the leased property from the time that the lease was made. In 1815, and prior thereto, the widow of Parsons, who continued in possession of the property, paid to Prout $100 on account of the purchase of the fee-simple in the said lot. In 1823 Prout died; Mary Bradley, one of the lessors of the plaintiff, being one of his surviving children. After Prout's death, the widow of Parsons gave possession of the property in question to Mary Ann Connor, the defendant in the ejectment, who for some time paid the taxes as they accrued, and also paid various sums of money on account of the rent due, and in arrear, and of the accruing rent. In 1831, a partition of the estate of Prout was made, according to law, among his children, and the leased premises in question were assigned to Mary Bradley. After the partition, Mary Ann Connor made payments on account of the rent to Mary Bradley, and also paid the taxes to the corporation of the city of Washington, up to the year 1831, but omitted to pay the taxes for the years 1831, 1832, 1833, and 1834, amounting in all to $44.33. In 1835, George Adams, the collector of taxes for the corporation of Washington, after having advertised the property, set up to sale the leasehold interest in the said premises, but 213*] receiving *no bid for the same, imme diately thereafter exposed to public sale the feesimple interest and estate, which was purchased by one Allison Nailor, for the sum of $49.83, being the amount of taxes due thereon, to gether with the expense of selling the same. The property had been assessed on the books of the corporation of Washington, from 1813 to 1838, in the name of Joseph B. Parsons' heirs. On the 2d of June, 1838, the corporation of Washington made a deed of the premises to Allison Nailor, and, in November following, he conveyed them to Mary Ann Connor. In November, 1838, Henry Bradley and Mary, his wife, brought an ejectment against Mary Anna Connor, counting on two demises; one from William Prout, on the first day of January, 1827, and the other from Henry Bradley and Mary, his wife, on the 1st day of January, 1838. The judgment of the court below was for the plaintiffs. Two bills of exceptions were taken, the first of which it is only necessary to notice, and which is stated at large in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Brent and Brent for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Bradley for defendant. Only such parts of their agreements will be noted as bear upon the point upon which the court rested their judgment. Mr. Brent, for plaintiff in error, contended, that, as to the first demise, laid on the 1st January, 1827, it was bad, because the evidence showed that Prout died in 1823. (3 Wend., 153.) The second demise is laid on the 1st January, 1838, and the lessor must show a right to re enter on that day; and he cannot have such right unless there be insufficient distress upon the premises. (3 Harris & Johns., 19; 5 Harris & Johns., 175; Adams on Ejectment, 189; 1 Johns. Cas., 283; 6 Cowen, 149; 2 Leigh's N. P., 882, 883, 934; 4 Durn. & East, 681; 6 Binn., 454; 3 Bibb, 297; 3 Marshall, 134; 3 Monr., 221.) The evidence shows that there was not. sufficient distress on the premises, on the day of October, 1838, but not how it was in January, 1838. (Evans's Practice, 48; Adams on Ejectment, 150, reciting statute of Geo. II.; 7 Durn. & East, 117, 120; 2 Leigh's N. P., 924; Doug., 485; 15 East, 286; 2 Chitty's Pleading, 880, note K; 2 Maule & Selw., 529; 6 Cowen, 149. *Mr. Bradley(15 East, 286-288, referred [*214 to in Leigh's N. P.) only says that there must be an insufficiency at the time of the notice, or when the declaration was served. But in this case the tenant sets up an adversary title, and does not come within the rule. (Buller N. P., 96; 6 Johns. Rep., 272.) Connor must be considered as a trustee for the true owner, having obtained the title by fraud. (2 Bos. & Pull., 178; 8 East, 263.) Court will direct the jury to resume a deed from trustee to cestui que trust. (4 T. R., 682.) Mr. Brent, in conclusion, insisted that the demise in the declaration must correspond with the right of entry, which did not accrue until there was an insufficient distress. (8 Peters, 214.) Reason of the rule stated in 3 Harris & Johns., 19; 6 Johns., 273. Question of fraud not raised in the bill of exceptions. Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court: At the trial below, the jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the court thereupon adjudged to him his unexpired term in the premises claimed. To the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial two bills of excep tions were sealed at the instance of the defendant. The second to these bills is adverted to merely as making a part of the history of this cause. The questions thereby presented as growing out of the assessment of taxes on lots in the city of Washington, and the modes of proceeding by the corporate authorities to subject the real property of delinquents to sale for arrears of taxes, under the Acts of Congress applicable to such subjects, are withdrawn from the action of the court by previous and more material considerations claiming its atten tion under the first bill of exceptions; and which, in the view of the court, must determine the rights of these parties in their present attitude here. This bill of exceptions is in the following words: Defendant's first exception: On this trial of this cause, the plaintiffs, to maintain the issue on their part joined, gave in evidence a lease from William Prout to Joseph B. Parsons, as follows (copied in page 18), and proved that the premises in question are the same as those mentioned in said lease; they further gave evidence to show that Joseph B. Parsons entered into 215*] the *possession of the said premises under the said lease, and continued to occupy them until his death, which happened some time in the year 1813; that he left a widow and seven children, of whom the defendant is one; that his widow was left in the possession thereof at his death, and remained and continued in said possession until the death of said William Prout, which happened sometime in the year 1923; that previous to the year 1815, she paid to the said William Prout $100 on account of the purchase of the fee simple of the said lot; that smetime after the death of the said William Prout, the said widow of Joseph B. Parsons abandoned the possession of the said premises to the defendant, and the defendant took possession, thereon claiming to hold the leasehold interest, with the full knowledge and consent of said widow, and of the children of said Joseph P. Parsons; that the defendant thenceforth paid the taxes on the said lot under the said lease, and, from time to time, paid various Fims of money on account of the rent due and in arrear under the said lease, and of the accruing rent; that, as appears by the within admis son of the defendant filed in this cause, marked A, and as follows (copied in page 14), a partition of the estate of said William Prout was made, in March, 1831, among his children; that by that partition, the said premises, and the reversionary interest in the land described in the said lease, was assigned Mary Bradley, ore of the plaintiffs, in fee-simple; that the square in which the said demised premises are situated was divided into lots, on the plan of the city of Washington; that after said partition, the said defendant paid moneys on account of said rent, under said lease, to said Mary Bradley, and also paid the taxes to the corporation of the city of Washington, as provided in said lease, to the year 1831; that she failed to pay the taxes for the years 1831, 1832, 1833, and 1834, amounting in all to the sum of $44.33, and the said leasehold interest was set up for sale, and it not producing enough, the fee-simple of the ground described in said lease was set up for sale for taxes, and was sold; that at the time of the said tax sale, there was personal property on the said ground, liable for said taxes, more than sufficient to pay such taxes, and the said ground was improved property, having a dwelling-house upon it; that after said tax sale, the defendant promised the plaintiffs to redeem said property, and failed to 216) do so within the two years next succeeding said sale; that she waited until said two years had elapsed, and then called upon Allison Nailor, the purchaser thereof at said tax sale, and represented to him that she was the owner of the said property, and obtained from him an assignment of his certificate of purchase at said tax sale; that afterwards, the said assignment was cancelled. because the corporation could make no deed to an assignee. and the said Nailor received a conveyance from the corporation of Washington, and then exeruted a conveyance to the defendant of the premises in question, and the defendant then set up a claim to the premises in fee-simple, and adverse to the plaintiffs; that on the - day of October, 1838, there was rent due and in arrear, under the said lease, amounting to $193; and that there was not more than $30 of personal property on the said premises, liable to distress for rent, on the - day of October, or at the time of bringing this action; and here the