held that "bankruptcies" apply to all persons unable to pay their debts; that the power of Congress is not restrained to any particular mode of discharge, whether voluntary or involuntary; and that the power exists to relieve the insolvent from debts antecedent as well as those subsequent to the statute. There is no direct restriction upon the power of Congress to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts; and it was considered that the general grant of power to pass laws on the subject of bankruptcies, ex vi termini, includes prior as well as subsequent liabilities within its purview. The prohibition upon Congress from passing ex post facto laws, refers, as will be shown hereafter, to criminal offences only.1

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§ 402. From the foregoing statement and analysis, it ap pears to be settled by judicial decision and legislative practice, that Congress has full authority to pass all laws relating to the distribution of the estates, and discharge of the liabilities, of failing debtors, whether we technically call such laws bankrupt or insolvent"; that it may provide for the compulsory seizure and distribution of the assets at the instance of creditors, or the voluntary proceeding at the suit of the debtor; that the discharge may be made operative upon debts contracted prior as well as subsequent to the passage of the statute; that all matters of detail, such as whether the operation of the laws shall extend to all insolvents, or be confined to particular and designated classes, are mere questions of policy, to be settled by Congress, and not questions of legislative jurisdiction, to be determined by courts. And I see no reason why Congress may not incorporate provisions looking to the punishment of fraudulent or extravagant debtors, by withholding the discharge for a time, or even by imprisoning the person in case where this severity is warranted by the circumstances.

§ 403. I cannot leave this subject without departing somewhat from my general plan, and adding a remark upon the policy of legislation under the grant of power so distinctly conferred, and the expediency of a national system of bank

1 See also McCormick v. Pickering, 4 Comst. 276; Thompson v. Alger, 12 Met. 428.

ruptcy. I pass by the consideration of the relief it will afford to thousands of debtors hopelessly insolvent, and the fresh impetus it will give to business; because this topic belongs more especially to the political and social economist. There are other reasons which seem to me unanswerable, which apply to all times, and show that such a system should be a permanent part of the national legislation.

§ 404. The great trade and commerce of the country now passes beyond the limits of any one state; it is in a measure international; the creditor resides in one state, under one municipal law, the debtor in a different commonwealth which is governed by another local code. The diversities among the state laws which regulate the collection of debts and the settlement of the estates of insolvents, whether fraudulent or simply unfortunate, are almost as numerous as the states themselves. In some, preferential assignments are permitted, in others forbidden; in some, long stays upon execution are allowed; in some, an insolvent may be discharged from liability with the consent of a definite portion of the creditors; in others, without the consent of any; in others still, not without the consent of all. Added to this discrepancy, it is firmly settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, that an insolvent's discharge under a state law has no extraterritorial effect; that it is not in the least binding upon a creditor residing in another commonwealth who has not assented to it, although he may have been notified of the proceeding and made a party thereto.

§ 405. It certainly cannot be claimed that any benefit arises from this confusion and contradiction; that the rights of either creditor or debtor are subserved thereby. Among absolutely independent and sovereign nations, there will, of course, be more or less diversity of municipal laws; and persons engaged in foreign trade and commerce must necessarily be put to some inconvenience. But even among independent nations the tendency of the present age is to assimilate their systems of commercial and mercantile law. Among the several states of the Union, this diversity, and its accompanying inconvenience, need not exist. The Constitution confers upon

Congress full power virtually to ordain one set of rules governing the relations of debtor and creditor throughout the whole extent of the country. The " uniformity" permitted by the organic law would render a discharge in one state binding in all others; would establish the same acts and defaults of the debtor as occasions for bankrupt proceedings in every section; would abolish the iniquitous privilege of making preferential assignments; would enable the merchant in New York or Philadelphia who sells on credit to a trader in Illinois or Kentucky, to feel certain that when the time for payment should arrive, his debtor would not have failed and placed his assets completely beyond the reach of the deceived and exasperated creditor.

