of an age, at the time of making the contract, which fixes infancy on the defendant within the terms of the common law, dispenses with the necessity of evidence to prove the law of the place of the contract in support of the plea.1 13 1 Holmes v. Mallett, Morris, (Iowa,) C : CHAPTER XX. LEGAL STATUS AND JURISDICTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND PERSONAL INTERESTS. I. THE LEGAL STATUS FOLLOWS THE OWNER. II. III. IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE. SALES AND TRANSFERS VALID WHERE MADE ARE VALID ELSEWHERE. V. LOCALITY AND SITUS OF MONEY OBLIGATIONS AND DEBTS. VI. VII. MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. SUBSCRIPTIONS TO CAPITAL STOCK. VIII. VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS. IX. WHEN PERSONAL PROPERTY IS TAXABLE. I. THE LEGAL STATUS FOLLOWS THE OWNER. No fixed Situs. In the language of RANNEY, J., " personal property has no fixed situs." It" adheres, in contemplation of law, to the person of the owner, and is disposed of in almost every respect, whether of transfers inter-vivos, testamentary dispositions, or successions by the law of his domicile." This is a universal rule of law among all civilized people, and has become a sort of common law of the world. So thoroughly is it a part of the jus gentium or law of nations, that instead of the local law of place giving way to it as matter of comity, it is itself, in virtue of its universality, a part of the local law in every civilized community. In the language of the court, in Despard v. Churchill,3 "personal property is subject to the law which governs the person of its owner, 1 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; Ackerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86; Partee v. Silliman, 44 Miss. 272. 2 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424, 429; Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 665, 690; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 John. Ch. 460; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394; DeCouche v. Savetier, 3 John. Ch. 190; DeGobry v. DeLaistre, 2 Har. & John. 193;, Shultz v. Pulver, 3 Paige, 182; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300. 3 53 N. Y. 192. as to its transmission by last will and testament; and this principal, though arising in the exercise of international comity, has become obligatory as a rule of decision by the courts." As is said by Lord LOUGHBOROUGH: "It is a clear proposition, not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner, both with respect to the disposition of it and with respect to the transmission of it, either by succession or by the act of the party. It follows the law of the person. The owner, in any country, may dispose of his personal property. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is, but the law of the country of which he was a subject, that will regulate the succession." And RANNEY, J., in Swearingen v. Morris, above cited, says: "Indeed, so universally has it been treated as a part of the jus gentium, and thus incorporated into the municipal law of every country, that C. J. ABBOTT declared it not correct to say, that the law of England gives way to the law of the foreign country; but that it is a part of the law of England that personal property should be distributed according to the jus domicilii." Justice RANNEY adds: "The doctrine has been universally acted upon in this country, and it will be readily seen that it could nowhere be applied with greater benefit or less inconvenience than between the States of the American Union." II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE. Local Liabilities. To this general rule of the law there are these exceptions: That visible or tangible personal property situated in another State than that of the owner's domicile is there first liable, by paramount right of the local government, and of creditors of the owner therein resident, to be distributed in satisfac. tion of all just demands against the same or against the owner thereof, which the local government or its citizens or subjects3 are 1 Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 690. ? 14 Ohio St. 424, 429. 3 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424, 429; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657. And if claimed under a transfer of the owner, as, for instance, an assignment with preferences, for benefit of creditors, then if such transfer be prohibited by the law of the State where the property is situ entitled to, and is there liable, also, to taxation, if in a different sovereignty.1 A sale or transfer by the owner, valid where the owner lives, is valid in the State where the property is, not only as between the parties thereto, but also as against all others, except citizens or subjects of the State wherein the property is, having prior just claims against the owner, to which it may be subject, or as against the claims of the State itself. The right of satisfaction of these out of the property is paramount. So if the owner die intestate, the property is to be distributed in the manner and to those to whom it descends by the law of his domicile at the time of his death, but being first subject to such local claims of persons or the State as exist where it is situated. The residue, after satisfying these, is to be thus distributed by the local court, or turned over to the administrator of the domicile of the deceased to be then distributed.3 And in like manner a devise or testamentary disposition of the personal property, valid by the law of the domicile of the testator, is (subject to the liabilities and exceptions aforesaid,) valid where the property is situated in such other jurisdiction, and will be so distributed, either by the court of the country where situated, or else the residue, after satisfaction of liability, will be turned over to the administrator or executor of the deceased, in the courts of the country of his late domicile. But this rule of law, though general, as before stated, is nevertheless subject to alteration or legislative control of the several States, they being sovereign in their own domestic affairs; and therefore, where a different rule is by statute enacted in a State, then such local statutory law of such State will govern in regard to personal property therein situated, although the property be owned by a resident or citizen of another State. So, if ated, it will not be enforced in the courts of such State as against creditors of the assignor. Ibid.; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N, Y. 192, 199. 'See Post Sec. IX. of this chapter. 2 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86. Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Johnson v. Copeland, 35 Ala. 521; Hill v. Townsend, 24 Tex. 575; Townes v. Durbin, 3 Met. (Ky.) 352; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Story, 755; 4 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 199; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; 2 Kent's Com. *429. Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 200. to enforce the law of the owner's domicile, or to enforce a sale of property there made by him, valid where made, would violate the policy of the State where the property is situated, or be contrary to good morals, or work an injury to citizens or residents of such State, the law of the former will control. So, if the personal property has a sort of fixed locality and purpose, as if the owner has mills or other local property to which there is personal property appurtenant or servient in its uses, then the rule of law is in some respects different. Under such circumstances personal property thus servient may pass with the realty, under the local laws of the State or country. In regard, however, to remitting the effects of assets of a decedent's estate to the administration at the domicile, after satisfying local claims, it is held not to be so much a rule of imperative law requiring the same to be done, as it is a matter within the just and sound discretion of the court.3 Leaseholds. The proceeds of leasehold estates are to be regarded as personal effects, and as coming within the rule of following the person of a decedent, and as distributable in accordance with the law of his domicile. III. SALES AND TRANSFERS VALID WHERE MADE, ARE VALID ELSEWHERE. A legal transfer of personal property by a duly recorded deed in a State where such transfer carries the ownership, and is valid irrespective of possession thereof, has like validity in all other States where property of the description transferred is by law recognized as property, notwithstanding the absence of possession under such transfer, and notwithstanding no record is made. of the deed, in the State or States to which such property is removed, and irrespective of any law of such latter State or States requiring, as a prerequisite to validity, the recording of transfers of such property, where the possession thereof has not passed with the transfer to the grantee in the deed. The contract being valid where made, and not made in reference to performance in Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 200. 2 Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300. 192, 200; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103. Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192. |