reformation of S.'s lease, so as to give a renewal of the lease of 1861, and to
set aside the sale to H. Held, that a verdict for defendants was properly
directed, as the language of the lease of 1810 was satisfied by holding that it
gave the lessee the right to two renewals which were given. Syms v. Mayor,
etc., of New York, N. Y., 819.

2. Evidence-record.] The remedy under the landlord and tenant act of
December 14, 1863, and its supplement of 1872, is restricted to plain cases of
ordinary tenancy. In proceeding under these acts, not only must the relation
of landlord and tenant be established by competent evidence of an express
contract, but also the fact that there was a rent reserved, fixed and certain in its
terms. Magistrates invested with jurisdiction under these enactments must
clearly and distinctly set forth, in the record of their proceedings, every thing
that is required to give them undoubted jurisdiction. Davis v. Davis,
Penn., 851.

3. Lease-renewal - expectancy - opportunity.] The tenant's right of
renewal in a lease is an asset incident to an existing lease, and when the lease
is held by a partnership, the renewal, expectancy or opportunity is an asset
of the firm in which all the partners have an interest. Appeal of William H.
Johnson, Penn., 854.

4.

title-fraud- mistake - estoppel.] If one in possession under claim
of title is induced to accept a lease of the premises through the misrepresen-
tation, trick, or fraud of the lessor, he is not estopped from setting up a title
superior to that of his lessor. So, where a lease is made through mutual mis-
take of the facts, the lessee, if in possession when the lease was executed,
may set up a superior title. Berridge v. Glassey, Penn., 857.

5. Vendee-contract- rent use and occupation.] Assumpsit lies for
use and occupation where one occupies the land of another with his consent,
but without any agreement. A. entered into possession of real estate under
an express contract with B.. by which B., for a specified valuable considera-
tion, agreed to convey to him the premises by a perfect title and free and
clear of all incumbrances. B. was not able to execute a deed as contracted
for. Held, A. was not in possession under such circumstances as to create the
relation of landlord and tenant. In re Estate of M. Kaas, deceased, Penn., 841.
See NEGLIGENCE, 599.
LEASE.

1. Fixtures - personal property - chattel real — sheriff – levy-sale
- trespass.] A lease of land for a term of years may be sold on a fieri
facias as personal property; and fixtures erected by the tenant on the demised
premises for the purpose of carrying on his trade are personal property during
the continuance of the term. C., a sheriff, levied upon “all the right, title,
etc., of the defendants, of, in, and to their leasehold interest, in two lots of
ground in . . . bounded
on which is erected a stationary steam
saw-mill, with engine and boilers, saw and log carriage, and lumber car, and
all other fixtures about same, in good running order;" according to his return
he made sale of "the leasehold interest in the piece of land in said borough,
levied upon by virtue of this writ, with the improvements." D., alleging that
he had purchased the saw-mill from the defendant in the writ held by C.
before the writ had issued, brought trespass vi et armis de bonis asportatis
against C.' Held, that as the property sold was a chattel real, not susceptible
of actual seizure, and the saw-mill had not been severed in the levy and sale
but had been sold as appurtenant thereto, that C. could not be held on tres-
pass, etc. Kile v. Geibner, Penn., 508.

2. Piano-conditional sale - waiver.] In a written lease of a piano from
G. to B., it was stipulated that B. should pay for the use of the piano $200 in
advance and $50 quarterly thereafter, with seven and three-tenths per cent
interest, and when $500 had thus been paid for the use of the piano G. should
give B. a bill of sale. G. was authorized to enter B.'s dwelling and take the
piano upon failure of any payment. The piano was then delivered and pay-
ments made the last October 9, 1874 - until they amounted in all to $500.

B. remained in undisturbed possession, without demand of any kind upon her
G., .until her death in June, 1884. Held, that the pretended lease was a con-
ditional sale, and if it was upon condition precedent, the condition was
waived in B.'s life-time. Gorham v. Holder, Me., 1006.

LEGACY.

A legatee may take by a reputed name. Vermont, etc., Convention v. Ladd, Vt., 83.

