objects foreknown. Must not God be said to will what He foresees yet permits, when He has the power to prevent? How is the creation of men, whose sin and ruin are foreseen, compatible with His love and holiness? "It avails nothing to say, God knows the free as free, and His knowledge must be separated from His will. Here we are speaking of foreknowledge, not of knowledge. This is something quite different from knowledge." Men, again, are reduced to mere automata, their life and acts are all determined from the first. But, we are told, the foreknowledge is not the cause of the event, but the event of the foreknowledge. Man freely plays his part in life, which God merely saw before man did. 'But-and here we come to the supposition on which the whole theory rests, and which we have hitherto left unquestioned-it is not possible that God should foreknow the free, but a selfcontradiction. It is implied in the idea of free decision that it cannot be calculated on beforehand. A psychologist can only foresee with probability, on the ground of knowledge of a man's present inner state, what the man will do in given circumstances, but cannot know it exactly. This must also be true of God. That He knows the free as free is self-evident, but if He foreknows it as free, it cannot really have been free. Thus, with God's providence, the theory also abolishes human freedom." The writer replies to three objections to his doctrine. The first objection is that he makes God's eternal foreknowledge of the world's course impossible; the second, that He must also deny God's temporal foreknowledge; the third, that He makes a fixed Divine plan of the world inconceivable. He concedes the substantial correctness of the objections. The truth of the first objection he admits unreservedly. Since foreknowledge is inconsistent with free action, one or other must go, and he gives up the former. The second also he admits with a reserve. While still excluding all free temporal events from absolute foreknowledge, he still maintains the reality of a Divine plan of the world, "only not fixed, unchangeable." "God knows quite definitely what He will do from the beginning with the world as a whole, and in time with every nation and man; His works are known to Him from eternity; but in the execution of His plans He makes Himself dependent on human freedom, whose issues He does not exactly know beforehand. His plans, therefore, are not like rigid fate, but plastic, leaving room for freedom. . . . . Divine Providence and human freedom are preserved only on this view."

Dorner objects that this position would leave it uncertain whether even a single soul would be saved. Breithaupt replies that the need and desire for salvation existing in mankind (Gen. iii. 15) will ensure the salvation of some, "although the names of these were not certain."

Another objection is that the theory makes God finite, asserting that He not merely knows the temporal as temporal, but also in a temporal way. "We hold decidedly that God is eternal and exalted above time and the world as to His nature. But, just as decidedly, we must maintain that, when God has created the world, whose history goes on in the form of time, and rules over this world, He necessarily by this rule enters into time. For if the world itself and its development is something real, it must also be real to God. And since this development proceeds in the form of time, and must so proceed by its very nature, time also must be real to God, so that what is future or past here is also known by Him as future or past. Whoever denies this, either denies God's truthfulness, who then would not see and know things as they really are, or he denies the reality of the world's development. And he puts a gulf between the eternal God and the temporal world-order, which seems to us quite impassable."

The writer contends also that Scripture is on his side. If Scripture speaks of

pre-temporal election to salvation (Eph. i. 4; cf. 2 Tim. i. 9), nothing is said of definite persons. The "in Christ" shows that a certain moral class is meant. Again, the πрoуwwσкew (Rom. viii. 29 and xi. 2) signifies "as is certain, despite the opposite expositions of Hofmann and Cremer, not foreknowing, but rather joining oneself beforehand with some one, ordaining him beforehand for fellowship with oneself, and is consequently akin, not to εἰδέναι, but to προορίζειν and ἐκλέγειν. But such a meaning is not at all opposed to our view." The writer gives no reasons for this somewhat strained interpretation.

The prophecies also only speak of Divine actions, conditional or otherwise. The predictions about Judas and the destruction of Jerusalem seem to be exceptions. But it is held that here the event foretold was so probable that Jesus might foresee it with perfect certainty, without foreknowledge of the free, by His psychological insight and His knowledge of God's purposes and the laws of moral government. prophecy refers to individuals or a people it is made conditional on the conduct of the Where latter. The writer refers to the history of Cain as directly confirming his theory. "Can any one who impartially considers the history suppose that God, either from eternity or even an hour before, knew with unconditional certainty that Cain would be a murderer, when He so earnestly warns him in the last hour? On the other hand, we see the psychological knowledge of God most plainly confirmed." The writer sums up so far in two propositions: "1. God sees with constant immediateness the whole of creaturely life, even the germs of future development; but He does not possess an unconditionally certain foreknowledge of the free. He knows the temporal not only as temporal, but also in temporal form. 2. God's world-plan, both in general and particular, is conditional. In executing it God makes Himself dependent on the working of creaturely forces." The theory is certainly not lacking in boldness. (Conclusion to follow.)

