within the general expressions of the introductory part. These prohibitions are in some degree auxiliary to a due construction of the Constitution. When a general power over certain objects is granted, accompanied with certain exceptions, it may be considered as leaving that general power undiminished in all those respects which are not thus excepted.

The value and effect of this proposition may be adverted to hereafter.

The legislative body possesses with us a great advantage over that of those countries where it may be adjourned or dissolved at the pleasure of the executive authority. It is self-moving and self-dependent. Although it may be convened by the executive, it cannot be adjourned or dissolved by it. The time of its assembling is fixed by the Constitution, until which, unless a law has been passed appointing an earlier day, or the president on extraordinary occasions has thought proper to convene it, the action of the legislature cannot commence; but if in their opinion the public good shall require it, they may continue uninterruptedly in session, until the termination of the period for which the members of the house of representatives are elected, and they may fix as early a time for the meeting of the next congress as they think proper. A similar principle prevails in all the state constitutions, and it is only where it exists, that a legislature is truly independent. It is as inconsistent with sound principles for the executive to suspend, at its pleasure, the action of the legislature, as for the latter to undertake to deprive the executive of its constitutional functions.

But without a constitutional limit on its duration, it must be conceded, that a power in the legislature to protract its own continuance, would be dangerous. Blackstone attributes the misfortunes of Charles I. to his having unadvisedly passed

an act to continue the parliament, then in being, till such time as it should please to dissolve itself, and this is one of the many proofs that the much praised constitution of that country wants the character of certainty. No act of congress could prolong the continuance of the legislature beyond the term fixed by the Constitution.

CHAPTER IIL

OF THE SENATE.

THE senate, on account of its more permanent duration and various functions, will receive our first attention. If the infusion of any aristocratic quality can be found in our Constitution, it must be in the senate; but it is so justly tempered and regulated by other divisions of power, that it excites no uneasiness. The mounds and safeguards with which it is surrounded must be violently broken down, before any political injury can arise from the senate.

The senators are appointed from time to time, by the legislatures of the different states; but if a vacancy happens during the recess of the state legislature, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

The vesting this power in the state legislatures is the only material remnant of the federative character of the late congress; but the delegates then appointed possessed the whole power; those now appointed, hold but a part of the powers of the general government. It is recommended by the double advantage of favouring a select appointment, and of giving to the state governments, such an agency in the formation of the general government as preserves the authority of the former, and contributes to render them living members of the great

body.* Whether the appointment shall be made by a joint or a concurrent vote of the two branches, when the legislature of a state consists of two branches, as it now universally does, the Constitution does not direct. The difference is, that in a joint vote, the members of both houses assemble together and vote numerically. A concurrent vote is taken by each house voting separately, and the vote of one receiving the assent of the other branch.

1

The person appointed must be at least thirty years of age, have been a citizen of the United States nine years, and at the time of his election, he must be an inhabitant of the state by which he shall be chosen. The senatorial trust requiring great extent of information and stability of character, a mature age is requisite. Participating immediately in some of the transactions with foreign nations, it ought to be exercised by those who are thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years is a reasonable medium between a total exclusion of naturalized citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share of public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might possibly create a channel for foreign influence in the national council.t

Each state, whether more or less populous, appoints two senators-a number which would have been inconvenient, if the votes in the senate were taken, as in the former congress, by states, when, if the delegates from a state were equally divided, the vote of the state was lost; and which of course

* Federalist, No. 62. The author avails himself of the first occasion to quote this excellent work, to unite in the general homage that has been paid to it. The letters signed Publius were the production of three enlightened statesmen, Jay, Madison, and Hamilton. They were collected and published under the title of the Federalist, and contain the soundest principles of government, expressed in the most eloquent language.

† Federalist, No. 62.

rendered an uneven number preferable: but in the senate, a numerical vote is taken in all cases, and the division of opinion among those who represent particular states, has no influence in the general result. If the senate should be equally divided, the casting vote is given by the Vice President, whose office it is to preside in the senate. The equality of states in this respect, is not perhaps defensible on the principle of representing the people, which ought always to be according to numbers; but it was the result of mutual concession and compromise, in which the populous states, enjoying the advantages of proportional numbers in the house of representatives, by which they are enabled to control the interests of the smaller states, yielded as a compensation, the principle of equality in this branch of the legislature, which enjoys in most respects equal, in some respects greater powers.

No other political league or community is known to have possessed this wise adjustment of its capacities and qualities. In Europe, different states or cities have always stood as individual members of the league, and the majority which decided, was the majority of the league, not of the representatives who attended. This composition of both is peculiar to our country, and has been found in practice, neither productive of schism nor deficient in energy. A perfect independence of sentiment has been uniformly manifested by the members, and great superiority to local interests and impressions, particularly sought for in the senate, has always been found there..

It may not be improper to observe in this place, that some of the state legislatures appear to have viewed the relative duties of the senators whom they have appointed, in a more restricted light than it is apprehended the Constitution implies. It seems to have been supposed that the senators were bound to obey the directions of the state legislatures, and the language of some resolutions has been, that the senators be "instructed," and the members of the house of representatives from the