215 U.S. Argument for Appellant. ing acquired jurisdiction over the succession, is alone competent to entertain and determine every issue which may arise in the progress of the cause, whether it be as to the construction of the will, the rights of heirs and legatees to the estate, and the claims of creditors which may be asserted against it, whether such parties be citizens of other States or not, until the administration is terminated, the funds distributed and the executor discharged, would be to deny the judicial power of the United States conferred by the Constitution as extending over "controversies between citizens of different States" and force such citizens into the state courts in order to have their complaints heard. This is answered by Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 347; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679. Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, is claimed to be decisive against the Federal jurisdiction over this bill, but it can be distinguished as in that case the only question was as to the power of the Circuit Court to annul a will admitted to probate. It was held that, where the laws of a State afforded a remedy by contest in proceedings supplementary to the original probate proceedings, such a contest was not inter partes, and hence not within the designation of "a suit at law or in equity." It was further held that, where the construction and effect of the will is wholly subordinate to the sole issue of probate, Federal jurisdiction did not attach under the rule "that no instrument can be effective as a will, no rights in relation to it can arise until preliminary probate has been first made." Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485. But here there is no contest over the existence or non-existence of the will, and such a question is, therefore, a moot one. In Louisiana, an action to set aside a will already admitted to probate is strictly and purely an independent action in nullity between parties. Unlike the Washington statutes, involved in Farrell v. O'Brien, the judgment setting aside the will only binds the parties, inures only to the benefit of the particular contestant, and is not operative as to the whole world. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10. As to Argument for Appellant. 215 U.S. those not parties, the judgment of probate still stands prima facie valid. Succession of Barker, 10 La. Ann. 28; Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob. (La.) 56; Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U. S. 335; Garzot v. DeRubio, 209 U. S. 283, can also be distinguished. The modes of the action in nullity may be various, but essentially and in its nature it is one inter partes, and if the cause of nullity of a judgment probating a will is not one of form, but one of substance, relating to the merits, then the courts of the United States have jurisdiction where diversity of citizenship exists and state rules on the subject cannot deprive them of it. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 85; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 98; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 667. It is, however, out of place to pursue this matter at length, since there is nothing in the case that seeks to set aside the probate of the will. The sole question is: Have the Federal courts jurisdiction to establish a claim or right against and into an estate where the parties are, on one side citizens of one State and on the other citizens of another State? The long line of jurisprudence of this court remains unbroken. The question has been answered in the affirmative. As to the indispensability of parties: That the right of action for the establishment of his claim, as well as his interest by an heir is separable from that of his co-heirs is the law of Louisiana. Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848; Denbridge v. Crawley, 43 La. Ann. 504; Glasscock v. Clark, 33 La. Ann. 584; Burney Heirs v. Ludeling, 41 La. Ann. 627, 632; Denegre v. Denegre, 33 La. Ann. 689; Skipwith v. Glathary, 34 La. Ann. 28; Arts. 113 and 120, Code of Practice of Louisiana. Even if Louisiana jurisprudence cannot be invoked to control the jurisdiction of the Federal court, sitting in equity, nevertheless it should control the question upon which equity jurisdiction as to parties is founded concerning the character of an heir's interest in the estate as separate from that of his co-heir. At least, it is persuasive, since it fully accords with 215 U.S. Argument for Appellees. equity jurisdiction as to parties. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 433; Story's Equity Pleading, 10th ed., §§ 89, 207a, 212. The strict rule as to parties will yield if the court can proceed to decree and do justice to the parties before it without injury to the absentees. Cooper's Eq. Pl. 35; West v. Randall 2 Massachusetts, 181. In Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 235, this court regarded the absent parties as absolutely indispensable to the main cause of action, which is not the case here. See Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; Van Bokellen v. Cook, Fed. Cas. No. 16,831; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 167; Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co., 133 U. S. 473. Complainant may be required to waive her allegation as to Davis and still the court has jurisdiction. Northey v. Northey, 2 Arkansas, 77; S. C., 26 Eng. Reprint, 447; Williams v. Williams, 9 Mod. 299; S. C., 88 Eng. Reprint, 465. Reservation of Davis' rights need not be made by amendment; the court may modify the decree prayed for to meet it. Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103, 132. Mr. Wm. C. Dufour, Mr. Edgar H. Farrar, Mr. Jas. McConnell, Mr. Chas. E. Fenner, Mr. Geo. C. Walshe, Mr. Geo. H. Terriberry, Mr. H. Garland Dupre, Mr. S. McC. Lawrason, Mr. Walter Guion, Mr. Victor Leovy, Mr. Pierre Crabites and Mr. H. Generes Dufour for appellees: No Federal court has jurisdiction to remove an entire succession administration from a state court, as the bill in this case proposes to do. The state court acted first, and, under the law of Louisiana, has the entire estate in its possession and its administration, and it is entitled to proceed with that administration until it shall be completed. If complainant's contention is correct, a non-resident creditor of an estate in the hands of a receiver appointed by a state court can file a suit in a Federal court against the state court receiver, and request the Federal court, not only to pass upon the litigated claim, but further to fix the costs and expenses of the state court receivership, to determine who were the creditors of the estate, to settle the amount for distribution and the rank and order in which the creditors should be paid, and to direct the receiver to account to the Federal court and not to the state court. No precedent for this remarkable action can be found. See Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, which distinguishes Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608; Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 223; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 570. Under Arts. 133, 134 of the constitution of Louisiana and § 924 of the Code of Peace of that State, Denegre v. Denegre, 33 La. Ann. 689; Succession of Burnside, 34 La. Ann. 728. See Westfeldt v. Nor. Car. Mining Co., 166 Fed. Rep. 706; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, as to disinclination of this court to permit Federal courts to interfere with proceedings in state courts and to withdraw questions properly and necessarily involved in proceedings in the state courts. On the indispensability of parties: Under Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130; Garzot v. DeRubio, 209 U. S. 283; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 237; 47th Rule in Equity, Arts. 967, 1014, 1017, Code of Practice of Louisiana, Davis is an absolutely indispensable party and the bill cannot be maintained in any court of equity without him. MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court. This case presents a question of jurisdiction concerning the right of the United States Circuit Court to entertain a certain bill in equity. Frances E. Waterman, wife of Charles A. Crane, a resident of Chicago in the State of Illinois, and a citizen of that State, joined by her husband, also a citizen of Illinois, brought the suit in the United States Circuit Court against the Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Company, executor of the last will and testament of Caroline Stannard Tilton, deceased, a citizen of the State of Louisiana and an inhabitant of the East ern District of Louisiana, and also against the Charity Hospital of New Orleans, St. Ann's Asylum, Protestant Episcopal Orphan Asylum, Home for Incurables, Christian Woman's Exchange, State Insane Asylum of Jackson, Louisiana; City of New Orleans and Louisiana Retreat, conducted by the Society of the Daughters of St. Vincent de Paul, all and each of them being institutions established under the laws of Louisiana and citizens of the State of Louisiana, and inhabitants of the Eastern District of Louisiana; also against Robert Waterman and Frederick Waterman, citizens of the State of Louisiana and inhabitants of the Eastern District thereof. The bill set forth in substance: That Caroline Stannard Tilton, widow of Frederick W. Tilton, late of the city of New Orleans, duly made and published her last will and testament and codicils thereunto annexed, and by said will and codicils said Caroline Stannard Tilton gave and bequeathed to Robert Waterman the sum of $3,000; to the said Robert Waterman and his wife, fifteen premium bonds; to Frederick Waterman $3,000; to Frederick Tilton Davis, $1,000, and the whole series of No. 5,963 premium bonds. That the said Caroline Stannard Tilton departed this life on or about the sixth of July, 1908; that the Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Company, executor in said will named, duly proved the same in the court of probate jurisdiction in and for the Parish of Orleans in the State of Louisiana, and undertook the executorship thereof, and possessed itself of the personal estate and effects of the said testatrix to a very considerable amount, and more than sufficient to discharge her just debts, funeral expenses and legacies. The complainant further avers that she is the sole surviving niece, and that Robert and Frederick Waterman and Frederick Tilton Davis are the sole surviving nephews of said Caroline Stannard Tilton, and that there are no other persons within the nearest degree of kinship of the said testatrix; and that the said Frederick Tilton Davis resides in the State of Alabama, outside of the court's jurisdiction. She avers that the said Robert Waterman, Frederick Water |