amount in controversy and the citizenship of the parties thereto are such as to ordinarily confer jurisdiction on the United States circuit court. It follows, as a legal conclusion therefrom, that wherever a judgment at law is conclusive as a record as a cause of action, a decree in chancery is of equal validity for that purpose, and, therefore, actions are maintainable in one State on decrees in chancery of another State, authenticated as by the act of Congress is required.2 Whatever doubts may have formerly existed upon this subject the modern rulings of the courts, both State and National, have set at rest, and in so doing have but conformed to prevailing English doctrines on the subject. In the case here cited the Supreme Court of the United States, DANIEL, J., say: "We lay it down, therefore, as the general rule, that in every instance in which an action of debt can be maintained, upon a judgment at law, for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity which is for an ascertained and specific amount, and nothing more; and that the record of the proceedings in the one case must be ranked with and responded to as of the same dignity and binding obligation with the record in the other." So, that a bill in equity will lie to enforce a decree for money, of the same court or different court, has ever been recognized as a correct principle in courts of equity. Therefore, not only an action at law will lie in one State, as we have seen, upon a money decree of a court of another State, but it follows that a bill in equity will lie in the court of a State or United States upon a decree of a court, either Federal or State, rendered in another State, provided the citizenship of the parties to the bill (if in the Federal court) be such and the amount in controversy be such as in these respects to confer jurisdiction upon the court." The case here cited originated in the District court of the United States for the northern district of Iowa, upon a decree of the Circuit court of Grayson county, in the State of Kentucky, by certain of the heirs and distributees of John Golds 1 Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195, 203; Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. & R. 252; Warren . McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95. 2 Cases above cited. 3 Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65. 4 Ibid. 5 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253, 262. 6 Ibid. bury, deceased, for an accounting for the proceeds of said Goldsbury's estate. A decree was made in favor of the complainants in a court of Kentucky, and upon that decree the suit was brought in the United States District court (then exercising circuit court jurisdiction) for the district of Iowa. The court decreed in favor of complainants and the case went thence to the Supreme Court of the United States, which affirmed the decree. It being objected, in said cause, that a bill in equity would lie upon a decree, the court said, DANIEL, J.: "Among the original and undoubted powers of a court of equity is that of entertaining a bill filed for enforcing and carrying into effect a decree of the same or of a different court, as the exigencies of the case or the interests of the parties may require."1 Decrees, as well as judgments of a final character, of courts of the United States and of courts of the several States, where jurisdiction has fully attached, are binding and conclusive upon parties and privies until satisfied, superseded, set aside or reversed, in all other courts, State and Federal, wherein they come in question in a legitimate course of inquiry, properly verified or authenticated.2 III. ACTIONS IN STATE AND UNITED STATES COURTS ON JUDGMENT OF EITHER. An action will lie in a State court upon a judgment of a United States court; and so, in a United States court, on a judgment of a State court, the parties being of the proper qualification as to jurisdiction, and the matter in controversy being of the required amount to authorize jurisdiction; and in such actions nothing adjudicated in the rendition of the judgment can be readjudicated. If jurisdiction of the person of defendant is attached, the correctness of the recovery is not open to question when the judg ment is sued on, for these State and United States courts are not foreign to each other, although their localities or forums be in different States.4 1 18 How. 262. 227. Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N. H. 3 Thomson v. Lee Co., 22 Iowa, 200; Niblet v. Scott, 4 La. Ann. 245; Barney v. Patterson, 6 Harr. & J. 182; 4 Thomson v. Lee Co., 22 Iowa, 206. IV. ACTION ON CONDITIONAL AND INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS. On Conditional Judgment. An interlocutory or conditional judgment will not sustain an action in another State, as where its validity for enforcement by execution depend upon something subsequently to be done; as where a judgment is rendered against a surety in an appeal, under a statute providing therefor, and which statute required that to render such surety liable for the judgment, execution must go against the principal within thirty days, or within a given time, then such statutory regulation not being enforcible in another State, no regard can therein be had to the same, so as to carry out its provisions; and to render a judgment as at common law would be to give to the judgment greater force than it is entitled to where originally rendered; therefore, no judgment can be entered thereon in another State, either statutory or at common law. 1 Judgment on Penal Bonds - Continued. A judgment upon a penal bond for the amount of the penalty, with leave to have execution for a sum named as then due, and the principal judgment to stand as security for other installments of the same debt, as they severally, from time to time, became due, so as then to resume the proceedings and take order of execution therefor, will not maintain or support an