Two NOTES ON PHIL. ii. 5 (Theol. Stud. u. Krit., 1893. No. 1). Note on Phil. ii. 5, by O. HAIN, Pastor in Eppstein, Nassau.-The right explanation of this verse depends on the right understanding of the TOUTO and the correct supplying of the predicate omitted in the relative clause. With the exception of von Hofmann, who supplies the indicative present poveîte, which certainly yields no appropriate thought alongside the imperative of the demonstrative main clause, because it really supposes the disposition to exist in the Philippians, to which they are exhorted in the main clause, expositors fluctuate between v, in the wake of the Syrian and the Vulgate, and eppovýon (ppoveîтo, Weiffenbach) in the train of Erasmus and Luther. supplying of cannot be justified grammatically, and gives, as it would not be a The copula, but a predicative verb, the irrational thought that something existing in Christ Jesus was to be the object of the disposition befitting Christians. In supplying ἐφρονήθη οι ἐφρονεῖτο, the purpose is to explain the ellipsis of the predicate by putting in its place an ellipsis of the subject, for the relative clause could only be rendered : "which was also thought (felt or minded) in Christ Jesus," and the question would arise which would not be hypercritical, but a demand of rational thought: What, then, was thought (felt or minded) in Christ Jesus, namely, which was to be or become the disposition of the Philippians? Every attempt to answer this question confirms the impossibility of this supplement, which also cannot be harmonized with or justified by the rules of Greek syntax, to say nothing of the fact that the Apostle does not hold up before the Philippians the inner disposition of Christ Jesus in itself as a pattern, but so far as it has been exhibited in the facts of His life-history and is discernible from them. Also poveîv év vμîv is not "think in yourselves, in your soul,' but "to be minded toward (among) yourselves," as is clear from Rom. xv. 5, where

The

τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ Χριστόν Ἰησοῦν expresses the same thought. Apostle Paul has here written in full accord with classical usage; the Greek syntax is the key to the right explanation of the present passage.

τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν δ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ: “ Be thus minded among (toward) yourselves, as you ought also (then) to be in Christ Jesus."

TOûTO refers, as must first be maintained against the commentators, to what precedes, here to the exhortations addressed to the Philippians in vers. 2-4, in harmony with the ordinary usage in Greek (Phil. Buttmann, Griech. Gramm., 21 Aufl. § 127), and also with the ordinary usage in the New Testament (Alex. Buttmann, Gramm. d. N.T. Sprachgebrauchs, s. 91, Nr. 3); cf. Phil. i. 18, 19, 25, ii. 23, iii. 7, 15, iv. 8; elsewhere, 1 Peter ii. 21; Acts. iv. 11, &c.

8 kai: Kai here according to good classical usage in the sense of "also": "then (donc); for, says Phil. Buttmann (ibid. § 149, 8), in Greek κaí is often added in the sense "also "superfluously to all appearance, most usually after relatives, cf. Plato, Alc. i. 6 66 (I concede all thy questions) ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ, ὅ, τι καὶ ἐρεῖς, that I may learn what thou wilt then say." The predicate of the preceding demonstrative main clause must also be taken as the predicate of this relative sentence, and therefore the imperative poveîte must be supplied after kai; for in Greek we very often find (Phil. Buttmann, § 143, Anm. 3, cf. Alex. Buttmann, s. 335, 337) an ellipsis, in which the entire predicate is omitted in the relative clause, when the same predicate has to stand in the relative as in the main clause. Respecting the imperative in the relative clause, Aug. Matthiae (Ausf. Griech. Gramm. 2 Aufl. § 511, a.b. s. 973) says: "The imperative often expresses not so much a command proceeding from a definite person, who can demand obedience, as the statement of that which the other ought to do in accordance with his circumstances," e.g., Herod i. 89: Kátiσov tŵv dopvpbpwv ènì táoŋoi τῇσι πολῇσι φυλάκους οἳ λεγόντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐκφέροντας τὰ χρήματα ἀπαιρεύμενοι, ί.., “ place at all the gates sentinels from the spearmen, who shall take away the treasures from those who are carrying them off and shall say to them"; cf. Dr. Curtius (Griech. Schulgrammatik, 14 Aufl. § 552, 2,) who cites the example: ouk äžiov toîs Xóyois μâXλov πιστεῦσαι ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις, ὃν ὑμεῖς σαφέστατον ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς νομίσατε (more forcible than Xpǹ voμíσai): "It is not right to put trust rather in words than deeds, which you should regard, ought to regard, as the plainest evidence of truth."