plaintiffs rested. And thereupon, the defendant, by her counsel, prayed the court to instruct the jury that, under the evidence aforesaid, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this action; which instruction the court refused to give, and the defendant excepts thereto, and prays the court to sign and seal this bill of exceptions, which is done accordingly. W. CRANCH, [L. S.] JAMES S. MORSELL. [L. S. By a comparison of the facts set out in this bill, with the first count in the declaration, it will be seen that the plaintiff has counted upon a lease to him from William Prout of the date of January, 1827, when it is manifest by the proofs adduced by the plaintiff, that Prout died in 1823, four years previously to the existence of the lease. This irreconcilable contradiction between the different parts of the plaintiff's title, as dependent upon the first count, it is unnecessary to comment upon, as the counsel was understood, in the argument, to admit its effects as conclusive to prevent a recovery under that count. Had the plaintiff in ejectment a right to recover under the demise from Bradley and wife, upon the second count? The foundations for the recovery contended for on behalf of the plaintiff are, a forfeiture of tenure by the defendants, and a right of re-entry in the plaintiff, for a breach of the condition in the lease of the premises, by the father of Mary Bradley, one of the lessors of the plaintiff to Joseph B. [*217 Parsons. It is a settled rule at the common law, that where a right of re-entry is claimed on the ground of forfeiture for nonpayment of rent, there must be proof of a demand of the precise sum due, at a convenient time before sunset on the day when the rent is due, upon the land, in the most notorious place of it, even though there be no person on the land to pay. (1 Saund., 287, note 16, in which are cited 1 Leon., 305; Cro. Eliz., 209; Plowd. 172, b; 10 Rep., 129; Co. Litt., 201, b; 4 Leon, 117; 7 T. R., 117; and numerous other authorities, see, also, upon the same point, Doe, ex dem. Wheeldon, v. Paul, 3 Car. & Payne, 613, 14 Eng. Com. Law, 483; and Roe, ex dem. West, v. Davis, 7 East, 363.) In this case no proof is adduced or even pretended of a compliance with any one of the requisites just enumerated. But this suit is said not to be prosecuted upon rules of practice at the common law, but under the authority of the statute of 4 Geo. II. (ch. 28), which is in force in Washington County. We will inquire how far the decisions upon the interpretation of this statute have been fulfilled in the case before us. In Doe v. Lewis (1 Burr., 619, 620) the court say that this statute prescribes a method of proceeding in ejectment in two cases, viz.: one in case of judgment against the causual ejector; the other in case of its coming to trial. In the former, an affidavit must be made in the court where the suit is depending, that half a year's rent was due before the AL., Plaintiff in Error, v. BENJAMIN JEWELL ET AL., Defendants, Evidence-declarations of deceased member of family to disprove marriages-newspaper ad vertisement prepared by deceased-contract to marry per verba de presenti and de futuro. The declarations of a deceased member of a family that the parents of it never were married, are admissible in evidence whether his connection with that family was by blood or marriage. The acts and declarations of the parties being given in evidence on both sides, on the question of marriage, an advertisement announcing their separation and appearing in the principal com immediately after their separation, is part of the mercial newspaper of the place of their residence res gesta, and admissible in evidence. Whether or not it was inserted by the party, and if it was, what were his motives, are questions of fact for the jury. If a written contract between the parties be of fered in evidence, the purport of which is to show that the parties lived together on another basis than marriage, and the opposite party either denies the authenticity of the paper or alleges that it was obtained by fraud; the question, whether there was a marriage or not, is still open to the jury upon the whole of the evidence, declaration was served, and that no sufficient | *LESSEE OF SARÁH I. JEWELL ET [*219 distress was to be found on the premises countervailing the arrears then due, and that the lessor had power to re-enter; in the latter (that of a trial), the same things must be proved upon the trial; therefore it is held that this statute does not extend to cases where there is a sufficient distress upon the premises, and consequently in such cases the lessor