vided they are taxed in the usual way in which such property is taxed, and not taxed by reason or because of such exportation, or intended exportation; the carrying of them to and depositing them at a depot for the purpose of transportation is no part of that transportation."

Bradley, J., in giving the opinion in Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, says in substance: The question is whether the products of a state are liable to be taxed like other property within the state, though intended for exportation to another state, and partially prepared for that purpose, by being deposited at a place of shipment, such products being owned by persons residing in another state.

Property cannot be exempt from taxation by reason of being owned by non-residents of the state. A state has jurisdiction of all persons and things within its territory which do not belong to some other jurisdiction, such as the representatives of foreign governments, with their houses and effects, and property belonging to or in the use of the government of the United States.

Does the owner's state of mind in relation to the goods, i. e. his intent to export them, and his partial preparation to do so, exempt them from taxation?

Logs cut in the State of Maine, and detained while in the course of transportation through New Hampshire by low water or other causes, are already in the course of commercial transportation, and are clearly under the protection of the Constitution.

So would the goods in question be when actually started in the course of transportation to another state, or delivered to a carrier for such transportation. There must be a point of time when they cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law, and begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose, in which they commence their final movement for transportation from the state of their origin to that of their destination. When the products of the farm or the forest are collected and brought in from the surrounding country to a station or town serving as an entrepot for that particular region, whether on a river or a line of railroad, such products are not yet exports, nor are they in process of exportation, nor is exportation begun until they are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the state to the state of their destination, or have started on their ultimate passage to that state. Woodruff v. Parliam, 8 Wall. 123; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622.

No definite rule has been adopted with regard to the point of time at which the taxing power of the state ceases as to goods exported to a foreign country or to another state.

The true rule is that the products of one state intended for exportation to another state do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the state, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another state, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.

It seems to us untenable to hold that a crop or herd is exempt from taxation merely because it is, by its owner, intended for exportation.

As long as wheat, corn, and cotton are on the lands which produce them, they are part of the general property of the state. And so they continue to be until they have entered upon their final journeys for leaving the state and going into another state.

The carrying of products in carts, or even floating them, to the depot where the journey is to commence, is no part of that journey. That is all preliminary work, performed for the purpose of putting the property in a state of preparation and readiness for transportation.

Until actually launched on its way to another state, or committed to a common carrier for transportation to such state, its destination is not fixed and certain.

The logs taxed in this case in New Hampshire were cut in that state, and had not when taxed been shipped, or started, or their final voyage, or journey, to the State of Maine. They had only been drawn from Wentworth's Location to Errol, the place from which they were to be transported to Lewiston in the State of Maine. They come precisely within the character of property which according to the principles here laid down is taxable. And see Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504.

REGULATION OF COMMERCE. -A tax imposed by a statute of a state upon an occupation which necessarily discriminates against the introduction and sale of the products of another state, or against the citizens of another state, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

The police power of a state, to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors and preserve the public health and morals, does not warrant the enactment of laws infringing positive enactments, provisions of the Constitution of the United States.

A state statute which imposes a tax upon persons who, not residing or having their principal place of business within the state, engage there in the business of selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors to be shipped into the state from places without it, but does not impose a similar tax upon persons selling or soliciting the sale of intoxicating liquors manufactured within the state, is a regulation in restraint of commerce repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and the defect is not cured by a subsequent enactment, imposing a greater tax upon all persons within the state engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling such liquors therein.

Opinion by Bradley, J. The case is clearly within the decision. in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. See, also, Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall, 148; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344.

See the previous decisions on this subject collected in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622. See, also, Higgins v. Three Hundred Casks of Lime, 130 Mass. 1; State v. Furbush, 72 Me. 493; State v. Scott, 27 Mo. 464. — Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446.

TAXATION DIFFERENT RATES.· . It is within the constitutional power of Congress, acting as the local legislature of the District of Columbia, to tax different classes of property within the District at different rates. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404.

IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS RAILROAD COMMISSIONER'S CASE. - A state has power to limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property within its own jurisdiction, unless restrained by some contract in the charter, or unless what is done amounts to a regulation of foreign or inter-state commerce. R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456; C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. C. & N. W. R. R. 94 U. S. 164; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526, 531.

This power of regulation is a power of government, continuing in its nature, and if it can be bargained away at all it can only be by words of positive grant, or something which is in law equivalent. If there is reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the existence of the power. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 419; Delaware R. R. Tax Case, 18 Wall. 206; Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548.

The rights and privileges of the corporation in its business of

transportation are just what those of a natural person would be under like circumstances; no more, no less. The natural person would be subject to legislative control as to the amount of his charges. So must the corporation be. Cases cited above.

Section 12 of the charter is, "that it shall be lawful for the company. . . from time to time to fix, regulate, and receive the toll and charges to be by them received for transportation," etc.

It is argued that by this section the state has surrendered the power to fix a maximum for this company. We see no evidence of any such intention. The right to fix reasonable charges has been granted, but the power of declaring what shall be deemed reasonable has not been surrendered.

From what has thus been said, it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation. Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the state cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of law. Harlan and Field, JJ., dissent. Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 116 U. S. 307.

Bill in equity for an injunction to restrain the Railroad Commissioners in Mississippi from enlarging the act referred to in Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 116 U. S. 307. The principles controlling that decision are affirmed.

road Company, 116 U. S. 347.

Stone v. Illinois Central Rail

See, also, Stone v. New Orleans

& Northeastern Railroad Co. 116 U. S. 352.

FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS - SEARCH AND Seizure. Act of June 22, 1874, sect. 5, authorizes a court of the United States, in revenue cases, on motion of the government attorney, to require the defendant or claimant to produce in court his private papers, or else the allegations of the attorney to be confessed;

Held, to be unconstitutional and void as applied to suits for penalties or to establish a forfeiture of the party's goods, as being repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

Proceedings in rem were instituted to establish a forfeiture of certain goods alleged to have been fraudulently imported without paying the duties therein, pursuant to the twelfth section of said act;

Held, that an order of court made under the fifth section, requir

ing the claimants of goods to produce a certain invoice in court for the inspection of the government attorney, and to be offered in evidence by him, was an unconstitutional exercise of authority, and the inspection of the invoice by the attorney, and its admission in evidence, were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings.

It does not require actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; a compulsory production of a party's private books and papers to be used against himself or his property in a criminal or penal proceeding, or for a forfeiture, is within the spirit and meaning of the amendment.

It is equivalent to a compulsory production of papers, to make the non-production of them a confession of the allegations which it is pretended they will prove.

A proceeding to forfeit a person's goods for an offence against the laws, though civil in form, aud whether in rem or in personam, is a "criminal case" within that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person "shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself."

The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used against himself is equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and in a prosecution for a crime, penalty, or forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.

Both amendments relate to the personal security of the citizen. They nearly run into and throw light upon each other. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely, compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private papers, it is an "unreasonable search and seizure " within the Fourth Amendment.

Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence for the purpose of convicting him of a crime, recovering a penalty, or of forfeiting his property, is totally different from the search and seizure of stolen goods, dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid, and the like, which rightfully belong to the custody of the law.

Opinion by Bradley, J. "A compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure."