3. In ejactment on title, a new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, when the party applying for the new trial was, before the former trial, aware of the existence of the evidence, and might, on a proper application for that purpose, have obtained a reasonable postponement of the former trial until he had obtained such evidence. Rules by which the Court is governed as to granting a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. The Court is slow to relax such rules in cases of ejectment on title. Q. B. O'Grady v. Dwyer EJECTMENT 440 FOR NON-PAY. MENT OF RENT. By indenture in 1761, D. O'Callaghan, sen., demised lands to Nash, for two lives, and such other lives as should for ever thereafter be added, pursuant to the covenant for perpetual renewal therein. In 1769, Nash demised the same lands to Withers, for 993 years; and in 1782, Withers demised the lands to Atkins, for 950 years, at a profit-rent. Both the lives in the lease of 1761 being dead, that lease was renewed in 1794 to Nash's representatives, by C. O'Callaghan (heirat-law of D. O'Callaghan, sen.), for the lives of two persons, the survivor of whom died in 1837. In 1807, C. O'Callaghan became assignee of Nash's interest. From 1823 to 1849, the assignees of Atkins' interest paid to D. O'Callaghan, jun. (heir-at-law of C. O'Callaghan), as assignee of Nash's interest, the rent reserved by the lease of 1769, and also, during the same period, paid to the representatives of Withers the profit-rent reserved by the lease of 1782; but no rent was paid after 1849. In 1851, D. O'Callaghan, jun., brought ejectment for non-payment of the rent reserved by the lease of 1769, and recovered possession of the lands; but the representatives of Withers were not served with O'Callaghan's ejectment. In 1858, Withers' representatives having brought ejectment for non-payment of the rent reserved by the lease of 1782: -Held, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, that this ejectment was not maintainable, the tenancy, if any, being nothing more than a parol yearly tenancy, created by overholding, and payment of rent from 1837.-[PIGOT, C. B., dissentiente.] The Irish statutable ejectment for non-payment of rent cannot be maintained upon a tenancy created by a parol demise from year to year, express or implied.-[PIGOT, C. B., dissentiente.] Notwithstanding the covenant for perpetual renewal, by D. O'Callaghan, sen., in the lease of 1761, and even assuming that Nash and his representatives were bound to keep up that lease by due renewals, in order to keep on foot the term of 993 years demised by Nash to Withers in 1769, the result, at Law, of the assignment of Nash's interest to the heir-at-law of D. O'Callaghan, sen., in 1807, was to merge the lease of 1761, and the renewal thereof, in the reversion, and, therefore, upon the fall of the lives in that lease and renewal, to destroy the term of 993 years, which depended thereon for its continuance, the doctrine of enlargement not being applicable to such a state of facts, so as to keep the term subsisting.[PIGOT, C. B., dissentiente.] A tenancy which arises from overholding, and payment of rent after the expiration of a lease, is a parol tenancy from year to year, arising by implication of law, though regulated by such of the provisions of the ex 570 EJECTMENT, &c. GRAND JURY ACT. pired lease as are applicable to a ten- | In an action for money lent, evidence of ancy from year to year. The rule of Law, that, although the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of the landlord under whom he has taken possession, yet he is at liberty to show that the landlord's title has determined, applies to a statutable ejectment for non-payment of rent, as well as any other species of action. Per MONAHAN, C. J.-The 5 G. 2, c. 4, s. 4 (Ir.), applies only to surrenders of existing leases, and not to cases where leases have determined at Law. The object and effect of the Irish Ejectment Statutes considered. Thomas v. Packer (1 H. & N. 669; S. C., 3. Jur., N. S., 143; 26 Law Jour., Exch., 207) considered in reference to the Irish Ejectment Statutes. Q. B. & Ex. Ch. Foot v. Warren EMBARRASSING PLEA. See MAGISTRATES. PLEADING, 1. ENLARGEMENT. 