must proceed at common law as before the statute. To the same effect is the decision in Doe, ex dem. Foster, v. Wandless (7 T. R., 117). It has been expressly ruled that under the statute of 4 Geo. II., there must be proof that on some day or period between the time at which the rent fell due, and the day of the demise, there was not a sufficient distress on the premises (Doe, ex dem. Smelt,v. Fuchau, 15 East,286); and further, that evidence must be adduced showing an examination of every part of the premises, and 218*] that where a party omitted to *enter a cottage, this was deemed an insufficient search. (2 Bro. & Bing., 514, 6 Eng. Com. Law.) Of the two demises laid in the declaration, the first is in January, 1827, the second on the 1st of January, 1838. Turning to the first bill of exceptions, we find it stated as having been proved, that on the day of October, 1838, there was rent due and in arrear, amounting to $193; next, that there was not more than $30 value of personal property on the premises liable to distress for rent on the day of October, or at the time of bringing this action. It will thus be perceived that the proofs by the plaintiff in ejectment fall short of the requirements of the statute in the following particulars, viz., in failing to show that any examination had been made to ascertain what amount of personal property was upon the premises at any time, or that there was any one day or period of time between the accrual of the rent for six months, and the date of either demise, at which there was a deficiency of personal property on the premises countervailing (to adopt the language of the courts) the arrears then due, for the last demise is dated January 1, 1838, the deficiency is averred to have been in the month of October following; the declaration was served in November, 1838, a still later period of time. For these defects in the case made by the plaintiff in ejectment, it is the opinion of this court that the instruction prayed by the defendant, as set forth in the first bill of excep tions, ought to have been given; that in refus ing such instruction the Circuit Court has erred. Its jugment must therefore be reversed. ORDER. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the County of Washington, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the asme is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo. Cited-15 Wall., 476; 4 Ben., 51. Upon the two questions, 1st. Whether, "if before any sexual connection between the parties, they, in the presence of her family and friends, agreed and wife," it was a legal marriage and the tie indisto marry, and did afterwards live together as man soluble even by mutual consent; and, 2d. Whether, "if the contract be made per verba de presenti and de futuro and be followed by consummation," it remains without cohabitation, or if made per verba amounts to a valid marriage, which the parties (being competent as to age and consent) cannot facie ecclesia; the court can express no opinion, dissolve, and is as equally binding as if made in being equally divided. THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina. The facts which were not denied were few; nearly all the evidence being of a contradictory character. All this evidence was brought to the notice of this court, in the argument, in consequence of the refusal of the court below to grant the third instruction prayed for by the plaintiffs, which instruction will be stated hereafter. The admitted facts were these: About the year 1794 or 1795, Benjamin Jewell became acquainted with Sophie Prevost, a young girl, who, with her family, had shortly before emigrated from the West Indies to Savannah. They lived together and continued to do so for many years. They resided but a short time in Savannah, then removed to Barnwell, in South Carolina, and finally to Charleston. During this time *many children [*220 were born, who were reared in the house where their parents lived, the mother passing by the name of Mrs. Jewell. In the year 1810, they separated by mutual consent, after executing the following paper: "Articles of agreement between Benjamin NOTE-As to pedigree and facts of family history. when may be proved by hearsay, see note to Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet., 328; and note to Chirac v. Rhinecker, 2 Pet., 615. What constitutes a valid marriage, and evidence to prove marriage. A marriage by words of present Jewell and Sophie Prevost, and receipt of * phie Prevost, dated 1810 and 1811. **Articles of agreement entered into this 4th y of December, 1810; Benjamin Jewell on the one part, and Sophie