How, again, φρονεῖν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ is to be understood and explained is shown by the τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν κυρίῳ iv. 2, with which may be compared τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν Rom. xv. 5, and i. John ii. 6: ὁ λέγων ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν ὀφείλει καθῶς ἐκεινὸς περιεπάτησεν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως περιπατεῖν.

Accordingly the Apostle shows the Philippians that they should have among or toward one another such a disposition as he asked of them in vers. 2-4 to complete his joy, if they would really walk in the ways of the Lord Jesus, their Saviour, as ἅγιοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (ver. 1); for whoever is joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him (i. Cor. vi. 17); but he who has not Christ's spirit is not His (Rom. viii. 9). As Paul here in the facts of the life-history of Christ Jesus showed the Philippians, so the Lord Jesus Christ showed His Apostles in the act of feet-washing which He performed, of what disposition they His followers should and ought to be as His disciples (John xiii. 14, 15; cf. i. Peter iv. 1, 2, Eph. v. 2). On this view of the passage Beza's saying gets its full meaning that Jesus Christ is the norma omnium virtutum, and also the Lord's demand (John xii. 26): "He that would serve me let him follow me." Thus only does the entire section chap. ii. 1-11 appear clearly and plainly a homogeneous whole and the exegesis in full harmony with Greek grammar.

Note on Phil. ii. 6 by Prof. E. Nestle, Tübingen. 'Ev μорøù ¦εоû ùñáрxwv. As

Gen. iii. 5 should be cited and actually is cited by some expositors and editions on Tò elvai loa Oeŵ (e.g., by Theile in the margin, but not in the recensus locorum V.T. in Novo,) so also Gen. i. 27 (not v. 26) should be referred to on μoppǹ coû in the verse named. That this is not done in any of the editions and expositions known to me, not even by Cremer in the elaborate discussion of the word popp, in the latest editions of his Lexicon, is perhaps due to the fact, that Dy is translated by the LXX. in the passage named by Kar' eikóva Ocoû,-hence 2 Cor. iv. 4, &c.—and in no concordance is μoppń, which rarely occurs in the Old as in the New Testament, adduced as a translation of the Hebrew Dy. Once, however, it is found in this way. In the genuine LXX. version of Daniel, first printed in 1772, and hence not yet sufficiently used in exegesis, in chap. iii. 19 YN DEN DY is translated: ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἠλλοιώθη. The passage is all the more interesting as in the parallel places iv. 33, v. 6, 10, vii. 28 1 glory dóža stands, Theodition uniformly μopp. Accordingly in Biblical Greek μoppń signifies glorious form, coming very near to dóga (John i. 14; Heb. i. 3); cf. also Matt. xvii. 2 μeтeμoppwłŋ kai éλaμyev. Let others follow this further and the bearing of this reference of Gen. i.; it must suffice for me to have pointed out the rendering in Daniel, from which, as I have shown elsewhere, Matt. xxviii. 18: éôóîn μoi mâσa éžovoía (= Dan. vii. 14) is also taken.

