who dies intestate to be distributed in accordance with the law of the country wherein was his domicile at the time of his death, irrespective of where the property may be, or of the place at which he may die; and which always regards movable property as disposable according to the law of the owner's domicile. 1

And, the equally well recognized principle that contracts valid by the law of the place where they are made, or lex loci contractus, are valid in every other country or State. The exceptions to this rule will be noticed hereafter, under the proper head in relation to contracts. So, also, we will notice others, under their proper order.

1 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 465, 466.

2 Story on Conf. of Laws, § 273; Nelson v. Fotterall, 7 Leigh. 201; Warder v. Arell, 2 Wash. (Va.) 282, 295. In this case, one of the earliest American decisions on the subject, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, ROANE, J., say: "This contract having been made in Pennsylvania, without a view to performance in any other State, the agreement made upon the trial of the cause, referring to those laws, was an act of supererogation, and entirely unnecessary, for it is clear that the laws of that country where a contract is made must govern the fate of it. The rule which I have just mentioned is laid down in the case

of Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1679, and is well explained and illustrated in Fonblanque's excellent Treatise of Equity,' 2 vol. p. 443. It is true that the laws of one country have not, of themselves, an extra-territorial force in another; but, by the general assent of nations, they are always regarded, in contracts formed there. A distinction, however, is attempted in this case, under the idea that this is a penal law, and that the courts of one country will never execute the penal laws of another. The principle is true, but inapplicable. The law of 1777 points out a mode of discharging debts different from that which is customary; it may produce an injury, but it is not therefore penal."

III. SUITS BETWEEN TWO OR MORE STATES.

IV. SUIT AGAINST A STATE BY A CITIZEN OF ANOTHER STATE.

1. State and National Sovereignty. Duality and Unity of Government. We will now proceed under this and the subsequent heads of the present chapter, to treat somewhat of the correlation of our government and courts; in doing which, being aware of the difficulty of the task, and of the sacred ground on which we tread, we will carefully confine ourselves to the law of adjudicated cases. We will endeavor to regard our complex, yet beautiful, system of interwoven State and national sovereignties and jurisprudence, not as embodying any actual conflict of law, but rather as an harmonious whole, composed of so many independent, yet kindred, parts, each moving in its own proper sphere, and not necessarily impeded, or interfered with, by the others, believing as we do, that if conflict occurs it is by reason of one or more of them departing from their proper spheres of action. The true line of demarcation between the respective powers of State and national courts is not always very perceptible or easily defined, but, for that very reason, it devolves upon both to be cautious in the exercise of doubtful authority.2 Paramount Authority of National Courts. Whenever a question of paramount jurisdiction arises, the national courts are, in

1 Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 88. Per DILLON, J.: "Each court must keep within its own orbit." Id. p. 112. Coliens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 419. In this case, our great and eminent

jurist, Chief Justice MARSHALL,
says:
"The national and State sys.
tem are to be regarded as one whole."
2 Railroad Company . Husen, 5
Otto, 465, 470, 474.

the very nature of things, as well as by the provisions of the Constitution, the supreme arbiters thereof.1

In the case of Railroad Company v. Husen, the learned Judge STRONG, realizing that imperfectness which is common to all created things, and therefore as affording no argument against the value of our duplex system of government, says, in relation to one of those respective powers: "What that power is, it is difficult to define with sharp precision, * ** * and as its range sometimes comes very near to the field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against any needless intrusion."2 The same may be said, with equal propriety, in reference to all doubtful questions incident to our governmental system. The line of approach must be carefully kept in the foreground, and any intrusion thereon most vigilantly avoided.

Unity and Duality of Our Government. Though the citizens of the several States are one people and one nation, under the unity of the national government as the supreme authority within the limitations of the Constitution,3 yet the States themselves are severally sovereign, independent, and foreign to each other, in regard to their internal and domestic affairs. Such being the case, it results therefrom that the State constitutions and laws have no extra-territorial force, anywhere, except as conceded to them by mere comity. Were it otherwise, their condition would be incompatible with State sovereignty and independence of each other, inasmuch as the extra-territorial force of the laws of one within the territorial boundaries of an

1 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Tel.Co., 6 Otto, 1 and 10. 25 Otto, 470, 474.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 336, 347; Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 86; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586; Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; Warder . Arell, 2 Wash. (Va.) 282, 298; U. S. v. Reese, 2 Otto, 214, 217; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto, 542, 550; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 414, 419.

