and very various are the questions which have arisen under this provision. We cannot here give an account of them, for it would occupy a large part of the volume. But some things we may say, to show how this provision works.

It is held that an act of incorporation is a charter between the State and the stockholders. Therefore, if a charter for a bridge. declares that no other bridge shall be built within a certain distance, a law authorizing another bridge to be built within that distance is held by the courts to be unconstitutional, and therefore void.

If a bank be chartered with certain powers, an act taking away or interfering with those powers, or impairing them to the injury of the stockholders, is unconstitutional and void.

A grant of land by a State, and a compact between two States, are such contracts, and cannot be subsequently interfered with, unless by consent. But an act creating a salaried office is not such a contract that it cannot be repealed; but the salary due before any change in the law must be paid in the terms of the law.

CHAPTER III.

THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF WRITING.

The same article of the constitution from which we last quoted provides that Congress "shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." Here again we see that this provision applies only to the laws of Congress; but similar provisions are made by law in the other States, and in some of them by their constitutions. The effect of these provisions is, that every man may have a right to speak, write, and publish his opinions upon any subject whatever, without the need of any prior license or permission, and without any prior restraint. Nevertheless, every man both speaks and publishes upon his own responsibility; for it is possible to do a grievous wrong to another, in his rights, his peace, his property, and his reputation, by a wrongful speaking or publishing. He who commits this offence is punishable therefor, according to the character of his offence, either by indictment, as for a wrong committed against the public; or by an action, as for a wrong committed against an individual. This offence of wrongful speaking or publishing to the injury of the community or of a person is either a

libel or a slander, and the law on these subjects shall be briefly stated.

LIBEL.

The difference between a libel and a slander consists in this: a libel consists in injurious words against another, or harmful to the community, which are published. Injurious words spoken, but not published, are not a libel, but they constitute a slander. One cannot be indicted for slander, but only for libel. Publication may be by writing or printing, or by a picture or caricature, if these are made with malicious or mischievous intent towards individuals, magistrates, or government: and any publication is indictable as a libel which blasphemes God, or brings contempt or ridicule on the Christian religion; or is immoral, corrupt, or obscene; or calumniates the law or government of the country; or degrades and abuses the administration of justice; or imperils the peace of the country by personal abuse of a foreign sovereign or his officers; or blackens the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation of one who is living. And if the matter is plainly to be understood as meaning or intended to mean any of these things, it is libellous, however it may be expressed. Publication means the holding forth to the public in any way whatever. The publication must be malicious; but if the writing is on the face of it libellous, the law presumes that it was published from a malicious intention. We have said that the publisher of a libel may be punished criminally by indictment. He is also subject to an action for damages by the party libelled; and both of these remedies may be pursued at the same time.

SLANDER.

Injurious words spoken, but not published, constitute slander The offence of slander is not indictable: it is considered as an injury only to the person slandered; and he may recover damages for the injury by a proper action. Slanderous words are divided in law into two classes. One consists of those words for which damages may be recovered, without proving special damage; and the other, of those for which the slandered party can recover damages only by proof that he has suffered damage from them. The first class of words, which are called words in themselves actionable, are those which, first, impute some offence to another for which that other might be subjected to legal process as a criminal; second, those which impute to him a disease or distemper which makes him dangerous in or unfit for society; third, the want of integrity or capacity in the conduct of any profession, business, or trade, or in the discharge of

the duties of any office of profit. The law supposes that every person slandered in either of these ways must suffer damage from the slander, and leaves it to a jury to determine how much that damage is.

For injurious words of any other description, affecting his reputation or standing in society, the slandered person may have his action, and will recover such damage as he can prove to the jury that he has sustained from the slanderous words. The best author ity holds that the repetition of oral slander which is already in circulation lays the person who repeats it open to an action.

TRUTH AS A DEFENCE.

In all actions of slander, if the defendant prove that the words spoken were true, this is a sufficient defence for him, however mean and malicious were his motives and his conduct. This is to be regretted; it would have been better to apply to actions for slander, or unpublished words, the same rule in respect to truth as a defence which is applied to actions for libel, or published words. This rule, after a good deal of difficulty and conflict in the courts, is now established as law all over this country. The words of the rule vary in different places; but it is always substantially this: that the truth of the words spoken is a perfect defence, provided that the words were spoken from good motives and for justifiable purposes.

CHAPTER IV.

FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AND PROFESSION.

The first article of the constitution provides that Congress shali make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and in the sixth article it is provided that no religious tests shall ever be required for office. These are the only provisions in the federal constitution upon this subject.

It will be observed that these clauses (unlike many of those already considered) apply only to laws of the United States: they place no restraint whatever on the action of the States, and make no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberties, against the laws of the States.

The constitution of some of the States did not fully respond to this entire freedom of religion. Religious tests, to a certain extent, were retained in the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, Tennessee, Mississippi, and North Carolina. In this last State, by the constitution of 1776, no person denying the divine authority of the Old or New Testaments, or the truth of the Protestant religion, could hold a civil office; but by the constitution of 1835 the word "Christian" was substituted for the word "Protestant." But in all these, as well as the other States, in point of practice, the utmost religious freedom may be said to prevail. The practical law of the country may now be stated in the words of the contract or concession made by William Penn in 1676, with or to the planters and proprietors of the province of west New Jersey. These words are: "No man on earth has power or authority to rule over men's conscience in religious matters; and no person shall be called in question, or punished or hurt in person, estate, or privilege, for the sake of his opinion, judgment, or worship, in the concernments of religion."

In the Ordinance of Congress of 1787, for the government of the territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio, it was declared to be a fundamental and unalterable principle in the compact between the original States and the people and States in that territory, that no person demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner should ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments. And this may be regarded as at this day the practical law of the United States.

CHAPTER V.

MILITARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

The constitution gives power to Congress to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. The constitution makes no provision whatever for regulating the militia, but leaves that altogether to Congress and to the States. Congress has passed acts authorizing the President to call forth the militia in certain exigencies; and it belongs exclusively to him to judge whether those exigencies have occurred and placed in his hands this authority. His decision on this subject is conclusive. The militia, however, is not the militia of the United

States, but of the States respectively; and when the President calls out the militia, he makes his requisitions directly upon the executive of the States; and when the militia of a State is so called into the service of the general government, and mustered at the place of rendezvous appointed by a national authority, it then, and not before, becomes a national militia.

Although the constitution gives to Congress power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, this power has never been fully exercised. Arms have been distributed to the States; but they have been left to organize, discipline, and arm their militia at their pleasure. The same paragraph reserves to the States the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. "Militia" undoubtedly means the body of arms-bearing citizens, as distinguished from the regular army. In 1863 Congress passed an act declaring that all citizens of the United States, &c., "are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States, when called out by the President for that purpose." In New York it has been held that this act was unconstitutional, and in Pennsylvania that it was constitutional; both the decisions being by single judges.

The second article of the amendments to the constitution provides that a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF SUFFRAGE.

Citizenship and suffrage are often confounded. They are entirely distinct things, although similar in some respects, and fre quently united, as we shall see in what follows.

By the constitution Congress has power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization; and laws for that purpose have been made. Their effect is to make a person born in foreign countries, and residing in this country, stand here upon the same footing as one that is born here, if he takes the steps pointed out by these laws. This subject has already been fully considered