Where the certificate of the acknowledgment of femes covert to a mortgage
subsequent to the act of 1840, declared that they executed it without fear
or compulsion of their husbands, it was held, that such certificate was no
evidence, either in law or equity, of such an acknowledgment by them as
the act of 1840 requires, to bar their right of dower. Barstow v. Smith, 394
1. Where the person who executed a trust deed for the benefit of his creditors,
offered, as administrator, to prove a debt due from him to the estate, held,
that it was incompetent for him to do so; but that the next of kin of the
deceased, or others entitled to the money due from him as administrator,
might come in and claim under such deed, as his individual creditors.
Suydam v. Dequindre,
23
2. An administrator appointed in another State has no interest in the real or
personal property of his intestate here. Nor has an administrator appoint-
ed in this State any interest in, or authority over, real estate, unless the per-
sonal property of the deceased is insufficient to pay his debts, and then he
can only dispose of it after express permission given by the judge of pro-
bate, on application made for that purpose. Thayer v. Lane,
200
3. Where an estate had been represented insolvent by an administrator de bonis
non, a motion was granted staying proceedings on execution, for balances
due on certain mortgage foreclosures, (not being such debts as are pre-
ferred by law,) which had been levied before such representation of insol-
vency. Quackenbush v. Campbell, adm. &c.,
525
4. It is immaterial whether the estate be represented insolvent by the original
administrator, or the administrator de bonis non; the provisions of the
statute applying to the former, apply also to the latter, where there is no
express provision to the contrary. Id.,
ADMINISTRATOR.—Continued.
5. No time is limited by statute, within which an estate must be declared insol-
vent by an executor or alministrator. Id.,
1. The admissions in a bill or answer, to be conclusive on the party making
them, must be full and unequivocal. They must not be inferred from other
admissions, unless the express admission is so closely connected with the on
to be inferred, that to disprove the latter would disprove the former.
Schwarz v. Sears,
2. Where a defendant permits a bill to be taken as confessed against him, it
is an admission on his part of every material fact stated in it. Ward v.
Jewett,
Where there is an adverse possession, the legal title cannot pass by a convey-
ance from a person out of possession. Godfroy v. Disbrow,
1. The possession of State property by the authorized agents and officers of
the State, is the possession of the State. Michigan State Bank v. Hast-
ings,
9
2. Equity will not decree the specific execution of a written contract for the sale
of land made by a special agent, who has exceeded his authority.
Chamberlin v. Darragh,
149
3. Neither will it require the agent to convey his equitable interest in the land
as cestui que trust, he having acted only as the agent of the trustee in selling
the land, although the contract on its face, does not disclose the agency;
the bill charging that the contract was made by him as the agent of the
trustee, and not that it was made by him in his own right. Id., 149
4. Where an agent, acting within the scope of his authority, does a thing which,
standing alone and by itself, would be binding on his principal, and at the
same time does something more, which he was not authorized to do, and
the two are not so interwoven with each other that they cannot be sepa-
rated, but constitute different parts of the same contract, that which the
agent was authorized to do, is binding on his principal, and that only
which he was not authorized to do, is void. Hammond v. Michigan State
Bank,
5. A person who deals with an agent is bound to inquire into his authority, and
ignorance of the extent of the agent's authority, is no excuse. Id., 214
6. The declarations of an agent, made at the time of doing an act within the
scope of his authority, and relating to the subject matter of the act, are
evidence, as a part of the res gesta; but statements subsequently made by
him are not, because the latter are made without authority, and, for that
reason, stand on the same footing with the declarations of another per-
son. Benedict v. Denton,
336
7. An agent, whether of the public or of individuals, who is authorized to sell
property for the best price that can be obtained for it, cannot become the
purchaser, either in his own name or that of another, whether the sale be
public or private. Ingerson v. Starkweather,
See EVIDENCE, 8. MICHIGAN STATE BANK, 1. MORTGAGEE, 37.
1. When allowed. Sawyer v. Sawyer, note, p.
2. In a suit by or against a wife, for a divorce, if she have no separate property
of her own, the Court, when necessary, on petition, will grant her temporary
alimony pending the suit, and require her husband to advance money to
enable her to prosecute her suit, or make her defense. Story v. Story, 421
3. The affidavit of the husband, denying the ground on which the wife asks a
divorce, is no answer to an application for alimony during the suit, but
may be read to aid the Court in the exercise of its discretion as to the
amount to be allowed. Id.,
421
See PRACTICE, III. 10, 11, 12, 13.
See EVIDENCE, 10, 11, 12, 13. PLEADING, V. PRACTICE, V.
The right of appeal is a statutory right, and, where a party has failed to com-
ply with the provisions of the statute, within the time prescribed, the Court
will not allow a re-entry of the decree to enable him to appeal. Weed v.
Lyon,
77
1. The assignment of a debt secured by a mortgage, carries with it the mort-
gage, as an incident to the debt, although there is no mention made of the
mortgage in the assignment. So, the assignment of a part of a debt, or
of one of several notes secured by a mortgage, carries with it a propor-
tional interest in the mortgage, unless it is agreed between the parties, at
the time, that no interest in the mortgage is to pass to the assignee.
Cooper v. Ulmann,
251
2. Where there are several notes falling due at different times, the fact that one
note becomes due first, will not, of itself, give it a preference over the
rest, where the mortgaged premises are insufficient to pay the whole.
Id.,
251
3. The assignor may, if he see fit, give the assignee a priority of payment; but
the law gives no such priority, where there is no understanding or agree-
ment between the parties to that effect. Id.,
251
4. An assignee of a contract cannot insist upon fraud used in the making of the
contract on the party under whom he claims. Carroll v. Potter, 355
5. Where an assignment of a debt is made to defraud creditors, they only can
take advantage of the fraud to set it aside, and it is good against all
others; and the debtor cannot set it up as a defense to a suit by the
assignee. Morey v. Forsyth,
465
See JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S BILL, 22, 23 26; MORTGAGE, III.
1. Where the charter of a bank prohibited the discounting of notes for stock-
holders to pay installments on their stock, and a note for $70,000 and a
certificate of deposit on which $12,000 was due, were discounted to enable
an individual to purchase a controlling interest in the bank, and to pay the
balance due the bank on the stock purchased by him, and a bill was filed
to restrain a suit brought by the bank on the note, and to have the note
and certificate given up and canceled; upon demurrer it was held, that
the bill should not be sustained, and that the parties should be left to their
remedy at law. Welles v. River Raisin and Grand River R. R. Co., 35
2. Where a bank had power under its charter to take and hold lands for the con-
venient transaction of its business, and to secure debts, but for no other
purpose, it was held, it had no right to purchase lands for the purpose of
selling them again; and the Court refused to assist it in enforcing a contract
made with that intent. Bank of Michigan v. Niles,
99
3. A purchase after the contract was made, in part performance of it, will
not change the case. Id.,
99
4. A bank may take a mortgage for a debt due to it, with seven per cent. inter-
est, (that being the legal rate of interest,) notwithstanding it is prohibited
by its charter from taking "more than six per cent. per annum in advance,
on its loans or discounts." Bailey v. Murphy,
424
See CORPORATION, 3, 4. MICHigan State Bank, 1, 2.
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