John Marshall's Law: Interpretation, Ideology, and InterestBloomsbury Academic, 21 Jul 1994 - 192 halaman This study draws on critical historical analysis and contemporary language theory to illuminate John Marshall's jurisprudence and political philosophy in new ways. It challenges both liberal and conservative views and it defines Marshall's constitutional interpretations, political ideology, and pragmatic interests anew. It shows how his pragmatism and republican revisionism impacted decisions about matters of property, contract, and debt. Legal scholars, political scientists, and historians interested in law and language, 19th-century history, and republicanism will find this study especially interesting. |
Isi
Introduction | 1 |
Law and Language in AngloSaxon Jurisprudence | 15 |
John Marshall and the Interpretive Enterprise | 37 |
Hak Cipta | |
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John Marshall's Law: Interpretation, Ideology, and Interest Thomas Shevory Pratinjau tidak tersedia - 1994 |
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Amendment American analysis appeal argued argument attempted authority bank bankruptcy Barron Beveridge bills Blackstone Blackstone's Bork Brockenbrough C. C. Little century charter Chicago Coke Coke's Reports Commentaries common law compact theory conflict Congress consent considered constitutional interpretation construction context contract clause contractarianism corporate Crosskey Dartmouth College debt decision defend democratic economic Faulkner federal grant Harvard Law Review History Hobbes Ibid interest Interpretivism issue Jeffersonian John Marshall John Marshall's Defense Joseph Story judge jurisdiction jurisprudence justice language Law Review legal interpretation legislative legislature legitimacy legitimate liberal linguistic Locke Locke's Madison Marbury Marshall Court Marshall's Marshall's interpretation Marshall's view McCulloch meaning nature obligations opinion original intent party political principles property rights protection reason republican rhetorical Roane's Robert Bork rules sense shall's simply social contract sovereignty specific Spencer Roane statute Story Story's Supreme Court Thomas Jefferson tradition U.S. Constitution Virginia virtue Washington Wheaton William words York