The CHAIRMAN. Your idea, General, is, if you want to whip a fellow you want to whip him and beat him, but if you know he was a .45 Colt you are not as apt to start it. General BRADLEY. You are not as apt to start it, and even though you are pretty sure you might lick him, if you are going to end up crippled yourself you might hesitate to start it. Senator FULBRIGHT. What I was getting at was whether in addition to the arms program there is any other thought coming from your discussions. Have you thought of any other thing? PROPAGANDA General BRADLEY. If you are referring to a full use of propaganda like the "Voice of America," newspapers, anything of that kind, we think yes. We are going to use every means we can to embarrass Russia. Senator FULBRIGHT. I was wondering whether among those other things any of them stood out that your staff and your people felt would contribute more than any of the others. I am just asking for my own information. I would like to know if there has been any other thought that you have felt in the last several years made a real contribution more than anything else. General BRADLEY. We think the "Voice of America" is making a real contribution, and we think we ought to take every step we can to not only discredit communism and that concept, but also to point out the advantages of our form of government. In other words, take an aggressive attitude in teaching our beliefs. Senator FULBRIGHT. You feel that that really makes a very substantial contribution to your efforts, does it? General BRADLEY. I think it makes a contribution to keeping the peace, because the more trouble they have at home the less apt they are to start something away from home. Senator FULBRIGHT. Do your intelligence people ever report anything about the effect that that is having inside of Russia? General BRADLEY. We understand that a lot of people are listening to the "Voice of America." Senator FULBRIGHT. There is always a question, every time we have that up, from the civilians that come up here, that they don't know whether it is getting through or not. General BRADLEY. There is a lot of conflicting information, but there are a lot of sources reporting that there are people listening. Senator FULBRIGHT. That would also be a point in our own friendly countries; that is, propaganda in countries like Italy and France is important, is it not? General BRADLEY. We think it is quite important in France and Italy, for example, to teach the advantages of our form of government, as well as running down communism, because even though they belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we must realize there is a large Communist element in them. It is not what it was 3 or 4 years ago, but it may ebb and flow and increase again, and therefore we should do everything we can to keep down the number of people who believe in communism, even in our own allied countries. THE SITUATION IN TURKEY Senator FULBRIGHT. One other thought: The situation in Turkey. I was very much impressed by the election they had the other day, which was rather unexpected, we have been told. What is your feeling about the situation in Turkey? I mean, both militarily and politically. Is it stable, and so on? General BRADLEY. Everyone who comes back from over there comes back with the firm conviction that Turkey would fight whether or not they had allies. [Discussion was continued off the record.] Senator FULBRIGHT. Have they been cooperative in the use of the funds which we gave them for military purposes and so on? Have you had much difficulty with them? General BRADLEY. They do not get funds. They get equipment. General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. Senator FULBRIGHT. Do they respond very well and cooperate with you? [Discussion was off the record.] The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until tomorrow afternoon at 2 o'clock, when we will have General Marshall and probably some other witnesses. We will meet here. [Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the meeting was adjourned, to reconvene on the following day, Wednesday, June 7, 1950, at 2 p.m.] MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM-Continued 1 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1950 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to adjournment on Tuesday, June 6, 1950, in the committee hearing room, U.S. Capitol, at 2 p.m., Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the joint committee) presiding. Present: Senators Connally (chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee), George, Thomas of Utah, Green, Smith of New Jersey, and Lodge; Morse, Knowland, Chapman, and Johnson of the Armed Services Committee. Members of the committee staff present: Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Pat Holt, and Emmett O'Grady. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We are considering, General, the European arms aid program. We are very fortunate to have you here. Several of the committee members have thought that the wisdom and military science of the distinguished General Marshall ought to be submitted to this committee. While the war was on, and I am sure now, he had an unrivalled opportunity to know the military situation in all the countries of the world, the military needs and the military outlook for the future. LEAKS FROM THE COMMITTEE General, we understand you have already been before the House committee in public session, but we are going to save you the public part of it here. This is an executive session, and you can talk as freely as you desire not that you would not talk freely anyway, but we will keep secret what transpires here, completely secret-until we adjourn. The minute we get out of that door it is not always secret. I hope it will be today. You understand the legislation, General, providing for $1 billion for the second year of the program. STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL NOT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THIS LEGISLATION General MARSHALL. In the first place I should say, Mr. Chairman, that I have not