ties; "thence W. 290 poles, to J.'s line." There were no natural objects called for in the grant in relation to said line. The line claimed by defendant as the true one strikes the J. line 470 poles from the agreed point, which he claims is the proper place of intersection if the line from the beginning point be reversed, A line due west would strike the J. line at a distance of 299 poles. Held, that the line due west is the prop er one. 2. The location of a posterior line in a grant cannot be controlled by a reversed survey. 3. Where some of the boundaries as described in a grant are designated as running with an earlier grant, the boundaries of the earlier grant cannot be located or controlled by the boundaries of the second grant. 4. The possible intentions of a party in running a line of a grant will not control courses and distances as recited in the grant. Douglas and Clark, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from superior court, Pitt county; Timberlake, Judge. Trespass by Florence P. Tucker, individually and as executrix of R. S. Tucker, deceased, against J. H. Satterthwaite and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. The following is a map of the land in controversy: T. J. Jarvis and Bond & Fleming, for appellants. W. B. Rodman and Jones & Boykin for appellee. FURCHES, J. On the 6th day of November, 1784, the state granted to William Smith a certain tract of land in Pitt county, beginning at a gum in Beaver Dam pocoson and John Jordan's corner; thence S., 59 deg. E., 240 poles; thence N., 20 deg. E., 242 poles; thence N., 66 deg. W., 80 poles; thence N. 60 poles; thence N., 25 deg. W., 120 poles, to a pine; thence W. 290 poles, to John Jordan's line; thence S., with Jordan's line, 40 poles; thence S., 35 deg. E., 130 poles; thence S., 20 E., 40 poles; thence S., 10 deg. E., 100 poles; thence to the beginning. On the 21st day of October, 1782, the state granted to John Brinkley a tract of land bounded as follows: "Beginning at a pine, John Jordan's corner, in the Bee Gum island; thence N. 40 poles, to a pine; thence E., 240 poles, into Matthew Hodges' line; thence, with his line, S. 122 poles, to a pine into William Smith's line; thence, with his line, west 240 poles, to a pine, his corner in Jordan's line; thence, with Jordan's line, to the beginning." Bee Gum island is not located, and cuts no figure in the case. And on the same day, the 21st of October, 1782, the state granted to John Jordan a tract of land, the second call of which strikes the William Smith grant at its beginning corner; thence calling for an agreed line with William Smith, N., 42 deg. W., 202 poles; thence N., 10 deg. E., 100 poles; thence N., 20 deg. W., 40 poles; thence N., 50 deg. W., 130 poles; thence N. 86 poles,-which carries the Jordan line further north than the intersection of the northern boundary of the Smith grant, as claimed by either party. There appears to be some inconsistency in the calls and dates of these grants. The John Brinkley grant is dated October 21, 1782, calling for the line of the William Smith grant, dated November 6, 1784. But this is susceptible to explanation, from the fact that the Smith survey was made on the 1st day of August, 1781, and the Brinkley survey was made on the 9th day of October, 1781. The plaintiff is admitted to be the owner of the lands included in the Brinkley grant, and the defendant is admitted to be the owner of the lands included in the Smith grant. This being so, the sole question depends upon the location of the northern boundary line of the Smith grant. The Brinkley grant, calling for this line of the Smith grant, and thence with it west to Smith's corner, on the Jordan line, the boundary line of the Smith grant is necessarily the southern boundary of the Brinkley grant. This was recognized on the argument as the sole question in the case, the defendant's counsel stating this to be so, and abandoning all other exceptions he had in the record of the case on appeal. To locate the northern boundary of the Smith grant, it is necessary to start at the beginning corner, which is admitted by both parties to be at A on the map, then to B, then to C, then to D, then to E, and then to F. These points are all agreed to by both parties, including A and F. The call from F is west 290 poles, to John Jordan's line, which the plaintiff says is at 44 on the map. The defendant admits that a due west line run from F 299 poles would strike the Jordan line at 44, as claimed by the plaintiff, and that, if this is the correct line,-that is, the northern boundary of the William Smith grant,— then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. But the defendant claims that this is not the northern boundary line of the Smith grant, and contends that it runs from F to G. And the plaintiff admits that, if this line from F to G is the true boundary line,-that is, the northern boundary line of the Smith grant,she is not entitled to recover. The defendant claims to arrive at the conclusion that G is the proper termini of the line from F west 290 poles to the Jordan line, by reversing the calls and distances, from the beginning corner at A, or, rather, by