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out any relationship to the Hiss case or anything else, if you can put into this record a forthright statement of your view of communism and your attitude toward it which this committee could release after this hearing this morning, at least as a flank movement it would be highly useful.

Senator GREEN. Didn't he do that yesterday? I thought that was why he was reading those speeches he made against totalitarianism. Mr. ACHESON. That was the purpose of it, exactly, Senator. Senator GREEN. Those are still your beliefs?

Mr. ACHESON. Of course. That is why I read what I said years ago about this.

Senator LODGE. That was directed at Nazi Germany and not at Russian communism.

Mr. ACHESON. The very interesting point about that speech is that it refers to the Russo-German group. That was at a time when the Russians were hand and glove with the Germans, and I thought it was quite an interesting fact that what was said then applied to both of them.

Senator VANDENBERG. I would like to know what the Secretary of State of the United States thinks about communism in 1949.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. You do not surely believe that if he makes a constructive statement the press would pay any attention to it, do you?

Senator VANDENBERG. I think they would.

Senator THOMAS of Utah. I don't think they paid much attention yesterday to his statement. I have seen only one paper. I do not think they are looking for anything constructive like that.

Mr. ACHESON. Senator, if you would like me to talk about that at this moment, I shall be glad to do it.

Senator VANDENBERG. I do not wish to intrude.

Senator LODGE. I think it would be very valuable to have it.

Senator SMITH. I think the Senator's point is well taken, because something will have to come out of this meeting. What are we going to put out?

Mr. ACHESON. I shall be very glad to answer that question, and do

it at once.

TWO ASPECTS OF COMMUNISM

In talking about communism, I think we have to think about it in two respects. One is this Marxian doctrine which has been given such tremendous impetus by the Russian Revolution and Lenin; the whole ideology of that doctrine, the whole effect of that on the minds and spirits and words of people who believe in it. The second part of it is Russian foreign policy as a national policy.

COMMUNISM A CORRUPTING IDEOLOGY

Now, so far as communism is concerned, it seems to me one of the basically corrupting ideologies, doctrines, movements, which has happened to the human mind over a long period of time. It goes directly contrary to the basic theory upon which every free institution has been founded, which is that the individual must himself be the

final judge of what is true. This doctrine is a doctrine that the individual is a servant and not a master. The individual must take ideas and thoughts and actions which are given to him in accordance with some kind of system which has been worked out.

The whole Communist ideology not only is basically evil from that point of view, but it is basically evil on the ground of the inherent corruption which it carries on in the human mind itself. It takes such ideas as that truth is better than falsehood and it discards that idea entirely. Truth and falsehood both, under the Marxian ideology, are merely tools which you use to attain some result which the state hands out as the result to be achieved. Therefore, it corrupts the very basis upon which any free society, or any free association of men together, can continue.

ECONOMIC IDEAS ERRONEOUS

So far as its purely economic ideas are concerned, they seem to me of secondary importance. I think that they are quite erroneous as applied to a highly developed industrial civilization. Whether or not they can work in a simpler sort of civilization I have no idea, because I have no experience. But as applied to something as complex as the economic system of the Western World, I think they are childish. And the greatest efforts which the Russians have made to apply their economic ideas to their own industrial system have left it far short in efficiency and productivity of the system which we have evolved, which leaves freedom for the tremendous energy of the human being within that system.

COMMUNISM A TOOL OF RUSSIAN POLICY

Now, so far as communism has to do with Russian foreign policy, communism is a tool of Russian foreign policy. It is a tool which is a very invaluable tool for the Russians. It is a method by which they can penetrate into countries which are not contiguous to them and where the power of their arms does not carry. This is a modern form of some sort of evangelism. Communism takes hold of the minds of people in foreign countries and leads them to do what no other system would permit them to do, and that is, with a sense of virtue to be traitors to their own country, and you will find in practically every country in the world that the Communist Party is not merely a radical party, not merely a group of people who have leftist ideas in the economic field, but is an adjunct of Russian foreign policy and a disciplined group who will do within their own country what it is desired to do from those in control of Russia.

THE RUSSIAN PROGRAM

So far as Russian foreign policy itself is concerned, I can enlarge upon the famous remark which brought down such displeasure from Mr. Molotov. It is one in which, so far as I see it, the Russians are proceeding in a series of waves. Their immediate policy was to nail down and get under their control all those areas which were contiguous to them and over which their armies could exercise their power. That policy was carried out vigorously and, so far, with some success-not complete success, because you have already begun to see that nationalism is a pretty strong seed in these countries, and the experience of the

Russians with Tito shows that there are limits to the domination which they can exercise in this way. I think there are indications that all is not clear sailing from them in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Russian effort, aside from these contiguous territories, was then directed to the south. There I think there were three general objectives of Russian foreign policy, all of which were related. One of them, in 1946, was a thrust down into Persia. At the same time that was going on, there was another thrust which came further to the west, and that went to Greece and Turkey. And then there was another one still, which was directed toward the Adriatic and Trieste. At the time this was going on, there was a third wave, which I shall come to in a moment, which was directed to more distanct countries, and that was to keep other people occupied and to cause trouble while the more immediate objectives were to be achieved.

FAILURE IN PERSIA

The thrust into Persia completely failed. It failed in large part through the vigor of Mr. Byrnes and the Security Council of the United Nations, and perhaps almost equally important was the complete incompetence of the Russian effort. The collapse of the Soviet in Azerbaijan was a complete surprise to everybody who was observing it. Nobody could believe that the Russians were as incompetent as they were. That incompetence came partly from bad management, partly from overreaching, trying to take everything out of the country that they could. At any rate, their puppet government completely collapsed, and that effort for the time being, at least, was, if not abandoned, certainly put to one side.

