observed and performed with perfect and mutual good faith, and that a treaty of commerce should be concluded by them, on principles of reciprocal advantages to both, I wish to be ascertained of the sentiments and intentions of the Court of London on these interesting subjects.

It appears to me most expedient to have these enquiries made informally, by a private agent; and understanding that you will soon be in London, I desire you in that capacity, and on the authority and credit of this letter, to converse with his Britannic Majesty's ministers on these points, viz. whether there be any, and what, objections to now performing those articles in the treaty which remained to be performed on his part, and whether they incline to a treaty of commerce with the United States on any, and what, terms.

This communication ought regularly to be made to you by the Secretary of State; but that office not being at present filled my desire of avoiding delays induces me to make it under my own hand. It is my wish to promote harmony and mutual satisfaction between the two countries; and it would give me great pleasure to find that the result of your agency, in the business now committed to you, will conduce to that end.

Gouverneur Morris, Esq.

I am, &c.
GEO. WASHINGTON.

Can it be doubted that North Carolina and Rhode Island, States remote from each other, which had not then joined the new agency,' had a right at that time to likewise send a representative, separately or conjointly? And, on the same principle, are not the States comprising the Southern Confederacy entitled to have ministers at the several European courts? In fact, the Union under the Constitution might have been formed by any nine States. Surely the doors of the Foreign Office could not have been closed against the other four?

The non-reception of the Confederate Commissioners by the Governments of the European nations, to whom they

have been accredited, is a clear violation of existing treaties, and is, in fact, simply deferring to the whims and ambitious assumption of the Washington Government, which has never been formally recognised by any power on earth, intercourse with it having been merely held as the 'agent' of the respective States. Hence it was that Lord Lyons, about two years ago, remonstrated with Mr. Seward in regard to some violations of the Constitution, the power of attorney,' under which authority the Lincoln administration professes to act. Mr. Seward replied that he would not permit any foreign government to thus dictate to him. Surely, in the ordinary walks of life, we all require, in dealing with agents, to know exactly the extent of their powers, and have a right to disregard any acts that do not come within the prescribed limits of their delegated authority. Are the Governments of Europe doing right, then, in thus openly fraternising with a revolutionary Government-that at Washington?- for revolutionary it is, because the Federal Constitution has been completely set aside. It is not necessary to enumerate the violations on the part of Mr. Lincoln, his Cabinet and his Congress, of the Federal compact. They are well known. I will be content to give the following extracts from Mr. Madison's reports of the debates in the convention at Philadelphia, which framed the Constitution, to show that the policy of coercion was twice mooted in that body, and was disapproved of on both occasions:

Tuesday, May 29, 1787.—Mr. Randolph (Virginia) proposed to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the articles thereof.'

Thursday, May 31, 1787.—Mr. Madison (Virginia), in reply to the above clause, observed, 'that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice,

and the efficacy of it, when applied to people collectively, and not individually. A Union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed.' This motion was agreed to nem. con.

Friday, June 15, 1787.-Among a series of resolutions offered by Mr. Patterson (New Jersey) was the following:- And that if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts and treaties, the Federal Executive shall be authorised to call forth the power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties.'

Saturday, June 16, 1787.-Mr. Randolph, who seems to have changed his views on the subject, remarked:-Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood and riot in the spoils of their fellow-citizens, and consequently train them up for the service of ambition.'

Wednesday, June 20, 1787.-Mr. Mason (Virginia) said:'It was acknowledged by Mr. Patterson, that the plan could not be enforced without military coercion. Does he consider the force of this concession? The most jarring elements of nature, fire and water themselves, are not more incompatible than such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution. Will the militia march from one State into another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the citizens of the invaded States assist one another, till they rise as one man and shake off the Union altogether?

** He took this occasion to repeat that, notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national Government, he never would agree to abolish the States Governments, or render them absolutely insignificant.'

Mr. Luther Martin (Maryland) 'agreed with Colonel Mason as to the importance of the States Governments; he would support them at the expense of the general Government, which was instituted for the purpose of that support. At

the separation from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating themselves into one. Το these they look up for the security of their lives, liberties, and properties; to these they must look up. The Federal Government they formed to defend the whole against foreign nations in time of war, and to defend the lesser States against the ambition of the larger. They were afraid of granting powers unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union; lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States which the Union was meant to support, and expose the lesser to being swallowed up by the larger. He conceived also that the people of the States, having already vested their powers in their respective legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their govern

ments.'

The question of coercion was then dropped. The only clause in the Constitution giving the Central Government control of the military, to be used except in a foreign war, is contained in Article IV. Section 4, viz. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.'

Mr. Alexander Hamilton, also a member of the Convention, speaking on this subject, said :—

It has been observed, to coerce States is one of the maddest projects ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single State. This being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war? Suppose Massachusetts or any large State should refuse, and Congress should attempt to

compel them, would they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from those States which are in the same situation as themselves? What picture does this idea present to our view? A complying State at war with a non-complying State, Congress marching the troops of one State into the bosom of another this State collecting auxiliaries, and forming, perhaps, a majority against its Federal head. Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable man be well-disposed towards a Government which makes war and carnage the only means of supporting itself-a Government that can exist only by the sword? Every such war must involve the innocent with the guilty. This single consideration should be sufficient to dispose any peaceable citizen against such a Government.

6

The great mass of Northerners of the present generation, especially the middle classes, are very stupid on the subject of politics, though those of the highest and lowest strata are, in every sense of the word, much better citizens. The midway folks, of which such associations as the New York Chamber of Commerce is composed, are as conceited as they are ignorant, and have been much flattered by the 'pot-house' politicians; hence the great decay in public morals in the North. These people, not regarding the significance of the terms Union' and 'United States,' have imagined the States to be one country, whereas they are each and all as different as the nations of Europe, the Constitution being practically little more than a treaty or alliance between them. The Governors of the States have the highest prerogatives of monarchs-the pardoning power; property is held and crime punished under State laws; no person can be a citizen of two States at the same time. Any of the States can have an established church, as was the case in Virginia for many years after she acceded to the Constitution; the clause in that document referring to this subject merely prohibits Congress from interfering in the matter.