closely allied it may be to powers conceded to belong to the States. 1 The ruling of the supreme court of Illinois in favor of the constitutionality of a similar statute was referred to, but not regarded with approbation by the United States supreme court. State Discrimination Between Residents and Non-Residents. So, an act of a State legislature is void which discriminates against non-residents and in favor of residents of the State as to the terms upon which they may engage in buying and selling articles of commerce and merchandise in such State. Such discriminating legislation violates Section 2 of Article IV. of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.2 And where such statute imposes a penalty for its violation recoverable by indictment and trial in the State court, error lies from such conviction to the supreme court of the United States, if on the trial the validity of such statute is drawn in question under the Federal constitution in the highest State, in which a decision in the case could be had, and the decision of such highest State court is in favor of the validity of the statute.3 A distinction is made, as we have before seen, in regard to the rights arising under said Section 2 of Article IV. of the Constitution, in this: That while legal entities, as corporations, for instance, are held to be so far citizens as to entitle them to the benefit of some other provisions thereof, that the section above referred to applies to natural persons only.4 Inhibition of State Interference. This inhibition to State interference extends to and protects such property as is transported into a State as articles of commerce from all hostile or interfering legislation until it has mingled with and has become a part of the general property of the country, and as such is subjected alike to similar protection and to no greater burdens." 1 Railroad Co. v. Husen, 5 Otto, 465, 471, 472. See, also, Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 2 Otto, 259; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Chy Lung . Freeman, 2 Otto, 275; Welton v. Missouri, 1 Otto, 275; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. See, also, a report of the case of Railroad Co. v. Husen, 6 Cent. Law Journal, 172, and note criticising the opinion. 2 Ward . Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 429, 432. 3 Ibid. 1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 85. 4 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. Welton v. Missouri, 1 Otto, 275, 281; Cook v. Pennsylvania, Chicago State Police. But this power conferred on Congress is not intended to prevent the States from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life and safety of their citizens, although such legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. 1 III. STATE REGULATION OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN COMMERCE. TAX OF COMMANDERS, AND OF ARRIVALS - AND OF INTERSTATE PASSENGERS, BY LAND AND BY WATER. State laws assuming to regulate the movements of vessels navigating the waters of the State, when such vessels are licensed and enrolled under the laws of the United States are unconstitutional and void, except such laws as are of a police character. Hence a State law requiring of the owners or masters of such vessels the filing of a statement in writing in a designated State office, setting forth the name of the vessel, the name of the owner or owners, his or their place of residence, and interest of each owner, before leaving a port of the State, and under a specified penalty, is void, as conflicting with the constitution and also with the acts of Congress regulating commerce and the coasting trade.2 State Police. But the power of the States to make inspection, quaratine, and other necessary local regulations of a police nature not affecting commerce or the instrument of commerce, exists as matter of domestic police.3 State laws imposing a payment of a sum of money upon vessels engaged in commerce, and plying between the ports of such State and those of another State, for each arrival, and for the benefit Legal News, Vol. XI. p. 65, U. S. S. Ct. October Term, 1878. By this case a State tax on auction sales of goods from another State while yet in the original packages, was held equally within the prohibition. 1 Sherlock v. Alling, 3 Otto, 99, 103; License Cases, 5 How. 504; Bode v. State, 7 Gill. 326; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill. 39; Thomason v. State, 15 Ind. 449; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. * Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; of port officers without service performed or offered therefor, is unconstitutional and void, as amounting to an interference with commerce between the States.1 The case is not like one arising under the law of pilotage, by which pilots are compelled to go out and offer service to incoming vessels, and if service be refused from the pilot first offering it, entitling such pilot to half pilotage. In the latter case, the law compels the offer of service, and if declined, gives to the party tendering it half pilotage as compensation for the labor and risk of making the offer, and the same law implies a contract on the part of the shipowner or master to pay it. But the imposing of a sum certain upon vessels for each arrival without any consideration in return is a tax, and to the extent imposed, operated directly in restraint of commerce. In the language of the United States Supreme Court in the Steamship Company v. Port Wardens,3 it "works the very mischief against which the constitution intended to protect commerce among the States." State Capitation Tax on Inter-State Travelers. So, a State law is unconstitutional and void which imposes a capitation tax upon a person leaving the State by railroad, stage coach or other vehicle engaged or employed in the business of transporting passengers for hire, collectable of the proprietors or owners and corporations so engaged in transporting passengers. Such a law strikes at the right of the people to have free ingress or egress to and from and through all the States and Territories composing our common government, and also at the right of that government to require and enforce their presence into and out of such States and Territories, and to cause them to pass through the same on such occasions as national exigencies may require within the constitutional powers of such government. 