GREECE AND TURKEY

Then came the pressure on Greece and Turkey. The pressure was equal on both sides. I mean, the pressure was equal on Greece and Turkey. I think the Russians felt that they did not have to win both of those. If they had won either one, they had won both, because Greece and Turkey are two sides of an apple, and if you get one side the other is of no use.

It seemed to those of us who were concerned with this matter at the time that it was of vital importance to the United States that that issue should be met with the utmost vigor. The important thing was not altogether the words in which a policy was put, but the immediate decision and the objectives of that policy, and that policy was to prevent Russian control of Greece and Turkey and the Straits and the eastern Mediterranean.

It came up first of all in connection with Russian pressure on Turkey to make a new arrangement about the Straits. The United States, France, Great Britain, took a very vigorous attitude on that after the matter had been thoroughly thrashed out with the Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of War and Navy, and the full seriousness of our position was completely understood.

Then the Russians relaxed that particular part of their effort and turned to the one of stirring up such trouble on the northern boundaries of Greece that Greece would have to collapse, would in turn have

a Communist government, and they would achieve their objectives in that way. There again the U.S. Government took a most vigorous attitude, and so far has prevented that result from happening, and I think is making some progress, though not much progress, in trying to bring about a strengthened and revived Greece.

Senator SMITH. As I recall it, you were in the State Department when the so-called Truman doctrine was announced.

Mr. ACHESON. Yes; I was, Senator.

Senator GREEN. Do you really think that they have made progress? Mr. ACHESON. I say there has been some progress made. The important thing is that the Greek Government is still a Greek Government and is not a Communist government. That is success, limited. The Greek Government is ineffective. The whole Greek structure is extremely weak. It is a great worry as to what can be done with it in the future economically, spiritually, individually. The whole thing

is in a weak state.

OTHER FAILURES

The effort toward Trieste also failed. While all of these things were going on, there was a very strong movement in the Communist Parties in Italy and France. If those efforts had been successful, all of these other pushes would automatically have been successful. The further West Communist Russia-dominated governments could be thrust, the more would be the collapse of those to the East.

The effort in Italy was defeated; the effort in France was defeated. All of those dangers still exist. I think of all situations in Europe the French is the most worrisome and the weakest of all.

That is where we are at the present moment. I may have overlooked something in what I have said. I shall be very glad to have Senator Vandenberg or somebody else bring it out.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

Senator SMITH. Could you add a word about the Chinese penetration by the Communists?

Mr. ACHESON. The Chinese situation, for one who is completely out of it for 18 months and who has no idea of what the recent papers on the subject are, is a very dark and discouraging one.

Senator WILEY. What about the Mideast?

Mr. ACHESON. Do you want me to go to that? I was going to say a word or two about this Chinese thing.

Senator WILEY. I beg your pardon. I thought you had concluded.

CAUSES OF NATIONALIST DEFEATS

Mr. ACHESON. When I last had any close information about this, in June 1947, it seemed to me that the developments were bearing out the wisdom of General Marshall's observations in China in 1946. What he concluded was that the great difficulty of the Chinese Government was not primarily one of military supply, but it was of great weakness in the Chinese Government, incompetence of a high order, complete lack of any military leadership, and an increasing failure to have popular support. He made efforts to bring about a peace. He thought

continued warfare would continue the weakness of the Chinese Government, and might eventually lead to its collapse.

It seems to me that what has happened has borne out the wisdom of that judgment. So far as I know, and I say I know nothing about the official papers on this, but what one reads in the newspapers would lead me to believe, the failure of the national Government in its campaigns against the Communists has not come from lack of military supply, but from the most futile and ineffective leadership, the disaffection of the troops and the disaffection of its people. That is where the difficulty lies.

What one can do with China is beyond my experience or knowledge. People have made efforts in that direction for a good many hundreds of years. It is a vast country with vast population, practically, no communications, practically no industry, and an incredibly low standard of living.

EFFECT OF THE YALTA DECISIONS ON NATIONALISTS

Senator SMITH. Do you think that we pulled the rug out from under Chiang with the Manchurian conversations at Yalta.

Mr. ACHESON. I knew nothing about it at the time, and have only a vague judgment about it. I heard Mr. Stettinius say yesterday that he was going to write a book about that subject. It seemed to me at the time, when I did know about those decisions, that what was uppermost in the minds of the men who made them was their great concern about the future of the Japanese campaign. It was thought at that time that the only way to conquer Japan was by a landing on their shores, and that that would be an extremely costly thing in lives. It could ultimately become successful, but it would be so costly that everything that could be done to alleviate that ought to be done. Apparently it was felt that every effort ought to be made to bring the Russians into the war and to have them not only contain as many Japanese troops as possible, but to divert as many Japanese troops as possible.

It is perfectly plain, as things have turned out, that if that was the idea it was both, in the light of events which have happened since, unsuccessful and unnecessary. The Russians did not come into the war until a few days before the surrender; they did not deflect any more Japanese troops than they already had, and on the other hand, their entrance into the war led to very great difficulty and trouble in Manchuria. What they in effect did was to despoil the country, make it quite impossible for the Chinese to reoccupy it in any competent and proper way, and start a whole series of difficulties which ave greatly added to the problems of the Chinese Government. That is knowledge after the fact.

Senator SMITH. Oh, yes; I recognize that, but it seems to me that if we look back to that for a certain starting point, you have certain situation for the difficulty Chiang finds himself in now.

Mr. ACHESON. It is a difficulty. The other difficulties were so great that I don't know whether this has materially changed the outcome. Senator PEPPER. The atom bomb had not, at the time of the Yalta Conference, been perfected, so that you did not know at that time that it was actually going to be an effective weapon, did you?

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