Prevost on the other. "Whereas, the said Benjamin Jewell and Sophie Prevost have cohabited for several years , and have had eight children, but are now wing and desirous to separate and live asuner, on certain terms and conditions hereinafter cified: Now, this instrument of writing tesseth, that the said B. Jewell and Sophie Post do agree henceforward to live separate and asunder. The said B. Jewell, on his part, consents and engages that the said Sophie Prevost shall Lave under her sole and absolute control, and free from all restraint or control by the said Jewell, the following children, viz.: Juliana, Daniel, and Washington, each child having its Ching. The said Sophie Prevost, on her rt, engages and consents that the said B. Texell shall have under his sole and absolute atrol, and free from all restraint or control the said Sophie Prevost, the following tren, viz.: Benjamin, Joseph, Hannah, Hey, and Delia, with their clothing. The Sophie is to pay all the expenses of clothaz, education, and maintenance of the chilen above allotted to her; and the said BenjaJewell is to pay all the expenses of cloth12 education, and maintenance of the chilIn allotted to him; and moreover engages to for one year's schooling, viz., the sum of for the child Juliana, in order to complete schooling. The said Sophie engages not to disturb the ed Benjamin, in respect to the management the children allotted to him, nor in any Manner control or interfere with them. And Ta said Benjamin engages in like manner in espect to those children assigned to the said Sophie. And in consideration of this separation and nsent to live asunder, the said Benjamin ento pay to the said Sophie Prevost the atract, such as would have been good at common 4, is vaid, notwithstanding statutory directions are been disregarded. Such is the rule in MichiMeister v. Moore, 96 U.S., 6 Otto, 76. Where a man was actually married at the time of arriage with his second wife, and this last Carriage was therefore void; but, upon the death (is actual wife, the man and the second wife aly consented to be man and wife, and coated as such. Held, that there was a valid arriage from the time of this consent. Holabird Atlantic Ins. Co., 12 Am. L. Reg.,566. Persons cannot go beyond the State of their resi, for instance, at sea, purposely to avoid renctions on marriage, of their own State, and There contract a marriage in a manner contrary to aws of the State of their residence, and afterwards have such marriage sustained by the courts thin it. Holmes v. Holmes, Abb., U.S., 525. Amarriage between a woman and a man who is y lawfully married, is void. The woman afterwards legally form another marriage hout waiting for a judicial sentence declaring first marriage a nullity. Patterson v. Gaines, How, 550. Marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil contract, to be pleted without regard to form, by any suffiwords used in the present tense. It may be ired by anyone who was present and can ideny the parties. Ibid. That marriage may be validly contracted by mual promises alone, without the presence or beneRetion of a priest, see Hallett v. Collins, 10 How, 174. sum of $3,000; and to give her a bill of sale of the fellow Jesse, the girl Harriet, the wench Nancy, with her three children, Char- [*221 lotte, Mary, and Charles; also, the following articles of furniture (here follows a list of furniture); and in consideration of the above, on the part of said Benjamin Jewell, the said Sophie Prevost doth hereby release and discharge the said Benjamin Jewell from all claims and demands whatsoever. In witness whereof, the parties to these presents have set their hands, this 4th of December, 1810. "W. L. SMITH. "BENJAMIN Jewell, "SOPHIE PREVOST." (Note. The signature of W. L. Smith in the original paper is written with pencil.) It was admitted that Sophie Prevost gave sundry receipts for the cash and furniture mentioned in the above agreement. It was further admitted, that in June, 1813, Benjamin Jewell was married in Richmond, Virginia, to Sarah Isaacs, by the regular minister of the Hebrew congregation, according to the rites and ceremonies observed by the Jews, soon after which they removed to the State of Louisiana. In 1818, Sophie Prevost married a man by the name of Storne, continuing to reside in Charleston. In 1828, Benjamin Jewell died, intestate, in Louisiana; and his widow and children living there, brought an ejectment against his children in Charleston, to recover a house and lot, of which the latter were in possession. The whole question turned upon the validity of the first marriage; there being no controversy about