LEGISLATION.

-

- mer-

Words construing of butchers Pittsburgh taxation
chandise.] The plain and literal meaning of the words in a statute should
not, in construing it, be departed from, except upon considerations of the most
convincing character and the greatest merit. Butchers selling meat, whether
in stalls or shops, within the limits of the city of Pittsburgh, are subject to
the operations of the act of March 7, 1846-P. L. 78 and required to bear
their share of the taxation which it imposes upon all alike, who sell goods,
wares, and merchandise or articles of trade and commerce. City of Pittsburgh
v. Kalchthaler, Penn., 610.

LIBEL AND SLANDER.

1. Malice.] In a legal sense malice as an ingredient of an action of libel or
slander signifies nothing more than a wrongful act done intentionally with-
out just cause or excuse. King v. Patterson, N. J., 325.

2. When presumed.] Where the publication imputes a crime so as to be action-
able per se, or is actionable only on averment and proof of special damages, if
the publication is not justified by proof of its truth or by the privileged occasion
of publication, the law conclusively presumes malice such as.is essential to
the action. Id.

3. Burden of proof] The burden of proving that the occasion of publication
was privileged is on the defendant. The occasion being privileged, the bur-
den is then cast upon the plaintiff of showing that the words were published
from an improper motive and not for a reason which otherwise would render
them privileged. Id.

4. Privileged communication.] The occasions which give rise to the privilege
of speaking or publishing defamatory words which otherwise would be action-
able are various. Whether the privilege is available as a defense depends
upon the circumstances of the particular case, the situation of the parties,
the persons to whom, the circumstances under which, and the manner in which
the communication was made. Id.

6.

-] The subject in relation to which the communication was made may be
privileged and a communication on that subject be unprivileged. If the
restraints and qualification imposed by law upon the publicity to be given to
such communications be disregarded the communication is unprivileged and
actionable. In such cases good faith and honest belief will be no defense. Id.
-.] A communication made bona fide, upon any subject-matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty,
is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contain criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be
be actionable. Id.

7. To mercantile agency.] A communication made by the proprietors of a mer-
cantile agency in respect to the character and financial standing of a trader is
privileged when made to those of its patrons who have a special interest in
the information communicated. But this privilege does not extend to pub-
lications made to patrons who have no such interest in the subject-matter. Id.
8. ] The publication by a mercantile agency of a notification sheet which is
sent to its subscribers irrespective of their interest in the plaintiff's standing
and credit is not a privileged communication, and the proprietors are liable
for a false report of the plaintiff's financial condition in such publication. Id.
9. Damages.] The damages recoverable in such an action are such as might
reasonably have been foreseen as the probable consequences of the wrongful
VOL. XI.- 131

act, and which were the results in the usual order of things of such wrongful
act. Id.

LIEN.

1. Where, by the terms of the agreement, the goods upon which a party has per-
formed work are to be returned and delivered to the owner before payment
is to be made, the party performing the work has no lien upon the goods for
his services. Wiles Laundry Co. v. Hahlo, N. Y., 956.

2. On animals - proceeds of sales to enforce liens -- equity.] Equity
cannot be maintained to recover, from a fund deposited in court, for keep-
ing of animals from the date of a petition to enforce a lien claim thereon,
to the date of their sale by an officer upon the lien judgment, though the
fund in court was deposited by the officer making such sale, and was the
surplus received at the sale of the animals over and above the judgment
lien, and was deposited by the officer in court in accordance with the pro-
visions of the statute for enforcing such liens. Lord v. Collins, Me., 436.
3. On buildings.] Liens on buildings and lots, given by the statute of Maine,
must be enforced by suit against the contracting party. The lien is an inci-
dent to the contract. Where a lien under one contract has been dissolved,
by lapse of time, it cannot be tacked to another lien, under another contract,
with another and different contracting party. Farnham v. Duvis, Penn., 550.
See STATUTE, 348.

LORD'S DAY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 219.
LUNATIC.