5 State Tax on Commanders of Vessels or Passengers. And equally obnoxious to the constitution are State laws assuming to enforce a tax for any purpose whatever upon commanders of vessels, foreign or inter-State, or on passengers thereon, coming 1 Steamship Company . The Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31. 2 Steamship Company v. Port War. dens, 6 Wall. 31; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236; Steamship Company v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cooley v. Ward ens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299. 3 Supra. 4 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 48. into ports of the State. Such laws are in direct violation of the provisions of the United States constitution, which confers upon the national Congress the exclusive power of regulating foreign commerce and commerce between the States, and which prohibits the States from imposing import duties and exports.1 The cases of Smith v. Turner and Norris v. City of Boston, known as the Passenger Cases, here cited, arose in this way: New York passed a law requiring for hospital purposes the payment of a tax by the master of every vessel from a foreign port, for himself and each cabin passenger, one dollar and fifty cents; for each steerage passenger, mate, sailor, or mariner, one dollar. And from the master of each coasting vessel, for each person on board, twenty-five cents; except coasting vessels from New Jersey, Connecticut and Rhode Island, which were required to pay for no more than one voyage in each month. Said law also purported to empower the master in all such cases to collect such sums from the persons on whose account he was thus assessed. Smith, the master of a British ship, having landed passengers from a foreign port in New York, and refusing to pay such tax, was sued by the health officer, Turner, for the amount thereof. To the right of recovery defendant demurred on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute. Judgment was rendered thereon by the highest State court of New York, for the plaintiff, after overruling the demurrer. The case having gone to the United States Supreme Court, it was there held, MCLEAN, Justice, delivering the opinion, that the statute assumed to regulate foreign commerce, and was void as in conflict with that clause of the United States constitution which confers upon the national Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. In this connection the learned court say: "A tax or duty upon tonnage, merchandise, or passengers, is a regulation of commerce, and cannot be laid by a State except under the sanction of Congress and for the purposes specified in the constitution." Norris v. The City of Boston, grew out of similar legislation by the State of Massachusetts, assuming not only to levy and collect a tax upon passengers arriving by ship from foreign ports, but also to exclude from the privilege of landing certain of such passengers, as Passenger Cases, 7 How. 423. 2 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 408. lunatics, idiots and other specified objectionable persons. The plaintiff, Norris, an inhabitant of St. John, in the British dominion, arrived in the port of Boston with and in command. of a schooner which had foreign passengers on board, and the tax being demanded on such passengers by the Massachusetts authorities, was, by the said commander, paid under protest, and suit was brought to recover back the amount paid, against the city of Boston in the common pleas court. Judgment was rendered for the defendant, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. The Supreme Court of the United States held the law to be unconstitutional for like reasons as in Smith v. Turner, and both cases were by the Supreme Court of the United States, reversed.1 IV. STATE PROPERTY TAX OF VESSELS ENGAGED IN INTER-STATE COMMERCE. are. State Taxation at the Home Port. Though commerce between the States is not a subject of State taxation, yet the vehicles or instruments of local commerce used or engaged in carrying it on, as, for instance, steamboats or other means of transportation, Their situs is at the home port, and they are taxable by the State within which that port is situated just as other movable property is there taxable. Such home port is the port nearest to which the owner, husband, or managing agent usually resides in, in the district of their registry. They are not within the jurisdiction of the other States between whose ports or in whose waters they ply only temporarily, and are not there subject to State taxation any more than travelers of other States would be in passing through and stopping temporarily on business. Vessels thus employed do not become blended with the taxable interests or property of the States in which they temporarily touch, or do business, in their accustomed routes. In the language of HUNT, J., a vessel so employed is "engaged in inter-State commerce, with her home port still remaining unchanged and the property continuing unmixed with the permanent property of either State" so visited. 2 Vessels thus engaged are free to come and 1 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 408. Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 478; Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423; People v. |