(1) The contracting states undertake that their commercial relations shall not be hindered by excessive, unnecessary or arbitrary customs or other similar formalities, and that they will revise appropriately their laws and regulations for the purpose of giving effect to this provision. They promise mutually to accord most-favored-nation treatment in this respect.

(2) The contracting states undertake to reduce import and export prohibitions and restrictions to a minimum, to simplify prerequisite conditions and to expedite the issuance of licenses, which licenses should be non-transferable.

(3) The contracting states agree to make prompt publication of all regulations relating to customs and similar formalities and all modifications thereof, and, except in cases affecting essential national interests, not to enforce customs regulations prior to publication. Provision is also made for ensuring the publication of customs tariffs in a way calculated to meet the requirements of traders. Copies of publications must be furnished to the other contracting states, to the League of Nations and to the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs at Brussels.

(4) The contracting states agree to take measures for the prevention of the arbitrary or unjust application of their laws and regulations and to insure redress in the event of abuse.

(5) Goods which form the subject of a customs dispute must, in general, at the request of the declarant, be placed at once at his disposal pending the solution of the dispute, provided he can give satisfactory guaranties.

Technical experts representing the Commerce and Treasury Departments and the United States Tariff Commission were present as assistants to the Consul.

The International Chamber of Commerce, which had been invited by the Council of the League to participate in the Conference in a consultative capacity, was represented by a delegation including members from several different countries, including the United States.

(6) Each contracting state, within twelve months from the coming into force in its own case of the present Convention, and periodically and on request thereafter, is to furnish to the Secretary General of the League a summary of all the steps which it has taken to bring about simplification in customs matters.

(7) Commercial samples are in general to be admitted free of duty subject to exportation within not less than six months and to certain additional safeguards. The Convention deals with this subject at some length and sets forth the language of a specimen identity card for commercial

travelers.

(8) The contracting states are to reduce as far as possible the number of cases in which certificates of origin are demanded and to simplify their requirements in this respect.

(9) Consular invoices will not be required unless their production is necessary either to establish the origin of the goods in cases where the origin may affect the conditions under which the goods are admitted, or to ascertain their value in cases where the commercial invoice would not suffice for the purposes of an ad valorem tariff.

(10) Where imported goods must meet technical conditions, for example standards of purity, the contracting states will endeavor to make arrangements to accept guaranties made by the exporting country, and so avoid subjecting such goods to a second analysis.

(11) The contracting states will consider the most appropriate methods of simplifying and making more uniform and reasonable the formalities relating to the rapid passage of goods through the customs, the examination of travelers' luggage, and other matters. The temporary importation and exportation of goods in order to undergo manufacturing processes, and for other purpoes, is to be facilitated.

(12) The present Convention is not to prejudice emergency measures or sanitary regulations and is not to abrogate the obligation of contracting states in relation to customs regulations under agreements concluded before November 3, 1923; but effort is to be made to modify conflicting agreements.

(13) In conformity with Article 23 (e) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, any contracting state which can establish a good case against the application of any provisions of the Convention to its territory on the ground of the grave economic situation arising out of acts of devastation during the World War, is to be relieved temporarily of the obligations arising from the application of such provision. Moreover, the Convention is not to regulate rights and obligations inter se of territories forming part or placed under the protection of the same sovereign state.

(14) Arrangement is made for the amicable settlement of disputes through reference to technical bodies to be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations or through the Permanent Court of International Justice.

That these proposals are not vital or, comparatively speaking, far-reaching, must be admitted, but the adoption by a considerable number of states of the Convention outlined above, would be of very great convenience and saving to the commercial and traveling public. It could probably be effected without interfering with genuine national policies of any kind because its subjects are almost wholly technical and administrative. The possibility of considering problems of national policy such as the height of tariff walls was, indeed, envisaged by the Economic Committee, but it was generally felt that the moment had not arrived in which any effective attempt could be made to deal with them. Matters of national policy were, therefore, specifically excluded from the program of the customs conference.

Previous conferences on customs regulations were held at Paris in 1900 and 1913 and were attended by representatives of the United States.

The catalog of instances of the treatment of customs matters through general international convention, as presented above, indicates that, excepting the problem of bounty-fed sugar, questions involving important constituent elements of the national policies of powerful states have not been accorded this method of solution. But it is also evident that substantial precedents have been set and the way partially cleared for world consideration of the tariff problem, including the question of equal treatment for all and special treatment for none.

75. THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE

(a) A Universal Treaty of Commercial Equality "I believe," said Secretary Hughes in a recent address, that we shall be able at no distant day to keep within reasonable limits some of our pressing economic rivalries by fair international agreements in which the self-interest of rivals will submit to mutual restrictions in the furtherance of friendly accord.1

Such a statement would seem to imply confidence in the further extension of the multi-lateral convention as a means of reaching settlements in matters affecting international commerce. The most immediately pressing questions requiring a uniformity of solution improbable of attainment through the medium of special treaties connecting the countries of the world two by two are as follows:

1. The precise meaning of most-favored-nation treatment is a matter about which there is room for no little diver

1 From the advance press copy of "The Pathway of Peace," p. 10, delivered before the Canadian Bar Association at Montreal, Sept. 4, 1923.

gence of opinion. A country may enter into treaties with two different countries intending to realize exactly the same concept of most-favored-nation treatment. Slight variations in language, however, may occur and may give rise, especially on the part of the two foreign countries acting separately, to divergent interpretations. Even where the words are similar, unless they are more clear and unmistakable than treaty language sometimes is, widely different meanings may be deduced. The United States, it will be remembered, has engaged in many diplomatic contests over the meaning of most-favored-nation clauses which were not expressly conditional or unconditional and has persistently clung to a meaning from which most of the rest of the world has dissented. While the general adoption of the expressly unconditional form of the clause would go far toward giving it certainty of meaning, only the universal adoption of the same precise language in a single general treaty can reduce to a minimum the chances of variation. Uniformity of meaning is probably more important to the business public than any particular meaning.

2. Even where the language of a most-favored-nation clause is expressly unconditional some doubts may arise as to its absolute application. If the United States makes such a guarantee without expressly excepting the treatment it accords to its own dependencies having individual tariff laws, shall this country be understood to promise the advantages which it accords to them? A universal agreement determining this point and also specifying what, if any, intraimperial preferences are allowable, would be of great advantage to the commercial world.

3. Treaties entered into between countries bi-laterally often specify exceptions to the otherwise full measure of most-favored-nation treatment for which they provide. Thus the United States may expressly except its treatment