expression "Christendom." At all events, the absence of any recognition of polygamy in the country would place marriages contracted in Japan outside the scope of the decision in Hyde v. Hyde; and as a matter of fact Mr. Brinkley's marriage exactly complied with Lord Penzance's definition of legal marriage in that case, as "a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others."*

If the petitioner had been resident in China, the case would have been more difficult.

In America, a peculiar question on the same subject recently came before the Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. Rep. 602. The matter in dispute was a claim to certain property by inheritance derived from a marriage between Indians in a tribal relation. The particular marriage was valid by the laws or usages of the tribe, and contracted at a time when there was no law of the United States on the subject of Indian marriages. The Supreme Court of the State, in an elaborate Judgment, delivered by Mr. Justice Campbell, held that as regards the question of inheritance, the marriage must be looked upon as valid.

The learned Judge pointed out that by the U.S. Constitution the tribes were placed beyond the jurisdiction. and laws of the State, "and there was no other law interfering with the full jurisdiction of the tribe over personal relations." "While most civilized nations in our

[* This definition is, of course, not one which owes its origin to Lord Penzance, being not only in exact conformity with the doctrine of Roman Law, but also expressing the doctrine of the best Theologians of the Western Church, at least as regards Christians, according to the view which has the support of mediæval Roman Pontiffs, that the spouses are themselves the ministers of the Sacrament of Matrimony. Cf. for this, Friedrich, Gott meine einzige Hoffnung. Leipzig. Honer. 1873. p. 190. "Die Theologen erklären deshalb auch fast einstimmig, dass die Brautleute selbst die Spender

day wisely discard polygamy, and it is not probably lawful anywhere among English-speaking nations, yet it is a recognized and valid institution among many nations, and in no way universally unlawful." This latter is a dictum. which, perhaps, somewhat clashes not only with the remarks of Lord Penzance and other English Judges, but also with the view which the Supreme Court, U.S.A., takes of Mormon "sealings." It must be remembered, however, that this was not a case of the intermarriage of a person of European extraction with an Indian, but an ordinary union between members of the same tribe. In any case, the conclusions of the Court were certainly irresistible that "we must either hold that there can be no valid Indian marriage, or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by Indian usage are so regarded. There is no middle ground so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes."*

The Samoan Conference.

The unfortunate dispute in which we were involved a short time ago in connection with Samoa, has reached a temporary termination, which, it is to be hoped, may become final, of an entirely satisfactory character.

a

In pursuance of the scheme drawn up and signed on 14th June, 1889, by the three Plenipotentiaries representing Germany, the United States, and our own country, and recently ratified by the Governments concerned, "General Act of the Samoan Conference of Berlin" has lately been published,† which is an extremely noteworthy document both from the point of view of Politics and of International Law.

This Instrument may be taken to settle the whole question

* Among the English cases referred to was Cursetjee v. Perozeboye, 6 Moo. 34.

of Samoan Government, internal and external,* and its chief provisions are briefly the following:-By Article I., the Neutrality of the Islands is guaranteed; subjects of the Signatory Powers are to have equal rights of residence, trade and personal protection; the Independence of the native Government is recognised, as also the free right of the natives to elect a king or chief; and finally it is mutually stipulated that none of the Signatory Powers shall exercise any separate control over the Islands or the Government. Article III. provides for the constitution of a Supreme Court, under the jurisdiction of a single Judge, assisted by a clerk or marshal. The title of the Judge is to be "Chief Justice," and he is to be nominated jointly by the three Signatories, or in case of disagreement by the King of Sweden and Norway. His jurisdiction is to extend to the following matters:—

1. All Civil suits concerning real property in Samoa. 2. All Civil suits between foreigners of different

nationalities.

3. All crimes by natives against foreigners and by such foreigners as are are not subject to any Consular Jurisdiction.

4. Any differences between the Signatory Powers and Samoa which they shall fail to adjust by mutual accord, and which shall be referred to the Chief Justice.

The remaining Articles deal chiefly with the locally important matters of finance, taxation, and the customs.

Finally, it is agreed that the Act is to remain in force till changed by common consent of the Signatory Powers, at the suggestion of any of them.

[* It should be borne in mind, however, that, according to the Belgian News, 1st February, 1890, Count Herbert Bismarck is reported by the Kölnische Zeitung as having expressly limited the treatment of questions of Internal Samoan Government to the point at which they touched External questions,

Foreign Judgments.

Two cases of some importance on the subject of Foreign Judgments have been decided since our last issue. The first, and in some respects the more important, owing to its being a decision of the highest Judicial authority, is the case of In re Henderson, Nouvion v. Freeman, L.R. 15, App. Cas. 1; 62 L.T. 189. The House of Lords, affirming the order of the Court of Appeal reversing the finding of North, J., held that a Spanish "remate judgment" is not such a final Judgment as to enable the successful party to sue upon it in our own Courts.

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Professor Westlake, it may be noted, states the rule on this subject in these words: "The foreign judgment in personam which is to be sued upon or otherwise enforced [here] must be such as lays on the defendant a present "duty to pay."* And so the Editors of the recent edition of Phillimore's International Law: "It [the Tribunal] must "have decided definitively and either in the last resort (en "dernier ressort) or, which is the same thing, without any "appeal prosecuted from its decision to the Superior "Courts of the State in which it was pronounced."+

In Henderson's Case the question was not altogether as to the existence of a right of appeal, or a stay of execution pending appeal, as in the old cases of Patrick v. Shedden, 2 E. & B. 14, and Scott v. Pilkington, 2 B. & S. 11; but a somewhat more complicated one, arising out of the peculiar nature of the Judgment on which the English action was based.

Evidence was given at the trial to shew that by the Law of Spain a man in whose favour documents of a certain. character have been executed may institute what are called in Spain "executive" proceedings, in which he may obtain a kind of Summary Judgment-the only pleas open to the

*Private International Law. Ed. 1880, p. 302, § 295

defendant being those which admit the original right of action, but allege that the latter has been lost either by a contract not to proceed, or satisfaction, payment, or other discharge of a similar nature.

Such a Judgment, however, does not preclude either party from taking "plenary" or "ordinary" proceedings on the same subject-matter, in which every possible defence may be set up, and the "executive " decree does not occupy the position of res judicata. It is, nevertheless, open to the plaintiff, upon giving security, to enforce the "remate" Judgment, though the plenary proceedings are pending. The House of Lords, on these facts, held, confirming the Court of Appeal, that the "executive " Judgment was not such a Judgment as the law of England would allow to be made a cause of action so as to found on it alone a proceeding in this country.

An equally interesting point was raised in the case of Boissière and Co. v. Brockner and Co., VI. Times L.R. 85. The decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Voinêt v. Barret, 55 L.J. Q.B. 37, will be remembered as dealing in a very clear and unequivocal way with the question as to whether voluntary Submission by a defendant to a particular jurisdiction constitutes such jurisdiction a competent forum for the purpose of enforcing its decrees here.

In Voinêt's case it was held that submission by the defendants in order to protect property which they merely apprehended might in the future be seized, although not in fact already seized, was not so far involuntary as to avoid action on a Judgment here. In Boissière v. Brockner, there was no question of seizure of property apprehended or otherwise, but one as to whether an appearance under protest, followed by voluntary appeals in which the protest against the jurisdiction was still maintained, was " voluntary "