days before the fitting of the court, to which the writ is returnable. In confequence of this ftatute, the practice has been for all corporations to appear, to profecute and defend by agent. Tho the fta tute fays, that they may appear by themfelves, yet this must relate only to fuch minute corporations, as will admit of the names of all the member to be inferted in the writ; but where the names are not mentioned, and the fuit is brought in the corporate name, it is impoffible for the court to know the individuals in all fuch cafes, the appearance of course must be by agent or attorney. It is ufual to infert the name of the agent in the writ.

The only way that a corporation can legally exprefs their minds, or do any act, is by the vote of the majority of the members legally convened, and which must be certified by their clerk, or fome perfon duly authorised for that purpose, under the feal of the corporation, if they have one. There are however certain officers in all corporations, who are vested with certain powers, which they can execute perfonally but in the proper business of the corporation, they must meet, and the act must be done by the vote of the members. Thus, if a corporation cominence an action, an individual cannot difcharge or controul it, but it must be done by act of the corporation, or fome perfon to whom they delegate that power. If a town have a debt against a perfon, it can be discharged only by an act of the town, and not by an individual of the

town.

:

A corporation can neither maintain nor be made defendant to an action of battery, or fuch like perfonal injury, for it can neither beat nor be beaten in its body politic. No action in the nature of an action of trefpafs, will lie against a corporation, for they cannot in their corporate capacity commit a trefpafs. If by an act, they direct any of their officers or any other perfon to do a trefpafs with force, and if it be done, they may be liable in an action of the cafe, for the confequential injury but cannot be deemed trefpaffers.

A corporation can commit no crime in its corporate capacity, cannot be an executor or adminiftrator, or perform any perfonal duties, and cannot be committed to prifon, for the existence being

Gg 2

ideal

ideal, no man can apprehend or arrest it, but the estate of the corporation is liable to be taken on execution for their debts.

III. We close this fubject, with confidering the mode of diffolving corporations. It is manifeft, that the legislature have the power of diffolving or altering all corporations of a public nature, as counties, towns, and societies, but corporations of a private nature can be diffolved only by the death of all the members, by the furrendry of its franchises into the hands of the affembly, or by a forfeiture of its charter, through negligence or abufe of its powers and privileges. In the laft cafe, the regular mode of proceeding is, to bring an information, in the nature of a quo warranto, to enquire by what warrant, the members now exercise their corporate power having forfeited them by certain acts, which are pointed out in the information. The court muft enquire into the facts, and if they are found true, and amount to a forfeiture of the charter, they may nd the corporation is diffolved.

A SYSTEM

A SYSTEM of the LAWS

OF THE

STATE of CONNECTICUT.

BOOK THIRD.

Of Things.

CHAPTER FIRST.

OF THE NATURAL TITLE TO THINGS.

HAVING in the preceding books entered into a minute account

of the conftitution and government of this ftate, and the rights and privileges of its citizens, I proceed in the next place to the contemplation of Things, which are the principal objects of all political regulations. It will be amufing to the inquifitive mind to open thefe enquiries, by a flight view of the origin and foundation of property, and the method by which an exclufive title to it is acquired.

When we observe mankind in the ufe and improvement of the things of this world, it is manifest that they were created for their benefit and happiness. The original defign of the fupreme author of nature, has furnished infallible evidence of the common right of man, to the enjoyment of the bleffings that are placed within his reach. It is upon this original and natural principle that the right of property is founded. Antecedent to the existence of civil regu lations, men poffeffed all things in common. Every one had the power to convert to his own ufe, whatever his neceffities required. But whenever any perfon had manifefted a defign, to appropriate any particular thing to his own ufe, by taking it to himfelf, he was entitled

entitled to exclude all others from interrupting him in the enjoy., ment of it. This is the foundation of the exclufive right of property. While mankind remained in a state of nature, this principle furnished the only rule of conduct. While all things were in com. mon, every one had the right of choice; but when any perfon had made his election, no other could juftly take from him, what he had taken to himself. This principle is finely exemplified by the comparison of a theatre, which tho equally open for every person that comes, yet the feat which any individual has chofen and taken, is in a proper and peculiar fenfe his own; for the moment any place is filled, nobody has a right to remove the occupier for the purpose of feizing it for himself.

This taking poffeffion of any particular thing that lies in com mon, and appropriating it to one's own ufe, has by writer's on natural law, been denominated occupancy, and confidered as the natural foundation of the exclufive right of property. Some writers contend that the right of occupancy is founded upon a tacit and implied confent of all mankind, that the first occupant should become the owner; and others, that the act of occupancy being a degree of bodily labor, is from a principle of natural juftice, without any conlent, fufficient to gain a title. This fine-fpun reafoning upon fo plain a fubject, is fingular and unaccountable. The com mon right of man to things, all muft acknowledge originates from the conftitution of nature, without any implied confent, or perfonal labor. The exclufive right manifeftly depends upon the fame principles, because it exifts prior to and independent of any confideration of confent or labor. A man when in the primeval ftate of nature, he collected acorns from the trees, or killed the beafts of the forefts, to fatisfy the cravings of hunger, did not enquire whether all the human race had tacitly acknowledged his right, nor did his perfonal labor meliorate the things he confumed: but he felt that they were created for his ufe, and that he had a natural right to make the appropriation. The idea of a common right to things, includes the doctrine, that every perfon may acquire an exclufive right to a particular thing, by appropri ating it to his own ufe. The neceflary confequence is, that the

electing

electing any particular thing, the taking poffeffion of it, the act of appropriation, create an exclufive title. This is the act of occupancy, and as it is the proper evidence to establish the right, it has by a very common figure been called the right of occupancy.

When the first occupier abandons a thing, which he has taken, it reverts to a common ftate, and others may take it in their turn. There are many things which perifh in the ufe; but land is capable of a temporary improvement, and we find in the paftoral age of fociety, that the wandering tribes, which inhabited the earth, took poffeffion of convenient places for the pafturage of their herds and flocks; and when they moved to other places, they were fucceeded by other tribes, who occupied the ground in the fame manner. While they were in actual poffeffion of a particular fpot, they confidered themselves as having an exclusive right, and that none had a right to interrupt them in the improvement of it. Their dereliction gave to others a fimilar right; and fuch is the title to lands in the pure paftoral age of fociety. But when mankind in the progreffive courfe of improvement, advanced to the age of agriculture, they difcovered the advantage to be derived from a permanent title to the ground, which they cultivated.

66

a When an individual had bestowed a portion of his labor on a particular spot, and thereby rendered it more productive, than "it was in a state of nature, the idea was eafily adopted, that his

right to that fpot did not expire with every temporary dereliction "of poffeffion. He was entitled to the produce in the courfe of

the feafons. This led to the divifion of lands. Then portions 46 were in the first inftance diftributed among the nations of the "the earth, and afterwards by a progreffive fubdivifion, affigned to tribes, families, and individuals.

"To effectuate the ftill further advance of civilization, labour, "and industry were neceflary: which led to a variety of inven

tions, by which the gifts of nature were made to contribute in

a far greater degree, to the conveniences of life, than they "were capable of doing in their primitively uncultivated state. "Things derived an acceffion of value from labour, which they "had not in their primitive ftate, and it was juft, that the produce