is the admiralty jurisdiction extended over all the public navigable waters of the country, in all its breadth, except as limited as hereinbefore stated upon the western lakes. This jurisdiction is exclusive in the district courts of the United States when the proceeding is in rem,1 but where a common law remedy in personam is only sought, the jurisdiction as to the cause of action, but not as to the proceeding in rem, is concurrent in the courts of the States of the proper locality and jurisdictional character, and also in the circuit courts of the United States of the proper district, if the character of the parties as to citizenship and amount in controversy are such as to permit of jurisdiction in these courts. In the language of CLIFFORD, Justice, in the case of The Belfast, the party "may proceed in rem in the admiralty, or he may bring his suit in personam in the same jurisdiction, or he may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may resort to his common law remedy in the State courts or in the circuit court of the United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court jurisdiction of his case."2 Maritime jurisdiction in cases growing out of contracts, depends upon the nature of the contract; in cases of civil torts, it depends upon the locality where the act occurs.3 To confer admiralty jurisdiction of torts, they must occur upon the public navigable waters which are within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.4 Contracts, claims, and service touching rights and duties in relation to commerce and navigation on maritime waters, whether between ports of different States or of the same State, as for instance contracts of affreightment or for transportation of passengers, are of admiralty jurisdiction. For a breach of such contracts and for the infliction of such torts, maritime liens arise in favor of the injured party enforcible only in the United States district court; but they may be waived and a remedy pursued at 1 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 644; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411. 27 Wall. 664; Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 1; Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; The Lottawana, 21 Wall. 558. 3 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 637; Railroad Co. v. Steam Towboat Co., 23 How. 215; Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175; The Thomas The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 637; The 5 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 637; 1 Conkling's Admiralty, 19, 32; Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 184; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; Railroad Co. v. Steam Towboat Co., 23 How. 215. common law in personam against the master or owners of the vessel or craft offending.1 II. MARITIME LIENS. The States have no power to create or enforce maritime liens in rem. The jurisdiction in that respect is exclusively in Congress and the national courts. By Section 2 of Article III. of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States is expressly extended "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and Section 9 of the judiciary act of 1789 declares that the district courts of the United States "shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," saving to suitors the common law remedy where the common law can give it. This exclusive cognizance is exclusive of the State courts as well as of other Federal courts.3 Parties entitled to proceed as for a maritime lien in rem may do so in the district court of the United States, or if possessed of the requisite citizenship to enable them to sue in the United States circuit court, may waive the lien and proceed in the latter court in personam against the master or owners of the vessel; but there is no concurrent jurisdiction in rem in the State courts.4 In all cases where the maritime lien is sought to be enforced in rem the jurisdiction is exclusive in the district courts of the United States. If the party elect to proceed in personam in the circuit court of the United States instead of proceeding in rem in the district court, 1 Sturgis . Boyer, 24 How. 117; Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How. 548; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 643; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; The Reindeer, 2 Wall. 384; Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat, 473. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; Walters v. Steamboat Mollie Dozier, 24 Iowa, 192. See, also, Desly's Shipping & Admiralty, § 68, et seq. 3 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 638; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344, 390; United States v. The Betsey, 4 Cr. 442; United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Octavia, 1 Wheat. 24; The Samuel, 1 Wheat. 9; Walters v. Steamboat Mollie Dozier, 24 Iowa, 192. 4 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 643. In Trevor . The Steamboat Ad. Hine, the Iowa supreme court sustained the State court jurisdiction in rem, but the pleadings did not show the case to be one of maritime character. 17 Iowa, 349; Vose v. Cockroft, 44 N. Y. (5 Hand.) 415. People's Ferry Company . Beers, 20 How. 393, 402; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 646: The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Weston v. Morse, 40 Wis. 455; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558. as we have above scen he may do, when qualified in point of citizenship, the proceedings are the same in such cause as in other cases in said court at common law or suits not maritime; and if attachments are allowable under the State law, they may be resorted to in such suits as auxiliary to the proceedings in personam, as in other cases. 