different domiciles in different States of joint and several obligors or debtors. Nor does it alter the case that the debt be secured by mortgage on real estate situated in a different State than that which is the domicile of the creditor. The mortgage is but a security, and confers no interest on the creditor in the mortgaged property, but only a right to realize his debt thereof over others. If such local mortgage could give a situs to the debt or bonds secured thereby, then in case the security be on lands in different counties or States, which of these localities would become the situs of the debt? It could not be at each. It is with the creditor, or that one of them, if several, who holds possession of the obligation. It follows the person. And a debt is not property.3

VI. MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Mortgages of personal property made in the State where the property is at the time situated, and which are there recorded as required by law, so as to be valid where made, will be held valid in every other State into which the property is afterwards carried or removed. This, too, is the law, although possession of the property remains in the mortgageor. 5

VII. SUBSCRIPTIONS TO CAPITAL STOCK.

Governed by Law of the Company's Residence. Subscriptions. made in one State to the capital stock of a private corporation which exists by law in another State, and there transacts and carries on its business and has its principal offices or places of business, are contracts to be performed in the latter State at such place of business, and are governed and are to be construed by the laws of that State."

VIII. VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS.

Of Personalty, How far Valid in Other States. Voluntary assignments of personal property for the benefit of creditors,

'Cleveland, Pain. & Asht. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300.

2 Ibid.

3 Murray v. Charleston, 6 Otto, 432. Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42; Fergu son v. Clifford, 37 N. H. 86; Jeter v. Fellowes, 32 Penn. St. 465; Fouke v.

Fleming, 13 Md. 392; Wilson v. Carson, 12 Md. 54; Shelton v. Marshall, 16 Tex. 344.

Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42. Penobscott R. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 12 Gray, 244.

when valid by the laws of the State wherein they are made, are, upon general principles of public policy and comity, recognized in the courts of other States as obligatory, whether such assignments would have been valid or not if made in such other of the States wherein they are sought to be enforced, except in so far as bona fide transfers, payments, liens, or other interests may have

intervened. 1

Of Realty, Must Conform to the Lex Loci Rei Sitæ. An assignment to creditors made in one State or Territory of lands situated in a different State, must conform to the law of the place where the lands are situated, in the legality of its purpose. Its validity depends upon the lex loci rei sito. Thus, an assignment executed in the District of Columbia, in view of insolvency of the makers, of lands situated in the State of Iowa, and designed to prefer certain creditors, is repugnant to the law of Iowa inhibiting such preferences, and will, therefore, be held of no effect in Iowa, and in equity will be set aside.a

IX. WHERE PERSONAL PROPERTY IS TAXABLE.

Taxable Property. Goods and chattels, horses, cattle, and other movable property of a visible or tangible character, are liable to taxation in the jurisdiction or State wherein the same are, and are ordinarily kept, irrespective of the residence or domicile of the owner.3 Legal protection and taxation are reciprocal, so that such personal property and effects of a coporeal nature, or that may be handled and removed, as receives the protection of the law is liable to be taxed by the law where it is thus protected. But this rule does not apply to property

1 Brashear v. West, 7 Pet, 608; Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. 483; Mow. ry v. Crocker, 6 Wis. 326; Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick. 25; Burlock v. Taylor, 16 Pick. 335; Daniels v. Willard, 16 Pick. 36; Means v. Hapgood, 19 Pick. 105; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 John. Ch. 460; Sanderson v. Bradford, 10 N. H. 260; Saunders v. Williams, 5 N. H. 213; Smith v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 267; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, 32; Atwood v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 555.

2 Loving v. Pairo, 10 Iowa, 282.

Hartland v. Church, 47 Maine, 169; Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I. 317; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; People v. Com'rs Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 292; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Blackstone Manf. Co. v. Inhabitants of Blackstone, 13 Gray, 488; Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, 14 Ill. 163.

4 Bank of U. S. v. Mississippi, 12 Sm. & M. 456; De Pauw v. New Albany, 22 Ind. 204; Egleston v. Charleston, 1 Tread. (S. C.) Const. 45.

which is in transit, or which is temporarily within a State, as, for instance, if a resident of one State go into another on a visit or business, traveling in his own conveyance, or carrying with him personal effects for his own use during his temporary stay, or sent into a State for sale, such property is not subject to taxation there, although entitled to and receiving the temporary protection of the law for the time being.1

Intangible Property. Interests of an intangible character are taxable only where the owner makes his residence, for in contemplation of law they accompany the person of the owner; as, for instance, debts owing in one State to a person in another State are not taxable at the place of the debtor's residence.2

