Woodward v. Mich., etc., R. R. Co. ...10 Ohio St. 121 ..145, 156, 163. Worster v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co....25 N. H. 525. .140. AMERICAN INTER-STATE LAW. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. The object of this volume is to treat of American Inter-State Law as the same exists under our peculiar system of duplex government, and it is therefore no part of our purpose to discuss the doctrine of international law, or law of nations, as the same exists between, and is recognized by, nations and states that are entirely foreign to each other; but to this we will only refer when necessary in connection with the more immediate subject of our work. Nor is it our purpose, except as its relevancy may incidentally occur, to treat of the political powers, or of the political functions, of the several departments of the State or national governments; for, as a general principle, the exercise of these is not the subject of judicial cognizance or control. Thus, in Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of the United States advert to this as a settled principle, in these words: "In the cases of Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 307, and Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, this court has laid down the rule, that the action of the political branches of the government, in a manner that belongs to them, is conclusive." In the case of Mississippi 1 Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; Taylor v. Martin, 2 Curt. 154; Fellows . Blacksmith, 19 How. 366; Clark v. Braden, 16 How. 635; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Williams . Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; Garcia o. Lee, 12 Pet. 511; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Luther v. Borden, v. Johnson, President of the United States, there was an application by bill in equity for a writ of injunction, to restrain the President from executing certain acts of Congress, and the Supreme Court of the United States, in denying the application, said: "Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court, and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that collision may occur between the executive and legislative departments of government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And, in that case, could the court interfere in behalf of the President thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court? These questions answer themselves." So, also, in the case of Fellows v. Blacksmith, in which the validity of an Indian treaty was attempted to be drawn in question, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "An objection was taken on the argument, to the validity of the treaty, on the ground that the Tonawanda band of the Seneca Indians were not represented by the chiefs and head men of the band, in the negotiations and execution of it. But the answer to this is, that the treaty, after executed and ratified by the proper authorities of the government, becomes the supreme law cf the land, and the courts can no more go behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect, and operation, than they can behind an act of Congress." 4 3 In the case of The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and cited in Georgia v. Stanton, the United States Supreme Court, MARSHALL, Ch. J., said: "The bill requires us to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the execution of its physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court may be well questioned. It savors too much of the exercise of political power, to be within the province of the judicial department." 1 4 Wall. 500. 19 How. 366. 35 Pet. 1. |