surveying the John Jordan line, north from A, according to course and distance; and the defendant claims that this will show G to be the proper termini of the west end of the line from F. This contention of the defendant violates all rules of construction, as we are taught to understand them. The first general rule, to which we know of no exception, is that, from a known or an agreed point, course and dis tance must govern, unless there is some nat ural object called for in the deed or grant that is more certain than the course and distance called for. F is the last admitted corner in the Smith grant, and the call from this station is "west 290 poles, to Jordan's line." There is no natural object, to change the course, called for in the grant, as the only natural object called for in the grant is Jordan's line, and this is reached by running the course called for. The distance called for, to intersect the Jordan line at 44 (this being the course of the call), is only 9 poles more than the distance called for in the grant; while the distance from F to G, the point of intersection claimed by the defendant, is 470 poles,-180 poles more than the distance called for in the grant. And, when this line of 470 poles reaches G, it strikes the same natural object that it strikes at 44 in running the course called for in the grant. We admit that if the call in the Smith grant had been west 290 poles, to Jordan's line, and that line could not have been reached except at G, the line in that event should go from F to G. But that is not the case. The natural object called for is reached at 44 by running the course called for in the grant, at a distance of only 9 poles more than called for in the grant But, as has been said, the defendant claims to arrive at the conclusion that G is the point of intersection by reversing the line from A, the admitted beginning corner of the Smith grant, and by running the John Jordan line north from the beginning corner at A. cannot be done, for reasons appearing in the grant, nor can it be done for legal reasons established by the rules of interpretation in such cases. The physical or mathematical reason contained in the grant is that neither course nor distance is given in the last call of the Smith grant,-"thence to the beginning." This makes it physically or mathematically impossible to reverse this line. And as there are no known or admitted corners in the Smith grant, between the intersection of the line running west to the Jordan line, whether at G or at 44, it cannot be reversed. It cannot be reversed for the purpose of fixing the intersection of the line west from F for legal reasons. The Smith grant was run from A to B, from B to C, from C to D, from D to E, from E to F, and therefore the line from F and those following are what is termed a "posterior line," and cannot be located by a reversed survey. To locate a line, the original order of survey must be observed and followed, and a posterior line cannot be controlled by a reversed survey. This rule is too firmly established by numerous decisions of this court to be disputed now. Duncan v. Hall, 117 N. C. 443, 23 S. This E. 362; Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N. C. 513, 19 S. E. 349; Graybeal v. Powers, 76 N. C. 66; Harry v. Graham, 18 N. C. 76. It is the Smith grant that we are locating, and it is the northern boundary line which is in dispute. This line is not bounded by the Jordan grant, and cannot be located by a survey of that grant. This could not be done if the Smith grant had called for the Jordan line, south from the point of intersection, which it does not do; and the call in the Jordan grant for the line of the Smith grant can be no more than a declaration of Jordan that his line runs with Smith's. The Jordan grant calling to run with Smith's grant would be controlled by the Smith grant, and not the Smith grant by the Jordan grant. So, it is plain that the Smith grant cannot be located by the Jordan grant. It is contended (though not by counsel of defendant) that Smith intended to run his line from F somewhere north until he reached a point east of G, and then west to G. This may be so, but, if he did, we do not know it, and there is nothing in the grant to show that he did. Whatever we may suppose his intentions were, these are but conjectures now. It is certain he did not do it, and we cannot do it for him. Graybeal v. Powers, supra. By every rule of construction known to us, the dividing line between the plaintiff and the defendant must run from F west to the Jordan line, which is admitted to be at 44. The judgment below must be affirmed. DOUGLAS, J. I cannot concur in the opinion of the court. This is an action in the nature of trespass, brought to try the title to certain lands, which depends upon the proper location of two grants,-one to William Smith, and the other to John Brinkley. The real question in dispute seems to be whether the line constituting the northern boundary of the Smith grant and the southern boundary of the Brinkley grant runs from F, an admitted corner, to G, or to 44, as shown on the plat filed in the case. The usual issues were submitted, all of which were