Cave, J., held that it was voluntary, on the ground that the true test in such cases was that enunciated by the Master of the Rolls in Voinêt v. Barret, i.e., "An appearance is voluntary unless it is caused by the fact that property has already been seized by the foreign tribunalfor every appearance which is not made under pressure is a voluntary appearance."

So again in the words of the Court in the latter case; "A man cannot properly be said to protest against doing something which he is not obliged to do but which he deems it for his interest to do."

A further point taken by the defendants was that the proceedings in the French Courts were contrary to "natural justice." This was at once overruled by the Court as based on an altogether mistaken view of the meaning of the term. The sole ground for the plea was the fact that the Court of Appeal at Rouen had ordered accounts to be taken by an avoué who happened to be the avoué employed by the plaintiff in the case. Cave, J., said that the ordinary course of procedure had been followed, and that the mere fact that the French practice differed from our own was no reason for stigmatising the proceedings as "contrary to Natural Justice." As to when this latter plea will be allowed, the remarks of the Master of the Rolls in Voinêt's case (p. 41) are very apposite, the conclusion from this and other cases perhaps being that it will only lie where a Court has grievously abused its own process, or made an order in direct disregard of important matters brought distinctly before its notice, as in Simpson v. Fogo, 32 L.J. Ch. 249, and never in respect of any question arising out of the merits of the case.

It may not be altogether out of place to mention in this connection, a curious case which was recently decided by the Court of Appeal sub nom. Eschger and Co. v.

were in the nature of an Interpleader issue as to the ownership of certain goods. The immediate question before the Court of Appeal was whether an order of the Divisional Court was valid, which practically made "a "foreign firm wholly domiciled abroad defendants without "observing any of the conditions which the law required "to be observed before making a foreigner a defendant in "an independent action."

The Court of Appeal held that the order of the Court below must be set aside.

The Slave Trade as an International Question. The Treaty between Great Britain and Italy for the suppression of the African Slave Trade, signed last year and recently issued as a Parliamentary Paper,* is deserving of some notice by the student of International Law. The material part of the Treaty is in Article 1, by which the two Governments " engage to prohibit all Trade in slaves, either by their respective subjects or under their respective flags, or by means of capital belonging to their respective subjects; and to declare such traffic Piracy." More comprehensive terms can hardly be imagined, and they are strengthened by other Articles conceding the mutual right of visitation and search within certain limits. Any ship captured on suspicion is to be brought into port for adjudication, and confiscated or released with compensation according to the evidence adduced.

It will be remembered that Italy was one of the States. engaged in the East African Blockade, instituted in 1888, as a concerted blow at the Slave Trade on the Zanzibar Coast.

It might fairly be questioned now, particularly in view of Article 9 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference,

1885, and the action of the Brussels International Conference on the Slave Trade, whether it is not pretty well established as a rule of International Law that the Slave Trade is illegal, and liable to be regarded as Piracy Jure Gentium.

*

Lis Alibi Pendens.

The principle enunciated in Hyam v. Helm, 24 Ch. D. 531, that superior facility of procedure or execution abroad tends to negative the vexatiousness of a multiplicity of actions, was again clearly laid down by the Court of Appeal in the case of Baird v. Prescott & Co., Times L.R. VI., 231, where the facts more strongly favoured the application of the principle than in the earlier case.

In Hyam v. Helm there were certain general advantages to be gained by an action being brought in America, but in the later case, the relief sought in the Foreign Court was of a kind which could only be obtained there. The Court therefore refused to stay the Foreign suit as vexatious.

English and Foreign Bankruptcies.

A somewhat similar question to that just mentioned came before the Court of Appeal in the case of In re the Bankruptcy of Artola Hermanos, Times L.R. VI., 271, on an application by the Syndic of a French Bankruptcy to set aside or stay proceedings in the same Bankruptcy in this country. It will be remembered that under Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the Court has discretionary power, "for sufficient reasons," to stay proceedings under a petition.

The Firm in question was a Firm, as Fry, L.J., said probably domiciled in Spain, but also having business houses in Paris and London.

The Court held, in accordance with Lyall v. Jardine,

161, and other well-known cases, that the English adjudication was perfectly proper, and although in some cases proceedings here might be stayed pending a foreign Bankruptcy (Ex parte Pascal, 1 Ch. D. 509), especially if the foreign country were the place of the debtor's domicil, yet in the present case there was no sufficient reason to grant a stay, particularly in view of the fact that large assets of the Firm were in England.

JOHN M. GOVer.

Quarterly Notes.

The Bankruptcy Bill, 1890.

Modern legislation in this country on the subject of Bankrupty has been, it may certainly be said, increasingly Draconic in its severity towards the Bankrupt. The tendency to such severity seems to be a feature which bids fair to become the dominant characteristic of English Law in this branch. We believe that this tendency is to be regretted, and therefore we are glad to draw attention to some useful criticisms of this year's Bill which have reached us from the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool. The Committee which puts forth these criticisms is of opinion that the general tendency of the Bill, as, indeed, it might be added, of all our recent Legislation on this subject, is to destroy the practice of arrangements outside the Court between a debtor and his creditors. We do not think that this can be denied. The only question can be whether the old practice in that respect worked well. The Committee thinks that it did: successive Governments and their majorities appear to have thought the contrary. But it may be questioned how far the majorities in Parliament really thought about it at all. They probably got hold of

kind of person, like the man who sold oleo-margarine for butter, and that a short and easy way must be found for putting an end to him. Whether this can be called Scientific Legislation may perhaps be doubted. We may be told that it is the best which can be expected under present circumstances if so, that is not saying much for the best. What appears clear to us, as to the Committee of the Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, is that not by any means every Bankrupt is fraudulent : probably the majority may be taken to be innocent. Of course, it is a very nice thing, and one which provides a pleasing amount of sensation in certain quarters, to be able to drive into Court a person who is unfortunate enough to bear a title. This is good capital for the Demonstrations which seem to be taking their place as part of our mob-ridden existence. But it is, we submit, very bad policy for those who really wish to preserve the existing Constitution, or who profess to think it worth preserving. What seems obvious to any unprejudiced mind is what the Liverpool Committee urge, viz., that while on the one hand there should be power to punish dishonest and fraudulent Bankrupts, there should not, on the other hand, be any necessity to resort to the Court in cases in which the creditors are satisfied that there has been no improper conduct on the part of the debtor, and are consequently willing to accept a composition or private arrangement; we wish the Liverpool Committee's views were more generally endorsed than our experience of the Past leads us to hope that we shall see them endorsed. They appear to us to be moderate and rational, but moderate views are too frequently at a discount, and common sense is, we are told, one of the rarest of senses.

The Public Trustee Bill, 1890.

We are in receipt of another communication from the Liverpool Incorporated Law Society, dealing with the