4 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 414; McIlvaine . Coxe, 4 Cr. 209; Bank of the U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto, 542, 550; Buckner v. Finley, 2 Pet. 586; Pen. noyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714.

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet 519; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1; Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Hill, 527. Seymour v. Butler, 8 Iowa, 304; Pen. noyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714; Cleveland. Painesville & Ash. R. R. Co. v. Penn. sylvania, 15 Wall. 300; Foster v. Glaz ener, 27 Ala. 391.

other, would be common alike to all, and none would be either sovereign or independent in their accustomed domestic and internal affairs.

But notwithstanding this sovereignty of the several States, within their territorial limits, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted therein by the national Constitution; for the powers of the States and of the national government, both exist, and are exercised, within the territorial limits of the respective States, as separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres, and making therein a duality of government. But the sphere of action of the national government is as far beyond the judicial powers of the State courts, as if the divisional line of power was marked out by land-marks and boundaries visible to the eye, and sensible to the touch. And so are the processes of each within. their spheres of action. Neither may intrude upon the other; within their proper limits or spheres of power and authority neither is responsible to the other; but in cases of conflict of authority, if any such occur, the authority of the United States is supreme over all, so far as is necessary to sustain and preserve the rightful supremacy of the national Constitution, courts and laws. This power results to the Federal courts from the fact that the Constitution of the United States, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, are declared by the Constitution itself to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every State are bound thereby, "anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." If conflicts of power or jurisdiction unhappily arise, the national

1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714; In re Steamboat Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19, 24.

2 Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406, 407; U. S. v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514,516; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166, 195, 196; Duncan v. Darst, 1 How. 301, 310; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Sinnot. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714, 733; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 6 Otto, 1 and 10. In the case last cited the United States Supreme Court say: "The govern

ment of the United States, within the scope of its powers, operates upon every foot of territory under its jurisdiction. It legislates for the whole nation, and is not embarrassed by State lines. Its peculiar duty is to protect one part of the country from encroachments by another, upon the national rights which belong to all." 3 14th amendment; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714, 733.

authority has supremacy, and the questions are to be decided by national courts.1

Concurrent Jurisdiction. Where there is concurrent power in the courts, as on some subjects there is, the general rule of law is that the tribunal which first obtains jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit or particular case, will retain and dispose of it; but to this there is the exception which allows certain suits to be removed from the State courts to the circuit courts of the United States.2

Opposing Process. And so where processes from different courts, State and Federal, are attempted to be levied upon property of a common defendant, the first levy accompanied with actual possession places the property in legal custody, and will be respected. 3

If this rule of law be violated, and property levied on and reduced to possession, by the Marshal of the United States, on process from a United States court, be taken out of his possession by a sheriff, on the process or orders of a State court, the remedy therefor, of the Marshal, or plaintiff in the writ under which he held the property, is not by injunction from the United States court to restrain the illegal interference simply as such, but the remedy is at law, by action of trespass against the sheriff, or by an attachment against that officer from the United States court, to enforce the proper deference to its process and authority.4

And, upon the same principle, money in the hands of an officer of the United States, and which he holds for purposes of disbursement under the national law, cannot be reached by garnishee process from a State court, in behalf of a creditor of one to whom such money is, by law, about to be paid.

1 Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 407; U. S. v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 6 Otto, 1, 10.

2 Shelby v. Bacon, 10 How. 56; Green v. Creighton, 23 How. 90; Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166, 196; Ex parte

Thus, where a purser

Holman, 28 Iowa, 88, 105; Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191, 197; Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat. 532.

Taylor v. Caryl, 20 How. 583, 591; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400.

4 Cookendorfer v. Preston, 4 How. 317.

5 Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20.