said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other Act of the Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said Acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organise a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do.*

Mr. Calhoun, in his work already quoted, writes

But, according to the fundamental principles of our system, sovereignty resides in the people, and not in the Government; 'and if in them, it must be in them, as the people of the several States; for, politically speaking, there is no other known to the system. It not only resides in them, but resides in its plenitude, unexhausted and unimpaired. If proof be required, it will be found in the fact-which cannot be controverted, so far as the United States are concerned that the people of the several States, acting in the same capacity and in the same way, in which they ordained and established the Federal Constitution, can, by their concurrent and united voice, change or abolish it, and establish another in its place; or dissolve the Union, and resolve themselves into separate and disconnected States. A power which can rightfully do all this, must exist in full plenitude, unexhausted and unimpaired; for no higher act of sovereignty can be conceived. . . . . . They (the States and the United States) stand then, as to the one, in relation of superior to subordinate the creator to the created. The people of the several States called it into existence, and conferred by it, on the Government, whatever power or authority it possesses. Regarded simply as a constitution, it is as subordinate to them,

South Carolina did not on this occasion, as is generally supposed, withdraw from the sound position she had taken. It was not until after the tariff on foreign importations was reduced by what is known as 'the Compromise Act' that she rescinded her ordinance of nullification.

J

as are their respective State constitutions; and it imposes no more restrictions on the exercise of any of their sovereign rights than they do. The case, however, is different as to the relations which the people of the several States bear to each other in reference to it. Having ratified and adopted it by mutual agreement, they stand to it in the relation of parties to a constitutional compact; and, of course, it is binding between them as a compact, and not on or over them as a constitution. Of all compacts that can exist between independent and sovereign. communities, it is the most intimate, solemn, and sacred, whether regarded in reference to the closeness of connection, the importance of the objects to be effected, or to the obligations imposed. Laying aside all intermediate agencies, the people of the several States, each in their sovereign capacity, agreed to unite themselves together in the closest possible connection that could be formed, without merging their respective sovereignties into one common sovereignty,-to establish one common government, for certain specific objects, which, regarding the mutual interest and security of each, and of all, they supposed could be more certainly, safely, and effectually promoted by it, than by their several separate governments; pledging their faith, in the most solemn manner possible to support the compact thus formed by respecting its provisions, obeying all acts of the government made in conformity with them, and preserving it, as far as in them lay, against all infractions. But as solemn and sacred as it is, and as high as the obligations may be which it imposes,-still it is but a compact and not a constitutionregarded in reference to the people of the several States in their sovereign capacity. To use the language of the constitution itself, it was ordained as a constitution for the United States,'-not over them; and established, not over but between the States ratifying it:' and hence a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, and in the same manner in which it ratified and adopted the constitution, may be guilty of violating it as a compact, but cannot be guilty of violating it as a law. . . . That a State, as a party to the constitutional compact, has the right to secede acting in the same capacity in which it ratified the constitution-cannot, with any show of reason, be denied by anyone who regards the constitution as a compact,—if a power

should be inserted by the amending power, which would radically change the character of the constitution, or the nature of the system; or if the former should fail to fulfill the ends for which it was established. This results necessarily from the nature of a compact, -where the parties to it are sovereign, and, of course, have no higher authority to which to appeal. That the effect of secession would be to place her in the relation of a foreign State to the others, is equally clear. Nor is it less so, that it would make her (not her citizens individually,) responsible to them, in that character. All this results, necessarily, from the nature of a compact between sovereign parties.

Further New England testimony in support of the right of secession will be found in Mr. John Quincy Adams' address before the Historical Society of New York, on the occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, 1839: he said:

To the people alone is then reserved, as well the dissolving as the constituent power; and that power can be exercised by them only under the tie of conscience, binding them to the retributive justice of heaven.

With these qualifications, we may admit the same right to be vested in the people of every State in the Union, with reference to the general government, which was exercised by the people of the United colonies with reference to the supreme head of the British Empire, of which they formed a part; and, under these limitations, have the people of each State in the Union a right to secede from the Confederated Union itself.

Thus stands the right. But the indissoluble link of union between the people of the several States of this confederated nation is, after all, not in the right, but in the heart. If the day should ever come (may heaven avert it!) when the affections of the people of these States shall be alienated from each other -when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or collisions of interest shall fester into hatred-the bands of political association will not long hold together parties no longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly

sympathies; and far better will it be for the people of the dis united States to part in friendship from each other, than to be held together by constraint. Then will be the time for reverting to the precedent which occurred at the formation and adoption of the Constitution to form a more perfect Union, by dissolving that which could no longer bind, and to leave the separated parts to be reunited by the law of political gravitation to the

centre.

The Congressional records, and other American State papers, are replete with arguments and opinions that have emanated from the ablest minds the country has produced, which strongly endorse the present course of the Southern States. We may, however, pass on, and read what some weaker intellects say upon the subject.

Mr. Abraham Lincoln, as a member from Illinois, said in the Federal House of Representatives on January 12, 1848:

Any people, anywhere, being inclined, and having the power, have a right to rise up and shake off the existing Government and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred right—a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. Nor is this right confined to cases in which the whole people of an existing government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that can, may revolutionise and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than this-a majority of any portion of such people may revolutionise, putting down a minority, intermingled with or near about them, who may oppose their movements. It is a quality of revolution not to go by old lines or old laws, but to break up both, and to make

new ones.

It was acting on the principle thus enunciated that Mr. Lincoln recognised' what is called 'Western Virginia,' in violation of the 3rd Section of Article IV. of the Constitution, which says, 'New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new

State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.'

Mr. Edward Bates, the Attorney-General of the United States, appointed by Mr. Lincoln, and still one of his Cabinet, in the subjoined letter furnishes his opinion in reference to the unconstitutionality of the division of the State of Virginia. Mr. Lincoln seems to disregard even the decision of his own legal advisers.

Attorney-General's Office: August 12, 1861.

HON. A. F. RITCHIE, VIRGINIA CONVENTION, WHEELING. Sir,-Your letter of the 9th instant was received within this hour, and as you ask an immediate answer, you, of course, will not expect me to go elaborately into the subject.

I have thought a great deal upon the question of dividing the State of Virginia into two States; and since I came here as a member of the Government I have conversed with a good many, and corresponded with some of the good men of Western Virginia in regard to that matter. In all this intercourse my constant and earnest effort has been to impress upon the minds of those gentlemen the vast importance-not to say necessityin this terrible crisis of our national affairs, to abstain from the introduction of any new elements of revolution, to avoid, as far as possible, all new and original theories of government; but, on the contrary, in all the insurgent commonwealths, to adhere, as circumstances will allow, to the old constitutional standard of principle and to the traditional habits and thoughts of the people. And I still think that course is dictated by the plainest teachings of prudence.

The formation of a new State out of Western Virginia is an original, independent act of revolution. I do not deny the power of revolution (I do not call it right, for it is never prescribed-it exists in force only, and has and can have no law but the will of the revolutionists). Any attempt to carry it out