ABANDONED AND CAPTURED PROPERTY.
See COURT OF CLAIMS.
ABANDONMENT OF INVENTION.
1. On an appeal by the libellants in a cause of salvage, from a decree of
the Circuit Court which awarded to them a less amount than the Dis-
trict Court had awarded, on an appeal from that court taken only by
the libellants, this court, being unable to say, from the findings of fact
by the Circuit Court, that that court did not properly exercise its dis-
cretion in making the allowance it did, affirmed its decree. Irvine v.
The Hesper, 256.
2. An appeal in admiralty from a District Court to a Circuit Court vacates
altogether the decree of the District Court, and the case is tried de
novo, and this is true, whether both parties appeal, or whether only
the one or the other appeals. Ib.
When the transcript from a court below filed in an appellate court in due
time is imperfect, and the imperfection can be cured by a writ of cer-
tiorari, the appeal is valid. Clinton v. Missouri Pacific Railway, 469.
See ADMIRALTY, 2;
JURISDICTION, A, 2, 3, 4, 5;
LOCAL LAW, 10.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
1. A payment by an insolvent debtor of a debt due to his wife, in advance
and in contemplation of a general assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors, does not invalidate the subsequent assignment. Estes v. Gunter,
2. The taking of supplies and of money for family use from the store of
an insolvent trader by his wife does not invalidate a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors, subsequently made. 1b.
3. The court, being satisfied that the conveyance of real estate by the hus-
band, when insolvent, to a trustee for the benefit of his wife (which is
assailed in this suit), was made in good faith to secure an indebted-
ness from him to her for sums previously realized by him from sales
of her individual property, sustains it, as coming within the doctrine,
well settled here, that while such a deed, made under such circum-
stances, is not valid if its sole purpose is to secure the wife against
future necessities, it is, if made to secure a prior existing indebted-
ness from the husband to the wife, as valid as if made to secure a like
indebtedness to any other of his creditors. Bean v. Patterson, 496.
See ATTACHMENT;
LOCAL LAW, 8, 9.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
See PRACTICE, 2.
ASSUMPSIT.
See COURT AND JURY, 4;
LOCAL LAW, 1;
PLEADING, 1.
B. and M. sued out an attachment against the property of L. and A., who
had made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The writ coming
to the hands of the marshal of the United States, he indorsed thereon
an appointment of a special deputy, leaving the name of the latter
blank, and verbally authorizing the attorney of the attaching creditors
to fill the blank with the name of some "bonded officer." The blank
was filled by the attorney with the name of a sheriff; and, he declin-
ing to act, his name was erased by the attorney, who then inserted the
name of a town marshal. The latter having executed the writ by
seizing the property of the debtors, on the same day turned over both
the property and the writ to a regular deputy of a marshal. Subse-
quently the court, with the consent of the attaching creditors, the
debtors and the assignee of the debtors, ordered the property to be
sold, and the proceeds to be brought into court for the benefit of all
the attaching creditors, in their order. After the money was paid to
the clerk of the court, other creditors of the same debtors obtained
judgments against them, and, having procured writs of garnishment
to be served on the marshal and clerk, moved to discharge the levy
under the attachment on the ground that it was made by an unauthor-
ized person and was void. Held, that the attaching creditors, the
debtors, and the assignee of the debtors having, in effect, waived their
objections to the manner in which the property was seized, and the
consent order of sale not being impeached for fraud, subsequent judg
ment creditors could not question the validity of the levy, or the dis-
position made of the proceeds of the property. Walter v. Bickham, 320.
See COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2.
An assignee in bankruptcy has no standing to impeach a voluntary con-
veyance made by the bankrupt to his children prior to the adjudica-
tion in bankruptcy, unless such conveyance was void because of
fraud; and, in Georgia, it is not fraudulent and void when the
property conveyed forms an inconsiderable part of the grantor's
estate, and there is no purpose to hinder and delay creditors.
Only existing creditors have a right to assail such a conveyance.
The assignee, there being no fraud, takes only such rights as the
bankrupt had. Adams v. Collier, 382.
See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, 3, 4, 6, 7.
BILL OF LADING.
See COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2.
1. Chicago, Burlington & Kansas City Railroad v. Guffey, 120 U. S. 569,
affirmed on petition for a rehearing, 56.
2. Iron Mountain & Helena Railroad v. Johnson, 119 U. S. 608, affirmed
and applied. Denver & Rio Grande Railway v. Harris, 597.
3. Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 325, affirmed on petition for a
rehearing, 365.
4. Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Allen, 121 U. S. 67, affirmed on a petition for
rehearing, 376.
5. Phonix Ins. Co. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 32, affirmed.
& Nashville Railroad, 391.
6. Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 120 U. S. 649, affirmed on a
petition for a rehearing, 267.
7. Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 111 U. S. 482, affirmed. Goodlett
v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 391.
8. Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U. S. 535. Williams v. Albany, 154.
CASES DOUBTED, EXPLAINED, OR QUESTIONED.
1. Ralls County v. United States, 105 U. S. 733, explained. Harshman v.
Knox County, 306.
2. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, considered and
questioned. Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania,
326.
1. Prior to a collision between two steam vessels, the C. and the M., they
were moving on nearly parallel, opposite, but slightly converging
lines, and that fact was apparent to the officers of both for some
considerable time before the C. ported and ran across the course
of the M. The M. did not slacken her speed, or signal her
intentions, or reverse until it was too late. The relative courses of
the vessels, and the bearing of their lights, and the manifest uncer-
tainty as to the intentions of the C., in connection with all the sur-
rounding facts, called for the closest watch and the highest degree of
diligence, on the part of each, with reference to the movements of the
other: Held, that, although the C. was in fault, the M. was also in
fault for not indicating her course by her whistle, and for not slow-
ing, and for not reversing until too late. The Manitoba, 97.
2. The proper mode of applying a limitation of liability, where both
vessels are in fault and the damages are divided, and both vessels are
allowed such limitation, stated. Ib.
3. The M. having been bonded, in the limited liability proceedings, on a
bond in a fixed sum, conditioned to "abide and answer the decree,"
that sum does not carry interest until the date of the decree of the
District Court. lb.
4. The loss of the C., with interest from the date of the collision to the
date of the decree of the Circuit Court, exceeded the loss of the M.,
with like interest, by a sum, one-half of which was greater than the
amount of such bond, with interest from the date of the decree of the
District Court to the date of the decree of the Circuit Court. It was,
therefore, proper for the Circuit Court to award to the C., as damages,
the amount of the bond, with such interest. Iò.
1. A bill of lading, acknowledging the receipt by a common carrier of "the
following packages, contents unknown. . . marked and numbered as
per margin, to be transported" to the place of destination, is not a
warranty, on the part of the carrier, that the goods are of the quality
described in the margin. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Rail-
way v. Knight, 79.
2. P. shipped by rail a large quantity of cotton at different times, and at
different points south of Texarkana, Ark., to be made up into bales
there at a compress house, and to be thence forwarded to various des-
tinations North and East. The work at the compress house was to be
done by the carrier, but under direction of the shipper, who had con-
trol of the cotton there for that purpose, and who superintended the
weighing, the classing, and the marking of it, and who selected for
shipment the particular bales to fill the respective orders at the points
of destination. Bills of lading for it were issued from time to time by
the agents of the railroad company, sometimes in advance of the sepa-
ration by P. of particular bales from the mass to correspond with
them. P. was in the habit of drawing against shipments with bills of
lading attached, and his drafts were discounted at the local banks.
When shipments were heavy, drafts would often mature before the ar-
rival of the cotton. 325 bales, marked on the margin as of a particu-
lar quality, were so selected and shipped to K. at Providence, Rhode
Island. The bill of lading described them as "contents unknown,"
"marked and numbered as per margin." The contents of the bales,
on arrival, were found not to correspond with the marks on the margin.
The consignee had honored the draft before the arrival of the cotton.
He refused to receive the cotton, and sold it on account of the railroad
company, after notice to it, and sued in assumpsit, on the bill of lad-
ing, to recover from the company, as a common carrier, the amount of
the loss. Held, (1) That the bill of lading was not a guarantee by
the carrier that the cotton was of the quality described in the margin;
(2) That if the railroad company was liable as warehouseman, that
liability could not be enforced under this declaration; nor, under the
circumstances of this case, by the consignee of the cotton; (3) That
the company was not liable as a common carrier from points south of
Texarkana for the specific bales consigned to K; (4) That its liability
as common carrier began only when specific lots were marked and
designated at Texarkana, and specifically set apart to correspond with
a bill of lading then or previously issued. Ib.
1. It being the settled doctrine of this court that "the remedy subsisting
in a state when and where a contract is made and is to be performed
is a part of its obligation, and" that "any subsequent law of the state
which so effects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the
value of the contract is forbidden by the Constitution, and is therefore
void;" and the legislature of Missouri having, by the act of March
23, 1868, to facilitate the construction of railroads, enacted that the
county court should from time to time levy and cause to be collected,
in the same manner as county taxes, a special tax in order to pay the
interest and principal of any bond which might be issued by a munic-
ipal corporation in the state on account of a subscription, authorized
by the act, to the stock of a railroad company, which tax should be
levied on all the real estate within the township making the subscrip-
tion, in accordance with the valuation then last made by the county
assessors for the county purposes, Held: (1) That it was a material
part of this contract that such creditor should always have the right
to a special tax to be levied and collected in the same manner as
county taxes at the same time might be levied and collected; (2)
That the provisions contained in §§ 6798, 6799, and 6800 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri of 1879 respecting the assessment and col-
lection of such taxes are not a legal equivalent for the provisions
contained in the act of 1868; and (3) That the law of 1868, although
repealed by the legislature of Missouri, is still in force for the purpose
of levying and collecting the tax necessary for the payment of a judg-
ment recovered against a municipal corporation in the state, upon a
debt incurred by subscribing to the stock of a railroad company in
accordance with its provisions. Seibert v. Lewis, 284.
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