action of debt in another State, when from the record it appears that the first and only installment ascertained and adjudicated as due, by the court rendering the judg ment, has been paid. The main judgment is but a security; the action is not terminated as to the subsequently occurring liabilities or installments, and the court of a different State cannot take up the proceeding where left off by scire facias or otherwise. The real judgment in such a proceeding is for the amount then found to be due, and for nothing more; and that being satisfied, the bond in all other forums, except of the State where such judgment is rendered, is not merged in the proceeding, but remains as it was before. In delivering the opinion in this case, and after reviewing the whole subject with great ability, and in 1 Kellam v. Toms, 38 Wis. 592. This case was decided on demurrer of defendant, and the proceedings being very irregular and imperfect, leave was given plaintiff to amend. 2 Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569; Pierce v. Reed, 2 N. H. 359. all its aspects, Justice REDFIELD said: "It is in vain to treat this as in any sense a judgment importing an obligation upon which to found an action of debt. It is, at most, an inchoate proceeding the mere pendency of an action. It is in no sense a more perfect judgment than a default, or judgment upon demurrer, where no damages have been assessed, and where they rest in pais, and depend upon proof to be adduced in court. In such case, which is certainly stronger for the plaintiff than the present, it would seem absurd to claim that a court in another State, or, indeed, any other court, could perfect the judgment. We might as well expect that if a defendant leaves one State and goes into another, after the service of process upon him, the court of the latter State will take up the proceedings at that very stage and perfect the judgment." In this same connection the court expressed great doubt if any of the collateral undertakings or obligations growing out of judicial proceedings in one State can be enforced in the courts of another State, the same being in their nature local to the forum where created or taken, and, as we may here add, subject in a measure to the subsequent rulings of the same forum as to their ultimate enforcement, if not as to their final binding effect. As, for instance, as enumerated in the opinion above referred to, proceedings by scire facias, or in debt upon recognizances of bail upon mesne process; suits against receiptors of property, and on replevin bonds and against sheriffs for neglect of duty, and upon prison bonds; and the enforcement of warrants of attorney to confess judgment; and declares it to be clearly the law, that proceedings to enforce any of such collateral liabilities or remedies by scire facias must be confined to the court wherein they arose; that the remedies on all such are local. And so of interlocutory judgments. They are not final, and no action can be maintained upon them. To support an action, the judgment must be conclusive.3 V. ACTION ON JOINT JUDGMENT. A joint judgment, against two or more defendants, rendered without service on or jurisdiction of both, is incapable of being 1 Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 580. 2 Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569, 579, 590. See, also, Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102. 3 Thorner v. Batory, 41 Md. 593; Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Tonilinson, 6 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 127; S. C., 3 Hun. 630 enforced by an action in another State.1 At least so, if there be no showing that the law of the State where the judgment was rendered tolerated the rendering of such a judgment. So, on the other hand, a joint judgment of another State against several defendants, when the record states that service was had on each, will not sustain an action against one alone of the defendants therein, there being nothing stated in the petition or declaration as a reason for proceeding against but one; but where joint judgment debtors are resident in different States, an action on such judgment may be maintained against each of them separately by averring and showing such residence. VI. ACTIONS ON A JUDGMENT RENDERED ON A PENAL BOND. The case of Battey v. Holbrook was an action brought in a court of Massachusetts on a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island. The judgment in Rhode island was rendered upon a penal bond, conditioned for the payment of an annual sum for support of a wife, where the parties had separated, which was payable to a trustee as obligee of the bond. Upon breaches to a part of the payments suit was brought, and judgment obtained for the penalty of the bond, as security for both the future and past breaches, with judgment of execution for the amount found due and therein specified for past breaches; the formal judgment for the penalty to stand good for future breaches, and the cause to remain in court, with the right in plaintiff to take orders of execution for the amounts of future breaches which might occur, upon scire facias against the defendant, to show cause against the same. The defendant having reinoved from the jurisdiction of Rhode Island into Massachusetts, was there sued in the State court upon the judgment. The courts of Massachusetts held that judgment could in that State be recovered only upon the effective part of the judgment sued ononly on so much thereof as execution had been awarded for in the United States circuit court where the judgment was rendered; and that the remedy for future breaches was by scire facias in the United States court, where the cause was still pending. That 1 Frothingham v. Barnes, 9 R. I. 474; Mervin v. Kumbel, 23 Wend. 293; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 514. 2 Knapp v. Abell, 10 Allen, 485. 3 Dart v. Goss, 24 Mich. 266. 4 Brown v. Birdsall, 29 Barb. 549. |