Briefly summarised they may be stated as follows: (a.) States have a general absolute right to admit or exclude aliens at discretion. (b.) In the absence of declared war, however, the expulsion of a whole class of aliens cannot be justified except on the ground of Reprisals; and, even if war exists, such a step would not be justified except on the ground of reprisals or of urgent necessity. (c.) In any case, expulsion of foreigners, without any apparent cause, will always be reasonable ground for the foreign State to demand an explanation; and such expulsion should not, as a rule, take place without reasonable notice or delay. (d.) As regards the uncontrolled right of a State to admit aliens to its protection, this is in practice subject to two limitations, viz. :-(1.) The obligation to extradite criminals in certain cases; and (2.) The reasonable right which one State has of requiring another friendly State not to allow its territory to be made a basis of active and overt conspiracy against the welfare of the former. In view of the gravity of the question, it seems well that the Declaration ultimately adopted by the Institute should be appended. It consisted of the following Articles : 1. According to theory every Sovereign State can regulate the admission and expulsion of aliens as it thinks fit, but International comity renders it desirable that aliens should have notice of any general rules on which the State proposes to act. . 2. Except in urgent cases, such as war or serious troubles, a distinction must be drawn between ordinary expulsion, applying to specific individuals, and extraordinary expulsion, applying to whole classes of persons. 3. Expulsion in case of urgency should be temporary only. It should not last longer than the duration of the which it should give way to the usual rules of ordinary and extraordinary expulsion. 4. Extraordinary expulsion should be effected by special law, or by decree previously published. Any such general decree should be published a reasonable time before being carried into execution. 5. As regards ordinary expulsion, a distinction should be drawn between individuals domiciled or having a place of business in the country in question, and those not fulfilling either of these conditions. 6. Notice specifying the grounds of a decree of ordinary expulsion should be served on the individual concerned, before being carried into execution. * Lex Loci Contractûs. À propos of the case of In re the Missouri Steamship Co. (58 L.J. Ch. 72), recently decided in the Court of Appeal, and referred to in the last issue of this Review (p. 370), a very similar question was considered a few weeks earlier by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co. (9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499, affirming same case, 22 Fed. Rep. 715.) The point at issue in each case was as to the Law applicable to a contract of affreightment; the question being rendered important by reason of the fact that a limitation of liability for loss caused by perils of the sea is invalid by American Law, though allowed by that of our own country. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the American Law applied, basing its decision largely on the fact that the Bill of Lading was made and dated at New York by an agent of the English Company residing there. The decision certainly seems, at first sight, to be a retrogression from the modern tendency to make the intention of the parties, as deducible from all the circumstances of Briefly summarised they may be stated as follows: (a.) States have a general absolute right to admit or exclude aliens at discretion. (b.) In the absence of declared war, however, the expulsion of a whole class of aliens cannot be justified except on the ground of Reprisals; and, even if war exists, such a step would not be justified except on the ground of reprisals or of urgent necessity. (c.) In any case, expulsion of foreigners, without any apparent cause, will always be reasonable ground for the foreign State to demand an explanation; and such expulsion should not, as a rule, take place without reasonable notice or delay. (d.) As regards the uncontrolled right of a State to admit aliens to its protection, this is in practice subject to two limitations, viz. :-(1.) The obligation to extradite criminals in certain cases; and (2.) The reasonable right which one State has of requiring another friendly State not to allow its territory to be made a basis of active and overt conspiracy against the welfare of the former. In view of the gravity of the question, it seems well that the Declaration ultimately adopted by the Institute should be appended. It consisted of the following Articles : 1. According to theory every Sovereign State can regulate the admission and expulsion of aliens as it thinks fit, but International comity renders it desirable that aliens should have notice of any general rules on which the State proposes to act. 2. Except in urgent cases, such as war or serious. troubles, a distinction must be drawn between ordinary expulsion, applying to specific individuals, and extraordinary expulsion, applying to whole classes of persons. 3. Expulsion in case of urgency should be temporary only. It should not last longer than the duration of the which it should give way to the usual rules of ordinary and extraordinary expulsion. 4. Extraordinary expulsion should be effected by special law, or by decree previously published. Any such general decree should be published a reasonable time before being carried into execution. 5. As regards ordinary expulsion, a distinction should be. drawn between individuals domiciled or having a place of business in the country in question, and those not fulfilling either of these conditions. 6. Notice specifying the grounds of a decree of ordinary expulsion should be served on the individual concerned, before being carried into execution. Lex Loci Contractûs. À propos of the case of In re the Missouri Steamship Co. (58 L.J. Ch. 72), recently decided in the Court of Appeal, and referred to in the last issue of this Review (p. 370), a very similar question was considered a few weeks earlier by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co. (9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499, affirming same case, 22 Fed. Rep. 715.) The point at issue in each case was as to the Law applicable to a contract of affreightment; the question being rendered important by reason of the fact that a limitation of liability for loss caused by perils of the sea is invalid by American Law, though allowed by that of our own country. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the American Law applied, basing its decision largely on the fact that the Bill of Lading was made and dated at New York by an agent of the English Company residing there. The decision certainly seems, at first sight, to be a retrogression from the modern tendency to make the intention of the parties, as deducible from all the circumstances of would appear that the ship's flag was English, its owners were an English Company, and the goods were shipped to an English consignee at an English port. On the other hand, it is true that these facts were not indicated in the Bill of Lading, and that the shipper was an American, so that perhaps we may not be altogether justified in assuming that the decision was entirely out of harmony with the tendency of modern cases. We may observe, with reference to this subject, that our contemporary, the American Law Review, (Vol. XXIII., No. V., p. 841), pours out the vials of its wrath on our own Court of Appeal, for what it terms their "thoroughly stupid decision" in the Missouri case. Apart from any consideration of the unusually strong language in which the attack is couched, its injustice is apparent on the surface. The Court of Appeal did not base their conclusion as to the intention of the parties on the mere fact that "the contract was to be performed in England," as is suggested by our American contemporary, but on the concurrence of several very definite circumstances, all indicating English Law as that which was intended to apply. This was concisely expressed by Lord Halsbury, L.H.C., when he said "The contract is a contract for conveyance of cattle by sea, in a British ship owned by a British company, domiciled in England, to a British port. That, however, is not conclusive, but I look at the contract itself, and finding the ordinary exceptions to a British bill of lading, I come to the conclusion that the parties did contemplate British Law as that by which the contract was to be regulated." We fear that our contemporary must have based its adverse criticism on a slender acquaintance with the facts of the case, and a still scantier appreciation of the grounds on which the Judgments were based. |