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other states cannot justly complain, so long as they are not required to pay wharfage fees in excess of reasonable compensation for the use of the city's property. This proposition, however ingenious or plausible, is unsound both upon principle and authority."

In Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, it was decided that the act of Texas of June 3, 1873, which imposes a tax on vendors of beer and spirits, "is inoperative only so far as it discriminated against imported wines or beer. A person cannot, for selling either of them, be subjected to a higher tax than that imposed for selling wines or beer manufactured in the state." And Welton v. State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 475, was reviewed and approved.

§ 373 p. Taxing Foreign Manufactures. — In Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, a "statute of Virginia required that the agent for the sale of sewing-machines manufactured in other states must first obtain a license, for which he was required to pay a specific tax for each county in which he sells or offers to sell them, while the agent for the sale of articles manufactured in that state, if acting for the manufacturer, is not required to obtain a license or pay any license tax. It was held that the statute was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, and void."

"Commerce among the states is not free whenever a commodity is, by reason of its foreign growth or manufactures, subjected by state legislation to discriminating regulations or burdens." There is no objection to the legislation of Virginia in requiring a license for the sale of sewing-machines, by reason of the grant of letters-patent for the invention. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, approved. By the sections cited, however, a clear discrimination is made in favor of home manufacturers and against the manufacturers of other states.

Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, was referred to for full expressions of views on this question.

§ 373 q. A state statute imposing a tax on every alien passenger who shall come by vessel from a foreign country

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to the port of New York, and holding the vessel liable therefor, is unconstitutional, as attempting to regulate foreign commerce.1 Such a law is not valid as an "inspection " law. That word relates to property, not persons. A state statute providing for the examination of the form, size, and weight of packages of tobacco, is a valid "inspection law," although it does not require any inspection of the quality of the tobacco, and also requires the packages to be brought to the state warehouse for examination.2

§ 373 r. License to Steamboats. — In Moran v. New Or leans, 112 U. S. 69,3 the action was to recover a license tax. The city of New Orleans sued the testator Cooper to recover a tax laid upon him as owner of two steamboats. The tax was laid under authority of state law. The judgment below was for the city, but this was reversed on appeal, Matthews, J., saying: "The license fee in the present case is not a tax upon the boats as property. It is a charge explicitly made as the price of the privilege of navigating the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf, in the coastwise trade. It is an attempt to impose a state condition upon his United States license to use his boats. The ordinance imposing the tax is an infringement of the Constitution. The present case would seem to fall directly within the rule of these decisions, unless the fact that the ordinance of the city of New Orleans in the exercise of the taxing power of the state can be supposed to make a material difference. But since the case of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, it has been repeatedly decided by this court, that when a law of a state imposes a tax, under such circumstances, and with such effect as to constitute it a regulation of commerce, either for eign or interstate, it is void on that account. Telegraph Company v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, and cases there cited. In the State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232-276, it was

1 People v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59. ED. 2 Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38. Ed.

8 And see Sinnot v. Commissioners &c. of Mobile, 22 How. 227; Koster v. Commissioners &c. of Mobile, Ibid. 244. ED.

said that it could not make any difference that the legisla tive purpose was to raise money for the support of the state government, and not to regulate transportation; that it was not the purpose of the law, but its effect, which was to be considered. The fundamental proposition on the subject was expressed by Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35-45, in this comprehensive language: The question of the taxing power of the states, as its exercise has affected the functions of the federal government, has been repeatedly considered by this court, and the right of the states in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional operations of that government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly denied.' Otherwise unrestrained by the authority of the federal Constitution, the taxing power of the states extends to and embraces the persons, property, and pursuits of their people; although it is not always easy, in particular cases, to draw the line which separates the two jurisdictions; as may be seen by comparing the cases of The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, and of The State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, and as was said in Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479. And it is undoubtedly true, as it has often been judicially declared, that vessels engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, and duly enrolled and licensed under the acts of Congress, may be taxed by state authority as property; provided the tax be not a tonnage duty, is levied only at the port of registry, and is valued as other property in the state, without unfavorable discrimination on account of its employment. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. 17 How. 595; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. But the license fee in the present case is not a tax upon the boats as property, according to any valuation. The very law authorizing its imposition declares that it shall not be construed to be a tax on property. It is said, however, to be a tax on an occupation, and for that reason not a regulation of commerce. If it were a

tax upon the income derived from the business, it might be justified by the principle of the decision in the case of The State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, which shows the distinction between a tax on transportation and a tax upon its fruits, realized and reduced to possession, so as to have become part of the general capital and property of the tax-payer. But here it is not a tax on the profits and income after they have been realized from the business. It is a charge explicitly made as the price of the privilege of navigating the Mississippi River between New Orleans and the Gulf, in the coastwise trade; as the condition on which the state of Louisiana consents that the boats of the plaintiff in error may be employed by him according to the terms of the license granted under the authority of Congress. The sole occupation sought to be subjected to the tax is that of using and enjoying the license of the United States to employ these particular vessels in the coasting trade; and the state thus seeks to burden with an exaction, fixed at its own pleasure, the very right to which the plaintiff in error is entitled under, and which he derives from, the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Louisiana statute declares expressly that if he refuses or neglects to pay the li cense tax imposed on him, for using his boats in this way, he shall not be permitted to act under, and avail himself of, the license granted by the United States, but may be enjoined from so doing by judicial process. The conflict between the two authorities is direct and express. What the one declares may be done without the tax, the other declares shall not be done except upon payment of the tax. In such an opposition, the only question is, which is the superior authority; and reduced to that, it furnishes its own answer."

The validity of a license tax on keepers of ferries was much considered in the late case of Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. "The question," say the court, "relates to the power of the state to impose a license fee either directly or through one of its municipal corporations upon the keepers of ferries living in the state, for boats

owned by them and used in ferrying passengers and goods from a landing in the state across a navigable river, to a landing in another state." It was held that such an exaction was neither a regulation of commerce nor a duty of tonnage within the meaning of the Constitution. "The enrolment and licensing of a vessel under the laws of the United States does not of itself exclude the right of a state to exact a license from her own citizens on account of their ownership and use of such property having its situs within the state." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603.

§ 373 s. Transportation of Passengers. - In Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, the ferry company (a New Jersey corporation) leased its dock in Philadelphia and owned no property in Pennsylvania other than the lease. Its sole business was in ferrying passengers and freight across the river. Pennsylvania taxed its capital stock. It was held that the tax was upon commerce. Commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property, and the navigation of public waters for that purpose, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. The subject is one of national character and requires uniformity of regulation. Congress alone can deal with such transportation. Non-action by Congress is a declaration that it shall remain free from burdens imposed by the states. makes no difference whether such commerce is carried on by individuals or corporations. The lease of the wharf did not give the state of Pennsylvania a right to tax the capital stock of the company. The only interference of the state with the transportation and landing of passengers permissible is confined to measures which fall under the general head of port regulations. The opinion contains a valuable discussion of what are port and police regulations, and cites many United States cases: the judgment below was reversed.

§ 373 t. A state law authorizing the seizure and impris

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