the validity of the second, in case Jewell, at the time of contracting the second marriage, had not a wife living. To support the first marriage, it was given in evidence by Sophie Prevost (who had released her interest in the property in dispute), and by others, that at the time of the marriage she and her family had recently arrived from the West Indies; that she was very young; that they brought with them some negroes, of Cohabitation for thirty years as man and wife is sufficient evidence of a marriage. Rex v. Stockland, Burr. S. C., 508; 1 W. Bl., 367. Strong acknowledgments of marriage for eighteen years together are sufficient to establish it inter vivos, though no actual proof can be had. Hervey v. Hervey, 2 W. Bl., 877. A marriage may be established by preponderating repute and by conduct, even though the repute is divided. Lyle v. Elwood, 19 L. R., Eq., 98; 44 L. J., Chanc., 164; 23 W. R., 157-V. C. H. General reputation is sufficient evidence of a marriage to entitle a son to inherit property, though the father be still living. Doe, d. Fleming, v. Fleming, 4 Bing., 266; 12 Moore, 500. A marriage may be presumed. There is a strong legal presumption in favor of marriage, particu larly after the lapse of a great length of time, and this presumption must be met by strong, distinct and satisfactory disproof. Wilkinson v. Payne, 4 Term R., 468; Piers v. Piers, 2 H. L. Cas., 331; 13 Jur., 569, Rex v. Twining, 2 B. & A., 386; Harrod v. Harrod, 1 Kuy. & J., 4; 18 Jur., 853; Goodman v. Goodman, 5 Jur., N. S., 902; 28 L. J. Chanc., 745, L. J.; Sichel v. Lambert, 15 C. B. The validity of a marriage contract is to be determined by the law of the State where it was entered into; if valid there it is to be recognized as such in the courts of this State, unless contrary to the prohibitions of natural law, or the express prohibition of a statute. Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y., 18. Where, therefore, by a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, the marriage between E. and "CHARLES HARRIS, GEO. J. HULL.” whom Jewell received three as her portion; tion, and from which I do release and exonerthat, in consequence of her being a Catholic ate the said Benjamin Jewell of all actions, and Jewell a Jew, the ceremony of marriage demands, or engagements, whatsoever, from between them was performed by a magistrate the beginning of the world to the present day. named White, in the presence of her family [The remaining part of the paper is characterand other persons; that she was entirely igno- ized by the court as gross and indecent, and rant of the English language; that she lived the reporter does not think proper to insert it. with Jewell as his wife, in his house, and under Its purport was to recognize a continuance his name; that they removed to Barnwell dis- of the connection on another basis than martrict in South Carolina, where also she riage.] SOPHIE PREVOST.” 222*] *associated with the neighborhood as "Witness, his wife; that they then removed to Charleston, where Jewell kept a clothing store: that It was also given in evidence by the plaintshe attended to the concerns of the shop and iffs that the above paper was recorded in the family as Mrs. Jewell; that the children were clerk's office of the Superior Court for Chatcircumcised according to the Jewish laws, and ham County (the county in which Savannah is that none but legitimate children are so; that situated), in *the month of August after [*223 she was recognized in society as his wife; that, its date, on the oath of Mr. Harris, one of the in 1806, she executed a release of dower in subscribing witnesses. The handwriting of some property which Jewell had mortgaged, Mr. Harris, who was a distinguished counselor and that such release was in the form which at law in Savannah, as well as that of Hull, the law prescribed for wives; that according to the other subscribing witness, who was a depthe general opinion among Hebrews, a mar-uty-marshal of Georgia, was proved by a judge riage, in the scriptural sense, between a Chris- and by one of the members of the Savannah tian and a Jewess is not legal; but that the bar. It was also given in evidence that Charles Jewish law considers a connection between a Harris was of the highest standing and characHebrew man and a Christian woman, as con- ter; was a distinguished man in the State, and cubinage; that it is the duty of a Jew to obey understood and spoke French fluently. No the laws of the country in which he lives; that, other part of the paper was in his handwriting if a divorce be obtained according to their law, except the words “ witness, Charles Harris." by mutual consent, it is not considered unlawful to marry again; that the man writes a paper to the effect that the woman is at liberty to marry again, and the act on the part of the woman is her receiving it and assenting to it. The evidence offered by the plaintiffs in the suit below, to rebut the idea that a marriage had ever taken place between Jewell and Sophie Prevost was, in the first place, the fol lowing paper: "SAVANNAH, 10th March, 1796. "Received of Benjamin Jewell the sum of five hundred dollars, in full for the cause of action which I brought against him on a promise of marriage; which sum of five hundred dollars, I acknowledge to be in full compensa It was also given in evidence by the plaintiffs, that upon an examination of the minutes of the courts, where the record of magistrates still remains, the name of White, who was said to have performed the marriage ceremony, did not appear as a justice of the peace, in Savannah, in the year 1796, or at any time previous. | It was also given in evidence by the plaintiffs, that Jewell and Sophie Prevost were not considered to be married, by one Borbot, the clerk of Jewell, or by the persons with whom he associated. It was further given in evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs, by the Rev. Mr. Poznanski, the officiating minister of the Hebrew congre B. was dissolved on the ground of adultery of the all civil regulations to the contrary, and which the latter,the decree of divorce adjudging it is to be un-parties (being competent as to age and consent) lawful for him to marry during the life of E., and, cannot dissolve, and it is equally binding as if thereafter, during her life, he went to Connecticut made in facie ecclesia. 2 Kent's Com., 87; Buntand there married I., both being residents of said ing v. Lepingwell, 4 Co., 29; S. C., Moore, 169; JesState of New York, having gone out of it for the sin v. Collins, 6 Mod., 155; 2 Salk., 437; Dalrymple purpose of evading its laws, returning to it on the v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Consist. R., 54, 64; La Tour day of marriage, and thereafter, residing there, v. Teesdale, 8 Taunt., 830; Fenton v. Reed,4 Johns.. which marriage was valid under the laws of Con- 52; Londondery v. Chester, 2 N. H., 265; Rose v. necticut, held, that such marriage was valid in Clark, 8 Paige, 574; State v. Patterson, 2 Iredell, N. New York, and the issue of such marriage was le- C., 316. gitimate; also that the provision of the Revised Statutes (2 R. S., 139, $5; Id., 146, § 49), prohibiting the second marriage of a person divorced on the ground of his or her adultery, during the life of the former husband or wife, and declaring such second marriage void, had no application, as they are in And it is equally clear that a promise to marry, the nature of a penalty, and have no effect outside given and accepted, with subsequent cohabitation of this State, in the absence of express terms show-subsequent copula-and without any circumstaning a legislative intent to give them that effect.ces to disconnect the mutual promise from the coVan Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y., 18; S. C., 13 N. habitation, and where there was there was no previY., Week, Dig., 246; 40 Am. Rep., 505, followed in ous illicit connection, and valid marriage was really Moor v. Hegeman, 27 Hun., N. Y.. 68; 15 N. Y., intended by the parties, is a valid marriage. ShelWeek. Dig., 90. ford on Marriages and Divorce, p. 29, 989, edit. London 1841, and the authorities there cited. The consent of the parties is all that is required to the valid celebration of the marriage; and as mar. riage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that is required by the natural or public law. 2 Kent's Com., 86, and authorities cited. If the contract be made per verba de praesenti, and remains without cohabitation, or if inade per verba de futuro, and be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage in the absence of It is very clear that the marriage contract is valid and binding, if made by words de praesenti, though it be not followed by cohabitation. McAdam v. Walker, 1 Dow's P. R., 148; Jackson v. Winns, 7 Wend., 47. This is the rule in the Scotch law, though Lord Chancellor Brougham, in a case on appeal to the House of Lords, exceedingly regretted it. Honyman v. Campbell, 2 Dow. & Clark's P. C., 265. Proof of matrimonial cohabitation, declarations of the parties and reputation that they are man and wife, is sufficient upon which to found a presumption of marriage. Betsinger v. Chapman, 88 N. Y.. 487; 14 N. Y. Week. Dig., 33. |