tive notice of the suit, so as to bind the property in their hands by the judgment, it has been held that the clerk of a court in which was pending a suit for specific performance, was constructively charged with notice of the nature of plaintiff's demand.1 §46. Recitals in Title Papers. - Perhaps as striking an example of the extent of this doctrine as could be found, is the case of Peto v. Hammond, where a vendor's lien was retained in the deed to the grantor of the party charged, which deed had always remained in the original vendor's possession, and the grantee of the party against whom the debt stood that was secured by the lien, had never had an opportunity to inspect the instrument. Nevertheless, it was held that he had constructive notice of such lien, for the reason that it was recited in a deed which formed a necessary link in his chain of title. But where such recital is relied upon as constructive notice, it must be in an instrument affecting the title to the same piece of property to which such recital refers.3 $47. Possession of Deeds. Where the title deeds necessarily pass with the title, and strict reliance is not placed upon the registry of instruments affecting land titles, notice that the title deeds of an estate are in the possession of some one else than the grantor, is generally held to be constructive notice of whatever claim the one in possession of such deed had against the property.4 'Dickerson v. Campbell, 32 Mo., 544. 230 Beav., 495; S. C., 8 Jur. N. S., 550. 'Boggs v. Varner, 6 W. & S., 469. 4 Hiern v. Mill, 12 Ves., 114. CHAPTER II. NOTICE TO PURCHASERS. I. DIFFERENCE IN EFFECT OF NOTICE TO PURCHASERS OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROPERTY OR SECURITIES. II. REGISTRATION OF INSTRUMENTS. III. NOTICE BY POSSESSION. IV. NOTICE FROM TITLE PAPERS. V. LIS PENDENS. I. DIFFERENCE IN EFFECT OF NOTICE TO PURCHASERS OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROPERTY OR SECURITIES. § 48. Division of Subject. 49. Purchasers of Real Property. 50. Purchaser mila fide. 51. Notice of Marriage Settlement. 52. Parol Contract to Convey. 53. When Vendee Required to Perform in Lieu of Vendor. 54. Notice of Adopted Son's Equity. 55. Prior and Subsequent Contracts to Convey. 56. Possession of Title Deeds. 57. Purchaser with Knowledge of Trust. 58. Mortgagee, with Knowledge of Trust. 59. Notice to Trustec. 60. Notice Prior to Payment. 61. Purchaser without, from Purchaser with, Notice. 62. Purchaser with, from Purchaser without, Notice. 63. Re-purchase by Original mala flde Purchaser. 64. Unregistered Conveyances. 65. How Purchasers may be Notified. 66. Same. 67. Purchasers of Chattels. 68. Innocent Pledgees. 69. Mere Possession not Conclusive Evidence of Title. 70. Secret Instructions to Broker. 71. Secret Lien. 72. Conditional Sales. 73. Pledge. 74. Condition may be by Parol. 75. Property Reclaimed in an Altered State. 76. Caveat Emptor. 77. Chattel Mortgages. 78. Possession of Chattels 79. Choses in Action. 80. Negotiable Instruments. 81. Lost Bill. 82. Holder Affected only when Grossly Negligent. 83. Bad Faith Requisite to Defeat Holder's Rights. 84. Purchaser without Notice Protected. 85. Same-Knowledge a Question of Fact. 86. Facts which Excite Inquiry held Inadmissible. 87. Circumstances which put Purchaser on his Guard. 88. Bad Faith an Inference of Fact. 89. Stolen Securities-Avoidance of Knowledge. 91. When General Notice S 1.licient. 92. Suspicious Circumstances. 93. Payment Before and After Notice. 94. Patent Defects affecting Purchaser. § 48. Division of Subject. It is a well-recognized rule of equity jurisprudence, that a purchaser, with notice of a right in another, is liable in the same manner, and to the same extent, to the person in whom is the right of which he had notice, as was the one from whom he purchased. And this liability attaches in favor of such person whether he has united in himself both the legal an equitable titles, or is merely the owner of an equitable interest, with the legal title in the vendor. It applies to all classes of property, whether it be real, personal or mixed,-in possession or in action. It is the purpose in this place to show when and how it applies to these different kinds of property, which for convenience will be considered in the following order: 1. Real property. 2. Chattels in possession. 