Committee - real estate-leasing - possession — equity — ejectment.]
If in the judgment of the committee of a lunatic, the interest of the lunatic and
his family would be best promoted by leasing the entire homestead or a por-
tion of it, the committee can present the facts to the proper court and ask
its instructions, and if assistance becomes necessary to enforce the decree of
the court made in the premises, he may invoke aid as a receiver in other
proceedings in equity. The wife and children of a lunatic were in possession
of the homestead, holding under the husband, a portion of the building
being used by them as a residence and the remainder rented to tenants; the
committee of the husband brought ejectment against the wife to recover pos-
session. Held, the action would not lie. Shajer v. List, Penn.,
384.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

1. Abuse of process - evidence.]

An action will lie for the malicious abuse
of civil or criminal process which has been lawfully issued for a just cause,
and which is valid in form. The statements contained in a brief presented by
a party upon the argument of a case, as to the existence of certain facts which
he offered to prove, but which were rejected by the court below, cannot be
taken as admissions made by him that he had personal knowledge of the
truth of such facts; and the statements contained in the brief are not, there-
fore, evidence against him in a subsequent action involving the question of
his knowledge. Wood v. Bailey, Mass., 222.

2. Nolle pros.-entered.] Where a nolle prosequi has been entered by the pro-
curement of the party prosecuted or by his consent, he cannot afterward
maintain an action for malicious prosecution against the complainant. One
who does no more than enter a complaint before a magistrate, who thereupon
issues his warrant for the party complained of, is not liable in trespass for
the acts done by the officer in serving the warrant, even though the magis-
trate had no jurisdiction to issue it. Langford v. Boston & Albany R. R.
Co., Mass., 211.

MANDAMUS.

1. In view of the charter of the city of Elizabeth, the legal duty of the Essex com-
mon pleas now to order recorded a surveyor's return, filed in 1851, for the

laying out of a public road within the city limits, is not so clear as to justify
a mandamus commanding that court to perform it. City of Elizabeth v.
Court of Common Pleas of County of Essex, N. J., 556.

2. Petition-answer-certainty.] Certainty to a common intent is the rule
that applies, as well to the answer as to the petition, in the matter of an ap-
plication for a mandamus, and it is sufficient that the former, without am-
biguity or evasion, responds to and denies the assertions of the latter.
tral District and Printing Telegraph Co. v. Commonwealth, Penn., 645.

MARRIED WOMAN.

Cen-

1. Contract.] The promise of a married woman, having a separate estate, to
pay for necessaries furnished her upon the credit of her estate, is a sufficient
consideration for a new promise to pay for them, made after the death of her
husband. Sherwin v. Sanders, Vt., 473.

2. Real estate-Ohio.] The real estate in Pennsylvania, of a married woman
domiciled and doing business in Ohio, is not liable for her general debts con-
tracted in the course of such business. Spearman v. Ward, Penn., 638.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

1.

See CONTRACT, 725.

MORTGAGE.

See ACTION, 505.

MECHANIC'S LIEN.

A sub-contractor filed a mechanic's lien claim, and in an accompanying bill,
made a part thereof, he set forth the nature and kind of work done, the kind
and amount of material furnished, and the time when done or furnished, as
follows:

April 7, 1885.

"Mrs. Catharine J. Smith, owner, and W. J. Quinn, contractor,

To Louis Sarver, Dr.

"To 1,100 yards of plastering on house of Mrs. Smith, commenced
on or about January 5, 1885, and finished on April 7, 1885...... $300 00
"Of this sum, the one-half, viz., $150, is for work and labor done
in plastering said house, and the other half, viz., $150, is for
materials, viz., lime, sand, hair, water, etc., furnished for said
plastering.

"To 2 days' work laying walks around said house during the
month of May, 1885...

Held, sufficient. Sarver v. Smith, Penn., 409.