been briefed by the State Department or the military 1 See notes, p. 401. on this. I thought about it a little bit when I was told about this engagement on Memorial Day, and I have been away most of the time since then. I have not been in the councils regarding any of these things since I left the State Department. I was rather superficially briefed about an hour and a half before my appearance before the House committee at which you were present in connection with the first arms hearing. That was superficial, but my connection with it was so recent that it was sufficient for me at the time. So today I have none of the facts other than those that you get out of reading the bill or reading the press. It has not been discussed with me at all by the State Department or by the Army; not that they wouldn't if I had gone to them, but I have been minding my own particular business and thought it was wise to keep out of those things for which I was not responsible. So I can only talk about fundamentals. I know, or I assume, that General Bradley and others who have been in the various meetings have already testified before your committee. BACKGROUND TO THE AID PROGRAM It might help me in giving my own opinion in the matter to explain that when we went into the recovery program it was purely economic, and the first suggestion related to all of Europe rather than just to Western Europe, and the choice, in a sense, of the division line was that of Molotov and the Soviet Union. So we started off first with all of Europe and ended up with the present Western European division, and it was entirely economic in conception. It was addressed to the almost catastrophic situation particularly in France and Italy in the summer and late spring of 1947. From then on there were a series of meetings that followed the meeting in Moscow. There was a meeting in New York and a meeting in October and November and part of December of the foreign ministers in London. By that time it had become glaringly apparent that we were not only up against opposition to the entire economic procedure of rehabilitation, but that we were virtually being attacked. There was the great threat of military force which had all of the people of France and Belgium and Holland and Italy, of course, and Denmark and Norway, terrified at the prospect. So it became evident that something further would have to be done if the morale of those countries was to be restored sufficiently to give them some stability in addition to that which would come from pure economic rehabilitation. So when I was at the United Nations meeting in Paris about a year and a half ago I conducted behind the scenes, of course, discussions with the leaders, Foreign Ministers, in some cases Prime Ministers, of these countries, the matter of their building up their defenses in order to restore the morale of their people, and their confidence, and not just bivouacing, in a sense, on a battlefield without any arms to defend themselves. It was so evident that something had to be done, particularly for the French, to give them a feeling of security, though it was utterly impossible to give security, certainly not in a year, but it was possible, we felt, to effect a great psychological change and a gradual buildup toward such confidence as would lead to a situation where those nations did not live daily in mortal dread of Soviet aggression. The actual debates and all on the original measure occurred after I retired. Later I was briefed on it and appeared before the House committee, and that is when you were present. PROGRAM NECESSARY BUT REGRETTABLE I thought it was very necessary, but I thought it was very regrettable that we had to do this. I feel today, though I don't know the details of just what has to be provided except the total amount; I don't know the details of what the agreements are over there as to the character of the defense to be set up, but I do feel that it would be a grave error to draw into our shell right now and not go ahead with this program. CONFIDENCE IN BRADLEY, EXECUTIVE PLANNERS I have great confidence in General Bradley. I don't know what he has testified to you, but he is a man of courageous convictions, of very good sense, and I am quite certain would not lend himself to measures that are unpopular. I say that, of course, because the pressures are tremendous as to what you can give. They would only discuss complete divisional setups when I was over there. That was nonsense. They have to do a great many things for themselves, and it wasn't to be measured in any such way as that. They would have to come to a proper understanding, because they would only get what we could give. I have confidence in the planners to the extent that they would not engage us in perfectly futile procedures but are planning to provide the critical items to allow the European democracies to group themselves for a sufficient defensive posture to, in time, make it a little too dangerous for the Soviets to venture into an aggressive action. SOVIET POSITION UNKNOWN The argument that what we have done to date does not provide an adequate defense is quite true. Rome wasn't built in a day, and you have to go along, and we don't know exactly what the Soviet position is. At least I don't, and I didn't when I was Secretary of State. I knew it was a very closely run little tyranny there with which the people had small to do except as they were affected by propaganda and things of that sort, and those men made up their minds to move or not to move without any regard to public opinion. Except, of course, in a police state setup, a tyrannical setup like that, where very few control so many millions, they do have their problems, because the thing can break down and the whole house topple. I hope I don't know-that they are finding much more difficulty than we are aware of, but we don't learn about those things. In fact, if you talk your life is in danger. You just don't say what you think. You are not given the opportunity, much, in the first place, and you are afraid to say anything in the second place. 60-522-76- -28 |