considered. They are as follows: (1) That the patent is invalid. (2) That the invention is neither useful nor practical. Much discussion of the first error assigned cannot be required, as it is too indefinite to convey any distinct idea as to what is meant. Patents may be invalid because the patentee is not the original or first inventor of the improvement, or for the reason that the written description of the same is not in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains to make, construct, compound or use the same; or a re issued patent may be invalid because it is not for the same invention as the original. None of these defenses, however, if made, could be supported; and in view that no more explicit cause of error is assigned, the first assignment of error must be overruled. chines of the complainants in the respect charged in the bill of complaint. Re-issue No. 72 has but one claim, and the charge is that that claim is infringed by the respondents, and the complainants also charge that the respondents infringe the first claim of the patent No. 1682 and the second claim of 1683. Investigations of the kind are ordinarily best conducted by comparing the machine made by the respondent with the machines described in the complainants' patent, or patents, where more than one is embraced in the same suit. Due comparisons of the kind have been made; and the court is of the opinion that the several inventions of the complainants, excepting the claims pointed out as not infringed, are embodied in the machines made and sold by the respondents. Decided support to that proposition is derived from the testimony of the expert witnesses Explicit explanation is made in the brief examined by each of the contesting parties. Dias to what is meant by the second assignment rect testimony to that effect is given by the comof error, which is, that the patent does not in plainants' expert witness. He says that he finds terms describe any device to prevent the rake in Exhibit 1 the improvement described and specfrom rising when operating upon the grain, and ified in re issue No. 72; that the exhibit menenough appears to show that the rake in the tioned shows the quadrant shaped platform arfirst machine made by the complainants was not ranged relatively to the cutting apparatus subof sufficient weight to prevent it from rising stantially as described in re-issue No.72, for the when the teeth came in contact with heavy purpose of receiving the cut grain as it is sevgrain. Brief experiment, however, was suf-ered and falls upon the platform and is swept in ficient to disclose the defect, which was immediately remedied by adding a spring of proper stiffness to hold the rake down without impair ing the other operating devices to enable the rake to perform the function of removing the cut grain from the platform, and causing it to drop in gavels in the proper place. a circular form, heads foremost, upon the ground in the arc of a circle, out of the way of the team on the next round. Speaking of the other two re-issued patents, the witness says that he finds in that exhibit of the respondents the combination of a cutting apparatus of a harvesting machine with a quadNone of these facts are controverted; but the rant shaped platform arranged in the rear thererespondents contend that the spring was a new of, and a sweep rake, operated by mechanism invention, and that anyone may make and use in such a manner that its teeth are caused to the patented machine, or vend the same to sweep over the platform in curves when acting others to be used, without the spring, and not be on the grain, substantially as described in the liable as infringers; but the court is entirely of a complainants' re-issued patents. When specially different opinion, as the addition of the spring interrogated, he said he applied those remarks for the purpose suggested is nothing more than to both the other patents; and the expert wit any practical mechanic or operator would sup-ness examined by the respondents, in his crossply as soon as the difficulty was discovered. examination, fully confirms the substance and effect of those statements, and they accord with what this court decided in the former case, and are believed to be correct. Seymour v. Osborne [supra]. Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it is clear that the defense to the second patent must be overruled. III. Like defenses are set up to patent No. 1683, which must also be overruled for the same reasons, the opinion of the court being, that all three of the patents described in the bill of complaint are valid. Suppose that is so; still it is insisted by the respondents that they have not been guilty of infringement, as charged in the respective bills of complaint. Conclusive evidence is reported in the record, showing that the respondents were largely en gaged in manufacturing machines of the description referred to by the two expert witnesses examined in the case. Exhibit 1, it is conceded by the respondents, is an accurate representation of the machines which they made and sold, and the complainants accept the admission as correct. Great certainty, therefore, attends the present inquiry, and there is very little, if any, more difficulty in