Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee. 6 P. cession are referred to, it would seem that much difficulty cannot be felt in giving a correct construction to this provision. In making the cession, Virginia only reserved the right of satisfying warrants issued for military services in the state line, on the continental establishment. Warrants of no other description, therefore, could give any right to the holder, to any land in this district. In all the acts subsequently passed, giving further time for [*676] the location of warrants in this reservation, * there is a referAnd in the act of 1807, the "officers and soldiers of the Virginia line on continental establishment, are named as entitled to land in the district." ence to the kind of warrants which may be located. No act of congress passed subsequent to the deed of cession, which enlarged the rights of Virginia to this district, beyond the terms of the cession. Longer time has repeatedly been given for locations, but no new rights have been created. It would seem, therefore, to follow, that when the act of 1807 was passed, for the protection of surveys, congress could have designed to protect such surveys only as had been made in good faith. They could not have intended to sanction surveys made without the shadow of authority, or, which is the same thing, under a void authority. It is known to all who are conversant with land titles in this district, that the mode pursued in making entries and surveys under the Virginia land law, gave rise to the most ruinous litigations. The docket of this court contains abundant evidence of this fact. By the law of 1807, congress intended to lessen litigation. It is essential to the validity of an entry, that it shall call for an object notorious at the time, and that the other calls shall have precision. A survey, unless carried into grant, cannot aid a defective entry against one made subsequently. The survey, to be good, must be made in pursuance to the entry. To cure defects in entries and surveys was the design of the act of 1807. It was intended to sanction irregularities, which had occurred without fraud, in the pursuit of a valid title. In the passage of this act, congress could have had no reference, but to such titles as were embraced by the deed of cession. The case of Miller and others v. Kerr and others, reported in 7 Wheat. 1, is cited by the defendants' counsel. In this case, the register of the land-office of Virginia, had by mistake, given a warrant for military services in the continental line, on a certificate authorizing a warrant for services in the state line. An equity acquired under this warrant was set up against a legal title subsequently obtained; but the court sustained the legal title. They considered Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee. 6 P. the register a ministerial officer, and that his official acts, as such, might be inquired into. This entry was made subse- [677] quent to the deed of cession; and the court seemed to think if this territory had not been ceded, there would have been great force in the argument, that, as the holder was entitled to the land for services rendered, and as, by the mistake of the officer, he had been prevented from locating the warrant in Kentucky, and as no provision existed by which his claim could be satisfied, if the entry made should not be sustained, that under such circumstances it should be held valid. The case was a hard one, but the court were clear that, by virtue of the warrant thus issued, no right could be acquired in the Virginia reservation. The case of Hoofnagle and others v. Anderson, 7 Wheat. 212, is strongly relied on as a case, if not directly in point, that has at least a strong bearing on the question under consideration. In that case, the court decided that a patent is a title from its date, and conclusive against all those whose rights did not commence previous to its emanation. The entry on which this patent was founded was made in the Virginia reservation, by virtue of a warrant which was in fact issued for services in the state line; but it was stated on its face to have been issued for services on the continental establishment. This case would have been similar to the one under consideration, if the patent had not been issued; but the decision turned against the subsequent locator, on the ground that the patent appropriated the land. The court say, that the "principle is well settled, that a patent is unassailable by any title commenced after its emanation." The case of Jackson v. Clark et al. 1 Pet. 628, it is contended, bears a close analogy to the one under examination. That was a case where the act of 1807 was decided to protect a survey, although made on a warrant which had been previously located and not withdrawn. But the court sustained the survey, on the ground that it was not a void act, though it might be irregular. That, to the purchaser of the survey, there was no notice of irregularity, much less of fraud. The warrant was valid, and upon its face authorized the entry. The entry had been regularly made on the books of the surveyor, and the survey had been executed by a regular officer; and the only objection to the validity of the proceedings was, that the warrant had been previously located. This location, the [678] court said, might be withdrawn, and that would remove all objections to the subsequent proceedings. And they intimate that the powers of a court of chancery were sufficient to have compelled the original locator to withdraw the first entry, or enjoin him from Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee. 6 P. the use of it, so as to remove the objections to the second entry. Under all the circumstances of the case, they consider that the second survey was protected from subsequent entries by the act of 1807. They say: "If it be conceded that this provision in the above act was not intended for the protection of surveys which were in themselves absolutely void, it must be admitted that it was intended to protect those which were defective, and which might be avoided for irregularity." There can be no doubt that congress did intend to protect surveys which had been irregularly made, and it is equally clear that they did not design to sanction void surveys. A survey is void, unless made under the authority of a warrant; and it need not be stated again, that the warrant under which the survey of the defendants in the circuit court was made, gave no right to the holder to appropriate land north of the Ohio. Neither the entry nor the survey is a legal appropriation of the land. The claimant is only vested with the equitable estate, until his entry and survey have been carried into grant. This court decided, in the case of Taylor's Lessee v. Myers, 7 Wheat. 