3. Which is not proportionate to the other faculties of the same individual;

4. Which does not manifest itself simultaneously with the other faculties; that is, which appears and disappears earlier or later in life than other faculties;

5. Which may act or rest singly;

6. Which is propagated in a distinct manner from parents to children; and,

7. Which may singly preserve its proper state of health or disease

As phrenological observation establishes the existence of a plurality of mental faculties, each connected with a particular part of the brain, the question occurs, Is the mind simple, or an aggregate of separate powers+? It is extremely difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this inquiry. Looking at the facts presented to us by observation, the most obvious inference seems to be, that the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, and that one of them supplies the feeling of personal Identity, or the I of Consciousness, to which, as their substance, all the other feelings and capacities bear reference. This view is strongly supported by some of the phenomena of insanity; for patients are sometimes insane in the feeling of personal identity, and in no other faculty of the mind. Such individuals lose all consciousness of their past and proper personality, and imagine themselves different persons altogether; while, with the exception of this erroneous impression, they feel and think correctly. Under the head of Memory, in a subsequent part of this work, an abstract will be found of a case of divided personality, occurring through disease, reported by Dr DYCE of Aberdeen to Dr HENRY DEWAR, and by him published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. A similar case is stated in "The Medical Repository," communicated by Dr MITCHELL to the Reverend Dr NOTT, dated January 1816. "When I was employed," says he, early in December Phrenology by Dr SPURZHEIM, p. 126. +See Phren. Jour. vol. i. p. 205.

1815, with several other gentlemen, in doing the duty of a visitor to the United States Military Academy at West Point, a very extraordinary case of Double Consciousness in a woman, was related to me by one of the professors. Major Ellicott, who so worthily occupies the mathematical chair in that seminary, vouched for the correctness of the following narrative, the subject of which is related to him by blood, and an inhabitant of one of the western counties of Pennsylvania :-Miss R- -possessed, naturally, a very good constitution, and arrived at adult age without having it impaired by disease. She possessed an excellent capacity, and enjoyed fair opportunities to acquire knowledge. Besides the domestic arts and social attainments, she had improved her mind by reading and conversation, and was well versed in penmanship. Her memory was capacious, and stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking, she was discovered to have lost every trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory was tabula rasa,—all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn every thing again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing, and calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these exercises she made considerable proficiency. But, after a few months, another fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was in before the first paroxysm; but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had befallen her afterwards. The former condition of her existence, she now calls the Old State, and the latter the New State; and she is as unconscious of her double character as two distinct persons are of their respective natures. For example, in her old state, she possesses all her original knowledge; in her new state only what she acquired since.

If a gentleman or lady be introduced to her in the old state, and vice versa, (and so of all other matters), to know them satisfactorily she must learn them in both states. In the old state, she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in the new, she writes a poor awkward hand, having not had time or means to become expert. During four years and upwards, she has undergone periodical transitions from one of these states to the other. The alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse, and govern themselves accordingly. A history of her curious case is drawing up by the Reverend TIMOTHY ALDIN of Meadville." Such cases as the foregoing, have led some persons to the inference, that the feeling of personal Identity is a primitive mental affection, connected with a particular organ, and hence liable separately to disease; and because we have ascertained that each of the other primitive feelings and intellectual powers is also manifested by a separate organ, the mind has appeared to them to consist of an aggregate of powers acting together. This view corresponds with the apprehension of mankind in general, for popular language is framed on the principle of the I of Consciousness being distinct from the other mental affections. We speak of evil thoughts intruding themselves into our mind; and of our having strong desires which we forbear to indulge. In such expressions, the our and we seem to mean the principle of personal identity; and the evil thoughts and desires appear to be regarded as affections of that principle, originating in sources distinct from it, and different from one another.

The more general opinion of philosophers is, that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely different states of it. This view is espoused by my excellent friend the Reverend DAVID WELSH, who successfully shews, that it is consistent with

the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. "The leading doctrine," says he, " of Phrenology is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth of this position can obviously be ascertained only by observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked, how it can be reconciled with the great principle to which so frequent reference has been made, that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states?

"It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree affect Dr BROWN's leading principle. The cerebral organs are not the mind-nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance. And the only difference that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to Dr BROWN's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind, to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions of the encephalon.

"In looking upon any object-as snow-we have the notion of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow but in the mind. That is, the notion of colour is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind. There is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of colour, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. will be conceded, that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious, that another step in the process might be conceived, without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of colour, it might be a particular portion of the encepha

It

lon. As the notion of colour, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of colour, it follows, that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr BROWN himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material organ, which state would have been different had the organ been different.

"A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.

"When we say, then, that when we have any power, as, for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter but of mind.-The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I alluded in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr BROWN had not considered."

It is not necessary in studying Phrenology to decide which of these views is the correct interpretation of nature, because the effects of the organs on the mind is the same, whichever of them be adopted. Holding the mind to consist of an aggregate of powers,-then each acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested with a degree of energy in proportion to its size. Viewing it as a simple substance,