3. Things in action,with special reference to negotiable instruments. $49. Purchasers of Real Property. Except where the statute otherwise provides, a purchaser of real property will be affected by notice either actual or constructive, of an interest or title adverse to that of his grantor.1 Notice which is constructively given by the registration of instruments affecting the title, is perhaps the most general; but as this portion of the subject is more fully treated in the next part of this chapter it will not receive further attention here.2 § 50. Purchaser Mala Fide. The general ground upon which courts of equity interfere for the protection of the owner of an equitable interest in real estate, as against the subsequent purchaser with notice, is that it is in bad faith for one to attempt the circuinvention of the true owner of the property, by endeavoring to anticipate him in gaining the advantage to be derived from an acquisition of the legal title. Lord HARDWICKE in a leading case upon this subject, which has been so frequently cited as to become familiar to the profession, declares the substance of the rule in saying that, "the taking of a legal estate, after notice of a prior right, makes a person a mala fide purchaser." And this principle is applied to that case by the learned chancellor, notwithstanding the fact that the purchase declared to be fraudulent was for a valuable consideration, and the notice by which the purchaser was affected, was given to an agent, and there was no evidence that it had been communicated to the principal.5 $51. Notice of Marriage Settlement. - Upon this principle, where the defendant purchased an estate with notice of the fact that it had previously been entailed to the plaintiff in a marriage settlement by his father, who was defendant's grantor, it was held that such purchaser took the estate charged with 1 Gerson v. Pool, 31 Ark., 85; Haskell v. State, Id., 91; Colman v. Watson, 64 Ind., 65; Lamont v. Cheshire, 65 N. Y., 30. 2 See Post Ch. II, Pt. II. 'Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Sch. & Lef., 355; Coble v. Nonemaker, 78 Penn. St., 501; Kepler v. Davis, 80 Id., 153. 'Le Neve v. Le Neve, 3 Atk., 646; S. C., 1 Ves. Sen., 64. 5 See Ch. V. the trust which the court would compel him to execute, by accounting for the consideration received upon transferring the property to innocent purchasers.1 --- $52. Parol Contract to Convey. So a purchaser with notice of a parol contract, executed on the part of one of the parties, between the owner of the fee under whom he claimed, and a tenant per autre vie, to change the cestui que vie by inserting the name of tenant's wife instead of an older life, was held by decree to specific performance of the contract.2 $53. When Vendee Required to Perform in Lieu of Vendor. There are also numerous cases, where the owner of the equity, has gone into possession of the real estate under a parol contract of purchase, which only becomes the subject of equitable enforcement, by reason of the fact that there is a part performance by the covenantee which takes it out of the operation of the statute of frauds. In these cases, the purchasers who took with notice of the facts, were decreed to perform precisely as though they were the original contracting parties." $54. Notice of Adopted Son's Equity. And even where the claimant's equity is not fortified by possession and improve. ment, there are cases of a peculiar character where the courts have granted relief against the purchaser with notice. As where an agreement was entered into with the father of an infant son, by an uncle, to adopt the nephew as his own child, with provision that his property should descend to such adopted son, on the death of the uncle and wife. Pursuant to this agreement the child was taken into the uncle's family, and lived with him until he reached the age of twenty five years. At the age of sixty-five the uncle, in consideration of the support of himself and wife for the remainder of their lives, conveyed a considerable portion of his property to his wife's sister. The grantee, taking the deed with notice of the nephew's 1 Ferrars v. Cherry, 2 Vern., 383. 2 Crofton v. Ormsby, 2 Sch. & Lef., 583; Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga., 438. Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves., 249; Blatchley v. Osborn, 33 Conn., 226. |