ascertaining the proper construction of the complainants' machines, so that the principal matter of investigation under this issue is, whether the machines made and sold by the respondents infringe the patented ma Grant that, and still it is insisted by the respondents that the rake which they employ does not infringe the rake of the complainants; but the court is not able to sustain the proposition, as the rake of the respondents is combined with a quadrant shaped platform, and performs the same function in substantially the same way as it sweeps over the platform to remove the cut grain from the same, and cause it to be depos ited in gavels, as described in the complainants' patents. Differences exist in the mode of attaching the arm to the machine, and in the means employed for its return preparatory for another sweep: but in the performance of the function of removing the cut grain and depositing the same in gavels, the two devices are substantially the same in the sense of the patent law; nor can it benefit the respondents if their mode of returning the device for a second operation is better than the complainants', as that cannot give them any right to make, use or vend what is patented to another. Nothing remains but to examine the excep- | other right then a lien for a given sum, who sells tions to the master's report as confirmed by the the holder of the equity for all he receives beyond the land to innocent purchasers, must account to circuit court. Separate decrees were entered in the two cases, and the master made separate reports. He found in the first case that all claim for profits was waived by the complainants, the respondents contending and offering proofs to show that they made no profits. Hearing was had, and the master also found that the respondents had made fourteen hundred and sixty-two machines which infringed the complainants' patents, two hundred and six of which had not been sold. Of course, they made and sold twelve hundred and fifty-six machines, for which the master estimated the damages on the basis of the license fee of $5 each machine, amounting to $6,280, to which he added six cents as nominal damages for the machines made by the respondents and not sold. Pending the proceedings before the master in the second case, the complainants also with drew their claim for profits, for the same reason as in the other case, and made claim for damages as for a license fee. Accordingly, the master found that the respondents had built twenty-eight hundred and seventeen machines which infringed the complainants' rights, of which two hundred were not sold. Adopting the same rule as in the other case, he found as damages the license fee of $5 on each of the machines made and sold, amounting to $13,085, to which he added six cents as nominal damages for the machines made and not sold. Damages of a compensatory character may be allowed to a complainant in an equity suit, where it appears that the business of the infringer was so improvidently conducted that it did not yield any substantial profits, as in the case before the court. 16 Stat. at L., 206; R.S., sec. 4921; Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S., 64 [XXIII., 802]. Without more, these explanations are sufficient to show that none of the exceptions to the master's report can be sustained, and they are respectively overruled. Decree in each case affirmed. THEODORE SHILLABER, Appt., D. JOHN ROBINSON. (See S. C., 7 Otto, 68-79.) his lien. [No. 25:] Submitted Oct. 12, 1877. Decided Dec. 10, 1877. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit- ed States for the Eastern District of New The case is stated by the court. Mr. Michael H. Čardozo, for appellant: The terms "trust-deed" and "mortgage" are used in Illinois and other Western States, if not synonymously, at least interchangeably. The statutes and decisions of the courts of that State show that this is the fact; and many jurists in the different States maintain that there is no substantial difference between a "deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage" and a "mortgage." Hoffman v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St., 124, 130; Ingle v. Culbertson, 43 Ia., 265, 271; McQuie v. Peay, 58 Mo., 56; Adams and Durham's Real Estate Statutes and Decisions of Illinois, 202, 1702; Pardee v. Lindley, 31 Ill., 174; Wilson v. McDowall, 78 Ill., 514. The distinction between trust-deeds and mortgages is, at the most, only technical (Wilkins v. Wright, 6 McLean, 340), and it is laid down by more than one authority of weight, that they are in legal effect the same. Jones, Mort., secs. 60, 62, 1769; 3 South. L. Rev. (N. S.), 712, Dec. Jan. 1877-8; Hoffman v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St., 124; Woodruff v. Robb, 19 Ohio, 212; Coe v. Johnson, 18 Ind., 218; Goe v. McBrown, 22 Ind., 252; Newman v. Samuels, 17 Ia., 528, 535; Ingle v. Cuthbertson, 43 Ia., 265, 271; Surgent v. Howe, 21 Ill., 148; Eaton v. Whiting, 3 Pick., 484; Lenox v. Reed, 12 Kan., 223, 227; Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark., 429, 437; In re Bond holders of Y. & C. R. Co., 50 Me., 552; Palmer v. Gurnsey, 7 Wend., 248; Lawrence v. Loan & Trust Co., 13 N. Y., 200; Corpman v. Baccastow, 84 Pa., 363: Sup. Ct. of Pa., 1877, 5 N. Y. Weekly Dig., 204; Dillon, J., in 2 Am. Law. Reg. (N. S.), 648. It is a well known and long established principle of equity jurisprudence, that any transaction of whatever form, devised for the purpose of securing the payment of money, is a mortgage. Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat., 489; Conway v. Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218; Villa v. Rodri guez, 12 Wall., 323 (79 U. S., XX., 406); Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumn.,486; Coote, Mort.,11; Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 1018; Bright v. Wagle, 3 Dana (Ky.), 252; Edrington v. Harper, 3 J. J. Marsh, 354; Holmes v. Grant, 8 Paige, 243, 258; Horn Deed, when a mortgage—sale under a power- v. Keteltas, 46 N. Y., 605. surplus. There are three methods of foreclosing a mortgage under the New York laws. *1. A conveyance of land to secure the payment of a sum of money with power of sale, whether made It is not pretended, on the part of the defendto the creditor or to a third person, is, in equity, a ant, that proceedings in conformity with these mortgage, if there is left a right to redeem on pay-requirements were taken to foreclose the equity 2. A sale under the power, in such an instrument, of redemption of this complainant. must be made in strict conformity to the directions ment of the debt thereby secured. therein prescribed, or to such as may be prescribed by statute, or the sale will be absolutely void. right of redemption. 4. A person holding the strict legal title, with no *Head notes by Mr. Justice MILLER. the requirements of the instrument originating Trustees are bound to comply strictly with and defining their power and authority. 1 Hill. Mort., 4th ed., 143; Hill, Trust., 474, 2d Am. ed.; Thornton v. Boyden, 31 Ill., 200; Hall v. Towne, 45 Ill., 493; Griffin v. Marine Co., 52 Ill., 130; Strother v. Law., 54 Ill., 413; Jencks v. Alexander, 11 Paige, 619; Ormsby v. Tarascon, 3 Litt. (Ky.), 404; Wallis v. Thornton, 2 Brock.,422; Gray v. Shaw, 14 Mo.,341; Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen, 516; Roche v. Farnsworth, 106 Mass., 509; Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 574; Gilchrist v. Stevenson, 9 Barb., 9; Bigler v. Waller, 14 Wall., 297 (81 U. S., XX., 891). If Robinson were still in possession of the lands in question, there can be no doubt that the complainant would be entitled to a conveyance thereof, upon payment to the defendant of whatever sum of money still remained due him under the decree of the Illinois Court, and the same result would follow if the said lands had been conveyed to and were now in possession of parties having notice of the complainant's right in the premises. Willard, Eq. Jur., 608; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How., 333,401, Story, J.; Shepherd v. McEvers, 4 Johns. Ch., 138; Bloom v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Ill., 503; Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, Mass., 397; 8. C., 14 Allen, 369. In this case the defendant is accountable to this complainant for all moneys which he received upon the subsequent sales by him of the lands in question, with interest thereon from the dates when they were respectively made. Story, Eq. Jur., secs. 1015, 1016; Willard, Eq. Jur., 607; Bisp. Eq., sec. 157, and cases; Snell, Eq., 250, et seq; Bigler v. Waller (supra); Russell v. Southard, 12 How., 139, 154. Even if the deed which was made by the de fendant, Robinson, to Noble in pursuance of the terms of the decree, be regarded as a strict unconditional trust-deed, as creating an express trust under the New York Statutes for the sale of land, Robinson was not authorized by the said decree to become the purchaser at any such sale, and in the absence of an express permis sion by the instrument originating the alleged trust, he could not, under the circumstances of this case, acquire the title to said lands by such a sale, directly or indirectly. Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y., 548, 555, 557; Blake v. R. R. Co.,56 N. Y., 485, 490, 491; Case v. Carroll,35 N. Y.,385,388; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y., 327, 343; Colburn v. Morton, 3 Keyes, 296, 305; Conger v. Ring, 11 Barb. (Sup. Čt.), 356, 363; Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige, Ch., 237; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch., 252; Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Cai. Cas., 11, 13, 20; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How., 503; Ringo v. Binns, 10 Pet., 269; Lockett v. Hill, 1 Wood, U. S. C.C., 552; Dexter v. Shepard, 117 Mass., 480; Dyer v. Shurtleff, 112 Mass., 165; Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397; S. C., 14 Allen, 369; Benham v. Rowe, 2 Cal., 387: Parmenter v. Walker, 9 R. I., 225; Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves., 381; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves., 234; Ex parte Hughes,6 Ves., 617; 2 Washb. Real Prop., 79, 4th ed., 1876; Sugd. Vend. and P., ch. XX., sec. II.. par. I. Messrs. John H. Bergen and Philip S. Crooke, for appellee: The alleged error in the account stated in the decree of the Illinois Court cannot be reached or corrected in this action