accordingly a few days thereafter left the premises, it was held that this did not terminate the tenancy, and the tenant would still be liable for rent.1 8647. Defects in Notice may be Waived. The defects in a notice which is insufficient for the reason that it designates no time, either specially or in general terms, may be waived, so as to give it all the force and effect of a regular and perfect notice. Thus where such defective notice was given by the tenant to the landlord, and the latter, after receiving the notice, in order to induce the tenant to remain, offered to lower the rent and make certain repairs, these facts were held admissible in evidence to prove the landlord's waiver of the omissions from the notice.2 $648. Waiver of Rights under Notice. When notice has been given by either the landlord or the tenant, whether the time for which such notice is given has expired or not, the waiver by the party giving the notice would properly be styled a waiver of his rights under the same, rather than a waiver of notice, as it is generally termed. This right may be waived by either party so as to perpetuate the tenancy. If the landlord receive rent, after the date when the tenant is notified to quit, or after giving such notice in advance for a time subsequent to the designated time of quitting, this will operate conclusively upon him to prevent the enforcement of his rights to immediate possession. Upon the same principle, the landlord's distraining for rent accrued after the expiration of his notice to quit, will amount to a waiver.* § 619. Will not be Presumed from Acceptance of Rent by Unauthorized Person. But where the tenancy is regularly terminated by notice to quit, and the tenant willfully holds over without the permission of the landlord, express or implied, such holding 'Mollett v. Brayne, 2 Camp., 103. 'Boynton v. Bodwell, 113 Mass., 531. Collins v. Canty, 6 Cush., 415; Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend., 391; Goodright v. Cordwent, 6 T. R., 219. 4 Zouch v. Willingale, 1 H. Blackst., 311. over will not prolong the tenancy.' And though such permission may be implied from a receipt of rent after such notice, where the rent was paid to one who was not authorized to receive it, such payment will not affect the rights of the landlord, although such person had previously been accustomed to receive rents for the landlord. Nor would the giving of a second notice to quit after the expiration of the time limited in the first, amount to a waiver of the party's rights under the notice.3 $650. Mere Permission to Remain after Notice no Waiver. Mere permission of the landlord for the tenant to remain for a time after notice, will not in every instance amount to a waiver. Thus where after notice the landlord promised the tenant that he need not remove, unless the premises were sold, and accordingly permitted him to remain until such sale, it was held that the notice was not thereby waived.* 1 Boggs v. Black, 1 Bin., 333. 2 Doe v. Calvert, 2 Camp., 387. Messenger v. Armstrong, 1 T. R., 43. 4 Whiteacre v. Symonds, 10 East, 13. CHAPTER V. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. I. NOTICE OF AGENCY. I. NOTICE OF AGENCY. § 651. Principal's Liability, when Agent Exceeds Authority. 652. Secret Instructions will not Limit. 653. Limited by Written Authority. 654. Principal Bound by Agent's Representation. 655. Notice of Limitation should be Prior to the Transaction. 656. Principal Bound by Agent's Acts in Excess of Authority by Letter of Attorney. 657. Persons Dealing with Agent must take Notice of Contents of Let ter of Attorney. 658. Public and Private Restriction of Authority. 659. Agent's Authority Limited by Law. 660. When Parties bound to Inquire. 661. Illustration where Authority in Writing. 662. Illustration where Authority by Parol. 663. Difference between General and Special Agents. 664. Transactions Requiring Scrutiny of Agent's Authority. 665. Avoidance of Knowledge of Limitation of Agent's Authority. 666. Agent to Negotiate Bills and Notes. 667. Subsequent Ratification. 668. Ratification with Notice binds Principal. 669. Silent Acquiescence will Release Agent. 670. Contract in Name of Agent Binding. 671. Principal Bound though Agency Concealed or Revoked without Notice.-Husband and Wife. 651. Principal's Liability, when Agent Exceeds Authority. The full measure of the principal's liability for the acts of the agent is not declared in the rule as generally laid down-that the principal is liable for the acts of his agent, done within the scope of his authority. One dealing with an agent is not always fully informed of the extent of such agent's authority, and when his want of knowledge is not the result of laches, or voluntary ignorance, the principal may be bound, though the agent exceeds his authority. When the apparent authority with which the agent is clothed is greater than was intended by the principal, the liability of the latter for unauthorized acts of the former arises from the application of the familiar principal, that where one of two innocent parties must suffer by the misconduct of another, it should be the one who has placed it within the power of the other to perpetrate the wrong.1 $652. Secret Instructions will not Limit. A person dealing with an agent who is apparently clothed with general powers in connection with the subject matter of the transaction, is not required to take notice of private, or secret instructions, limiting the powers of such agent, nor is he put upon inquiry in regard to such instructions, so long as the transactions are within the general scope of the agent's ostensible powers.2 $653. Limited by Written Authority. When notice of the authority conferred upon an agent is communicated by a letter of attorney, letter of credit, or other writing, the course to be pursued by persons dealing with such agent is quite clear. The full extent of the power conferred may be looked for in the written instrument. By it, the agent's authority will be expressly defined. When, however, the principal has not thus expressly defined the limits of the power conferred upon his representative, the extent of his authority may be inferred from the acts of both principal and agent. As where goods 1 Ramsey v. Strobach, 52 Ala., 513; Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt, 2 Black, 372; 2 Kent Comm., 620--21; Story on Agency, § 127. 2 Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow., 354; Beals v. Allen, 18 Johns., 363; Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38. 3 Perkins v. Wash. Ins. Co., 4 Cowen, 645; Com. Bank Lake Erie o. Norton, 1 Hill, 501. were bought of a broker to whose name they had been transferred, the purchaser would not be affected by secret instructions from the principal. Putting the goods in the hands of one whose business it was to sell, amounted to an implied authority to sell them. So where the equitable owners of a vessel permitted her to be held in the name of another as legal owner, for the purpose of making a sale, a purchaser might infer from such conduct, even where he had notice of the character in which the legal owner held, that he had unlimited authority to dispose of the vessel. Such purchaser could not be affected by any concealed interest, or secret instructions from the principal, of which he had no notice. And such notice it was held, to affect him, should be established by unequivocal proof, where the fact had been studiously secreted, down to the time of sale. So also in an action of assumpsit, on a warranty by a servant empowered to sell a horse, the defendant denied the authority of the servant to make the warranty. It was held by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, however, that as the horse was entrusted to the servant's care, for the express purpose of selling it, the inference would follow that he was authorized to do whatever was necessary to affect the sale. So where an agent was employed to obtain subscriptions to the capital of a joint stock company, his principal was held liable for his false representations, because to make representations was within the scope of his authority, and was what should have been expected from one employed in that capacity.* § 654. Principal Bound by Agent's Representation. Where representations are made by an agent, to which it is sought to hold the principal, the privity of the principal may be presumed from the character of such representations, and the notoriety with which they are made. As where the agent of ship own ' Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38; Whitehead v. Tuckett, Id., 400; Everett v. Saltus, 15 Wend., 474; Dyer v. Pearson, 3 Barn. & Cres., 38; Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend., 260. 'Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt, 2 Black, 372. 'Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp., 72. • Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend., 260. |