1 See EJECTMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT. ESTOPPEL. See EJECTMENT FOR NON-PAY- EQUITABLE DEFENCE. EXECUTION. See PRACTICE, 5. EXCEPTIONS. See PRACTICE, 5. EVIDENCE. See ADVERSE POSSESSION. DOCUMENT. ORAL SLANder. REGISTRY APPEAL, 2, 3, 6. the poverty of the alleged lender is admissible upon the issue whether or not the money was lent. E. Dowling v. Dowling 236 EVIDENCE OF VALUE. FALSA DESIGNATIO. FALSE IMPRISONMENT. See ASSAULT. FORMS IN PROCEDURE ACT. See USE AND OCCUPATION. FRAUDULENT REPRESENTA TION. See PROMISSORY NOTE. GAME LAWS. A party having a sufficient property qualification to kill game, where the lease, of which he holds the reversion, reserved "free liberty to the lessor, his heirs and assigns, his and their servants and followers, to hunt, hawk, fish and fowl upon the demised premises," is entitled to employ a servant, not possessing the property qualification required by the 10 W. 3, c. 8, s. 8, to kill and hunt game in his absence. Held also, that where a special verdict is defective, in not finding a material fact, but simply leaving it a matter of inference, it is competent for the Court to award a venire de novo. Ex. Ch. Foott v. Hudson 509 GENERAL WORDS. See DEED, 2. GRAND JURY ACT, A presentment for a bridge had been passed by the grand jury, and fiated; voluntary contributions were raised in aid of the presentment, and part of the sum presented had been levied; the contractor also had expended considerable sums in labour and materials, in preparing for the construction of a bridge.-Held, that the Court would not, upon the application of parties who had actively concurred in passing the presentment, and had since acquiesced in it, grant a certiorari, to bring up the presentment, for the purpose of quashing it, upon the grounds that the grand jury had no authority to grant it, and that it was void upon the face of it, for omitting to state the section of the statute, and the year of the King's reign in which one of the statutes relied on had been passed. Held also, that it made no difference that the parties who had so concurred and acquiesced were trustees for an infant, whose rights might possibly be prejudiced by the construction of the bridge. Q. B. In re Franks HORSE-RACING. See CONTRACT. INFANT. See GRAND JURY ACT. INJURY TO LAND. See RAILWAY CONSOLIDATION ACTS, 1, 2. INSUFFICIENT DEFENCE. See TRESPASS, Q. C. F. INTERROGATORIES. See WEIGHMASTER. 93 IRISH EJECTMENT CODE. See EJECTMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT. IRRELEVANCY OF STATE MENT. See LIBEL, 1. JOINT OCCUPATION. See REGISTRY APPEAL, 7. JUSTICE, ACTION AGAINST. In an action against a Justice of the Peace, for acts done in the execution of his office, the proof of notice of action is a necessary part of the plaintiff's case, and must be given by him, though the want of it may not be relied upon in pleading by the defendant. E. Lawrenson v. Hill 498 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. Where a ticket, under the 3 and 4 Vic., c. 91 (Linen Act), contained a special clause that the whole of the cloth must be returned within five weeks from date, or 1s. 6d. to be deducted for every week longer kept :-Held, that though such an agreement was not in terms contemplated by the 16th section of the Act, it was not opposed to its policy; and that where the employer had been summoned before the Petty Sessions for the wages stipulated in the ticket, he was entitled to set off the penalty for delay. C. P. Dobbin v. Aikin 130 JUSTIFICATION. See ASSAULT. RAILWAYS CONSOLIDATION LANDED ESTATES COURT. LANDLORD AND TENANT. See EJECTMENT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT. TRESPASS. LEASE. 1. A lease was granted in 1852, to J. M., of "all that, &c., that part of the lands of M., containing, &c., together with a right of commonage and turbary for the use of the said farm, as now in the possession of the said J. M., situate, &c., as by a map of said lands, in the margin hereof, will appear; being part of the lands conveyed to the grantor by a deed, dated 31st of October 1851," &c. It appeared, by necessary intendment, that, BL at the time of the execution of said lease of 1852, J. M. was in possession, not only of the forty-one acres, but also of a right of commonage, on the adjoining mountain, for the use of said farm.-Held, that the lease gave to J. M. the farm in question, together with the same commonage and turbary which he then enjoyed in respect thereof. J. M., in 1858, demised to J. F. and others seventeen acres, portion of the forty-one acres, by the following description:-"All that, &c., part of the lands of Moyglass, containing seventeen acres, now in the possession of the said J. F. and partners, together with a right of commonage and turbary, for the use of the said farm," for a term of eighteen years, which was a shorter term than that for which the grantor was possessed.