or by this court, be cause: a. Errors committed by the court can only be examined by an appellate power. Voorhees v. Jackson, 10 Pet., 449; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y., 535. b. The decree of the Court in Illinois cannot be affected or attacked in a collateral proceeding. Cock v. Halsey, 16 Pet., 71; Warburton v. Aken, 1 McLean, 460; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall., 328 (69 U. S., XVII., 871); Nations v. Johnson, 24 How., 195 (65 U. S., XVI., 628); Jenkins v. Eldredge, 1 Wood. & M., 61; Field v. Gibbs, Pet. C. C., 155. The trust-deed of Noble, of the New York property, was valid and created a valid trust under the Statutes of New York. Corse v. Leggett, 25 Barb., 389, 395; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 18 Barb., 473. 483; 2d Rev. Stat. of N. Y., 355, sub. 1, 2, Vol. 1, Edmond's ed., 677; Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N. Y., 405. The appellee did not occupy any fiduciary relation either to Noble or Shillaber. Noble could not have purchased; he was s trustee; but Robinson was not, and even had he purchased the property, he had a perfect right so to do. If it is necessary to inquire whether this is a a valid trust under the Law of Illinois, which we submit it is not, then we say it is such by the Statutes of that State. See, Statutes of Ill., Gross, 3d ed., 1869, Vol. 1, 84, sec. 3. It is a well settled principle, that the law of the State where the land is situated governs in the construction of instruments affecting such land. Abell v. Douglass, 4 Den., 305. The lex loci contractus governs as to the construction and effect of the contract. Gans v. Frank, 36 Barb., N. Y., 320. Transcript of record 35, folio 115; Story, Confil. L., sec, 282; 2 Kent, Com., 457; Davis v. Garr, 6 N. Y., 124; Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y., 264. b. If the trust deed could be held to be an Illinois contract, still, as it was by its terms to be performed in New York, the law of New York must govern it. Smith v. Smith, 2 Johns. (N.Y.), 235; Thomp son v. Ketcham, 4 Johns., 285; Hyde v. Goodnow, 3 N. Y., 266; Bowen v. Newell, 13 N. Y., 290; Everett v. Vendryes, 19 N. Y., 436; Lee v. Murphy, 33 N. Y., 615. And the fee of the land was vested in the trustee, subject to the execution of the trust. Sec. 60 Stat., supra; Noyes v. Blakeman,6 N. Y., 578. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: The original transaction, out of which the present suit has grown, was a sale by John Shillaber, father of appellant, of about three thousand acres of land, in the State of Illinois, to John Robinson, the appellee. The contract was evidenced by a written agreement, by which it appears that Robinson, in part payment of the Illinois land, was to convey to Shillaber three different parcels of land, lying in the State of New York: one in Kings County, one in Sullivan County and one in Essex County. On this contract a suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Ogle County, Illinois, by Robinson, in the nature of a bill for specific per formance. Pending this suit John Shillaber died and Theodore Shillaber, the appellant, was substituted as sole heir of John Shillaber as defendant in that suit. It resulted in a decree which, among other things, established an indebtedness of Shillaber to Robinson, on final accounting, of $4.249.58, and ordered that, on the payment of this sum, Robinson should convey to Shillaber the lands in New York, already mentioned. In order that the whole matter should be finally disposed of, the decree then ordered that Robinson and wife should make and deposit with the clerk of the court a good and sufficient conveyance for said lands, as an escrow, to be delivered to Shillaber on his payment within ninety days of the sum aforesaid. It was further decreed that, if the money was not paid by Shillaber within that time, Robinson should convey to Silas Noble the lands, in trust, that he "Should proceed to sell the same, in such manner, and after giving such reasona ble notice of the time and place of such sale, as might be usual or provided by law in the State of New York,"and out of the proceeds pay the expenses of the trust and the money due Robin son, with interest, and hold the remainder, if any, subject to the order of the court. Shillaber did not pay the money as ordered by the decree. Robinson then made the deed of trust to Noble, in strict accordance with the terms of the decree; and on the 16th day of May, 1861, Noble sold the lands to John A. Robinson, for the sum of $1,950, and made to him a conveyance of the same. Since that time, and before the commencement of the present suit, John Robinson sold all these lands to divers and sundry individuals, for sums amounting in the aggregate to $9,628. The present suit was commenced in November, 1870, in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York, by Theodore Shillaber, against John Robinson, requiring him to account for the value of the New York lands, on the ground that he had never acquired any other title to them than that which he held when the decree of the Illinois court was made, and that, since the purchasers from him were innocent purchasers, without notice of Shillaber's rights, their