Blizzard, Adm'r, etc. v. Filler, Adm'r, et al. executor or administrator, in the manner prescribed in the seventh part of this act." By section 189 of the same law, it is provided that a suit in chancery, "instead of a proceeding at law," may be instituted by any person interested in an estate upon the executor's or administrator's bond. Karns did not resign, nor was he removed, or his letters of administration revoked. This case is not, therefore, within the terms of the act referred to; and unless this court are authorized to add to the section, this case can not be brought within its provisions. The three sections of the law preceding the one cited, provide in what cases the administrator may be removed, and for what his letters may be revoked, as well as for the appointment of an administrator de bonis non, in the event of his death; but the case of death is manifestly, designedly, left out of the section allowing the second administrator to sue upon the bond of the first. This leaves the matter in that case as it stood at common law, and there it is well settled that he could not maintain an action. If it is desirable that cases like this should be brought within such a remedy, the power is with the general assembly, but without legislation can not be applied by this court. We are referred to the cases of the Commonwealth v. Strobecker, Drenkle v. Shannon, and Weld v. McClure, all in 9 Watts, 479, 485, 495, as sustaining the positions of the complainant's counsel. The first of these was the case of a dismissed administrator, and was decided upon a statute of the State of Pennsylvania, [482 very similar to our own. The general doctrine is explicitly recognized by the judge delivering the opinion, that without such legislation the proceeding could not be maintained. The case of Drenkle v. Shannon was also decided upon section 31 of a law of that state, passed in 1834, which provided that "administrators de bonis non, with or without a will annexed, shall have power to demand and recover from their predecessors in the administration, or their legal representatives," etc. This section. differs from our statute in extending to all administrators de bonis non, and expressly provides for proceedings against the legal representatives of a deceased administrator. The judge says: "The object of this section was to change the common law in respect to the matters therein provided for ;" and further, he says: "Every one acquainted with the law as it stood before the passage of the act, must be sensible of the embarrassment that arose with The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville. creditors, legatees, and distributees of the deceased persons, in relation to having the respective claims adjusted and paid, from the circumstance of their being compelled to look to various sources and different persons, in some instances, for that purpose." Here again the common-law rule is acknowledged, and the decision placed upon a statute with which we have none to correspond. The case of Weld v. McClure was the case of a dismissed administrator. Sergeant., J., in delivering the opinion, says "The incapacity under which an administrator de bonis non labored previous to the act of February 24, 1834 (the one referred to in the last case), to recover the assets in the hands of the representatives of a prior executor or administrator who had died, arose from the want of title to the property of the decedent not remaining in specie. That reason does not apply in the case of a dismissed executor or administrator, because section 3 of the act of April 4, 1797, expressly gives to the successor the administration of the unadministered part of the estate, and directs that the dis483] missed party *surrender up the residue of the estate." Our law is the same, in effect, as this law of 1797, but we have no provision corresponding to the act of 1834. Without it we have the authority of this case for saying that it would be governed by the common law, and no action could be maintained. The fact that no objection to the jurisdiction is taken, can have no weight in this case. We do not decide it upon the ground that the remedy is at law, but upon the ground that no remedy in favor of the present plaintiff exists either at law or in chancery. The bill must be dismissed. THE ZANESVILLE CANAL AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY V. THE CITY OF ZANESVILLE. A gift to a charitable use is to receive the most liberal construction. The McIntire fund, given to establish "a school in the town of Zanesville, for the poor children in said town," is not limited in its benefits to the children of parents residing in that locality which constituted the town corporate of Zanesville, at the decease of the testator. The charity will be administered for the benefit of poor children in the town of Zanesville, according to the most general and popular sense of the term. The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville. THIS is a bill in chancery reserved from Muskingum county. The case stands upon bill and answer. The facts are undisputed. John McIntire, by his last will, dated March 18, 1815, directs that his estate be sold and invested in the stock of the Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Company; "and the president and directors of said company are, annually, forever to appropriate all the profits, rents, and issues of my stock as aforesaid, and all my estate, of whatever kind the same may be, for the use and support of a poor school which they are to establish in the town of [484 Zanesville for the use of the poor children in said town. The children who are to be the objects of this institution are to be fixed upon by the president and directors of said company." This will was proved August 4, 1815. John McIntire and Jonathan Zane were the original proprietors of the town of Zanesville, which was laid out upon the section granted by Congress to Ebenezer Zane. See Swan's Land Laws, 147. The section included land on each side of the river Muskingum and on each side of Licking creek. The town plat was exclusively confined to the east side of the Muskingum. Twenty lots were, however, subsequently laid out on the west side, and north of Licking, forming