and industrious men - devote themselves to what they consider their business, and spare no pains to avoid mistakes which would bring on them disaster, and to adopt such courses as promise to make them comfortable and successful. How happens it that they forget that very much of their comfort and success, even their pecuniary success, is involved in the good conduct of government, in the adoption of wise measures intended for the good of the whole, in the suppression of fraud and the defeat of corruption, and in the prevention of those measures which will subserve the interests of a few, and are carried out by these few through the men they send into office?

Nothing is more certain than this; and, at the same time, nothing is more certain than that the people at large do not seem to recognize this truth, or at least to act upon it. The enormous resources of this country, and its universal industry and thrift, give us, and probably for a time will give us, great prosperity, let the government and legislation of the country be conducted as they may. But if the whole people would awake to the truth, and see clearly how much of their personal success and well-being depends in the long run upon the conduct of government; and if every man, not because he is moved by partisan motives, but because of the convictions growing out of his study of the condition, prospects, and wants of the country, does what in him lies to see that honest and capable men are placed in authority, and that neither traders in nor gamblers for political power hold the places which better men should fill, how much fewer would be those panics and revulsions which now so often bring distress on multitudes!

How little need there would then be for the uprising of classes or sections of the people to cast off burdens imposed upon them. Legislation might still be sometimes mistaken, and measures adopted which do not promote the common welfare; but such mistakes would not be frequent; and the effort to remove them and make the law better would not be resisted by a class of politicians whose power depended upon corruption and falsehood: for their power would have come to an end, because the whole people cannot be corrupted, nor, if they will but attend to their true interests, be for any length of time blinded and cheated.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES GROWING OUT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

SECTION 1.

PARENT AND CHILD.

The obligation of the father to maintain the child is, and always has been, recognized in all civilized countries in some way and in some degree. The infant cannot support himself: he would perish if others did not supply him with the means of subsistence; and the only question is, whether the public (that is the State) shall do this or his parent. Justice, equally with the best affections of our nature, answers that it is the duty of the parent. But upon some points it is not entirely settled how far this duty is a legal obligation.

We should say, however, that a consideration of all the authorities justifies us in stating as strongly if not universally prevailing rules in this country, the following: First, if goods supplied to an infant are necessaries, the father's authority is presumed, and he is therefore liable to pay for them, unless he supplies them himself or was ready to supply them; second, when the infant lives with the father or under his control, his judgment as to what are necessaries will be so far respected that he will be held liable only for things furnished to the infant to relieve him from absolute want; third, if the things supplied are strict and absolute necessaries, needful for the child's subsistence, or if the child is living away from the parent under circumstances which indicate a desertion by the parent, or that the child has been expelled from his house, or caused to leave it by the wrongful acts of the parents, then whosoever supplies the wants of the child, may recover their cost or value from the parent; fourth, if the goods supplied were proper and beneficial to the child, but were not strict and absolute necessaries, the supplier can recover from the father only by proving that he authorized the supply. But slight evidence is held to be sufficient to prove such authority, as if they were clothes, and the father saw the son wear them, or knew that he had received them, and made no objection when he might have done so, he must pay for them.

The word "necessaries" must be interpreted according to the circumstances of the case. If the child be of sufficient age and strength to earn by proper exertions the whole or a part of his subsistence, it will not be deemed "necessary" that such aid should be rendered to him as it would be necessary to give to an infant incapacitated from contributing to his own support, by tender years or by debility of mind or body. We give, as closely connected with this subject, the law concerning infants, the law of guardian and ward, and the law of apprenticeship.

INFANTS OR MINORS.

Generally, all persons may bind themselves by contracts. But some are incapacitated. The incapacity may arise from many causes; as from insanity, or from being under guardianship, or from alienage in time of war, or from marriage, or from infancy.

All persons are infants, in law, until the age of twenty-one. But in Vermont, Maryland, Ohio, Maine, Missouri, Texas, and perhaps one or two other States, women are considered of full age at eighteen, for some purposes.

The rule of law is, that a person becomes of age at the beginning of the day before his twenty-first birthday. This rule opposes the common notion, and it rests on no very good reason, but on ancient authority and constant repetition. The reason assigned is, that the law takes no notice of parts of a day. The effect of the rule is, that a person born on the 9th of May, in the year 1840, becomes of age at the beginning of the 8th of May, 1861, and may sign a note, or do any thing, with the full power of a person of age, on any hour of that day.

The contract of an infant (if not for necessaries) is voidable, but not void. That is, he may disavow it, and so annul it, either before his majority, or within a reasonable time after it. As he may avoid it, so he may ratify and confirm it. He may do this by word only. But mere acknowledgment that the debt exists is not enough. It must be substantially, if not in form, a new promise. In England, and in a few of our States, it is provided by statute that this confirmation can only be by a new promise in writing, signed by the promisor. This rule seems to be useful, and we think it will be more widely adopted.