title was perfect, and Robin son was liable to him on a final settlement for the value of the lands, less the sum which Shillaber owed him, as ascertained by the decree in the Illinois court. The principal defense, in fact the only one which merits any consideration, is, that by the deed which Robinson made to Noble under the decree of the court, and by the sale which Noble made in conformity to the terms of the decree, and of the trust deed, Shillaber's rights were completely devested in the land; and since it did not bring, at that sale, as much money as was due to Robinson, which by the terms of both the decree and the deed of trust, were to be paid to him out of the proceeds of that sale, nothing was left for Shillaber in the matter. The decree in the Illinois suit, in which Theodore Shillaber had appeared after his father's death, is binding and conclusive on both parties. The deed of trust made by Robinson to Noble is in accordance with the decree, and contained an authority in him to sell the land. The purpose of this sale as expressed in the deed of trust and by the decree, was to pay to Robinson, the $4,249.58, which was a first lien on the land, and the balance into the court, for the use of Shillaber. Much discussion has been had in the case as to the nature of the conveyance to Noble, one party insisting that it is a simple mortgage with power of sale, and the other that it is, under the Statutes of New York, the creation of a valid trust in lands. The point of this discussion is found in the question, whether the sale by Noble, under that instrument, was valid or was void. The counsel of defendant insists that Noble became vested with a perfect title to the land by the deed of Robinson, and that his sale and conveyance are valid whether he pursued the direction of the deed in regard to advertising or not; and that, if any such advertising were necessary, there was no usual notice, nor any provided by law, for such sales in the State of New York. It is shown by the evidence that Noble did publish a notice that the three pieces of land in the three different counties would be sold on a day mentioned at Montague Hall, in the City of Brooklyn. This notice was published, for six weeks preceding the day appointed for the sale, in the Brooklyn Standard," a weekly paper printed in Kings County. But the Statutes of New York, then in force, prescribed publication of such notice for twelve weeks successively before the sale. If the instrument under which Noble acted is a mortgage with power of sale, it is beyond dispute that the sale is void, because it was not made in conformity with the terms on which alone he was authorized to sell. That the sale, under such circumstances, is void, is too well established to admit of controversy. We refer specially to the recent case in this court of Bigler v. Waller, 14 Wall., 302 [81 U. S., XX.,891]. The list of authorities cited in appellant's brief (to be given by the reporter) are to the same effect. Without entering into the argument of the question whether the instrument under which Ñoble acted is in all respects a mortgage, the case of Lawrence v. Loan & Tr. Co., 13 N. Y., 200, shows that it is an instrument which, for the purposes of the sale under the power which it contains, comes under the provisions of the statute we have cited as regards publication of notice. It also decides that a sale made without such notice is void. It is the well settled doctrine of courts of equity, that a conveyance of land, for the purpose of securing payment of a sum of money, is a mortgage, if it leaves a right to redeem upon payment of the debt. If there is no power of sale, the equity of redemption remains until it is foreclosed by a suit in chancery, or by some other mode recognized by law. If there is a power of sale, whether in the creditor or in some third person to whom the conveyance is made for that purpose, it is still in effect a mortgage, though in form a deed of trust, and may be foreclosed by sale in pursuance of the terms in which the power is conferred, or by suit in chancery. These instruments generally give specific directions regarding the notice to be given, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. In some States, the statute prescribes the manner of giving this notice, and in such case it must be complied with. In either case, the validity of the sale being wholly dependent on the power conferred by the instrument, a strict compliance with its terms is essential. If this is not a mortgage to which the notice | ceived by him for the lands, and interest thereof the New York Statute is applicable, we do on until the day of the decree, deducting therenot see that the defendant's position is improved from the sum found due him from Shillaber by by that circumstance; for there is, then, no pro- the Illinois decree, with interest to the same time, vision for a sale or foreclosure of the equity of and rendering a decree for the difference in favor Shillaber, but by a decree of an equity court. of Shillaber against Robinson with costs. This has never been had, and it still remains that there has been no valid execution of the Cited-106 U. S., 71; 32 Hun, 518. trust reposed in Noble by the deed. If the matter had