-Held, that the lessees of the seventeen acres acquired by the sub-lease, as against the head landlord, a proportional share of the common appurtenant to the forty-one acres. C. P. O'Hare v. Fahy 318 2. A lease pur autre vie contained a either that, "if the cestui que vies, or clause of them, should be absent from Ireland for three whole years at one time, such life, in respect to the continuance of this demise, shall be considered as if actually dead from the end of such three years." It then provided that, at any trial at Law, or hearing in Equity, at the suit of the landlord, concerning the premises, "it shall be incumbent on the defendant to prove the cestui que vies or the survivor in being, and that they or he, then or within three years next preceding the commencement of such action or suit, was actually in Ireland, or, in default of such proof, this lease shall be determined to be, and shall be, ipso facto, void," &c. In 1847, one of the cestui que vies died, the other one had left Ireland in 1845; and, after he had been absent for more than three years, an ejectment on the title was brought, and the pre mises were evicted, judgment having gone by default. After a lapse of several years, the plaintiffs, who were defendants in the former ejectment, brought a cross ejectment, and proved at the trial that the surviving cestui que vie was alive at the time of the former action; that he had since returned to Ireland, and had only recently gone back to America.— Held, that, inasmuch as under the clause in the lease it was incumbent on the tenant to have proved, in the former suit, that the cestui que vie was then in Ireland, by the omission to do so the lease had conclusively determined, and could not be set up by giving such proof in the present action. C. P. Scullin v. M'Naghten 526 LEGACY DUTY, LIABILITY TO. It is not necessary, in order that legacy duty should be payable in respect of the personal estate of any person, that such person should have acquired in his lifetime a present right to receive the fund charged. Upon the marriage of W., a sum of £15,950 was settled upon certain trusts for W., and A. his wife (in bar of her share in his personal estate), and upon the issue of the marriage; and it was provided that if there should be no issue, or, being such, they should all die before they became entitled to a vested interest in the fund, then, after the decease of W. and A., the fund was to be held "for the only proper use and behoof of W., his executors, administrators and assigns." W. died, leaving issue B, C and D, who were his next-of-kin. B, C and D then died, without having attained a vested interest in the fund, and the trust in favour of W.'s estate became absolute, subject to A.'s rights. B's death, his next-of-kin were C, D and A. The next-of-kin of C were D and A., and D's sole next-of-kin was A. The defendant, who was the personal representative and residuary legatee of A., also took out represen At 1. No action lies against a party for a statement in an affidavit, made by him as a witness, in the course of a cause, although such statement was irrelevant, and was expunged from the affidavit as prolix, impertinent and scandalous, by an order of the competent Court. E. Kennedy v. Hilliard 195 2. To an action for oral slander the defendant pleaded that before, &c., plaintiff and defendant were brother officers, and defendant was interested in the good character of plaintiff, and that no officer of the regiment should be guilty or suspected of any crime, "and that it was the duty of the defendant to mention to the adjutant of the regiment the existence of any such imputation upon the character or conduct of the plaintiff, as such brother officer, in order that the said imputation might be inquired into," and, if found to be false, removed. That before, &c., the plaintiff had been placed under arrest, upon a charge prejudicial to his character, and that directions were given, according to the Articles of War, and entered in the regimental order book, for holding a court-martial to investigate said charge; that all said facts were matters of notoriety in the regiment; that, at the time of the speaking, &c., the day for the court-martial had not arrived, and plaintiff was under arrest; "and that, under the circumstances aforesaid, the defend LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT. 573 ant entered into conversation with LIMITATION. See DEED, 1. 279 LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.- LINEN ACT. See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. LODGER. See REGISTRY APPEAL, 8. LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT. To an action by the plaintiff, as husband and administrator of his deceased wife, to recover compensation under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vic., c. 93), the defendant pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not, with the summons and plaint, deliver to the defendant, or to his attorney, a full particular of the persons for whom and on whose behalf the action was brought, and of the nature of the claim in respect of which damages were sought to be recovered in the action, as required by the statute, intituled, &c.-Held, upon demurrer, that the plea was no answer to the action, the requirements of section 4 of the 9 & 10 Vic., c. 93, that the particulars therein specified shall be |