what is commonly called West Zanesville; and additions were made to the town, on the east side, by McIntire and others, upon Congress land adjoining the section. An act to incorporate the town of Zanesville was passed January 21, 1814. Section 1 of that act reads as follows: "All that part of the town of Zanesville, in the county of Muskingum, included in the original plat thereof, and now on record in the county of Muskingum, together with all the additional lots since added thereto, on the east side of the river Muskingum, and now on record in the county of Muskingum, be and the same is hereby erected into a town corporate, and shall henceforth be known and distinguished by the name of the Borough of Zanesville;' subject, however, to such alterations and regulations. as the legislature may from time to time think proper to make." The limits of the town have since been enlarged by successive legislative enactments, all subsequent to Mr. McIntire's death; and, March 19, 1850, a city charter was granted, and the limits much. enlarged. 48 Laws of Ohio, 473. The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville. After the date of his will, April 21, 1815, Mr. McIntire laid out 485] an addition to the town, and caused the plat to be *recorded. His executors laid out another subsequent to his death. The directors of this company, who are made the trustees by Mr. McIntire's will, pray the aid of this court in executing the trust. There are poor children living beyond the bounds of the town, as incorporated at the time of Mr. McIntire's death, whom they would "fix upon as objects of this institution," if the law will permit them to do it. At the session of the general assembly next after the death of the testator, the corporate powers of the Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Company, conferred by the original act of incorporation of February 21, 1812 (10 Ohio Stat. 173), were enlarged by a new act of incorporation, entitled "an act to incorporate the stockholders of the Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Company," passed February 24, 1816. 14 Stat. 293. This act authorizes the corporation to act as trustee under the will of McIntire. At the date of the will and at the time of the death of the testator, Zanesville was an incorporated town, with boundaries defined by its charter. There were certain lots, called additions to the town, not included within its corporate limits. These, with the facts stated in argument and in the opinion of the court, are all that are material. C. B. GODDARD, for complainants, referred to the following authorities: Kent v. Burnett, 10 Ohio, 392; Regina v. Cottle, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 474; Regina v. Fisher, 8 C. & P. 614 (34 E. C. L. 550); Mallan v. May, 13 Mee. & Welsby, 510; also 518, in note. CHARLES C. CONVERSE, for city of Zanesville: I claim that the true construction of the will brings within the range of selection by the trustees of the charity, the poor 486] children of Zanesville as it now exists, and may hereafter extend itself; and that this bequest to purposes of general charity is not to be restricted to the territory that was included within the narrow limits of the corporation of Zanesville, as defined at the time of the death of the testator. 1. The language of the will itself, in the clause creating the charity, speaks that intent. The bequest is for the benefit of the poor children of the town of Zanesville generally, not only as the town chanced then to be, but as it might be in all future time. The Zanesville Canal and Manufacturing Co. v. The City of Zanesville. The original charter of the town, in force at the date of the will, was "subject to such alterations and regulations as the legislature might think proper from time to time to make." The testator must, therefore, be taken to have contemplated the exercise of this power at some future day, by way of an enlargement of the limits. There are no restrictive words in the bequest, binding down the gift to the particular blocks or squares at that time embraced within the corporate limits of the town. The terms of the will are comprehensive and general. This bequest is not one that exhausts itself at once in persons particularly designated. The bequest is to the trustees, who are ascertained and certain-the beneficiaries are not designated-only a class, from which they are at a future time to be taken. The selection is lodged in the trustees. The only restriction is, that the beneficiaries shall be taken from among "the poor children in the town of Zanesville." If, at the time of selection, those "fixed upon " as subjects of the testator's bounty, are "poor children of Zanesville," the restriction is satisfied. In the interpretation of charitable bequests, greater liberality of construction obtains than in cases of ordinary legacies. The construction that gives the limits of Zanesville as they are, or may be, as the limit of the range of this charity, is more reasonable than that which fixes as such limit unalterably the boundaries of Zanesville as it chanced to be at the date of the will or testator's death. 2. If we look to the condition of things at the time of the execution of the will, and to the relation in which the testator *stood to Zanesville, it is very clear that any such restric- [487 tion as limits this charity to a part only of what now constitutes or may at any time hereafter constitute Zanesville, is repugnant to the general intent of the testator. Parol evidence is admissible, to show the condition of things at the time of the execution of the will, and the relation of the testator to the town of Zanesville. (1) Boys v. Williams, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 689; S. C., 13 Eng. Cond. Ch. 232, 235; Tucker v. The Seamen's Aid Society et al., 7 Met. 205; 1 Jarman on Wills, 358, (1) See Hildebrand v. Fogle, 20 Ohio, 147. In Wigram on Extrinsic Evidence, in aid of the interpretation of wills, seven propositions are maintained as the results of principle and authority, and as illustrating the classes of cases in which extrinsic evidence may be received. It is said that "every claimant under a will has a right to require that a court of construction shall, by means |