found for the plaintiff. The court charged the jury, as a matter of law, that the line between the Smith and Brinkley grants must be run from F to 44, as contended by the plaintiff. To this instruction the defendant excepted, and it is the only exception necessary for us to consider in our view of the case. The grants herein referred to are as follows: (1) A grant from the state to William Smith, dated November 6, 1784, in which the description is as follows, the beginning corner being at A: "Beginning at a gum in Beaver Dam pocoson and John Jordan's corner; then down the pocoson, the dividing line between said Smith and John Brinkley, south, 59 degrees east, 240 poles, in said pocoson; then north, 20 degrees east, 232 poles, to a gum in the Pee branch and dividing between said Smith and William Little; then, running a dividing between Smith and How ell Hodges, north, 65 degrees west, 80 poles, to a gum in said branch; then north 60 poles, to a pine; then north, 25 degrees west, 120 poles to a pine; then west 290 poles, into John Jordan's line; then, along his line, south 40 poles, to a pine; then south, 50 degrees east, 130 poles, to a pine; then south, 20 degrees east, 40 poles, to a pine; then south, 10 degrees east, 100 poles, to a pine, and to the beginning." (2) A grant from the state to John Brinkley, dated October 21, 1782, containing the following description, the beginning corner being at H or L: "Beginning at a pine, John Jordan's corner, in the Bee Gum island; then north 40 poles, to a pine; then east 240 poles, to a pine, into Matthew Hodges' line; then, with his line, south 132 poles, to a pine into William Smith's line; then, with his line, west 240 poles, to a pine, his corner in Jordan's line; then, with Jordan's line, to the beginning." (3) A grant from the state to John Jordan, dated October 21, 1782, containing the following description, the beginning corner being at V: "Beginning at a pine, Jordan's corner; then, running the dividing line, John Brinkley and said Jordan, north, 32 degrees east, 232 poles, to a gum in the Beaver Dam swamp; then, running agreed line between William Smith and said Jordan, north, 42 degrees west, 200 poles, to a pine; then agreed line, the second time north, 10 degrees east, 100 poles, to a pine; thence agreed line north, 20 degrees west, 40 poles, to a pine; then agreed line again north, 50 degrees west, 130 poles, to a pine; then agreed line again north 86 poles, to a pine in a branch on the side of Bee Gum island; then west 272 poles, to a pine on a branch, and crossing one pocoson; then, down the branch, south 80 poles, to a water oak, and in James Barrow's line; then, with his line, east 186 poles, to his corner; then, with his other line, south 160 poles, to Jordan's own line; then, with his line, south, 60 degrees east, 40 poles; thence, with his other line, south, 75 degrees east, 80 poles; then, along his other line, to the beginning." The surveys on which these grants were issued were made as follows: The John Jordan survey, on July 31, 1781; the William Smith survey, on August 1, 1781; and the John Brinkley survey, on October 9, 1781. While the Brinkley grant was issued before the Smith grant, it is based on a later survey, and, calling for the Smith line, must be treated as the junior grant. Therefore the Smith grant must be located first, and its northern boundary being called for by the Brinkley grant, will become the southern boundary of the latter survey. There is thus no conflict; but, even if there were, the Brinkley grant would be compelled to give way under the act of 1777, which provided that a senior grant issued on a junior entry should be void. It is worthy of note that the Jordan and Smith surveys were made on consecutive days, and were practically simultaneous. The lines between them were evidently run but tified that he "found an old marked pine at once, and were in their origin dividing lines, | Among others, James Taylor, a surveyor, tesconstituting really one continuous boundary, made of several short lines, with slightly varying courses. This line seems never to have been disputed, and there is positive testimony that it has been repeatedly run without change of location, once while the Jordan land belonged to the devisor of the plaintiff. Their boundaries in reverse order completely coincide wherever they touch. This line may be regarded as settled, and becomes an important factor in the determination of the issue now before us. Both the Smith and Brinkley grants, under which the defendants and the plaintiff respectively claim, begin and end by their very terms in the Jordan line. Therefore this Jordan line must be located before the other surveys can even get a starting point. But the Brinkley grant calls for John Jordan's corner as its beginning point, and, when it reaches the line now in question, it calls for Smith's line, and thence, with Smith's line, to a pine, Smith's corner in Jordan's line. How can we better locate Smith's corner in Jordan's line than by fixing it where Smith and Jordan located it in its genesis? If we begin the Brinkley survey at L, as contended by the defendants, we can run every course