§ 406. If it should be objected that this legislation will oust the states of their jurisdiction, and render much of their law inoperative, I answer, in this very effect consists the great benefit of a national system of uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. It cannot be said that the measures of Congress will interfere with any rights and functions reserved to the states; for the grant of power to establish bankrupt laws is as express and as comprehensive as that to regulate commerce. All the reasons which led the convention and the people to confer upon Congress a supreme authority over foreign and inter-state commerce, all the arguments which show that the regulations of that commerce should be uniform, and must, therefore, be within the authority of the national legislature, are as strong and convincing when applied to the subject of bankruptcies. Indeed, both these grants of power form but parts of a general scheme by which uniformity in the laws which govern trade and finance throughout the country may be made possible; neither was intended to stand by itself, but to be exercised in connection with all the others. This uniformity was to be attained by giving Congress the power to regulate commerce and establish laws respecting bankruptcies, which would become exclusive by its exercise; by enabling it, and forbidding the states, to coin money; by Inhibiting the states from laying duties on imports, and requiring those laid by Congress to be the same in all parts of the

Union; and finally, by cutting off the power of the states to emit bills of credit, and to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Congress has executed to their full extent some of these powers; others it has exercised partially; it is only by giving complete effect to all, that the original idea of the Constitution can be completely carried out.

§ 407. I am confident that a comprehensive and careful system of bankrupt laws will do more to put the trade of the country upon a firm basis, to abolish untoward and hazardous speculation, to remove the opportunities and inducements for fraud, than any other species of legislation directly affecting the business relations of the people. Make the statute prospective only, if necessary; leave the thousands and tens of thousands of hopeless debtors still weighed down by the load of their insolvency, still subject to the demands of their creditors, if the principles or prejudices of society are too strongly opposed to a tabula rasa; but not one argument worthy the name can be brought against the adoption of a thorough and stringent system that shall apply to all future liabilities and transactions.

power

THE POWER TO COIN MONEY.

§ 408. Section VIII. of Article I. proceeds as follows in the enumeration of specific powers: "Congress shall have to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.' In this connection should be read a part of Section X. § 1, "No state shall coin money."

It is not necessary to dwell upon these grants and restrictions. The whole subject of coining money and regulating its value is placed in the exclusive control of Congress. The reason for this disposition of legislative functions is apparent. If the great elements of finance and trade were to be committed to the national authority, with the design that the regulations governing them should be uniform throughout the United States, it was absolutely necessary that the medium of

exchange -the current coin-should be solely in the hands of the general government. If the several states might also issue coin, fix its standard of purity, and determine its value, all uniformity in exchanges, in prices, in the values of commodities, would at once be lost, and the business of the country would be thrown into hopeless derangement. We are familiar with the evil results flowing from the various state banking systems, from a local currency possessing different degrees of credit, even when there is a common standard existing in the national coin. But if this standard should also be lost, the evils springing from the conflicting local systems would be increased in a tenfold degree.

§ 409. I am not aware that any question requiring judicial decision, or even involving a conflict of interpretation, has ever arisen upon these grants of power; the language of the Constitution is too plain to admit of any doubt. The authority of Congress to issue treasury notes and make them legal tender, was not rested upon their exclusive right to coin money; if it had been, the foundation would have failed at the slightest pressure. No amount of reasoning could show that executing a promissory note, and ordering it to be taken in payment of public and private debts, is a species of coining money.

§ 410. While the power to coin money and regulate its value was thus given exclusively to Congress, the power to fix the standard of weights and measures was left in the hands of the states as well as of the general government. As long as this power remains dormant in the national legislature, the local commonwealths may fully exercise it. Although the standard of weights and measures is connected with the general subject of the trade, business, and commerce of the country, and although uniformity in this standard throughout the Union is demanded by considerations of expediency, yet it is evident that such a uniformity is by no means as essential as a common standard of coined money. Without the latter, business would be interrupted, and in great measure destroyed; without the former, some inconveniences have been and are felt.

Thus far Congress has not assumed to fix, in any authori