-

6 00

$306 00"

2. Allegheny county.] The special "mechanic's lien" act of May 1, 1861 —
P. L. 550 is amendatory not explanatory of the act of June 16, 1836-P.
L. 695. The act of April 1, 1873-P. L. 473 extending the act of June
16, 1836-P. L. 695 and its supplements to leaseholds in Allegheny
county, applies only to the erection and construction of buildings not to the
repair of them. Appeal of Hancock, Penn., 605.
3. Notice - sale terms estoppel.] A., who held a mechanic's lien
against a building of B., which building was about to be sold by the sheriff,
upon an execution of a judgment creditor, went to the sheriff's sale and
announced that the purchaser would take subject to his mechanic's lien;
later, A. purchased the property himself at an inadequate price, and then
claimed the purchase-money fund, upon the ground that his lien had been
discharged by the sale. Held, he should be confined to the terms of sale
dictated by himself. Appeal of Thomas Birney, Penn., 394.

4. School building - act of 1878, chapter 315.] The trustees of public
schools in the city of New York entered into a contract for the building of a

school-house upon land owned by the city. Held, that the contract was one
with an incorporated city" within the meaning of the act of 1878, chapter
315, and that a lien might be filed against the city for failure of the comp-
troller to pay over moneys in his hands due on such contract. Bell v. Mayor,
etc., N. Y., 804.

5. Waiver-fraud.] Plaintiffs made a contract under seal with defendant B.,
to build for him a house on land which they supposed he owned. By the
terms of the contract the plaintiffs were to be paid in installments in B.'s
notes on four months' time. While the work was in progress, plaintiffs dis-
covered that the land belonged to one M., and upon interviewing M., he
assured them that B. had purchased it, although the deed had not passed;
and they were induced by the fraud of B. and M. to complete the building
under the contract. The last notes not having been paid they sought to
secure themselves by filing a mechanic's lien upon the property. In an action
to enforce the lien, held, that the written contract was a waiver of any lien
which they otherwise might have been entitled to, and that the fraud of B.
and M. could not operate to transform the written contract, under which the
work was done, into a right to a mechanic's lien. The statute gives no right
to a mechanic's lien based solely upon the ground of the enhanced value of
the property. Ellenwood v. Burgess, Mass., 908.

MILITARY SETTLEMENT.

Soldier deserter.] A soldier in the civil war who had served one term of
enlistment and been honorably discharged, and afterward re-enlisted and
deserted, gained no military settlement by virtue of his first enlistment. City
of Cambridge v. Inhabitants of Paxton, Mass., 744.

MINES AND MINING.

Oil-co-tenant-expense of pumpage, etc.] A. and B. purchased the
privilege of mining for oil, A. owning a one-fourth interest in the purchase.
A well was drilled, and, as a matter of convenience, the operating of it was
left to A., who employed C. to pump it, who was paid by A. and B. contribut-
ing pro rata for the purpose; later, D. purchased from B. a one-fourth inter-
est in the lease, whereupon C. was, against the expressed wish of A., dis-
charged, and D. was given his place at a compensation. A. then declined
to pay any part of the expenses of running the well, D.'s wages included, but
he received his share of the oil as pumped into the receptacles of a pipe-line
company. Held, in an action by D. against A., to recover such expenses, that
as a tenant in common A. was liable to account to his co-tenants for the
expenses necessary for the pumping and care of the oil produced, which was
owned in common, but not having employed D. he was not liable to him, as
claimed in the action brought. Thompson v. Newton, Penn., 40.

See COAL, 411; DEED, 44.
MISTAKE.

Money paid by.] Where one, either by compulsion of law, or to relieve
himself from liability, or to save himself from damage, has paid money not
officiously, which another ought to have paid, the former may recover from
the latter, in an action of assumpsit, the amount so paid. Iron City Tool
Works v. Long & Co., Penn., 392.

Excessive freight charges - goods withheld until paid.] See RAILROAD,

665.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

Used in gambling.] Where one lends money with the understanding and
intention that it is to be used by the borrower in gambling, and it is so used,
the lender cannot recover the money; but, if the lender demands the money
before it is used, he may recover. Tyler v. Carlisle, Me, 242.

MORTGAGE.

1. Consideration - future advances.] As between the parties and their