and distance without material variation and interfere with no one. If, however, we begin at H, as contended by the plaintiff, and run thence to Y, and south to 14, we cannot possibly form a parallelogram, as called for in the grant. Running east 240 poles, south 132 poles, and west 240 poles, must bring this point directly south of the beginning. And yet 44 is evidently not directly south of H. It is admitted that, if Brinkley's line is run from F to 44, it must stop at Jordan's line, which is considered as a natural boundary. But, if Jordan's line from H to I is a natural boundary as to Brinkley, why is it not a natural boundary as to Smith, being an agreed line between Smith and Jordan, for such is evidently the meaning of the grants? Jawett v. Hussey, 70 Me. 433. If we begin the Brinkley grant at H, as claimed by the plaintiff, we not only cut off a corner of that grant itself, but we utterly destroy the agreed and well-settled line between Smith and Jordan, which is the beginning point and foundation line from which both the plaintiff and the defendants begin their surveys and derive their title. It will be obliterated from G to 44, and south of that it will proceed in the most eccentric fashion, cutting in first on Jordan, then on Smith, and back again on Jordan, and finally ending in somebody's land at least 100 poles southeast of the beginning corner. Surely, an honored age of 100 years should protect it from such desecration. There is positive testimony tending to show that there were marked trees at L, M, N, and G, the corners of the Brinkley grant, as claimed by the defendants, and that there were no marked corners except the common corner, G, if it were located as claimed by the plaintiff. in running the calls of the John Brinkley grant as claimed by the defendants. Found no marked trees in running the same grant as claimed by the plaintiff. Both sides agreed that A was the beginning corner of the Smith grant, and also corner of John Jordan grant. At K, found an old marked pine. At H, found an old marked pine, marked as a corner, and pointing the direction of the John Jordan grant lines, and this old marked pine is 40 poles south of the point G." This evidence clearly tended to prove the contention of the defendants. The old marks on the pine at L were especially significant. Country surveyors, in the homely phrase of the woods, say "Howdye" and "Goodbye" whenever they meet a tree directly in the line; that is, they chop it on the side where the line first strikes, and again where the line leaves it. The relative position of these chops distinguishes a line tree from a corner tree. If the chops are on sides directly opposite to each other, the line passes on without variation; but, if the marks are not opposite to each other, it is necessarily a corner tree, the distance around the tree between the marks roughly indicating the angle of the survey. The same tree may be the corner of two tracts in the line of the third, and would thus be marked on three sides. Where, as in the present instance, the survey of a parallelogram begins in the middle of one side, the last line would come up behind the first on the same course, and would therefore be marked as a straight line. This would be so were the Brinkley grant to begin at L. It is true that beginning at A, and running the courses and distances of the Smith grant, we come to the admitted corner, F. Thence the call is, with Smith's line, west 240 poles, to a pine, Smith's corner in Jordan's line. Ordinarily, this line would be run according to the course and distance; that is, directly west to Jordan's line at 44. But we have seen that this would completely disarrange all the remaining calls of this grant, seriously disturb the boundaries of the Jordan grant, and prac tically obliterate an old and well settled line, which is the beginning point of both surveys now under consideration. It is evident that such could not have been the intention of the grantor. The original plat printed in the rec ord does not give us much assistance, as it omits two admitted lines of the Smith grant, one for 40 poles, and the other for 200 poles. It seems probable that another line has been omitted from the Smith grant, running perhaps from F to Y, which would reconcile the calls of all the grants. But, be that as it may, i am satisfied that G was intended to be the northwest corner of the Smith grant; and, as F is the next admitted corner, the line in dispute would run from F to G, as contended by the defendants, and not from F to 44, as contended by the plaintiff. The next question is, can we give effect to what appears to us the evident intent of the grantor, and keep within the established rules of construction as laid down by the courts? I think we can. In the construction of all deeds and grants, there is one essential object to be kept in view, and that is to ascertain the true Intent of the grantor, and to give full effect to that intention when not contrary to law. All rules of construction adopted by the courts are simply means to a given end, being those methods of reasoning which experience has taught are best calculated to lead to that intention. Hence