To this communication no formal reply was received until April 8. During the interval, the commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve to avoid war if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were received from the Government of the United States of its peaceful intentions, of its determination to evacuate Fort Sumter; and further, that no measures should be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States; that, in the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the commissioners.

The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy and candour and directness as the course of the United States Government towards our commissioners in Washington. For proof of this I refer to the annexed documents marked, taken in connection with further facts I now proceed to relate.

Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations for an extensive military and naval expedition in New York and other Northern ports. These preparations commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly completed, and on April 5, 6, and 7, transports and vessels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies, sailed from Northern ports bound southward.

Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication, and the reply dated on the 15th of the previous month, from which it appears that during the whole interval, whilst the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations.

That these assurances were given has been virtually confessed by the Government of the United States, by its act of sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use force if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter.

No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the Government of the United States towards the Confederacy can be required than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this notice.

According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels composing the expedition, and designed for the relief of Fort Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbour on April 9. Yet our commissioners in Washington were detained under assurances that notice should be given of any military movement. The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was so given at a late hour on April 8, on the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to arrive.

That this manœuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at Charleston to ask and receive instruction from the Government. Even then, under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our commissioners, and the treacherous course of the Government of the United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from directing our fire on Fort Sumter if he would promise not to open fire on our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused. The conclusion was, that the design of the United States was to place the besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet. The fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was executed by General Beauregard with skill and success, which were naturally to be expected from the well-known character of that gallant officer; and although the bombardment lasted some thirty-three hours,

our flag did not wave over the battered walls until after the appearance of the hostile fleet off Charleston.

Mr. William B. Reed, of Pennsylvania, in a paper containing a statement and vindication of certain political opinions,' dated August 14, 1862, thus furnishes an extract from a letter received by him from Judge Campbell, which gives some details of the treachery and baseness of Mr. Seward:

Then, in the months of March and April 1861, came the interlude, if the word can be so applied, of the negotiations as to Fort Sumter, between the Confederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward. And on this point I feel authorised so far to interrupt my personal narrative as to adduce some unpublished testimony, if for no other reason, in order to do justice to a distant friend. I have said that since these troubles began I have had, with a single exception, no correspondent within the limits of the Confederate States. This exception is the Honourable John A. Campbell, of Alabama, formerly a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, whom I hope there is no offence in describing as an eminent jurist, a sound Union man till the policy of the Administration rendered Unionism in the South impossible, and a Christian gentleman. To him, having been honoured by his friendship previously, I wrote urging him to retain his place in the Federal judiciary. On June 5, 1861, he answered my letter, and thus referred to his own patriotic agency in a last and ineffectual effort to keep the peace.

'I suppose you must have seen my letters to Governor Seward in some of the Northern papers. There are some facts connected with them that I am glad to have an opportunity to communicate to you. When I visited Governor Seward, I had not had any communication with General Davis, or any member of the Executive Department of the Montgomery Government. The first knowledge I had of the demand of the Commissioners for recognition, or of Mr. Seward's embarrassment, was derived from Judge Nelson and Mr. Seward. I offered to write to General Davis and ask him to restrain his commissioners.

I

supposed that Mr. Seward desired to prevent the irritation and complaint that would naturally follow from the rejection of the Commissioners in the South, and the reaction that their expression (sic) would have at the North. He informed me that Sumter was to be evacuated, and that Mr. Weed said, "This was a sharp and bitter pang, which he (Weed) was anxious might be spared to them." Mr. Seward authorised me to communicate the fact of the evacuation to Mr. Davis, and the precise object was to induce him to render his commissioners inactive. I did not anticipate having any other interview with Mr. Seward. I supposed that Sumter would be evacuated in the course of a very few days, and without any other action on my part. When upon the second and third interviews with him I found there was to be delay, I conversed with Judge Nelson as to the delicacy of my position, and it was at his suggestion and by his counsel that I agreed to be the "intermediary" until Sumter was evacuated. Neither of us doubted that the fort was to be surrendered or abandoned. The first notice of any other disposition was communicated on April 10. Colonel Lamon, the present Marshal of the district of Columbia, came to Washington with the family of Mr. Lincoln, I believe. He was with him at Washington in some familiar capacity. He visited Charleston in March, obtained access to Sumter, and left the impression on the mind of Governor Pickens that he was the agent of the Government, engaged in making arrangements for its evacuation. In the latter part of March, Governor Pickens sent a telegram to ascertain what had become of Lamon. I bore this to Mr. Seward, and he promised to enquire concerning him. His answer was that the President was concerned at any misconception of Lamon's words or visit, and desired me to converse with him; that Lamon did not visit Charleston for him, and was not commissioned to make any pledge or assurance to bind him. Mr. Seward said Lamon would be at the State Department for me to interrogate him. I declined to converse with Lamon, and recommended that he (Lamon) should himself write to Governor Pickens to explain the matter. I asked Governor Seward about the evacuation of the fort. Without any verbal reply, he wrote: "The President may desire to supply Sumter, but will not do so without giving notice to

Governor Pickens." Upon reading this, I asked if the President had any design to attempt a supply of Sumter. His reply contained an observation of the President. That I pass. But he said he did not believe any attempt would be made to supply Sumter, and there was no design to reinforce it. I told him if that were the case, I should not employ this language, that it would be interpreted as a design to attempt a supply, and that, if such a thing were believed in Charleston, they would bombard the fort, that they did not regard the surrender of Sumter as open to question, and when they did, they would proceed to extremities. He left the State Department, I remaining there till his return; and, on his return, he wrote these words:"I am satisfied that the Government will not undertake to supply Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." This excluded the matter of desire, and, with what had taken place, left the impression that if any attempt were made it would be an open, declared, and peaceful offer to supply the fort, which, being resisted by the Carolinians, the fort would be abandoned as a military necessity and to spare the effusion of blood-the odium of resistance and of the evacuation being thrown upon the late Administration and the Confederate States. Had these counsels prevailed-had the policy been marked with candour and moderation-I am not sure that even before this the fruit might have been seen ripening among the States in renewed relations of kindness and goodwill, to be followed ere long by a suitable political and civil union, adequate to the security of both sections at home and abroad. The ideas of union and a common country, as applied to all the States, are now simply obsolete.'

This simple and precise narrative, introduced here as having been addressed to me, is, in the light of what has occurred since, a sad revelation, which needs no comment. Neither at home nor abroad does the Administration seem to have known that

the best policy is fair play. I answered Judge Campbell's letter soon after its receipt, and, as evidence of my feelings and opinions then, I make an extract from my letter. You speak of the united and resolute feeling at the South. Here it is very nearly as unanimous, and I can discern no signs of reaction. There are (I speak of this city) a few gentlemen who hold, as I