CURRENT FRENCH THOUGHT. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY. By G. STEINHEIL. (Revue Chrétienne).—The traditional doctrine of eternal punishment has prevailed in the Church from the third century down to our own time, both in the East and in the West; and is characteristic of Protestant, no less than of Catholic orthodoxy. The work of a recent advocate of conditional immortality, M. Pétavel, may serve to bring before our readers other alternative solutions of the great problem of the final destiny of the impenitent. The fundamental idea of his theory may be given in this writer's own words. "Man, who is heir-presumptive of immortality, can only come to his inheritance on the condition of entering into communion with Jesus Christ, and of walking in His footsteps. If he depart from this path, there is before him nothing but eternal darkness: from that darkness he came, and into it all will again be plunged, who are not partakers of the holy life of the living God. The believer only receives from the Holy Spirit the vital force which triumphs over the second death." Man created in the image of God is capable of immortality, and God has destined him for an unending life. It is on this will of God, on this predestination to life, that our hope of immortality is founded, and not on an attribute of the soul itself. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has a philosophical origin, but finds no support in the Bible. It is not to a being of immortal essence that God could say, "Thou shalt surely die." God alone has immortality. United to God, man lives; separated from Him, he passes away to death and nothingness. God wishes us to become partakers of immortality and happiness by union with Jesus Christ. He wishes the means because he wishes the end they alone can secure; and He co-operates with man to enable him to fulfil the necessary condition of salvation.

Traditional theology betrays a weak point by affirming the absolute eternity of condemnation, while the strength of conditionalism lies in the idea of evil coming to an end by the annihilation of the wicked. I regard the conversion of the wicked as a much more complete abolition of evil; but, for all that, I am willing to acknowledge the great advance upon the older views, which is implied in conditionalism.

No doctrine casts a deeper shadow upon the conception of a God of love than that of eternal condemnation. Imagination recoils in horror from the pictures which even good men have, with the best of intentions, drawn of the sufferings of the lost. They seem to forget that these wretched lives can only subsist by being incessantly renewed, and perpetually preserved by miracles of God's creative and preserving power. What, compared with such actions attributed to Him, are the most atrocious tortures, invented and executed by the worst of men, to torment their victims? I cannot believe that this God is the God of love and of eternal mercy revealed by Jesus Christ.

Conditionalism finds some support in a certain reasonable doctrine of the nature of sin. According to it, sin is a malady of the soul, similar to maladies of the body. Now every malady is terminated at last by cure or by death. Thus is it with maladies of the soul. Some who are sick come to Christ, and find healing; others persist in remaining far from Him, and perish in their impenitence.

Another analogy is that between conditionalism and evolutionism. The survival of the fittest is the law which presides over the birth and death of every living being. Nature that great and busy worker-selects the most successful of her creations, and leaves to perish or violently destroys those she does not choose. According to the conditional theory, the righteous are the "fit" who survive and gain immortality; while the wicked are the "unfit " who are rejected and annihilated. For annihilation is all that can remain for beings so incurably diseased that God Himself has to give up attempts to heal them.

Among the adversaries of conditionalism are not only those who hold the ordinary doctrine of the eternity of future punishment, but also those who hold that of universal restoration. It is with these latter that I range myself. M. Pétavel denounces universalism as both unphilosophical and unbiblical, and as dangerous in its tendency. There is a universalism with which I have no sympathy and which I freely give over to his reprobation; it is that of those who say, "Live as you please, your final safety is secure," who substitute for the moral act of freely returning to God some sort of magical transformation wrought by the Divine omnipotence. But Biblical universalism ought not to be confounded with these fallacious and erroneous doctrines. A weakness of conditionalism is that it considers that the prospect of annihilation is bound to inspire sinners with a salutary fear. As a matter of fact this is not the case. One of the dire effects of sin is to render human life so miserable that annihilation is often welcomed. Hundreds of millions of Asiatics look on it as a supreme felicity to be gained by a life of self-mortification, while in conditionalism the final deliverance by annihilation is not the lot of the righteous, but that of sinners. Nor is this longing for annihilation confined to Asia: we find it in the West among the disciples of pessimistic philosophy. Those, too, who live a life of gross materialism, who virtually deny the existence of God and of the soul, and regard the ideas of judgment and heaven and hell, as fables, are not to be terrified into salvation by the threat of annihilation. Nor are those who are weary of life, and seek to end its misery by suicide, to be restrained in any such way. Would it not be a much more effectual means to effect a salutary change in them, to assure them that as long as they are rebels against God they will not see life, but the wrath of God will abide upon them? It is not universalism that deserves to be stigmatized as dangerous, but the doctrine that there are two ways of deliverance from evil, the one by returning to God, the other by annihilation.

Christian universalism is to me the synthesis of the Calvinistic and the Arminian doctrines. St. Paul says, "God our Saviour willeth that all men should be saved, and