all authorities unite in saying that no rule can be invoked, no matter how correct in its general application, that tends to defeat the intention of the grantor. This doctrine is of such universal acceptance as to require but few citations, more to illustrate its extent than to prove its existence. It is well expressed by Chief Justice Shaw in Salisbury v. Andrews, 19 Pick. 250, 252, as follows: "In construing the words of such a grant, where the words are doubtful or ambiguous, several rules are applicable, all, however, designed to aid in ascertaining what was the intent of the parties, such intent when ascertained being the governing principle of construction. And first, as the language of the deed is the language of the grantor, the rule is that all doubtful words shall be construed most strongly against the grantor, and most favorably and beneficially for the grantee. Again, every provision, clause, and word in the same instrument shall be taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of the parties, whether words of grant, of covenant or description, or words of qualification, restraint, exception, or explanation. Again, every word shall be presumed to have been used for some purpose, and shall be deemed to have some force and effect, if it can have. And further, although parol evidence is not admissible to prove that the parties intended something different from that which the written language expresses, or which may be the legal inference and conclusion to be drawn from it, yet it is always competent to give in evidence existing circumstances, such as the actual condition and situation of the land, buildings, passages, water courses, and other local objects, in order to give a definite meaning to language used in the deed, and to show the sense in which particular words were probably used by the parties, especially in matters of description." Salisbury v. Andrews, supra, a case cited by nearly all text writers with uniform approval. In Smith v. Parkhurst, 3 Atk. 135, Lord Chief Justice Wills says: "Another maxim is that such a construction should be made of the words of a deed as is most The agreeable to the intention of the grantor. The words are not the principal thing in a deed, but the intent and design of the grantor. We have no power, indeed, to alter the words or to insert words which are not in the deed, but we may and ought to construe the words in a manner the most agreeable to the meaning of the grantor, and may reject any words that are merely insensible. Those maxims, my lords, are founded upon the greatest authority, Coke, Plowden, and Lord Chief Justice Hale, and the law commends the astutia-the cunning-of judges in construing words in such a manner as shall best answer the intent. art of construing words in such a manner as shall destroy the intent may show the ingenuity of, but is very ill becoming, a judge." In Campbell v. McArthur, 9 N. C. 33, this court held that "a mistake in the course and distance of a deed. should not be permitted to disappoint the intent of the parties, if that intent appears, and if the means of correcting the mistake are furnished either by a more certain description in the same deed, or by reference to another deed containing a more certain description." Ritter v. Barrett, 20 N. C. 133; Credle v. Hays, 88 N. C. 321. Devl. Deeds, § 835, says: "But it is doubtful how far arbitrary rules can be of service where the only object is to determine the intention of the parties. In fact, the truth was well expressed by Mr. Justice Sanderson (Walsh v. Hill, 38 Cal. 481, 487), who said that 'in the construction of written instruments, we have never de rived much aid from the technical rules of the books. The only rule of much value is to place ourselves as near as possible in the seats which were occupied by the parties at the time the written instrument was executed; then, taking it by its four corners, read it.' This is the main object of all construction. When the intention of the parties can be ascertained, nothing remains but to effectuate that intention." Also, Id. §§ 836, 839, 1013; Sedgw. & W. Tr. Title Land, § 856; Tied. Real Prop. § 827; Washb. Real Prop. p. 403, par. 21; Id. p. 408, par. 24. While the deed itself is the evidence of the intent of the parties, there are frequently latent ambiguities, which must be explained by parol testimony or other evidence aliunde, such as deeds or plats referred to therein. It is well settled by this court in repeated adjudications that a mistake in course and distance will not be permitted to defeat the intent of the parties if such intent otherwise appears from the deed, and that any course and distance may be disregarded when it conflicts with a natural or artificial monument, a marked line of the same tract, or a well-known line of another called for in the deed. A number of authorities are cited in Bowen v. Gaylord, 122 N. C. 816, 29 S. E. 340, which it is unnecessary here to repeat. Brief reference to a few will show to what extent this rule has been carried. In the leading case of Person v. Roundtree, 2 N. C. 378, note, repeatedly cited and ap proved, the course of the first line was |