Tangible Personal Property. It is said to be a general principle of the law, that tangible personal property having no fixed locality follows the person of the owner and is taxable at his domicile, provided there be no express law taxing it where it is situated, if in a different jurisdiction; but this rule, we think, is confined to cases where the domicile of the owner is in the same State and only in a different county or district, and not to cases where the owner resides in a different State.3 In the case here cited of Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, Justice CATON, speaking of local taxation of real estate, says: "The same rule does not apply to personal property, but that it follows the residence of the owner is certainly true, and is there taxable when the owner resides within the State and the property is only temporarily absent;" and further he gives the following illustration: "Thus, if a man keeping a livery stable in Springfield had a team absent on a journey in another State at the time the assessment was made, he would be bound to include that property in the schedule of taxable property, while the rule might be different if he had personal property permanently located in another State or another county."4 The owner of the property in this case was a railroad company; the personal prop

1 St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Company, 40 Mo. 580; Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 240; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 242.

2 Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo. 387; Ante § v. of this chapter; Hayne v.

Delieselline, 3 McCord, 374; Murray v. Charleston, 6 Otto, 432.

Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, 14 Ill. 163; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 231.

414 Ill. 165.

erty was kept in Springfield, Sangamon county, when not in use; when in use it was in transit to and through Morgan county and back; the company was an Illinois corporation; and taxes were levied in both counties in the aggregate on the personal and real property. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the realty was only taxable, each part, in the county where situated, the law being general, and that the personal property was taxable only in Sangamon county, the principal place of business of the company, and where the property was kept when not in use, and was not taxable at all in Morgan county, wherein it only went on business trips.

But, notwithstanding it is justly said, that personal property, though it be of a tangible nature, has no fixed situs, yet it is not true that it has no situs at all. On the contrary, it has an actual situs, but not like that of real property, a fixed and permanent one. Real property being immovable its situs is not only fixed, but is permanent; but personal property being movable, its situs is susceptible of change. The actual situs of each is in the State where it is situated or located, although the owner resides in a different State; and each being by the law of the locality protected, is in turn, by the law of the locality, liable to be taxed. By a fiction of law, however, of universal import, if there be no law to the contrary at the place of its actual situs, the situs of the personal property is made to follow the person of the owner and the law of his domicile, if in another State, in all matters pertaining to its sale and transfer by him, and of descent and distribution in case of his death.3

'People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 226.

2 People v. Com'rs of Taxes, supra; Finley v. Philadelphia, 32 Penn. St. 381; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; John

son v. Lexington, 14 B. Mon. 648.

3

People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 228, 239; see supra §§ i.-iv. of this chapter.

CHAPTER XXI.

LEGAL STATUS AND JURISDICTION OF LANDS.

I. JURISDICTION AS TO LANDS IS LOCAL.

II. TITLE PASSES ONLY BY THE LEX REI SITE.

III. COURTS OF OTHER STATES MAY ACT UPON THE OWNER'S PERSON TO COERCE A CONVEYANCE.

IV. ONE STATE OWNING LANDS WITHIN ANOTHER.

V.

GOVERNMENT LANDS.

I.

THE JURISDICTION AS TO LAND IS LOCAL.

The jurisdiction of courts over land is local. Neither State nor Federal courts can reach or confer title, nor sell under a decree those which are situated in a different State from that in which the court sits.1

In a leading case, Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, the United States circuit court for the district of West Tennessee assumed to decree a lien against and sale of lands lying in the State of Mississippi, the Supreme Court of the United States held the decree to be erroncous for want of jurisdiction. In this case the court say, STORY, J.: "Another objection is to that part of the decree which creates a lien upon the land in controversy, lying in another State, and decrees a sale for the discharge of the lien. We are of opinion that the decree is erroneous in this respect, the court had no jurisdiction to decree a sale

* * *

1 Boyce v. Grundy, 9 Pet. 275; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 26. And so in the district as to United States circuit courts. Northern Ind. R. R. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 15 How. 233; Watts v. Waddle, 6 Pet. 400; Nowler v. Coit, 1 Ohio, 236; Brown v. Edson, 23 Vt. 435; Latimer v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 43 Mo. 105; City Ins. Co. of Providence v. Commer

cial Bank, 68 Ill. 348; Ex parte Reid, 2 Sneed, 375; Tardy v. Mor gan, 3 McL. 358; Price v. Johnston, 1 Ohio St. 390; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627; Story's Conf. of Laws, 19, 20, 538, 543; Rorer on Jud. & Ex. Sale, 2d ed. § 58; Brine v. Ins. Co., 6 Otto, 627.

29 Pet. 275.