imposed no restraint upon the transfer of the stock, but related only to the means by which it should be accomplished and the manner in which it might be evidenced. It is essentially a matter of method-of procedure-rather than of ultimate substantial rights."

Equally without merit is the contention that the statute of 1899 impaired the obligations of the stockholders' contract, in that it substituted for individual actions against them a suit in equity by a receiver appointed after judgment against the corporation. In becoming stockholders the defendants did not acquire a vested right in any particular mode of procedure adopted for the purpose of enforcing their liability as stockholders. It is a well-established doctrine that mere methods of procedure in actions on contract that do not affect the substantial rights of parties are always within the control of the State. It is to be assumed that parties make their contracts with reference to the existence of such power in the State.

Without expressing any opinion as to questions of a local character, we hold, for the reasons stated, that the statute of 1899 furnishes no valid basis for the contention that it impaired the obligation of the contract by which defendants acquired their stock. This is the only Federal question of a substantial character presented on this writ of error, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas must be affirmed. It is so ordered.

VOL. CCXV-25

Statement of the Case.

215 U.S.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. HARRIS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 19. Argued November 2, 1909.-Decided January 3, 1910.

The words "public lands" in legislation refer to such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws, and no other meaning will be attributed to them unless apparent from the context of or circumstances attending the legislation.

While the power of Congress continues over lands sought to be acquired under preëmption and homestead laws until final payment, an entryman in actual possession cannot be dispossessed of his priority at the instance of an individual.

While a grant of right of way may take effect as of the date of the grant that date must be found in the act prescribing the finally adopted route.

In this case the rights of a bona fide settler holding a patent under preemption law and his grantee held superior to those of the railroad company under the act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, 494, granting public lands for a railway right of way.

76 Kansas, 255, affirmed.

THE admitted facts are that on April 22, 1861, Bernhard Blou settled upon and improved the northeast quarter of section 12, township 14 south, of range 3, in Saline County, Kansas, and on May 13, 1861, filed the declaratory statement required by the preëmption laws. Blou, by occupation, cultivation and improvements, preserved all his rights under the preëmption until September 5, 1865, when, having made no payment or final proof, he changed his preëmption entry to one under the homestead act of May 20, 1862. He continued in occupation, on December 8, 1870 made final proof under his homestead entry, and, on March 15, 1872 received a patent.

By the act of July 1, 1862, the general Union Pacific Railroad act, 12 Stat. 489, 493, c. 120, the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, whose name was changed to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division,

and thereafter to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, was granted a right of way 200 feet in width on each side of its road, through the public lands of the United States. The plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the defendant, has succeeded to the right, title and interest of the Leavenworth company. The route of the company as prescribed by the act ran from Missouri up the Kaw River until it reached the Republican River, and then north along the left bank of that river to intersect with the one hundredth meridian in the Territory of Nebraska. On July 17, 1862, the company filed its map of general route, and caused the lands within the limits of fifteen miles thereof on either side of the proposed route to be withdrawn from sale. Under the amendatory act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356, c. 216, the company filed another map, designating the same general route. Neither of these routes came within forty-five miles of the tract in controversy. Among the changes in the last-named act is one providing in §3 for the condemnation of a right of way 200 feet wide through land occupied by the owner or claimant. The act of July 3, 1866, 14 Stat. 79, c. 159, changed the route to extend westwardly towards Denver. Under this act the company located and constructed its road westwardly along the Smoky Hill River instead of northwestwardly along the Republican River, and, as located and constructed, the road passed through the quarter-section which Blou was then seeking to acquire under the homestead law.

On January 20, 1873, Bernhard Blou executed and delivered to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, the successor of the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, a deed for a right of way through said quarter-section, which deed the railway company accepted and paid him the consideration named in it. The land in controversy is a strip 150 feet wide, lying immediately south of a line fifty feet south of the center of the track of the defendant through the quarter-section. On November 10, 1882, Blou sold and conveyed to John Erickson by warranty deed all that part of the

quarter-section lying south of the railroad track, containing 101 acres. The defendants in error, hereinafter called the plaintiffs, derive title from Erickson. The plaintiffs and those under whom they claim had exclusive possession of the land in question from May, 1861, to August, 1902; broke and cultivated it, and paid all taxes assessed upon it since the issue of the patent. In August, 1902, the defendant fenced and took possession of the tract in controversy, whereupon this action to recover possession was commenced by the plaintiffs. The court found in their favor, and rendered judgment accordingly. This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State (Union Pacific R. R. v. Harris, 76 Kansas, 255), and thereupon the case was brought here on

error.

Mr. Maxwell Evarts, with whom Mr. R. W. Blair was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. T. F. Garver and Mr. L. C. Milliken for defendant in error, submitted.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The grant of the right of way was "through the public lands." What is meant by 'public lands' is well settled. As stated in Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761, 763: "The words 'public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws." See also Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481, 490; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 391. If it is claimed in any given case that they are used in a different meaning, it should be apparent either from the context or from the circumstances attending the legislation. While the power of Congress over lands which an individual is seeking to acquire under either the preemption or the homestead law remains until by the payment of the full purchase price required by the former law or the full occupation prescribed by the lat

ter, yet under the general land laws of the United States one who, having made an entry, is in actual occupation under the preemption or homestead law cannot be dispossessed of his priority at the instance of any individual. Hastings &c. Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 363, 364. In other words, one who has taken land under the preëmption or homestead law acquires an equity of which he cannot be deprived by any individual under the like laws. Now at the time of the passage of the act of July 3, 1866, Blou was and had been for several months in actual occupation under the homestead law. Did Congress intend by its legislation to deprive him of that equity which he had under the general land laws as against any one proceeding under those laws?

Any possible rights of the railroad company in this land commence with the act of July 3, 1866, for while the acts of 1864 and 1866 were in amendment of the act of 1862, yet the route prescribed by the acts of 1862 and 1864 was far to the east of this land, and only by the act of 1866 was the company authorized to construct a road through or near it. True, as held in Railroad Company v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. 426; Bybee v. Oregon & California Railroad Company, 139 U. S. 663, 679; Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Hasse, 197 U. S. 9, 10, the grant of the right of way is absolute, and takes effect as of the date of the grant. But that date must be found in an act prescribing the finally adopted route.

A case much relied upon by the railroad company, as showing the intent of Congress in its grant of the right of way to the Union Pacific Railroad Company and its tributaries, is Union Pacific Ry. Company v. Douglas County, 31 Fed. Rep. 540. In it it was held:

"It was the evident intention of Congress by the act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 491, giving a right of way to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to grant such right of way through those lands which by surveys should be found to be sections 16 and 36, the school sections which it intended to give to the future State of Nebraska, pursuant to the provisions of the