23, that the act of 1807, did not protect a survey from which the entry had been withdrawn. In the argument, it was insisted that the entry and survey having been made in the name of Richard C. Anderson, the principal surveyor, were void under the laws of Virginia, that by those laws he was prohibited from making an entry in his own name. As there are other points in the cause on which the decision may rest, it is unnecessary to investigate this one further than to observe that, under other circumstances, it might be entitled to serious consideration. This is a case of great hardship on the part of the defendants below; and regret is felt that the principles of law which are involved in the cause do not authorize a reversal of the judgment given by the circuit court. [ * 679 ] *The judgment must be affirmed, with costs, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. BALDWIN, J., dissented, and gave an opinion in writing which was not published. 12 P. 264; 3 H. 32, 650. Wallace v. Parker. 6 P. CADWALLADER WALLACE, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOSIAH C. PARKER, Defendant in Error. 6 P. 680. The act of March 2, 1807, (2 Stats. at Large, 424,) to cure defects, &c., in entries and surveys, &c., extends to every case which comes within the reservation made by Virginia in her act of cession; and a warrant which in fact was issued in virtue of a resolution of the general assembly of that State, before the act of cession, for military services in the continental line, is within the act of cession, though it does not purport on its face to be issued by virtue of such resolution, and though the term of service was not as great as was required by the standing law of the State for such grants at the time the resolution was passed. THE case is stated in the opinion of the court. Creighton, for the plaintiff. Corwin, contrà. [*686 ] MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to a decree pronounced by the supreme court of the State of Ohio, sitting in and for the county of Brown, in a case in which the defendant in error was plaintiff. The case must, therefore, be brought within the 25th section of the Judicial Act,1 or this court cannot take jurisdiction of it. The plaintiff in error alleges that the construction of an act of congress was drawn in question on the trial, and that the decision was against the title set up under the act; and also, that the construction of a state law was drawn in question, as being contrary to an act of congress, and the decision was in favor of the party claiming under the state law. Josiah Parker obtained a land-warrant from the land-office of Virginia, for his services in the Virginia line, on continental establishment. The defendant in error having located the [* 687] warrant on lands in the military reserve, and received a patent therefor, instituted a suit in chancery against the plaintiff in error, who held the same land under a prior grant, and obtained a decree for a conveyance. This court cannot examine the general merits of the decree. Our inquiries are in this case limited to the question, whether the record shows that an act of congress has been misconstrued, to the injury of the plaintiff in error, or the title of the defendant in error has been sustained by a law of a State which is repugnant to a law of the United States. Both questions depend on the construction of the act by which Virginia ceded the territory she claimed northwest of the River Ohio to the United States, of the resolution accepting the deed of cession, and of the acts of congress '1 Stats. at Large, 85. Wallace v. Parker. 6 P. prolonging the time for completing titles to lands within the Virginia military reservation. The deed of cession was executed by the members of congress, then representing the State of Virginia, on the 1st of March, 1784; in virtue of a power conferred on them by the act of cession, which act it recites. One of the conditions on which the cession is made, is, 1 Laws U. S. p. 474, " that in case the quantity of good lands on the southeast side of the Ohio," "which have been reserved by law, for the Virginia troops or continental establishment, should" "prove insufficient for their legal bounties, the deficiency should be made up to the said troops, in good lands to be laid off between the rivers Sciota and Little Miamis, on the northwest side of the River Ohio, in such proportions as have been engaged to them by the laws of Virginia." The deed was accepted by congress according to its terms. The act of cession to which the deed refers was passed on the 20th of December, 1783. In his answer to an amended bill filed by the plaintiff in the state court, the defendant says: "That if the complainant's entry does contain that certainty and precision which the law requires, in order to constitute a valid entry, yet the complainant has no equitable claim to the lands in question, because, first, said entry is based upon a resolution warrant, which is not protected by any act of congress; and cannot, therefore, be a foundation on which to base a valid entry." [ * 688 ] * The warrant to which the answer refers is in the usual form, and does not purport to have been issued in virtue of a resolution. But the warrant did in fact issue on a resolution which appears in the proceedings in the cause. It appears that Colonel Josiah Parker presented a petition to the general assembly of Virginia, in which he stated himself to have served two years and ten months in the Virginia line on continental establishment, after which he resigned his commission as a colonel in the army. That, since his resignation, he had been called into service as colonel, commanding a corps of militia, during every invasion of the State. He prays that the assembly will grant him a colonel's allowance of lands. This petition was referred to a committee, whose report stated the facts, and concluded with the following resolution: "Resolved, that the petition of the said Josiah Parker, praying that he may be allowed the bounty in lands, by law given to a colonel in the continental line, is reasonable." This resolution was approved by the senate, and was passed the 20th of November, 1783. In March, 1807, congress passed an act, extending the time for |