remained in this condition, Shillaber would have had a right, enforcible in this suit, on payment to Robinson of the $4,249.58, HAMILTON N. ELDRIDGE et al., Piffs. with interest, to have a conveyance by Noble to him, of the New York land. But neither the in Err., V. OF ST. JOSEPH. (See S. C., 7 Otto, 92-95.) Payment of reward-liability of agent. conveyance by Robinson, which remained an JAMES HILL, TREASURER OF THE COUNTY escrow, nor that to Noble, were ever placed on record; and Robinson, in whom, according to the records of the proper counties in New York, the title still remained, sold all these lands to persons who, as innocent purchasers for a valuable consideration, now hold them by a good title. This title is equally beyond the reach of Robinson, of Shillaber, and of the court. Indeed, although Robinson alleges in his answer that the purchase of John A. Robinson was made for his benefit, he seems to have attached no importance to it; for he does not aver that John A. Robinson ever conveyed to him, nor does he, while giving copies of all the deeds on which he relies, including the deed to John A. Robinson, show any evidence of a conveyance from John A. Robinson to him. The defendant, therefore, when he sold and conveyed this land to parties who now hold it under him, did it in violation of the rights of Shillaber, as settled by the Illinois decree. By that decree, Robinson had no right to sell. By the conveyance made to Noble under that decree, he had nothing left in the New York lands but a lien for his $4,249.58. The sale by Noble was void, and conferred no rights on Robinson whatever. His belief in its validity did not change the matter. By availing himself of the title which was in him originally, and which appeared by the records to be there yet, he sold the lands for twice as much as his lien, and received the money. That he must account to Shillaber in some way is too plain for argument. If Shillaber could, by paying his debt to Robinson, redeem the lands from their present holders, it is the relief which he would prefer, and to which as against Robinson he would be entitled. But Robinson has put this out of his power, by a wrongful sale and conveyance to innocent purchasers. 1. Where county officers deposited with one a sum of money to be paid by him to persons who county to be returned, and he paid the money on should cause certain stolen books of record of the the return of the books, the county cannot after wards recover of him the money which he has so paid, because a few pages of the books were absent or defaced when returned. 2. Such person being a gratuitous agent or bailee of the county, could not be held liable to refund such money, in the absence of any pretense of bad faith on his part. [No. 251.] Argued Apr. 12, 1878. Ν Decided Apr. 22, 1878. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. This action was brought in the Circuit Court of St. Joseph Co., Michigan, by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error. The case was removed to the court below, where judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in that court. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. Carpenter, Coleman, J. W. Champlin and C. F. Peck, for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. Edwin W. Keightley, H. H. Riley and W. L. Stoughton, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: The bill of exceptions in this case shows that there were stolen from the office of the Register of Deeds of the County of St. Joseph, Michigan, forty-four record books, and some deeds, mortgages, and other papers, on the night of the 28th of June, 1872.. After an unavailing effort for over two months to recover them, the officers of the county seem to have come to an understanding with some detectives, by which they were to deposit in Chicago, with the law firm of Eldridge & Tourtelotte, now plaintiffs in error, the sum of $3,500, to be paid to the person causing said books and papers to be delivered to the county, if it was done before the 12th day of September. There is no evidence to show that the lands are now worth any more than Robinson sold them for; no evidence that they were worth more when he sold them. His answer gives the precise sum received by him for each parcel of land, and the date when he received it. He probably believed the land was his own when he sold it; but, as we have seen, he must be considered as holding such title as he had in trust, first for his own debt due from Shillaber, and the remainder for the use of Shillaber. Treating him, then, as trustee, he must account for the money received for the lands, according to the trusts on which he held them. The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing Shillaber's bill must be reversed, and the case remanded to that court with instructions to render a decree on the “It is hereby agreed that the said supervisbasis of charging Robinson with the sums re-ors and the treasurer shall deposit in the hands The money was so deposited on the 5th day of September, with Eldridge & Tourtelotte. and a written instrument signed by them and by the proper officers of the county, which, after reciting the circumstances that led to it, ends with the following agreement: |