dary of Canada, which was more extensive at some points than that of the proclamation of 1763. He was to urge these claims, and the right of the King to the ungranted domain, not indeed for their own sake, but in order to gain some compensation for the refugees, either by a direct cession of territory in their favor, or by engaging the half, or some proportion of what the back lands might produce when sold, or a sum mortgaged on those lands; or by the grant of a favorable boundary of Nova Scotia, extending, if possible, so as to include the province of Maine; or, if that could not be obtained, the province of Sagadahock, or, at the very least, Penobscot."

Lord Shelburne urged the same view, in a strong despatch to Oswald.

"As a resource to meet the demands of the refugees the matter of the boundaries and back lands presents itself. Independent of all the nonsense of charters, I mean, when they talk of extending as far as the sun sets, the soil is, and has always been acknowledged to be the King's. For the good of America, whatever the government may be, new provinces must be erected on those back lands and down the Mississippi; and supposing them to be sold, what can be so reasonable as that part of the province, where the King's property alone is in question, should be applied to furnish subsistence to those, whom for the sake of peace he can never consistently with his honor entirely abandon." "

This was a very different view from the one that Oswald had held when he declined "any attempt at asserting the claims of the English Crown over the ungranted domains, deeming that no real distinction could be drawn between them and other sovereign rights which were necessarily to be ceded."

It is impossible to say much about the Western boundary discussions, because we know next to nothing about them.

1 Life of Earl Shelburne, III., 281, 282.

2 Ibid., III., 284.

Other controversies at Paris, far less important, were reported much more fully; but here the information that we possess only piques our curiosity. The right to fish on the banks of Newfoundland was thought more valuable in 1782 than the ownership of the valleys of Ohio, the prairies of Illinois, and the forests of Michigan. What would we not give for a full review of the whole subject from the pen that wrote the "Canada Pamphlet" and the "Reply to Hillsborough?"

The Mississippi was finally conceded by the British Cabinet. Still, this concession left unanswered the question where the Northern boundary should strike the Mississippi. Writing to Minister Townsend, November 8th, Mr. Strachey says: "I despatch the boundary line originally sent to you by Mr. Oswald, and two other lines proposed by the American Commissioners after my arrival at Paris. Either of these you are to choose. They are both better than the original line, as well in respect to Canada as to Nova Scotia." Mr. Adams tells us that one of these lines was the forty-fifth parallel, northwest of the St. Lawrence, and the other the line of the middle of the lakes. Most fortunately for us, the British ministers, owing, no doubt, to their desire to give Canada frontage on the four lakes, and to a preference for a water boundary, chose that line which left the Northwest intact. Had the forty-fifth parallel become the boundary, nearly onehalf of Lakes Huron and Michigan, and of the States of Michigan and Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota, would have fallen to Great Britain. Writing to Robert R. Livingston, the American Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the commissioners say: "Congress will observe, that although our Northern line is in a certain part below the latitude of forty-five, yet in others it extends above it, divides the Lake Superior, and gives us access to its western and southern waters, from which a line in that latitude would have excluded us." " If the com

1 Fitzmaurice: Life of Earl Shelburne, III.,

295.

missioners had understood Northwestern geography better, to say nothing of the then unknown resources of Lake Superior, they would have stated the argument with even greater strength.

To close the war that began on Lexington Green, April 19, 1775, three separate treaties were necessary. France and the United States conducted simultaneous negotiations with different English commissioners, the understanding being that the preliminaries should be signed the same day. On November 29th Dr. Franklin wrote to M. de Vergennes that the American articles were already agreed upon, and that he hoped to lay a copy of them before his Excellency the next day. Except a single secret article, they were duly communicated; but, to the astonishment and mortification of the Count, they were already signed, and therefore binding, as far as the commissioners could make them so. The game for despoiling the young Republic of one-half her territorial heritage was effectually blocked. Vergennes bitterly reproached Franklin for the course that he and his associates had followed, and Franklin replied, making such defence as he could, admitting no more than that a point of bienséance had been neglected. The American Congress and Secretary for Foreign Affairs at first were also disposed to blame the commissioners; but so anxious was the country for peace and so much more favorable were the terms obtained than had been expected, that murmurs of dissatisfaction soon gave place to acclaims of gratification and delight. The preamble to the treaty contained the saving clause that it should not go into effect until France and England came to an understanding, a fact that the astute Franklin did not fail to press upon the attention of the irate Vergennes. However, that condition was soon fulfilled, and a general peace assured.

The definitive treaty of peace between the United States and England, which is merely the preliminary treaty over again, with the exception of a secret article, the conditions of which were never fulfilled, and so never became operative,