It must be a promise by the party, after full age, to pay the debt; or such a recognition of the debt as may fairly be understood by the creditor as expressive of the intention to pay it; for this would be a promise by implication. There are no particular words or phrases which the law requires or favors as a confirmation. No

ratification or confirmation can be used in any action which action was brought before the ratification was made. It must also be made voluntarily, and with the purpose of assuming a liability from which he knows that the law has discharged him. And if it be a condi. tional promise, the party who would enforce it must prove the condition to be fulfilled. Thus, if the plaintiff relies on a new promise, and asserts and proves that the defendant said, after full age, “I will pay when I am able," he must also prove that the defendant was able to pay when the action was brought.

If an infant's contract is not avoided, it remains in force. And it may be confirmed without words; and the question sometimes occurs, whether confirmation by mere silence, after a person arrives at full age, prevents him from avoiding his contract made during his infancy. As a general rule, mere silence, or the absence of disaffirmance, is not a confirmation; because it is time enough to disaffirm the contract when its enforcement is sought.

But if an infant buys property, any unequivocal act of ownership after majority-as selling it, for example-is a confirmation of the purchase. And, generally, a silent continued possession and use of the thing obtained by the contract is evidence of a confirmation; therefore, if an infant buys a horse, and gives his note for it, and after he is of age the seller puts the note in suit, the buyer may return the horse and refuse to pay the note; but if he keeps the horse, this is considered evidence of a confirmation of the note. The evidence of confirmation is much stronger if there be a refusal to redeliver the thing when it can be redelivered; and is generally conclusive when the conduct of the party must either be construed as a confirmation, or, if not so construed, must be regarded as fraudulent or wrongful. Thus, where an infant purchased a potashkettle, and gave his promissory note for the price, it being agreed by the parties that he might try the kettle, and return it if it did not suit him; and the vendor, after the infant became of age, requested him to return the kettle if he did not intend to keep it; but he retained and used it a month or two afterwards. The court held that this was a sufficient ratification of the contract, and that an action might be sustained on the note.

The great exception to the rule that an infant's contracts are voidable, is when the promise or contract is for necessaries. The rule itself is for the benefit and protection of the infant, and the same reason causes the exception; for it cannot be for the benefit of the infant or minor that he should be unable to purchase food, raiment, and shelter, on a credit, if he has no funds. The same reason, however, enlarges this exception, until it covers not only strict necessaries, or those without which the infant might perish, or

would certainly be uncomfortable, but all those things which are certainly appropriate to his person, station, and means.

There is no exact dividing line which could make this definition precise. But it is settled that mercantile contracts, as of partnership, purchase and sale of merchandise, promissory notes and bills, are not necessaries, and that all such contracts are voidable by the infant. So, if he gives his note even for necessaries, he is not bound by it; but may defend against it on the ground that it was for more than their true value; and the jury will be instructed to give against him only a verdict for so much as the necessaries were worth.

If he borrows money, to be expended in the purchase of necessaries, and gives his note, the debt, or the note, has been held, at law, voidable by the infant. But our courts would now hold an infant liable for such a debt; and it is well settled that an infant is liable for money paid at his request for necessaries for him; and if he give a note for necessaries with a surety who pays it, the surety may recover against the infant.

If an infant avoid a contract, he can take no benefit from it; thus, if he contracts to sell, and refuses to deliver, he cannot demand the price; or if he contracts to buy, and refuses the price, he cannot demand the thing sold.

An infant is as liable for torts (by torts or tortious acts the law means wrongs, or offences) as an adult; and, therefore, if he fraudulently represented himself as of age, when he was not, and so made a contract which he afterwards sought to avoid, this fraud will not prevent his avoiding the contract, but for damages caused by the fraud itself he is answerable just as an adult would be; and these damages might be measured by the contract. So if he disaffirms a sale, for which he has received the money, he must return the money; because keeping it would be a wrong, or else a confirmation of the sale. So if after his majority he destroys or puts out of his hands a thing bought while an infant, he cannot now demand his money back, as he might have done on tendering the thing bought; for by his disposal of it he has acted as owner, and confirmed the sale.

In general, if an infant avoids a contract on which he has advanced money, and it appears that he has received from the other party an adequate consideration for the money so advanced, which he cannot or will not restore, he cannot recover back the money which he advanced. But if an infant has engaged to labor for a certain period, and, after some part of the work is performed, rescinds the contract and ceases to do the work, he can recover for the work he has done, as much as that work was worth.