1 Maritime liens do not arise out of contracts to furnish materials and supplies for vessels in the home port; therefore, the States may, by law, create such liens as they deem proper in this class of cases, and may enforce the same in the State courts by all reasonable rules of law which do not amount to a regulation. of commerce.2 Contracts to build ships or for materials for ship building do not create maritime liens; they are not maritime contracts.3 III. MARITIME TORTS. Maritime torts can only occur upon the water, and then only where such waters are under maritime jurisdiction. If an injury occur upon the land, it is not a maritime injury, or tort, although the immediate cause thereof, and proceeding from a maritime vessel lying in maritime waters, or from the negligence of the master or servants in charge of such vessel. To render it a maritime tort, both the injury and the wrong act that causes it must take place upon the water.4 In such case the jurisdiction of the tort in rem is exclusively in the United States court; but if the injury occur upon the land, then the jurisdiction is in the State courts, although the cause of the injury proceed from on board a maritime craft, in maritime waters.5 The case of the Plymouth, here cited, occurred in this wise: The steam propeller Falcon, a vessel navigating the great lakes, was anchored off the wharf in the Chicago river, in "navigable water," and while so anchored took fire from negligence of some of those having her in charge, which fire communicated itself to erections on shore 1 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 643, 645; Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 110, 117; Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How. 548, 553. 2 The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 645, 646; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129; The Edith, 4 Otto, 518; Morrison v. Burns, 40 Mo. 491; Williams v. Tearney, 8 S. & R. 58; The Jerusalem, 2 Gall. 191; Francis . The Harrison, 1 Sawyer, 355. Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129. 4 The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; 1 Conkling's U. S. Admiralty, 32, et seq. Ibid. and destroyed the same and their contents. The Falcon was also destroyed. The owners of the shore property thus burned proceeded in admiralty, as for a marine tort, against the owners of the Falcon and attached the Plymouth, a vessel belonging to the defendants. The United States district court held that the case was not one coming within the admiralty jurisdiction, and dismissed it accordingly. On appeal, the supreme court of the United States affirmed the decision. NELSON, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The cause of action not being complete on navigable waters, affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction."1 Vessels on the Mississippi river, plying from point to point of opposite shores in two different States, are within the admiralty jurisdiction, notwithstanding their principal business is that of ferrying between opposite sides of said river." IV. COMMON LAW JURISDICTION OF MARITIME CASES. State courts have jurisdiction of personal actions growing out of maritime contracts by proceeding at common law, not for a lien, but for a personal recovery for breach of contract. Thus an action at law lies on a bill of lading for carriage of goods by a carrier upon maritime waters, from a port in one State to a port of another State, to recover damages for breach of the contract of carriage. 3 They also have jurisdiction at common law against the person for personal injuries and other torts, if there is a common law remedy, and this whether the right of action be one at common law or be given by statute.4 The term "suits at common law," in the Federal Constitution, is used in contradistinction to equity proceedings and proceedings in admiralty, in which latter a mixture of public law, maritime law and equity are sometimes found in the same suit. The term does not contemplate such proceedings only as in form and 13 Wall. 36. 2 The Gate City, 5 Biss. 200. Home Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Packet Co., 32 Iowa, 223; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; The Genesee Chief v. Fitz hugh, 12 How. 443; The Moses Tay. lor, 4 Wall. 441; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624. 4 Dougan . Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 1, 6; Swarthout v. New Jer sey Steam Nav. Co., 48 N. Y. 209. practice conform strictly to those of the old common law. In other words, proceedings at common law, in their true sense, "embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights."1 To enable the common law courts of a State to exercise common law jurisdiction in admiralty cases, where a common law remedy exists, it is not necessary that the right of action should be one known to the common law; it is sufficient, though the right be given by statute, if it can be enforced by a common law proceedings.2 Where a party having a right of action in admiralty is willing to forego his right of proceeding in rem, and to proceed at common law for his remedy in a personal action against the parties liable thereto, he has his election so to do, and may, if he elects to proceed at common law, have his action in the proper State court; or, if the parties and amount in controversy be such as to bring the case within the common law jurisdiction of the United States circuit court, may bring his action in the latter court, at his election.4 Such action lies thus at common law, if the circumstances, as before stated, be such as to warrant it, as well if the right of action be one at common law, or one given by statute. The case here cited, of Steamboat Co. v. Chase, was an action for the death of a person while crossing a highway, given by a statute of Rhode Island, in cases where the death is caused by negligence of a common carrier. The deceased was crossing Narragansett Bay on a public highway, and was run over and killed by a steamer there plying as a common carrier. The supreme court of the United States held that the common law action lay therefor in personam against the owner of the vessel, under the statute. Though by the civil law it is otherwise, yet, under the maritime law of the United States, neither a 'Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446, 447. Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 6 Lans. 430; S. C., 56 N. Y. 1. 31 U. S. Stat. at Large, 76; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 666; Baird v. Daly, 57 N.Y. 236, 247; Dougan v. Champlain Trans. Co., 56 N. Y. 1; Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 117; Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How. 553; Swarthout v. New Jersey 4 Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 117; Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How. 553. 5 16 Wall. 522; Baird v. Daly, 57 N. Y. 236, 247; Swarthout v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 48 N. Y. 209. |